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Abstract 
Risk has always motivated security in general terms; both assurance and IT governance 
approaches to security begin with a focus on risk, but the connection between risk and 
technical security is soon lost. As a result it is usually impossible to quantify the value of 
security features, or give metrics for the value of a security design compared to alternatives. 
This thesis describes the Security Design Analysis Framework (SeDAn), which relates a 
system design to its security environment (security goals, organisations, users, and 
attackers), allowing the connection between systematic risk and security requirements to be 
maintained and analysed. SeDAn innovations include: modelling the flexible relationships 
between organisations, assets and security goals in emerging networked systems; security 
requirements that constrain service behaviour; and the decomposition of systematic risk to 
sub-systems, allowing implementers to relate components of a system to their 
organisational and physical context. 
The framework also provides quality metrics for complete protection strategies, 
including: the value of security requirements in terms of risk; the degree of trust, or 
assurance, required of system components; and the balance between security and functional 
liveness. 
The effectiveness of SeDAn is demonstrated in practical tooling and a substantial 
industrial case-study. The proof-of-concept tool is capable of managing security 
requirements, and supporting the analysis of realistic systems. It is also able to exchange 
models with proprietary UML design tools, and hence integrate with standard engineering 
environments. The case study demonstrates the whole process of risk analysis and security 
design for a realistic industrial system, which includes a collaborative workflow between 
several companies (each with different assets and security concerns), distributed databases 
and queries, and specialised security goals. 
In summary, this thesis demonstrates the feasibility of a new security analysis and 
design framework, which maintains the vital connection between the requirements for 
security controls and systematic risks. 
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Part 1 explores the requirements for security design analysis, and shows that it is feasible 
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which design and analysis will be carried out, and develops generic models of risk, 
traceability, and risk quantification that are used throughout the thesis. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Information System Security is a serious problem for industry, commerce, defence and 
the national infrastructure. Deliberate attacks against information systems range from the 
defacement of web-sites, to targeted Denial of Service, and more disturbing incidents: 
"Attackers have seized control of entire Defense systems, many of which support 
critical functions, such as weapons systems research and development, logistics, and 
finance.... In a well publicized attack on Rome Laboratory, the Air Force's premier 
command and control research facility, two hackers took control of laboratory 
support systems, established links to foreign Internet sites, and stole tactical and 
artificial intelligence research data. " [91 
"In 2000 a hacker in Australia caused a computerized waste-management system to 
dump millions of gallons of raw sewage into rivers and parks. " [10] 
"In January [2003], infection by a computer worm caused a monitoring system to 
become disabled in an off-line nuclear power plant. " [10] 
"1.78 million Americans, or 3 percent of those attacked, remember giving the 
phishers sensitive financial or personal information ... [costing] U. S. banks and 
credit card issuers about $1.2 billion [in 20031. " [11] 
These incidents are the result of intentional attacks, facilitated by electronic 
connectivity, and these features separate them from other risks, such as weather-related 
disasters, or safety issues. There is a decreasing tendency to report security incidents [12], 
and some recent large-scale attacks (e. g. [13]) have had little publicity. This may save the 
embarrassment of the victims, but it has not changed the level of threat; networked 
information systems exist in an unrelentingly hostile environment. The 2005 CSI/FBI 
annual report [12] concludes that: 
"Virus attacks continue as the source of the greatest financial losses. Unauthorized 
access, however, showed a dramatic cost increase and replaced denial of service as 
the second most significant contributor to computer crime losses during the past 
year. 
24 Security Design Analysis (SeDAn) 
It is not difficult for a business, or a nation, to decide that the threats are real; the 
problem is determining a rational response: what resources are justified in countering the 
various threats, and where are those resources best deployed? Investment is usually judged 
against its likely outcome, and the measure of outcome for security is risk. Risk 
management is so central to security that the two can be regarded as synonymous; 
Borodizics suggests that "security could be seen as risk management in practice" [14], and 
the 2005 CSI/FBI report concludes: 
"In the initial stages, computer security focused largely on technical issues like 
encryption, access controls and intrusion detection systems. More recently ... 
economic, financial and risk management aspects of computer security have also 
become important ... These latter concerns are complements to, rather than 
substitutes for, the technical aspects of computer security. " 
This contrasts risk-based value-systems with technical security, but there is growing 
understanding that that risk-based values should directly determine the requirements for 
technical security mechanisms. For example, recent regulatory guidance on security for 
Internet banking instructs financial organizations to: 
"Ensure that their information security program: Identifies and assesses the risks 
associated with Internet-based products and services, [and] Identifies risk mitigation 
actions, including appropriate authentication strength... " [15] 
Risk has always motivated technical measures in general terms; security evaluation 
criteria [16] and IT governance approaches [17] begin with a focus on risk. The problem is 
that the connection between risk and technical security is soon lost, and as a result it is 
usually impossible to answer some important questions about a system, including: 
" What is the value (or level of responsibility) of any particular security feature, or system 
component, in terms of risk? 
" Is it possible to replace one security requirement with another, which may be more 
convenient in system terms? 
The second question is particularly significant because security is a design problem: 
security analysts makes choices about the type and position of security requirements in a 
system. At present these choices are based on experience, established checklists, and peer- 
review. While these mechanisms are valuable, they do not provide an explicit and 
systematic connection between system-level risks and the security requirements that are 
specified to mitigate these risks. This is the purpose of the Security Design Analysis 
framework described in this thesis. 
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1.1. Security Design Analysis (SeDAn) 
The motivation for SeDAn is the need for a systematic connection between system-level 
risks, and security requirements at the component level; this is needed to inform the security 
design process, and provide implementers with a risk-context for security mechanisms. 
To achieve this, SeDAn: 
" supports risk analysis within the context of existing IT governance and organisational 
risk methods; 
" provides a common framework in which functional design, the system security 
environment, and security requirements, can be related; 
" facilitates systematic analysis of a system and its protection strategy; 
" is able to express and analyse the security requirements and design configurations of 
emerging networked systems; 
" integrates with standard engineering design methods and tools; and 
" is supported with scalable tools that allow the framework to be applied to realistic 
systems. 
The following sections discuss these features in turn, and reference chapters in the main 
body of the thesis where they are described in more detail. 
1.1.1. IT Governance and the Context for Risk Analysis 
There are several well-established IT governance frameworks, including BS7799, and 
most employ a risk-based value-system. Their scope ranges from overall corporate 
management, to standards with more specific purposes, such as system design, 
organisational audit, or industry sector regulation. 
Most governance frameworks are concerned with the wider context for risk: its 
organisational, physical and social context, as well as the information system. The aim of 
SeDAn is to provide a component in the overall risk and governance environment, not to 
propose a new governance framework. To this end SeDAn does not provide a governance 
process; instead, it: 
" interfaces to existing governance frameworks via generic artefacts that are common to 
most risk-based methods, such as security goals, allowing SeDAn to share a model of 
the security environment with the governance process it supports (see section 1.1.2); 
and 
" incorporates risk metrics that link the information system to the wider context in which 
the system operates. 
The link between security in the IT system and the wider information context is 
particularly important. Risk mitigation may take place either inside an information system 
(by adding security requirements) or outside (e. g. by insurance, or process). Because of the 
shared model between SeDAn and its governance context, external mitigation of a risk 
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modifies the environment used for the analysis of the information system. For example, 
insurance may be used to reduce the impact of a possible security incident, and this in turn 
reduces the need to manage the risk inside the information system. 
SeDAn, however, is able to do more than reflect changes in its inputs; design analysis 
can also inform and influence the wider system context. Design analysis determines how 
security risks propagate in a system, and hence the value, in risk terms, of security 
requirements. However, this analysis can also be put to other uses, including the evaluation 
of how susceptible the system is to the subversion of any of its components. This evaluation 
decomposes the systematic risk environment into risk profiles for sub-systems, or 
components, with the result that implementers do not need to re-evaluate the whole system 
when the context of any particular component is known. For example, risk profiles indicate: 
" the risk associated with implementation vulnerabilities (e. g. the value of physical 
protection, or network firewalls); 
" the need to protect communications; 
" the risk-exposure, or degree of trust, associated with particular system users; and 
" the vulnerability of the system to attacks from external systems or components (e. g. the 
Internet). 
The risk management context for SeDAn is described in chapter 6; the analysis process 
is introduced in chapter 7, and defined in chapter 12. Implementation issues, including risk 
profiles, are described in chapter 13. 
1.1.2. The Security Analysis Framework 
The context for security design analysis is illustrated in figure 1.1, which shows the 
main factors that influence the evaluation of risk within a system design, and which in turn 
may be influenced by the outcome of a risk-based analysis. 
As noted in the previous section, SeDAn interfaces to the wider information context via 
a set of artefacts, which are standard in concept, if not always in format. They include the 
organisations involved in the business, its security goals, and the attackers that might target 
those goals. A further set of artefacts describe the information system, including its overall 
design, baseline protection strategy, and unwanted security outcomes (concerns) for assets 
in the system. 
SeDAn is described as a framework, rather than a process, because it provides a 
common basis in which these artefacts are described and related, but not the process by 
which they are derived; this is a matter for the overall governance framework, and for any 
system engineering process. SeDAn does, however, define a Security Design Analysis 
Process, which is introduced in the next section. 
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Figure 1.1. The Context for Security Design Anlaysis 
Risk analysis evaluates the possibility that an attacker may cause a particular unwanted 
outcome; the level of risk is determined by a combination of the likelihood of a successful 
attack, and the impact of the outcome to the organisation. The result of the analysis may 
influence the system design (by setting requirements that change the protection baseline) or 
the wider context (by mitigating a risk outside the system, for example, by insurance). 
Figure 1.1 also indicates the scope of SeDAn: it is necessary to define all these artefacts 
in a consistent way to allow automated analysis. However, it also illustrates the potential 
that design analysis has to inform its environment; the risk profiles outlined in the previous 
section are the result of this holistic approach. In SeDAn, the complete collection of 
artefacts on which analysis is performed is known as the system model. 
One aspect of the system model, which is important in determining the scope and 
expressiveness of the framework, is the set of security requirements that it supports. It is 
generally straightforward to define security requirements, such as access controls, that 
directly constrain behaviour defined in the functional design. However, a comprehensive 
account of system security also needs to constrain the behaviour of system services, whose 
functionality is rarely defined in a high-level design. This problem is resolved by deferred 
requirements, which: 
" are included in systematic risk analysis, using a specification in information-flow terms; 
however, 
" the detailed constraints they place on functionality remain to be determined by an 
implementer, in the light of their information behaviour, and the asset concerns that they 
defend. 
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Of course, system practitioners are unlikely to be comfortable or familiar with 
requirements that are stated only in information flow terms. This is dealt with in two ways: 
9 each deferred requirement is traceable to an asset concern, which provides 
informal 
semantics for the protection objective; and 
" requirement patterns are provided, such as stateless operation, which are more 
meaningful, and scalable, than primitive information constraints. 
Deferred requirements are conceptually important because they allow the specification 
and analysis of a wide range of security goals (e. g. provenance or availability, as well as 
confidentiality); effectively, information-flow constraints determine the position of certain 
security requirements, while the informal semantics define their type. 
Chapter 6 describes the risk framework artefacts in more detail, chapter 8 specifies how 
they can be written using UML, and the case study in chapter 15 shows how these artefacts 
were developed for one particular system. 
Chapter 5 describes what requirements are used in current systems and chapter 9 
introduces deferred requirements. Chapter 10 uses these inputs to define the SeDAn 
requirements taxonomy, and to specify each type of requirement in detail; examples of their 
use are given in chapter 11. 
1.1.3. Reasoning about Design 
The underlying process of risk analysis is straightforward in principle: the system 
is 
searched for potentially exploitable paths between attackers and assets of concern, the 
resulting risk is calculated by combining the likelihood of an attack and the impact of the 
outcome, and the result is reported. The analyst can choose to mitigate the risk inside the 
system (by adding security requirements), outside the system, or to simply accept the risk. 
The SeDAn framework ensures that the analysis process is sufficiently systematic to allow 
it to be automated, and this allows the underlying analysis to be used in other ways. The 
same analysis methods are used to: 
" evaluate threat paths; 
" value individual security requirements in terms of risk; and 
" evaluate a range of implementation risk metrics, including risk profiles for system 
components (see 1.1.1, above). 
As well as providing implementation guidance, risk analysis is used to assess the quality 
of a complete protection strategy. Requirements valuation is used to check that security 
requirements are necessary, as well as sufficient, and component risk profiles are used to 
evaluate a range of security aspects, including the need for trust in system components, and 
liveness. 
It is important to be able to measure the quality of a protection strategy, because the 
protection of a non-trivial system is usually too complex to simply be regarded as a large 
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collection of individual security requirements. It is necessary to structure and manage a 
large protection problem, and this is the purpose of the SeDAn design analysis process, a 
simplified version of which is shown in figure 1.2. (The compete process, described in 
chapter 12, is more detailed and also includes failure actions. ) 
Start 
1 Is the functionality of the system 
complete, Including functions ---No 
Complete the 
required by security goals? 
System Design. 
Yes 
"-"-"-"---"-"-" For each level of risk: 
Select the goals or concerns to be 
! 
reviewed in each protection module. 
! 1 ------- For each module ---------------- 
Propose or revise a protection strategy 
for the module; test the strategy. 
. -. -. -. -. -. -. -. -. -. -. -. -. 
Update the baseline with treated modules.. 
Review the quality of the overall strategy, 
including trust, liveness and coherence. 
Review the results:: 
Does this indicate redesign or implementation? 
Is external mitigation indicated, or preferable? 
Figure 1.2. Simplified Design Analysis Process 
This process progressively builds and reviews a system protection strategy. Analysis 
must be carried out on a complete functional design, so this is checked first. lfireats are 
then considered in descending order of risk, and at each risk level the problem is divided 
into a number of protection modules (e. g. a particular attack on a group of assets) for which 
a protection strategy is proposed. The quality of the protection strategy for individual 
modules is reviewed, as is the protection baseline resulting from the treatment of each risk 
level. At the completion of the process, or if it fails, the proposed protection strategy is 
reviewed in its wider context. 
The basic risk analysis process is introduced in chapter 7, and protection modules are 
introduced in the final example in chapter 11. The overall process is described in chapter 
12, together with the details of the supporting analysis methods and their limitations. The 
case study in chapter 15 shows how the process is used in practice. 
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1.1.4. Security in Emerging Networked Systems 
From the risk perspective, the most significant system trend is the extent that the 
information systems of different organisations, and nations, are interconnected to support 
collaborative information processing. The result is that system design practice has moved 
towards service-oriented architectures, and collaboration has extended the range of security 
requirements that must be supported, and the risks that are encountered. 
Important security requirements are often associated with artefacts that cross the 
boundaries between different security domains; for example, electronic products (e. g. music 
movies, software), and documents that implement collaborative workflows. Security goals 
that are specialised to the needs of collaborative processing include document authenticity, 
provenance, and protection against unlicensed use. 
The problem of reasoning about security in service-oriented architectures is 
compounded by deferred deployment. The organisation where a service will be hosted may 
not be known when the system is designed, and in extreme cases may be decided 
dynamically at run-time. To allow the analysis of such systems, SeDAn incorporates a 
novel flexible deployment model. This avoids the need for early deployment bindings for 
services, while allowing the specification of security requirements that constrain possible 
deployments. 
Emerging systems and their security goals are discussed in chapter 2, and one such 
system is studied in detail in the case study of chapter 15. The flexible deployment model 
used in SeDAn is introduced in chapter 7, and its effect on threat analysis is described in 
detail in chapter 12. 
Security requirements for such systems are discussed in chapter 9, which describes how 
SeDAn supports the security goals introduced in chapter 2; this is followed a detailed 
definition of SeDAn security requirements in chapter 10, and worked examples for each 
type of requirement in chapter 11. 
1.1.5. Integration with Established System Engineering Practice 
It is an engineering truism that mistakes early in the lifecycle of a project are 
disproportionately expensive. It is not hard to see why; regardless of the design 
methodology, early decisions and documents form the root of a tree of deliverables, which 
grows with each development iteration. Models of software development, or project 
management (for example, [18]), repeatedly illustrate the high cost of early mistakes. 
From the perspective of a system designer, SeDAn provides the ability to: 
" identify design defects early in a system's development, when they can still be 
corrected; and 
" resolve systematic security objectives into requirements on individual services, allowing 
implementers to focus on the security of services, rather than systems. 
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Mainstream industry design practice has converged on UML as a means of representing 
design documentation. There is almost universal use of use-cases and interaction diagrams 
(sequence diagrams) as part of requirements management, and class diagrams to represent 
high-level design. Outside of this usage there are many variants (e. g. defining behaviour 
using state-machines or pre & post conditions) and less consensus. UML 2.0 will promote a 
common underlying model for UML, but the present situation is that different design tools 
use different internal metamodels. The requirement is clear: for a design analysis process to 
integrate with standard system engineering practice, it must be able to exchange system 
documentation in UML with a variety of proprietary design tools. 
The complete SeDAn system model can therefore be expressed in UML. The functional 
design required by SeDAn is as close to a standard system design as possible, with some 
minor specialist additions, such as security requirements. The other risk management 
artefacts, such as the specification of organisations, security goals, and attackers, can also 
be represented in UML, and this is the format supported by SeDAn tooling. 
Chapter 4 discusses what types of system design are suitable for analysis, chapter 8 
gives details of the models used in SeDAn and how they are written in UML, and chapter 
14 describes how the SeDAn tooling is able to accommodate different proprietary UML 
metamodels. 
1.1.6. Tooling and Scalability 
The basis of systematic analysis is a single model of the framework introduced in 
section 1.1.2. This is the SeDAn information model, and it is designed to be efficient, as 
well as comprehensive. The underlying analysis method is threat path analysis: finding an 
exploitable path between an attacker and an asset of concern. Because the information 
model is inherently efficient, the tooled process is inherently scalable. 
SeDAn is supported by a proof-of-concept tool, the Security Analyst Workbench, which 
is sufficiently capable to allow the analysis of industrial-scale systems. It allows design 
information to be exchanged with standard UML design tools, and provides a range of 
different types of security analysis. The tool also supports the interactive management of 
protection strategies. Protection strategies are built and tested incrementally (see section 
1.1.3), and proposed strategies are often explored and modified before they are satisfactory. 
The Security Analyst Workbench is therefore interactive; it allows the management of the 
set of security requirements, as well as various types of system analysis. 
The SeDAn information model is described in chapter 9, and defined formally in 
appendix B; chapter 14 describes the Security Analyst Workbench, and evaluates its 
performance and scalability. 
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1.1.7. Conclusion 
SeDAn creates a systematic connection between system-level risks and security 
requirements at the component level. It also takes account of the many factors that are 
necessary for it to be effective in practice, including integration with existing information 
governance frameworks and engineering practices, and the ability to support service- 
oriented distributed systems. Proof-of-concept tooling has also been developed, to allow the 
method to be used on realistic systems, and to demonstrate that SeDAn is systematic and 
scalable. 
The framework includes the many components that influence risk in a system, and as a 
consequence the analysis methods in SeDAn also provide information about the relationship 
of a system to its wider context, including component risk-profiles, and the value of security 
requirements in terms of risk. 
The rest of this thesis is organised in three parts. The first establishes the context for 
SeDAn: it shows that analysis at the system level is worthwhile, determines requirements to 
be supported by the method, and develops generic models for risk and traceability. 
The second part describes SeDAn in detail, beginning with an overview and worked 
example, which places the remainder in context. This part also contrasts the various 
elements of SeDAn with the requirements established in part one, highlighting theoretical 
issues and benefits. 
The third part shows SeDAn in action. It begins by describing the Security Analyst 
Workbench, and reviewing its performance and scalability; a case study is then presented in 
which SeDAn is used to assess a practical system. This part concludes the thesis by 
reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the method, and identifying open questions. 
Supplementary material, including a formal definition of the SeDAn information model, 
is provided in the appendices. 
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1.2. The Thesis Proposition 
The proposition of this thesis is that: 
A security analysis framework can be developed in which security concerns, risks and 
mitigating mechanisms, are superimposed on the high-level design of a service-based 
system. Such a framework will allow a system analyst to reason about the effect of 
changes to security or functionality, provide risk-related metrics to guide 
implementers, and will be capable of being applied to a practical industrial example. 
This proposition can be divided into three main goals, which motivate the requirements 
outlined in the previous section. In brief: 
A security analysis framework ... in which security concerns, risks and mitigating 
mechanisms, are superimposed on the high-level design of a service-based system. 
To support this goal, the framework must: 
" support risk analysis within the context of existing IT governance and 
organisational risk methods; (1.1.1) 
" provide a common framework in which functional design, the system security 
environment, and security requirements, are related (1.1.2); and 
" express and analyse the security requirements and design configurations of 
emerging networked systems. (1.1.4) 
will allow a system analyst to reason about the effect of changes to security or 
functionality [and( provide risk-related metrics to guide implementers 
To support this goal, the framework must: 
" facilitate systematic analysis, or evaluation, of a system and its protection strategy. 
(1.1.3) 
and will be capable of being applied to a practical industrial example 
To support this goal, the framework must: 
" integrate with standard engineering design methods and tools; (1.1.5) 
" be supportable with scalable tools (1.1.6); and 
" be applicable to realistic systems. (1.1.6) 
The previous section describes how SeDAn supports each of these requirements, and 
references the associated thesis chapters; the thesis evaluation in chapter 16 provides a 
detailed account of how this proposition is satisfied by the thesis. 
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1.3. The Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised in three main parts, together with supporting appendices. The 
chapters are organised as follows: 
Part 1 Security, Design, and Risk Management 
Part 1 explores the requirements for security design analysis, and shows that it is feasible 
and productive to analyse security in a high-level system design. It explores the context in 
which design and analysis will be carried out, and develops generic models of risk, 
traceability, and risk quantification that are used throughout the thesis. 
Chapter 2. Emerging Systems and their Security Goals reviews the characteristics of 
emerging systems, and their security requirements. It concludes that the most critical assets 
are those that cross the boundary between security administrations, in systems that are 
increasingly focussed on collaboration. It also describes the range of security objectives 
implied by the usual security keywords (e. g. confidentiality, integrity). The theme of 
collaborative workflow is continued in chapter 4, and in the case study. In chapter 9 the 
SeDAn approach to security goals is reviewed against the requirements identified here. 
Chapter 3. Approaches to the Design and Specification of Secure Systems reviews 
historical approaches to the design of secure systems, and identifies the need for a 
systematic approach to Security Design Analysis. 
Chapter 4. Good and Bad Design describes what is meant by a system design, then 
explores the extent that security analysis at the design level is worthwhile. The chapter 
presents a series of problem templates, which are refactored into desirable design patterns, 
followed by two worked examples. These are novel design patterns for distributed system 
security, and demonstrate the value of security analysis in a high-level design. The patterns 
described in this chapter provide a reference point for some of the design problems 
identified in the case study, in chapter 15. 
Chapter 5. Essential Features of a Security Design establishes the types of security 
requirement that must be supported by SeDAn, by reviewing established design practice in 
the security patterns literature, and in web-services architecture specifications. The chapter 
includes a critical assessment of web-service application scenarios, with a view to 
determining what features should, or should not, be represented in SeDAn. This material is 
used in chapters 8 and 10, to determine the scope of the SeDAn system model, and the 
requirements taxonomy, respectively. 
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Chapter 6. Security Risk Management: The Context for Analysis begins by 
describing the wider context of IT governance and risk management. Some important 
generic models are then developed to support risk analysis: a model of the process artefacts 
used in risk management, and the traceability between security goals, asset concerns and 
requirements. These models are the foundation of the SeDAn risk-analysis developed in 
later chapters, and are justified by reference to existing risk-management methods. This 
chapter also develops the risk metrics used throughout the thesis. 
Part 2 Security Design Analysis 
Part two describes a novel risk analysis framework, SeDAn, in detail. It begins with an 
overview, which is illustrated by a worked example, and then develops of each part of the 
framework in detail. The requirements for each framework component are grounded in the 
context established in part 1; the value and limitations of the framework are reviewed 
against these criteria, and in further worked examples. 
Chapter 7. Overview and Worked Example introduces SeDAn, and uses a simple 
worked example to illustrate its main features. The example is presented in U ML, followed 
by an overview of security requirements and of analysis, including attacks from users, 
organisations and external attacks. The example is analysed is detail, and this allows the 
introduction of other SeDAn features, including path exploitability, requirement patterns, 
deployment, and risk-metrics for individual requirements. 
Chapter 8. Modelling the System describes the system model used in SeDAn, and how 
it can be written in UML. The SeDAn system model is logically a single entity, but is 
presented in two parts: the security environment and the functional model. The model meets 
requirements established in chapters 5,6 and 7, and profiles are used to specify how it can 
be written in UML. The chapter concludes with an example. The models and 
representations described in this chapter are used throughout the thesis. 
Chapter 9. From Asset Concerns to Security Requirements explains the approach 
used to specify asset concerns and security requirements. The chapter introduces deferred 
requirements and informally describes the information model, which is the theoretical core 
of the SeDAn framework. The chapter concludes by evaluating how well the concerns 
defined in SeDAn support the security goals identified in chapter 2. The information model 
is specified formally in appendix B; the model described in this chapter is a precursor to the 
requirements catalogue (chapter 10), and the analysis process (chapter 12). 
36 The Organisation of the Thesis 
Chapter 10. The SeDAn Requirements Catalogue specifies the security requirements 
supported by SeDAn. A Requirements Taxonomy is established, based on requirements 
identified in chapters 5,7 and 8, and this is used to motivate the security requirements that 
can be used within SeDAn. Each requirement is defined with reference to a typical system 
context, and its effect on information flow is described. 
Chapter 11. Solving Problems with Security Requirements shows how each of the 
SeDAn security requirements can be used in practice. A worked example is presented, 
which grows in complexity as more requirements are illustrated. The final example shows 
the use of message-based security to protect a system that communicates via an untrusted 
and potentially malicious sub-system. This is sufficiently complex to highlight issues of 
management and organisation in design analysis, which motivate the modular analysis 
process presented in chapter 12. 
Chapter 12. The Process of Security Design Analysis describes both the large-scale 
process needed for security design analysis, and also the detailed methods that support this 
process. The large-scale process describes how security design analysis is divided into 
protection modules that are treated progressively. The underlying analysis methods are 
concerned with threat-path analysis; these methods are described in detail, together with the 
variants necessary to analyse different types of attacker, and provide a range of different 
risk-metrics. The chapter concludes by evaluating the limitations of this form of analysis. 
Chapter 13. Implementing the System describes how a SeDAn security design 
constrains an implementation. The aim of system design analysis is to allow the 
implementer to focus on component, rather than system, issues; this chapter therefore 
summarises the obligations that a SeDAn security design places on an implementation. 
Most of these obligations relate to components, or sub-systems, but there are inevitably 
some residual system-level implementation requirements, and these are also described and 
evaluated. 
Part 3 SeDAn in Practice: Experience and Evaluation 
Part three presents the practical evaluation of SeDAn; this is in two main parts: the Security 
Analyst Workbench, which is a proof-of-concept tool to support the framework, and a case 
study, which uses SeDAn in the analysis and design of an industrial-scale system. This part 
also concludes the thesis by evaluating the extent that the thesis proposition has been 
demonstrated, summarising important and novel aspects of SeDAn that are of wider 
significance, and recording open questions that arise from the work. 
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Chapter 14 Tool Support: The Security Analyst Workbench describes a proof-of- 
concept tool to support SeDAn. The tool is novel, and was developed as part of the same 
programme of research, although its detailed design and technology is not discussed. The 
chapter describes the main requirements for the tool, its architecture, performance and 
scalability. The aim of the chapter is to show that SeDAn is capable of being tooled, and to 
introduce the tool used in the worked example. 
Chapter 15. SeDAn in Practice: A Case Study describes the use of SeDAn to evaluate 
the security of a complex collaborative industrial system. The complete study is described, 
including the preparatory work needed to populate SeDAn models. The results demonstrate 
that SeDAn is able to provide valuable insights into complex systems; the case study 
explores the effectiveness of SeDAn, as well as providing a full account of its use. 
Chapter 16. Evaluation describes how the thesis satisfies the research proposition, 
including the more detailed requirements identified in section 1.2. 
Chapter 17 Conclusions summarise some of the novel features in SeDAn, including the 
flexible modelling of organisations and system deployment, and the use of risk profiles to 
decompose systematic risk to individual sub-systems, or components. The chapter also 
records open questions that arise from this research, including issues of modelling, 
requirements and tooling. 
Appendix 
Appendix A Diagram Conventions and UML Profiles describes the information-flow 
and UMI, diagrams used in this thesis, and UML Profiles, which are used to customise 
UML for particular applications. 
Appendix B. Formal Model specifies the SeDAn information model, and the primitive 
information constraints which are used to specify SeDAn security requirements. 
Appendix C. Security Requirements UML Syntax describes how SeDAn security 
requirements are written in UML. 
Appendix D. Case Study Reference Information provides additional information about 
the case study, including the detailed security requirements needed to protect the system. 
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Chapter 2. Emerging Systems and their Security Goals 
The aim of this thesis is to present a framework for security design, which 
systematically develops the protection strategy, or the set of security requirements, 
necessary to support the security goals of an information system. An important precursor to 
security design is to understand the types of security goals that are required, but 
unfortunately much of the security literature disposes of this question with the short list of 
`Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability'. These categories provide a useful way of 
organizing ideas about security, but more is needed to understand what security is intended 
to achieve. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide that context, by reviewing what is required by 
different security goals, and relating these requirements to emerging networked systems. 
This chapter is organized in four parts, the first examines what types of system need to 
be considered, and what they imply for security. The second part reviews the nature of 
security properties, and the third takes the usual headings of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability together with privacy and accountability, and reviews historical and emerging 
goals. Finally, the most significant security goals for emerging systems are summarized. In 
detail, the chapter is organised as follows: 
9 section 2.1 reviews system trends, with a particular focus on modern or emerging 
networked systems, and what they imply in terms of security; 
" section 2.2 reviews what is meant by `security'; 
" section 2.3 reviews the range of possible security goals, organised under the headings of 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy and accountability; and 
" section 2.4 summarises the chapter in detail, highlighting the systems and assets of most 
importance from a security perspective, and their related security goals. 
Definitions 
The term `information processing system' should be taken to mean a system that may 
use computers that carry out data processing, but includes the surrounding physical, social 
and business context; security goals are concerned with this whole system. 
The use of the term `goal' is intended to emphasize a focus on what an organization 
needs to achieve by security. The use of `policy' has been avoided, since that is often 
defined as a set of rules, rather than an objective, for example: 
"[security policy] describes precisely which actions the entities in a system are 
allowed to take and which ones are prohibited "[19]. 
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2.1. System Trends 
Emerging systems are often described as 'distributed' or having `increased 
connectivity', but a more detailed description of system trends provides a useful 
background to their security needs and the business and organizational environments in 
which they will operate. 
The vision of how systems will develop ranges from incremental developments of 
established capability, such as e-business and e-government, through those that are in active 
development, such as the Grid, to pervasive systems, where the fundamental ideas and 
mechanisms are still being researched. This section describes each of these in order of 
maturity, or perhaps, ambition. 
2.1.1. Web-based Services and Products (e-services) 
The Internet is evolving into a medium for the delivery of services as well as data; 
many current services simply provide reference information, such as product data, but the 
introduction of web services [20] is expected to support a broader range of business activity. 
The commercial motivation for e-commerce [21] is much wider than simply providing 
electronic access to services, it includes improved customer accessibility (e. g. faster, more 
available, global access) speeding up the process of commerce (e. g. collaboration, supply 
chain integration) and creating new, electronic, types of good. 
Similar trends can be observed in `e-government': 
"e-business methods are relevant to a much wider range of government activity [than 
just service delivery] encompassing transactions with citizens, businesses, suppliers 
and with other public sector bodies" [22] 
The public sector is concerned with providing electronic services to the public, but also 
effecting internal and external process integration and collaboration. 
These changes are so fundamental that they influence the structure of organizations and 
the way that they work: 
"Increasingly we are seeing the advent of strong external coalitions that are 
transforming traditional monolithic, centralized, and hierarchical organizations into 
loosely coupled organic networks. These organizational forms are characterized by 
cooperation instead of autonomy and control. " [23] 
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2.1.2. The Grid 
The theme of collaboration, already evident in Business and Government, is a major 
factor in the Grid; for example, Foster, Kesselman et al, define the Grid as: 
`flexible, secure, coordinated resource sharing among dynamic collections of 
individuals, institutions, and resources - what we refer to as virtual 
organizations "[24] 
The Grid began as a scientific effort to share computing capability, particularly for 
physics projects,. but its vision [25] has grown to include collaborative projects that range 
across most areas of science [26]. 
Virtual organizations are already a reality in grid science; one recent survey of the grid 
community recorded that 82% of respondents needed to collaborate with people outside 
their companies or organizations, and 69% were involved in international partnerships [27]. 
2.1.3. Pervasive, or Ubiquitous, Systems 
Limited pervasive computing is already a reality, notably in the deployment of Radio 
Frequency Identity (RFID) tags in clothing and other products [28], but Weiser's vision 
[29] of computers so ubiquitous that they "vanish into the fabric", in the same way that 
electric motors have, is still distant. 
Pervasive systems can be characterized by physical integration into their surroundings 
and spontaneous interaction [30]. Individual devices are likely to be low powered and will 
need to sense their context, including physical location and other devices in their 
neighbourhood [31]; applications are expected to include the provision of task continuity 
for mobile users [32] and distributed sensing [33-35]. 
Pervasive computing research also includes mobile software agents: software that can 
"block execution in their allocated node and resume it later in another network 
node... autonomously" [361 
This technology has a wide range of applications [37] including specialist searches or 
transactions where it is more economical to move a process to a data location than vice- 
versa, or where it is necessary to migrate a process depending upon the results of its own 
computation. 
2.1.4. Common Themes 
The common factors in these systems include wider user access, collaborative processes 
that cross organization boundaries, autonomous computing, new product types, and mobile 
and context aware processes. Although these range from mature concepts to research 
topics, they can all be observed to some degree in systems that are already deployed. 
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Collaborative arrangements in business and science can be viewed as `virtual 
organizations', consistent with the vision of Grid computing [24]: groups of people from 
different organizations who share resources to achieve a common goal. The focus on 
collaboration rather than organization is a challenge to established security management 
practice, since it cuts across administrative domains. This disrupts the traditional 
distinction between `insider' and `outsider', complicating the flow of authority to use (and 
pay for) a resource, and creating potentially complex trust relationships between resource 
providers and service users [38]. Collaborations can also be viewed as implementing 
distributed workflows, with business requirements that parallel existing paper workflows 
[39,40]. Security implications include the need to designate responsible individuals, and 
maintain records of decision and approval. 
One side-effect of collaborative working is that while collaborators may trust their co- 
workers, they may be less trusting of their co-workers' organizations [27], so the 
distribution and use of personal data in these systems is likely to become a matter of 
concern. Privacy issues are not just related to authentication and service data, but also 
include secondary information, such as personalization [41,42]; for example, display or 
keyboard options may inadvertently reveal a user's disabilities. 
Autonomous computing is seen in grid applications [43], where a computing task must 
continue regardless of the presence of the user, and also in pervasive systems. Established 
ideas about user authentication and accountability are stretched by distributed autonomous 
services; in the grid, systems that maintain direct user accountability are being replaced by 
systems that are more scalable [44] but may provide only indirect traceability to end users. 
New product types and services, such as the electronic representation of music or film, 
or information based services, raise security concerns such as plagiarism, forgery, 
duplication and theft [45], that parallel those traditionally associated with physical products. 
Mobility: Systems that are mobile and able to sense their context may exacerbate 
existing security issues [46] and introduce a range of new concerns [47], of which the most 
often quoted is the erosion of individual privacy that may arise in a communicating, sensing 
and invisible network, which can associate individuals and locations [48]. Mobile software 
raises further issues of trust, integrity and mutual protection between the software and its 
hosts [49]. 
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2.2. What is the Purpose of Security? 
Security is usually regarded, technically, as a `safety' property, that is a property of the 
system that prevents specific undesired outcomes, in contrast to a `liveness' property that 
ensures certain actions. Where authors try to define the property "the purpose of computer 
security is to keep bad things from happening" [50] is typical. The influential US criteria, 
the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (the TCSEC, also known as "The Orange 
Book" [51 ]) supports this view: 
"... there are eleven separate definitions for security [in the FIPS glossary] ... a 
common thread running through these definitions is the word `Protection "'. 
Attacks. Current methods for eliciting security requirements focus on the risk to the 
assets of a business [52,53]; the object of security is to prevent undesirable outcomes from 
happening to assets as a result of an attack. Whether an intentional attacker occasions an 
attack is not uniformly agreed; some authors take a clear cut position: 
"Security concerns itself with intentional actions ... protecting assets from 
unintentional actions is safety, not security " [54]. 
It is generally agreed that `attack' is a technical, rather than a pejorative, term, and it 
may include inadvertent as well as deliberate actions. In addition, some risk-management 
methods also include `acts of God', such as fire and flood, in their definition of an attack. 
The System Perspective. The effectiveness of security mechanisms can only be judged 
in the context of the overall system. Dobson [55] gives an example of a bank clerk who 
fraudulently transfers money from a customer's account to his own; the clerk is authorised 
to use the system to transfer credit, so a wider security goal is needed than `authorised 
access'. An important paper by Anderson [56] surveys attacks on banking systems and 
concludes: 
"The threat model commonly used by cryptosystem designers was wrong: most frauds 
were not caused by cryptanalysis or other technical attacks, but by implementation 
errors and management failures. " 
Similar concerns are expressed by Dhillon [23] in the context of the topical problem of 
identity theft: the integrity of credentials (passports, keys etc) may be physically 
maintained, but they can still be misinterpreted or misused. 
Variable strength of mechanism. If security is not absolute, but can only be judged in 
context, then it is logical to consider if computer systems can provide variable degrees of 
security, to be tailored or selected according to requirement. Some authors [57,58] have 
suggested that security can be regarded as a set of quality of service attributes, for example 
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by selecting between alternative mechanisms (e. g. type of cryptography) or mechanism 
strengths (e. g. key length). Estimated continuous measures rather than binary metrics have 
also been proposed for trust in pervasive systems [59] and also for authentication [60]. 
Information theoretic metrics can be used to quantify information flow [61,62], and also 
privacy [63,64] (see 3.3). Variable or alternate security mechanisms may also be needed for 
practical reasons, such as meeting different export or license restrictions [65]. 
More Restricted Views of security. In contrast, security is sometimes viewed as no 
more than access control: 
"Security: Dependability, with respect to the prevention of unauthorized access or 
handling of information "[66]. 
A similarly narrow view can be found in the definitions of security policy noted above 
(see the chapter introduction). In view of the foregoing this perspective seems flawed, it 
may be a misinterpretation of many sources that stress that access control is a fundamental 
mechanism, but also recognize that its effectiveness can only be judged in context. The 
Orange book [51], again: 
"A Security Policy ... with regard to control over access and 
dissemination of 
information ... must be precisely 
defined ... [it] must accurately reflect the 
laws, 
regulations and general policies from which it is derived. " 
Turn [67], in a paper that anticipates many current issues including privacy, defines 
computer security as the "protection of the systems and data stored therein against 
unauthorised access, modification, destruction or use", but also stresses the significance of 
risk management and the threat environment in which the system is used. 
Summary. The purpose of security is to protect assets against specific undesired 
outcomes resulting from intentioned acts. Most authors agree that security goals apply to an 
overall information system, and there are ample examples of mismanagement or misuse to 
demonstrate that safety mechanisms in a computer system are not sufficient to provide 
protection on their own. This implies that secure is not a property of a computer system; it 
is a property of the overall information environment of which the computer system is a part. 
In addition, security is a relative rather than an absolute measure: a secure information 
system is one where the risks of specific undesired outcomes to its assets have been reduced 
to an acceptable level. 
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2.3. Security Goals 
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Security goals are often summarized as `Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability' [68], 
with Privacy and Accountability sometimes added as distinct issues. However, these 
keywords are broad categories of security, which carry different interpretations, depending 
upon context; it is important to understand the range of security goals that may be intended, 
since their detailed intent will considerably change how they need to be supported. This 
section will take each of these headings in turn, survey their established scope and seek 
evidence on emerging requirements. A previous study [1] used similar headings 
productively to discuss security in ubiquitous devices, this section expands these concerns 
to the wider range of emerging systems introduced in section 2.1. 
In the following sections the term `data' is used to signify a concrete representation of 
information, in any form (e. g. database, computer file, card file, paper document). 
2.3.1. Confidentiality 
"Confidentiality means that assets ... are accessible only by authorized parties" 
[68]. 
`Accessible' can be interpreted in a number of different ways, such as viewing, 
executing, taking possession, or even knowing the existence of an item. In the case of 
confidentiality, an asset is usually information embodied in either data items or executable 
programs; most of the issues below apply equally to either. 
Mandatory Security. The first attempts to define confidentiality focused on the 
military need to restrict individuals' access to sensitive data, based upon their clearance and 
its classification; this is referred to as mandatory security [51 ]. A significant feature of this 
requirement is that data items must be associated with some form of label or classification, 
to ensure that confidentiality is upheld regardless of the location of the data. Of course, 
data items are created and changed as well as stored and transported, so it is necessary to 
understand how classifications are determined; military practice is to conservatively classify 
a document with respect to its content, and this was formalized by Denning who modelled 
classification as a lattice [69]. This lattice can also represent users' clearances, allowing the 
dominance relation to be used to specify both legitimate access and permissible information 
flow. 
Other models have been used to formalize confidentiality, and the most influential of 
these in academic terms is the definition of information flow by non-interference [70]; 
roughly, it specifies that one item does not influence the content of another if the second is 
indifferent to the existence of the first. 
Despite the elegance of these, and subsequent models of information flow (see 3.7), they 
have proved to be ineffective as security goals, perhaps because their scope extends to all 
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information in the system, whereas the real threats are often more limited: the actions of 
legitimate users, and the introduction of software that deliberately exploits available 
bandwidth from high to low classification (the `Trojan Horse' attack). In practice military 
and government systems have taken a risk management approach to confidentiality by 
dividing the classification space into a small number of virtually independent systems that 
are bridged by well-controlled mechanisms. This subject is covered in depth in a major US 
post cold-war review of security [71] that stresses risk management and personnel security, 
and goes as far as proposing that the classification system should be simplified to just two 
categories. 
Confidentiality of mobile data. The mandatory military requirement is just one of a 
class of confidentiality goals that require constraints to be carried with potentially mobile 
data. It was previously noted (see section 2.1.1) that e-commerce is concerned with 
electronic products, resulting in the need to protect them against plagiarism, forgery, 
duplication and other forms of fraud. For example, the security requirements for a library 
[72] focus on ensuring that services are provided only to users whose institutions have a 
valid license; they specifically discount other security requirements, except in support of 
this goal. A survey of business requirements [45] describes items of concern as `digital 
assets' that need to be constrained in how they are used and the extent to which they can be 
copied. In this case, identification of the asset and authentication of the payment are more 
important than the identity of the user. 
A further constraint that may be placed on data regardless of its location is privacy. 
Some authors regard privacy as a subset of confidentiality [68], but the UK legislation and 
European framework impose security goals that are wider in scope, and are described in a 
separate section below (2.3.4). The terminology is potentially confused, since the medical 
community uses the term `confidentiality' to refer to a wide range of privacy and ethical 
requirements [73], rather than the more limited definition of non-disclosure quoted at the 
start of this section. 
An extreme requirement for the confidentiality of mobile data, the protection of a 
mobile agent or some part of its data from a hostile host, is often posed by researchers in 
pervasive security [47]. The feasibility of meeting such a goal is an open question, 
obfuscation is believed to be infeasible in general [74], but specific problems, such as 
maintaining the confidentiality of users' preferences or recommendations, can be 
implemented by mechanisms such as homomorphic encryption [75]. We conclude that 
while it may be possible to satisfy narrowly defined goals of this sort, the general 
requirement may be unsupportable. 
Discretionary Confidentiality. The second type of confidentiality identified in early 
studies was `discretionary confidentiality' or `discretionary access control' [76]. The term 
`discretion' implies that users, who may be system administrators, normal users, or a 
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combination of both, may make choices about who has the right to access data. This form 
of policy does not constrain the use of data once it has been accessed. Despite its ubiquity 
as a mechanism (e. g. the UNIX protection model), there are few cases where system 
security goals relating to data items can be framed directly in discretionary terms; the most 
common is the mutual isolation of multiple users' data. However, constraining users' 
access to services is a form of discretionary policy, and is likely to be important in any 
automated information system. Emerging distributed architectures [77] show a direct 
connection between the requirements of business workflows and the need to establish 
policies for access to services. 
In the grid environment there are both data items and catalogues of content (metadata) 
[78]. Data items may be moved, or replicated, to different physical locations. Security 
goals for such systems have yet to be established, but they are likely to restrict access to 
both data and metadata on the basis of location as well as by user, and some restrictions 
may need to be carried with the data as it is moved. Existing distributed systems also 
require catalogues or indexes of services [79], to which the same considerations apply. 
Structured Data. The confidentiality goals for structured data, such as that held in a 
card index or in a database, are no different than those for any other types of data [68]. 
However, confidentiality may be required for some data items and not others (for example, 
salary, but not contact number in a personal record) or may only be expressible in terms of 
particular views or aggregations of the underlying data. For example, aggregations of 
health records used for research are subject to ethical oversight arrangements that approve 
only specific views of the underlying data for any given purpose [80]. Although goals of 
this sort might, in principle, be expressed as confidentiality of certain patient information, 
this may be impractical; for example, the mapping between information (e. g. patient's 
name) and the data representation may not be predictable (e. g. name may inadvertently 
appear as text in an annotation) or it may be recognized that the nature of the research 
requires database views that could be used to infer confidential information, so the risk of 
inference may need to be limited by arbitrary constraints on the numbers of views that can 
be obtained or the use of the resulting information. Anderson also emphasizes that 
inference is hard to manage in such systems. [81] 
Summary. Confidentiality is a security goal that applies to information embodied in 
data or services, in a wide range of different circumstances. Confidentiality concerns 
include the provision of data, software or services to systems, other security domains or 
locations, as well as to users. Confidentiality goals can be divided into those that only 
apply at a particular location, for example to restrict the availability of a service or to 
provide isolation between users' data, to those that are require an item of data to be 
constrained regardless of location. The latter have been studied in the military context, but 
may be more significant in the growing field of electronic products. Distributed data 
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catalogues explicitly separate knowledge of an item from its embodiment, so the process of 
setting confidentiality goals will need to address these concerns as separate items. 
Usually, the mapping between information and its data representation is close enough 
that goals can be stated in terms of data, and much of the literature takes this approach. 
However, systems with a non-deterministic mapping between the information to be 
protected and its data representation, or where the content of some data items can be 
inferred from others, pose special problems that may result in arbitrary constraints on 
systems to manage the resulting confidentiality risk. 
2.3.2. Integrity 
In a substantial and seminal review by Mayfield, Roskos et al [82], integrity is given 
three definitions: 
"a system that meets defined expectations; 
"a system that protects itself and its data from inappropriate actions; and 
"a system that maintains data consistency internally and with respect to its 
environment. 
This wide perspective is instructive, since the mechanisms needed to uphold these 
properties range over physical security and the functional behaviour of a system, as well as 
the computer security goals proposed by Mayfield, which are no unauthorised changes and 
the maintenance of consistency. 
Integrity concepts were developed in parallel with confidentiality, and similar ideas 
were suggested. A lattice model was proposed by Biba [83], which specified that 
information should flow from high to low integrity objects, but failed to be influential 
because it is unable to model some types of high integrity information, such as Audit 
records, that originate from lower integrity sources. The most influential model, due to 
Clark and Wilson [84], argues that the integrity problem can be divided into external and 
internal consistency. The former is concerned to ensure that data in a system is consistent 
with the business process in the external environment, which the data represents; it can 
therefore be maintained only by the wider information system. Consistency of data within a 
computer system, can be maintained by that system. Clark and Wilson focus on the 
maintenance of consistency by ensuring that data are subject to only well formed 
transactions and also stress the importance of separation of user roles. Mayfield concurs 
with this viewpoint, suggesting that Clark-Wilson is a good starting point and concluding 
that "categories seem to be much more important than levels ". 
In a more recent attempt to clarify the various definitions of integrity [85], Sandhu 
suggests that that they can be ordered: consistency, improper modification, unauthorized 
modification and no undetected change. He distinguishes between consistency, which is 
maintained by active system functions (i. e. is a liveness property), from the progressively 
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more restricted types of integrity, which are essentially safety properties: they prohibit 
certain behaviour in a system. 
It would be consistent with these authorities to conclude that integrity is a liveness 
property of an information system ('maintain consistency'), and a safety property ('only 
well formed transformations') in any supporting computer system. 
Distributed Systems. Sandhu also makes a valuable observation on the need for 
integrity in distributed systems: 
"In the past, most organisations have dealt with a relatively few sources of data, 
about which [expectations of quality] can be reasonably built through experience. In 
the increasingly networked, interconnected, information-driven world ... one would 
expect data to be tagged with some seal of approval... indicating to the consumer 
some basis for assessing its integrity. "[85] 
The need to preserve the chain of authority in a distributed workflow [86] has already 
been identified as a requirement of electronic business (see section 2.1.4), but Sandhu's 
observation places these requirements in the wider context of data provenance. The library 
community has long recognized the need for electronic provenance management, and has 
defined a framework of metadata [87] for recording catalog information, but to date there 
has been little security related research on this topic. Grid based projects are starting to 
identify the problem as a requirement; for example myGrid, a bioinformatics project, defines 
a provenance architecture [88] that captures the sequence of services performed by a 
workflow enactment system. They stress the need for integrity: 
"Provenance provides a trusted source from which we can procure who the 
information belongs to and precisely how it was created". 
More comprehensive goals were identified by a National Science Foundation workshop 
[89]: 
"Information is valuable when we know who created it, who reduced it, who drew the 
conclusions, and the review process it has undergone. To make digital archives reach 
their full flower, there must be ways to attach these values in an obvious and 
unforgeable way, so that the signature, the imprint of the author or publisher stays 
with the information as it is reinterpreted in different ways. When the information is 
copied and abstracted, there should also be a mechanism to prevent illegal copying 
and reproduction of intellectual property. " 
The previous section (2.3.1) considered the problem of mobile agent confidentiality; 
there is a similar integrity issue, the protection of a mobile software agent from the host 
platform, and the same discussion applies. There is also the symmetrical problem of 
protecting the integrity of a platform from a mobile agent [90], which is a major issue for 
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resource providers in grid computing. In this case the security goal is straightforward, and 
there are a variety of implementation options depending on context. 
Structured Data. There are some complications in the nature of the `documents' 
involved; Buneman, Khanna et al [91] observe that web-based documentation is often an 
image that has been compiled dynamically at the time of viewing. Creating documents in 
XML, which is designed to express semantics as well as formatting, will exacerbate this 
trend. Buneman relates dynamically created documents to query operations on a database, 
and gives examples of the difficulty of establishing what elements in the database 
`contribute' to the final document -a reminder of the pervasive difficulty of providing a 
model based defmition of information flow. The subject of consistency in relational 
databases has its own literature and support infrastructure (notably relational integrity and 
commitment management); however, although relational consistency is mentioned in some 
security texts [68] it is usually regarded as a functional aspect of database design, rather 
than a security requirement. 
In addition to supporting hyperlinked documents, grid based systems use distributed 
data pointers to managed multiple copies of data items at the collection, file and metadata 
(catalogue) level [92]; it is reasonable to expect that some applications will need 
consistency in these networks too. 
Essentially, all these systems (database, web documents, grid data) are data graphs, and 
the question of consistency, either in the form of controlled change or guaranteed recovery, 
will be an issue for many applications. The extent to which this is regarded as a security 
goal, as opposed to a functional requirement, will depend on the context of threats and risks 
in which the system is deployed. 
Summary. Integrity goals may apply to both data and software, and have a range of 
possible interpretations: maintain consistency, prevent inappropriate modification, detect 
modification or allow recovery. Consistency requirements may be concerned with 
maintaining correspondence between representations of information (e. g. system data) and 
reality, or between data items within a computer system. The former can only be 
implemented within a suitably constrained business process. The parallel between 
distributed workflows and existing paper workflow systems provides an important model 
for integrity in collaborating systems and suggests that provenance will become as 
important a concern as consistency. Grid data, web documents and relational database 
share a graph structure where relational consistency properties may be required. Finally, 
there is a requirement in a range of emerging systems to ensure the integrity of execution 
environments, independent of any applications that they may run. 
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2.3.3. Availability 
Availability has been extensively studied in the context of functionality (e. g. networks, 
machine clusters, file systems, databases) but has received relatively little attention as a 
security requirement. Early US documents [51] did not include availability, but it was 
recognized as a separate problem by Gligor [93]. Following Gligor's seminal paper, 
subsequent government standards [94,95] and studies [96] use the double negative 
`prevention of denial of service', which is still a common formulation of the availability 
goal: 
An authorized party should not be prevented from accessing objects to which he, 
she, or it has legitimate access "[68]. 
Gligor has also summarized the recent history of the subject [97]. The underlying 
problem is that the availability of any service shared between a number of users requires the 
co-operation of those users. He argues that this co-operation cannot be enforced by the 
system, so availability is neither a liveness nor a safety property of a system. The threat of 
a large number of individuals co-operating to attack a system (or worse, a key element of 
common network infrastructure) is not negligible, but since many networked machines are 
not professionally administered, the use of large numbers of subverted machines to simulate 
such an attack is now commonplace [98-100]. Because availability cannot be guaranteed, 
Gligor suggests that a pragmatic approach is to use safety, or protection, mechanisms on a 
case-by-case basis to restrict the options available to attackers. 
Availability goals in context Another view of availability is provided by Hosmer [101] 
in the context of the national information infrastructure. She argues that current definitions 
of availability assume that providing a service to authorized users is always desirable, but 
there are many circumstances where a more careful evaluation of the underlying 
requirements is needed. She cites the example of telephone companies who, following an 
earthquake, blocked incoming calls to California in order to reserve capacity for disaster 
management and residents' emergency calls. More subtle availability restrictions may be 
needed to avoid distorting social or commercial activity because of the relative performance 
of alternative services, for example to discourage the over-use of a service of last resort. 
These considerations argue that availability goals need to be carefully considered in the 
business and social context of the system, but not that they are all security issues. 
Availability requires Detection and Recovery goals. Gligor also mentions the need 
for detection and recovery; this is emphasized by Needham: 
`In all security matters there are two objectives - to make violations awkward to do 
and to make them known to authority when they happen. In the case of denial of 
service the balance between the two tilts quite far towards the latter... "[102] 
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Needham remarks that detection and recovery have not received attention in fields such 
as confidentiality, where researchers have focused on safety mechanisms and models, but 
the availability problem forces the issue of how inappropriate actions of legitimate users or 
their software can be detected, and how an information system can recover from such 
actions. 
Summary. There is little published work on availability as a security goal, but it is very 
significant. It indicates that availability may never be supportable as a safety or liveness 
property of a system, so an information system must instead address user behaviour and, as 
far as possible, detect and recover from mistakes or malfeasance by its users. These issues 
directly motivate system goals to resolve (alert and patch) known system vulnerabilities, 
condition and audit user behaviour, detect intrusions or attacks, respond operationally to 
attacks, and be able to recover a system to a known safe state. 
2.3.4. Privacy and other Statutory Obligations 
Early concern about the potential for interconnected systems to prejudice personal 
privacy gave rise to data protection legislation (see below). To some extent these concerns 
have already been realized; many authors reflect public concern about the exposure of 
personal information on the internet [103-106] and some believe that lack of public 
confidence in security, particularly privacy, is responsible for slowing the uptake of new 
technology [107,108]. 
We have already noted that emerging systems have features that exacerbate this 
problem; for example, personalization [41,42], presence management, and the collection 
and distribution of contextual information about users, such as their location, [47,48]. 
Despite established public concern, and an understanding that emerging systems will 
introduce new risks, there is no simple definition of privacy that can be used as a security 
goal. In a useful ethical analysis, Walters notes that: 
"Private sector privacy protection is concerned with whether or not the data subject's 
choice concerning secondary use of information is voluntary in the sense that the 
agent controls his or her behaviour by unforced choice. " [109] 
and 
"the conj7ict of interpretations that surrounds privacy has to do with balancing 
individual rights, responsibilities and goods with societal rights responsibilities and 
goods " 
Different nations share these concerns but have different perspectives on how this 
balance should be achieved. In the UK, privacy requirements for data processing systems 
are specified by the Data Protection Act [110] (see Carey [111] for a useful summary and 
interpretation). The UK act complies with a European Directive [112] that places similar 
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constraints on other member states and requires trading partners to observe compatible 
standards before personal data can be exported outside the European Union. Similar 
principles can be found in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Guidelines [113] and in Fair Information Practices [114] that are an important reference 
point in the US. The US approach to data protection has not been to impose a single 
statutory framework, but to legislate in areas of specific concern, such as health [115]; this 
legislation balances economic or political issues against privacy and although the intent is 
similar the actual constraints are different to those in the EU; for example, this health rule 
does not require explicit patient consent. A useful detailed survey of international privacy 
requirements is maintained by Caslon Analytics [116]. 
The Goals of Purpose and Consent Confidentiality is usually required to support 
privacy: in the EU, data may only be disclosed to third parties, or exported to other 
countries, when they will provide equivalent protection to the rights of data subjects (UK 
principles 2 and 8 [110]). The most significant and universal privacy goals, however, are 
those of consent and purpose: a data subject must consent to the use of data for specific 
purposes, and it should only be processed for those purposes. (UK principles 1,2). These 
are quite general and far reaching goals that are also found as system requirements in health 
and biomedical research systems [117,118]; the protection goal is to limit the purpose of 
processing, the principle of consent constrains the function or process by which data are 
collected. 
Other Requirements. In the UK these goals are supported by a range of detailed 
requirements, including extra rights of data subjects (access to data, correct inaccuracies, 
limit the permitted scope of automated decision making) and constraints on system 
implementation (limit the collection of data to that necessary for specified processing, 
delete it when it is no longer required, and employ `technical and organizational measures'). 
Given the difficulty of defining privacy as a single concept [109], it is not surprising to find 
a collection of detailed requirements, several of which are expressed in implementation 
terms. However, expressing requirements in this way also means that as new services 
emerge, extra requirements will be needed; this can already be seen in the UK 
Telecommunications Regulations, 1999 [119] that include restrictions on the processing of 
personal data for traffic and billing, and new personal rights related to automated subscriber 
identification and directory entries. 
System specific requirements are similarly placed on projects which are subject to 
ethical oversight, and for the same reason; it is difficult to formulate consistent and 
meaningful goals, so case-specific rules are needed. (See the discussion of Structured Data 
in section 2.3.1) 
The scope of data covered by the UK Data Protection Act is very wide; for example, 
images collected by CCTV cameras are regarded as personal data, because they can 
54 Security Goals 
potentially identify individuals. In the context of distributed systems, the status of general 
identifiers, such as public keys used for authentication, is uncertain; Carey notes that they 
have not been determined to be privacy sensitive in the UK (p29 [1111), but they could be 
used to link other personal attributes which may result in a privacy concern [1051, so the 
management of authentication identifiers and user attributes in distributed systems will need 
careful consideration. 
Human Rights. In the UK, the Human Rights Act [120] places privacy legislation in 
the context of human rights. In itself it does not require new security features in information 
processing systems, but it does require that public bodies consider the rights of individuals 
in the context of their work. New privacy concerns may emerge in business processes that 
are designed to take account of human rights - for example additional personal data may be 
collected and processed to demonstrate equitable treatment of various population groups. 
A further problem is that the aggregation of seemingly innocent data, such as user 
preferences, profiles or location may reveal privacy sensitive information [121]. Both these 
issues imply that deciding what data assets exist in a system may not always be 
straightforward, and privacy must not be discounted as a potential security goal just because 
the business focus of a system lies elsewhere. 
Summary. Many nations will expect systems to maintain the privacy of personal data, 
and this goal is often imposed by legislation or sector regulation. The primary security goal 
is to constrain the processing of personal data to the purpose for which the data subject has 
consented, and this is also a key feature in international ethical frameworks that govern 
biomedical systems. In the UK, some categories of data (health, criminal, religion etc) 
indicate the need for a stronger form of consent. 
These goals are supported by confidentiality (not to disclose data unless it will be 
similarly treated) a broad range of risk-based organizational and technical security 
measures, and requirements to minimize the data collected and delete it when it is no longer 
required. 
Because the notion of privacy is incomplete, other specific requirements, personal rights 
(e. g. access and correction of data), and external rules (e. g. ethical restrictions) may be 
required in specific systems, and these are likely to be expanded by ongoing legislation. 
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2.3.5. Accountability 
When accountability is mentioned as a separate concern, the position taken usually 
reflects that given in the TCSEC [51]: 
"Audit information must be selectively kept and protected so that actions affecting 
security can be traced to the responsible party" 
The usual components of accountability are the identification of individuals associated 
with an event, the logging of that event and the protection and interrogation of the record. 
The discussion of availability (see section 2.3.3) has already indicated that it is necessary to 
audit user activity, because of the difficulty in framing a property that defends against 
colluding legitimate users. There are ample examples of attacks from corrupt but legitimate 
system users [122] to support this viewpoint. 
The identification of each action in a system with a user has been adopted in distributed 
systems such as the grid, resulting in delegation schemes [123] that propagate a user's 
identity with which to associate access rights and accounting. Propagating user identities 
through a large distributed system creates problems of scalability, management and privacy 
that are outside the scope of this discussion, but the result is that this long-standing view of 
accountability is now better understood as two separate concerns: 
" accounting for use (and misuse) of resources [124]; and 
" the ability to hold people responsible for their actions [125]. 
Resources. Accounting for the use of resources is the traditional computer security 
perspective of accountability, but in a large system the `user' may be a member of a `virtual 
organization' or be identified by some enabling attributes rather than identity. The goal 
becomes one of accounting for the use of a resource and may be traceable to another 
organization, rather than to an individual. 
Personal Action. The goal of holding people responsible for their actions moves from 
the realm of computer security back out to the overall information system. This sense of 
accountability has a range of possible interpretations, ranging from hard contractual 
requirements to softer sociomethodological issues. 
The most straightforward form of accountability is to hold people responsible for the 
outcome of specific contracts; there are many examples of this in the literature, but they are 
most common in delegation structures (in healthcare delegation and accountability are 
synonymous [126]) and in the transactions between activities in business workflows [127]. 
Dourish considers the practical success of workflow enactment systems [128], and 
concludes that they have two functions, one is to organize the flow of work, but the second 
is to provide accountability. He provides the interesting example of the use of a workflow 
automation system to provide evidence of the efficiency and activity of a whole business, 
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not just to order or measure individual operations, in order to provide `open book' visibility 
to customers. 
As a business goal, accountability may need to be more pervasive. Eriksen [129] argues 
that accountability is about visibility of action, in particular between co-workers. At first 
sight this would seem to be an unlikely security goal, but the grid is about collaboration, 
and it is not difficult to imagine scenarios where accurate interpretation of others' actions is 
critical, for example surgery. Confirmation of this viewpoint comes from the peer-to-peer 
community whose need to distribute information to support fairness and common good 
[130] can be viewed in the same light. 
Summary. There are two distinct accountability goals, one to account for the use of 
resources, and one to support individual (social) accountability. The latter may include 
hierarchal employment contracts or process obligations, accountability for a whole business 
or process, or even provide visibility of action to co-workers. Again, the extent to which 
any of these are security, as opposed to functionality, goals, depends on their importance 
and the risk context of the system or business. 
2.4. Summary 
The conclusions of section 2.2 put security in perspective: 
The purpose of security is to protect assets against specific undesired outcomes 
(threats) resulting from intentioned acts. 
and 
Security is a relative rather than an absolute measure: a `secure' information system 
is one where the risks of specific undesired outcomes to its assets have been reduced 
to an acceptable level. 
The boundary between security and functionality is often a question of degree of risk. 
For example, relational integrity falls within security-motivated definitions of `consistency', 
but is usually regarded as a functional aspect of a system. This illustrates why it is not 
appropriate to define security in terms of mechanisms: relational integrity may be critical to 
one business (e. g. an accounting system), but not another (e. g. a grid data replication). 
The standard concerns (confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy, accountability) 
are useful keywords that can help elicit concerns relating to specific assets, but are not 
security goals, or measures of a `secure system', in any absolute sense. This is well 
illustrated by the history of confidentiality; the problem of obtaining a workable protection 
model for information flow demonstrates the futility of seeking perfect security at the 
system level, it is simply not that kind of property. (Of course, at the component level there 
is considerable utility in metrics that characterize the strength of security mechanisms, but 
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that is outside the scope of this discussion. ) It is encouraging that even the military may 
reach the same conclusion [71]. 
Critical Assets and Related Security Goals. The important questions are therefore 
what assets matter most in emerging systems, and which are most vulnerable to attack. 
Information systems are inevitably divided into domains, distinguished by who is able to 
administer their assets and protection mechanisms. Managing assets in these domains, and 
policing the domain boundary, is traditional security territory. However, emerging systems 
replace `an outsider' with `a collaborator', who may be a co-worker, customer, supplier or 
the mechanized or organizational equivalent. Accounting or workflow information that 
would previously have been internal to a domain now crosses the boundary, and in so doing 
becomes more vulnerable. In general, the assets in distributed systems that are most 
vulnerable are those that are transferred between security domains. 
Despite the diversity of systems and concerns discussed, most assets that flow across 
domain boundaries in these systems can be categorized as: 
" workflow Records; 
" electronic Products; 
" licenses; or 
" accounting or accountability information. 
Workflow records capture the status of a collaboration process; they represent the 
history to date and may also determine the next action. They may be as informal as an 
annotated document, or as formal as a purchase order. The primary security goals may be to 
ensure provenance and, particularly if future action is determined, the authority that 
motivates or authorizes action. 
Electronic products may include music, movies, academic documents, journals, research 
results, commercial reference data, database queries and other valuable industrial property. 
In general, the security goals for such items will be to ensure that they are only used for the 
purpose for which they have been distributed, to protect them against theft, plagiarism, 
duplication etc. 
Many interactions in distributed systems will require payment, or other evidence that the 
requester has the right to request action or data. This either requires the transfer of a 
license, or the transfer of some form of proof that a license agreement is in place. A license 
may take many forms, including electronic cash, transferable software licenses, an 
institutional subscription to a service, or even just proof of membership of an organization. 
Important security goals for licenses include protection against theft or forgery and 
accounting for their use (e. g. prevention of double spending). 
Accounting and accountability information may be needed for two reasons; the first is to 
account for the use of resources, perhaps for charging, but also to allow the traditional 
assignment of responsibility for action. The second is to ensure the visibility of user actions, 
58 Summary 
to support personal accountability in contracts, processes, or in social interaction with co- 
workers. 
Shared Assets. A shared asset is one that is distributed between several security 
domains, and where the degree of dependence means that its value is greater than the simple 
sum of its parts; the best examples involve linked data, such as experimental results and 
calibration data. If related assets are not located in a single organization's domain they are 
effectively the property of a `virtual organization' [24]. If this situation cannot be avoided 
(for short lived virtual organisations it may be best avoided) the virtual organization must 
recognize that it is an asset owner in its own right and will therefore need to independently 
consider and manage its own security risks. 
Other Security Goals. Privacy goals are often mandated by legislation or ethical 
constraint, so some security goals may be imposed on a system independent of business 
considerations. Depending on the business, other security goals may also be imposed by 
statute or industry practice, for example company accounting standards. 
Finally, although this summary has focused on key assets and related security goals, 
some goals are asset independent, in particular the conditioning of user behaviour, the 
detection of unusual activity, and the need to be able to recover from an attack. 
This chapter has focussed on the goals for security, the next is concerned with reviewing 
how security design has been achieved, or attempted, in the past. 
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Chapter 3. Approaches to the Design and Specification 
of Secure Systems 
Security design is concerned with determining the detailed security requirements that 
will be imposed on components of a system, given the security goals or objectives for the 
system as a whole. The types of system, and their security goals, are described in the last 
chapter, they include complex distributed systems supporting collaborative business 
processes. The purpose of this chapter is to review existing approaches to security design, 
and to assess their relevance to distributed systems. 
This chapter is organised into sections that describe a range of approaches to security 
engineering, as follows: 
" section 3.1. Security Assurance; 
" section 3.2. Risk Management; 
" section 3.3. Information System Polices; 
" section 3.4. Requirements Engineering; 
" section 3.5. Goal-based Refinement; 
" section 3.6. Formal Development Methods; and 
" section 3.7. Security Modelling. 
These approaches are not mutually exclusive; for example, security models are often 
used to define security properties that will be subject to formal development. Section 3.8 
presents detailed conclusions about how they relate to the engineering of secure distributed 
systems, and the chapter is briefly summarised in section 3.9. 
Definitions 
The meanings of goal and requirement depend upon the perspective of the writer. For 
the purpose of this thesis we take a requirement to signify an `operationalized requirement', 
that is an specific statement about a system that can be readily implemented and tested, and 
a goal to be a higher level objective. Operationalized security requirements are also known 
as control requirements. Note that security goals may give risk to both functional 
requirements (e. g. system backup) as well as functional constraints (e. g. access control). See 
the glossary for more information. 
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3.1. Security Assurance 
The first and most influential assurance standard for computer security was the TCSEC 
[51 ]; its function was to provide 
"a basis for the evaluation of [the] effectiveness of security controls built into 
automatic data processing system products ". 
This standard grouped security and assurance requirements together in four ascending 
classes, with some internal divisions, resulting in eight categories ranging from minimal to 
comprehensive security. 
Assurance that a system possesses the claimed degree of security is achieved by a 
combination of architectural features, management, and documentation of its life cycle; key 
factors are: 
" architecture (minimize the size and ensure the integrity of security critical domains; 
security management and system recovery features); 
" the design process (specification and verification); 
" testing; 
" searching for vulnerabilities (particularly `covert channels'); 
" trusted delivery mechanisms; and 
" operational configuration management. 
Higher categories of assurance require more security features and also higher quality in 
the assurance process; for example, the highest class requires the use of formal methods in 
the verification process (see section 3.6 below). In order to claim compliance with these 
standards, a manufacturer is required to submit a system to an independent, government 
controlled, evaluation. The evaluation process is founded on traditional quality practices, 
where quality is established by inspection of evidence produced during the design process, 
as well as by independent testing. 
Evolving Practice. The approach to evaluation has remained almost unchanged to the 
present; what has changed, however, is the approach to security requirements. Each class in 
the Orange Book specifies a set of security functions that are focused on confidentiality, 
supported by user identification and accountability. Quite soon after the production of the 
Orange book it became clear that the application of this standard to components other than 
stand-alone computers was not straightforward, so the US government issued interpretations 
that showed how the TCSEC could be applied in other circumstances; perhaps the most 
significant of these was the Red Book [94] that provided guidance for secure networks. 
Other nations, including the UK, addressed this problem by separating functionality 
requirements from those for assurance, resulting in a joint standard between France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom [95]. Eventually the current standard, 
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the Common Criteria [16], was agreed internationally; this also separates functionality and 
assurance, but makes TCSEC functionality available, if required. Manufacturers may now 
specify a protection profile (for example [131]) to define the security controls appropriate to 
a particular product. A protection profile is expected to justify its security requirements by a 
threat analysis of the target system. 
Limitations. This process is expensive for a developer, even in low assurance products 
[132], but it is able to assure the quality of critical system components. The artefacts 
required for evaluation are not design-process neutral, they effectively mirror the 
deliverables of the top-down processes that were current when the TCSEC was written, and 
may therefore be inconsistent with agile development projects [133]. The process of 
development and evaluation is also monolithic, for example, the target is subject to a single 
evaluation and must be maintained in the evaluated configuration. This is a problem for 
systems of any complexity; even carefully managed systems must evolve for operational 
reasons, and critical security components must be updated to correct newly discovered 
vulnerabilities. This problem is not surprising, since current evaluation standards are 
intended to produce re-useable components, but it does limit the usefulness of these 
standards in distributed system design. 
Summary. Security assurance standards have moved away from specifying predefined 
packages of security controls and now require a developer to demonstrate the link between 
assets, threats, and security functionality, but do not provide guidance on how that can be 
achieved. The evaluation process model is suitable for system components, but not for 
distributed systems. 
3.2. Risk Management 
In security terms, risk is a measure of the likelihood of a specific undesired outcome to a 
system asset. This likelihood depends on both the likelihood of an attack, and its probability 
of success, which may in turn depend on exploiting vulnerabilities within the system. The 
evaluation of risk takes both its likelihood and the impact of the potential outcome into 
account in judging the degree to which the risk should be mitigated. 
The value of risk-based reasoning is that it provides decision criteria for security 
requirements in their business and social context. It is widely regarded as the only viable 
method of providing a cost benefit justification for security controls, or alternatively, of 
judging which controls provide the most benefit. As a consequence, risk management is the 
basis of most national standards for information security management [125,134-136] and 
best practice [17,134], and is also a rational approach to broader security choices in society 
[54]. 
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These standards have the same underlying management process, which is to: 
" establish the system context; 
" identify assets, and undesired outcomes to those assets; 
" evaluate the risk of each threat to an asset, considering possible attacks and system 
vulnerabilities; 
" choose solutions, if they are warranted by the degree of risk; followed by 
" re-evaluation, implementation and operation. 
Differences between risk management methods include how risks are quantified, the 
degree of skill required by the practitioner, the degree to which the process is organization 
rather than system focused, and the degree of integration with engineering design methods. 
Evolution of Risk Management Methods. The subject has been summarized from an 
academic perspective by Baskerville [137] and from a practice viewpoint by Straub and 
Welke [138]. Baskerville's analysis is still particularly relevant. He describes the design 
approach to secure systems in three generations: the first is checklist based, the second 
engineering based and the third will use abstract reasoning. 
Checklist based systems allow designers to select from a (long) list of available security 
controls; these methods use risk analysis to quantify the value of security controls and limit 
the tendency to seek security perfection, but still operate bottom-up by considering controls 
for all possible elements of the system. 
Engineering methods are employed top-down, using the process management model 
outlined above, and are now supported with tools (current examples are CRAMM [139] and 
RiskWatch [140]). Most tools support databases of vulnerabilities and controls, and some 
include probability models for common security events. This style of risk management is as 
much the mainstream today as it was in 1993. 
Baskerville's final generation describes a vision that is still open, he suggests that it is 
necessary to move towards abstract models of systems that allow a combination of security 
design and stakeholder analysis, independent of physical implementation, with separate 
steps for physical realization and operational maintenance. This characterisation of the risk- 
management problem is one of the motivations for the SeDAn framework, since it identifies 
the scope for a fundamentally better approach to risk analysis. 
Best Operational Practice. The `checklist' approach is still used for operational 
analysis [17,52,141] at the organizational level. Some security goals are not directly 
related to assets, but to sociomethodological aspects of a business (for example, see 
availability 2.3.3, and accountability 2.3.5), and this implies that it is not possible to 
motivate all the important security goals from an asset based analysis. As a consequence 
checklists of good practice appear in many of the risk based methods. For example, the first 
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part of the British Standard [17] is a code of practice; it recommends that most 
organizations need at least the following security management controls: 
"a (high level) security policy document; 
" the allocation of security responsibilities; 
" information security education & training; 
" security incident reporting; and 
" business continuity management. 
These compare directly with the goals derived in the earlier discussion on availability 
(see section 2.3.3): to condition users' behaviour, detect security incidents, and recover 
from attacks. 
Some risk methods distinguish between `strategic' and `tactical' change [52], the former 
is about long term adherence to best practice, while the latter is concerned with mitigating 
defects determined during an operational risk assessment. Adherence to best practice is 
determined by structured stakeholder questionnaires aimed at matching business 
performance against practice norms, or more open ended enquiries (such as "what is the 
worst possible business event", "... most likely event") [138]. 
Quantification of Risk. One unresolved problem is how to quantify risk. Most methods 
take the perspective that it is infeasible to provide good estimates of probability, given poor 
historical statistics, the large combination of possible attacks, vulnerabilities and controls, 
and the difficulty of quantifying potential losses These methods use restricted linguistic 
quantification scales (e. g. Low/Medium/High). On the other hand, tools and methods that 
are intended to support the financial community [138,140,142] attempt to determine return 
on investment (ROI) by comparing the estimated cost and likelihood of security incidents 
with the cost of controls. Proponents of numerical quantification argue that better risk 
methods will only emerge if companies find ways to share security statistics [143]. 
Integration of Risk with other methods. Recent work on risk is typified by the 
CORAS European research project [144-146]; this has not sought to introduce any new 
approaches, but to integrate risk and engineering models by providing process metamodels 
and threat stereotypes for UML, and by investigating how various methods from the safety 
and risk community (e. g. failure mode analysis, fault tree analysis) can be utilized in e- 
commerce risk assessment [147]: 
"CORAS is based on the hypothesis that ... combining existing [methods] ... will 
improve the state of art methodology for risk analysis of security critical systems. " 
While consolidation and cross-fertilization is valuable, this approach increases the 
internal detail employed in risk analysis, rather than necessarily improving the quality of its 
abstraction. E-commerce is also a theme in other threat methods (e. g. [142]) but few new 
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insights have emerged, other than the need to deal with rapidly changing threats and 
vulnerabilities arising from a dynamic operational environment. 
Summary. Risk analysis, in some form, may be the only rational decision tool that 
allows the value of security controls to be judged in context. There are well-established 
methods and tools that can be applied to organizations as a whole and, to a lesser extent, to 
the information system development processes. There is little evidence that these methods 
can deal with collaborative situations, and current methods produce highly detailed analyses 
that are difficult to relate to the non-physical stages of system design. Baskerville's vision 
of reasoning about security design via abstractions that are independent of physical 
deployment is still relevant and important, but little progress has been made in that 
direction. 
3.3. Information System Policies 
In the same way that goals and requirements can be expressed at different levels, so can 
policies; they range from high level organizational statements or goals of intent [135], to 
detailed sets of rules [19] about how an information system should be constrained. The 
ITSEC [95] distinguishes between two levels of policy: 
"[Corporate policy is] the set of laws, rules, and practices that regulate how assets 
including sensitive information are managed, protected, and distributed within an 
organization. " 
"[Technical policy is] the set of laws, rules, and practices regulating the processing 
of sensitive information and the use of resources by the hardware and software of an 
information technology system or product. " 
Management policies are a well-established part of corporate IT governance; however, 
most policy development has focussed on Information System policies, which are technical 
policies, or sets of rules at the same level of detail as operationalized requirements. The 
close relationship between these rules and access control mechanisms has led to a number 
of distributed access control systems that directly `implement policy' [148-152] and 
languages that express policy constraints [153-155]. These systems allow assertions 
(permissions, delegations, identities) to be expressed in policy languages that can be used 
directly to manage operational access. Despite the flexibility and usefulness of these 
systems, we recall a previous conclusion that equating security with access control is a 
flawed concept (see section 2.2). 
Approaches to the Design and Specification of Secure Systems 65 
There may also be difficulties formulating the policy in the first place, Dhillon remarks 
that 
"achieving consensus regarding safeguards for an information system among 
different stakeholders in an organization, has become more difficult than solving 
many of the technical problems that might arise "[23]. 
This difficulty can be seen in an important practical example of a healthcare policy 
formulated by Anderson [73] and the subsequent report on its implementation [156]. 
Contradictions and emergencies that arise in the working environment are dealt with by 
providing for rules that can be over-ridden, and the stakeholder requirements of a hospital 
environment are sufficiently complex for access control information to be carried as part of 
individual patient data. Other forms of information policy have been proposed, including 
authorizations flowing in a workflow environment [157] and the integration of access 
control with provisioning (e. g. choice of algorithm or resource) [158]. These all illustrate 
that practical policies are not simple, and they need to be flexible enough to deal with 
operational emergencies and exceptions. 
Role based policies. Many authors propose a risk management approach to formulating 
policies [159-161] but the distinctive contribution of the policy community has been to 
relate access rules to the responsibility and authority structure of businesses in terms of 
roles, rather than individuals [162-166]. This simplifies access control rules, and seeks to 
match them better to stakeholders' requirements. Generally, roles are attributes assigned to 
individuals, and they are often arranged hierarchically to facilitate delegation or upward 
substitution of tasks. Separation of duties is an inherent problem that is discussed by most 
authors, and the schemes usually embed rules that can enforce this concern. 
An alternative perspective can be seen in the OASIS model [167] that has taken the 
small but distinctive step of regarding roles as system services (i. e. actions permitted to a 
user) rather than fixed user attributes; this allows the context in which a user assumes a role 
to be varied under the policy, providing flexibility that is hard to achieve otherwise. 
Policy Obligations. Access management policies characterise the authority permitted to 
system users; some authors have proposed that obligations are also needed for information 
system management [153,168,169]. Strens' work [168] illustrates the relevance of this 
idea, since delegation of responsibility in an organization is usually accompanied by 
specific obligations. Obligations have also been extended to distributed systems, essentially 
by modelling domains or communities of users [170,171]. Lupu's small-scale healthcare 
example [171] makes an interesting contrast with Anderson's policy, described above [73]. 
The potential implementation problem with obligations is that they are more dynamic than 
role based access rules, and those suggested by Lupu are quite fine-grain. In the realistic 
healthcare system described by Anderson it is hard to see how such dynamic fine grain 
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policies could be used to achieve an intuitively appealing model of stakeholder concerns. 
In 
other words, it may be more effective to specify general rules, and ensure that individuals 
who over-ride the rules are accountable for their actions, rather than to try to encode and 
enforce the range of dynamic system policies implied by exceptional circumstances. 
A related approach, motivated by the workflow community, is to define access control 
in terms of tasks [38]. In formal workflows, tasks are statically defined obligations that are 
dynamically assigned to users by the enactment process. The distinction between a person 
assigned to a task, and someone with the role that allows the task to be assigned, may allow 
a simpler policies to be written in some circumstances. This approach may be less dynamic 
than the use of obligations, but shares the practical disadvantage that the required protection 
mechanisms depend on the integrity of potentially complex process management systems. 
Summary. The mainstream policy community has demonstrated the value of 
substituting roles or user attributes for identities in order to achieve an intuitive mapping 
between business needs and information policies, but the practical value of extending this 
work to represent management obligations or process tasks is an open question. Current 
implementations of distributed access control policies, also known as trust management 
systems, can incorporate arbitrary attributes and assertions, and capture a wide range of 
authorisation policy. Policy languages are an effective way of encoding users' authority, but 
they have the weakness that this is only one aspect of the security problem. 
3.4. Requirements Engineering 
A general survey of security requirements engineering is included in Antbn's paper on 
goal refinement [172] and the full breadth of requirements engineering approaches and 
issues are described by Jarke, Burbenko et al [173]. The challenge is to integrate security, 
or more generally non-functional requirements, into the requirements development process; 
at present no requirements methodology meets this challenge [174]. This section describes 
some approaches to security within conventional requirements engineering, the next deals 
with the distinct topic of goal based refinement. 
Abuse Scenarios. An important requirements elucidation technique is scenario (or use- 
case) management [175] and McDermott and Fox [176] have suggested a security 
equivalent: 
"We can describe abuse cases in exactly the same way that we describe use cases. 
However ... a use case description centers around a single abstract transaction or 
sequence of events, because a use case describes a desired interaction. On the other 
hand, because we are not sure where flaws will occur, an abuse case describes a 
family of undesirable interactions... " 
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McDermott succinctly describes the concept of abuse cases, and its main problem: his 
paper describes the practice of representing abuse cases as a tree of possibilities -a 
construct that is closer to Fault Tree Analysis than requirements capture using scenarios. 
Subsequent attempts to bring the two closer [177] have avoided this problem by setting 
abuse as a dual of use: seeking an abuse action that would deny each action in the 
corresponding use case. Unfortunately, this approach directs stakeholder concerns toward 
functions and mechanisms (e. g. deny ability to drive car), rather than assets and objectives 
(e. g. prevent car theft), which are the established focus for risk management. Abuse cases 
have the merit of using common requirements tools and languages, including UML, but the 
focus on functions may distract stakeholders from simpler and more general expressions of 
their security concerns. Abuse cases are, essentially, security stories, so they may be more 
valuable in eliciting scenarios that identify attackers and their motivation than sources of 
detailed security requirements. 
Integrating Security with Functional Refinement Both Moffett [178] and Cysneiros 
[179] suggest refining security and functionality goals separately, and merging the resulting 
requirements. Moffett works with an elaboration of Jackson's Problem Frames [180] and 
argues that security controls can be defined as constraints on functional requirements. This 
provides a conceptual basis for combining security controls with operationalized 
functionality requirements. 
Cysneiros works within a conventional object development model and uses a common 
ontology to consolidate operationalized security requirements with a UML class model of 
the system's functionality. He allows security controls to constrain operations, but notes 
that a significant number of operations are also added when the two models are merged. 
Other researchers have similarly concluded that security adds functional as well as non- 
functional requirements [ 181 ]. 
Both these approaches have the merit that they combine well-understood engineering 
methods for functional and non-functional design, and therefore represent the current state 
of art. The shared weakness is that there is no opportunity for the refinement of security and 
functional goals to influence each other, since they are carried out separately. Conflicts 
between requirements can be resolved by iterating one or both of these refinements, but less 
obvious potential tradeoffs and interactions (complexity, cost, synergy) are likely to be 
missed. 
3.5. Goal Based Refinement 
Goal based refinement is a process that links high level system goals to operationalized 
requirements (see definition in the introduction of this chapter). This has a number of 
advantages: it allows the expression of stable abstract goals about the information system, 
distinguishes clearly between these and requirements, and provides traceability between the 
two. The seminal paper by Dardenne, Lamsweerde and Fickas, written as part of the KAOS 
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project [182], and a recent review [183] by Lamsweerde, describe the breadth of the topic 
and practical industrial experience in its application. Lamsweerde also provides motivation 
for the use of high-level goals, including their ability to provide precise criteria for the 
completeness and the pertinence of the resulting requirements. 
The goal-based method constructs a directed graph, in which the nodes are goals and the 
edges reflect relationships in the direction of refinement; for example, a goal may be linked 
to a conjunction, or disjunction, of sub-goals. The final goals in the graph are 
operationalized requirements (i. e. goals stated in concrete terms). Goal based refinement is, 
essentially, an analysis process, so high level goals may be deduced by a review of 
stakeholder requirements for intentional words, or combined with other processes such as 
scenario analysis [184,185]. The refinement process may be informal [186] or formal 
[187]; one interesting approach is to re-use formally proven templates as refinement 
patterns [184]. 
Introducing Security. Goals may have attributes, and these can include relationships, 
constraints and pre and post conditions, as well as the system objects over which the goal 
may range. Goal attributes have been used by a number of authors to specify general non- 
functional requirements [188,189] and both Chung [190] and Anton and Earp [172] address 
security. 
Chung gives a separate graph for security constraints (e. g. introducing relationships, 
such as `security' = integrity & confidentiality & availability); one of his principal 
refinement operations is to satisfy a goal by linking it to a set of subgoals determined by the 
substitution of an alternative level in this security hierarchy. Ant6n treats the process more 
informally, driving the refinement by process heuristics, including checks to ensure 
consistency between functional and security goals. 
The detection of inconsistency, and synergy, is an important topic in goal-based 
refinement, and no consensus has yet emerged. Approaches include marking potential 
inconsistencies with explicit relations and assigning a priority ordering to requirements to 
specify precedence in the event of conflict. 
The goal community has recently begun to consider objects that are nearer to the assets 
understood by the security community [191,192]; this is an important step forward, but has 
yet to be reconciled with risk as the value-criterion, or with standard system engineering 
functional design practice. 
Summary. Goal based refinement is promising, since it promises an integrated process 
for security and functionality requirements. In its present form, however, it is unrelated to 
security risk, and limited in its ability to reason about system design. The literature also has 
difficulty in providing examples of meaningful security goals ('security' is not particularly 
helpful; neither, as we have seen in chapter 2, is `confidentiality' or `integrity'). 
Nevertheless, the process of establishing high level system goals and decomposing these 
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goals into asset-based objectives is a key contribution to the system development cycle; 
these reservations suggest that goal refinement will have more limited use in transforming 
high level security objectives to operationalized requirements. 
3.6. Formal Development Methods 
Most attempts to use formal methods for security at the system level have followed the 
requirements established by the TCSEC for class Al [51]. Essentially, this requires a formal 
top-level specification of a system, which is shown to comply with a formal security model. 
The security model comprises an abstract model of the system together with some security 
properties that constrain its behaviour. Compliance with the specification is shown 
informally, and supported by documentation and testing to provide confidence that the 
security properties hold for the implementation. 
These requirements were followed by more detailed guidance on tools [193] and 
methods [194]. The latter (see also chapter 4 of [195]) sought to overcome technical 
problems in refining security properties [196] and also introduced partial proofs to make the 
development process more predictable in an engineering environment. 
Limitations. A detailed and influential review of the effectiveness of this approach by 
Shaefer [197], highlights a number of key weaknesses in the TCSEC approach, including: 
" difficulty in establishing true correspondence between formal and informal artefacts; 
" incompleteness (the TCSEC requires the Trusted Computing Base to be specified 
formally, not the complete system); and 
" technical difficulties with formal methods. 
The correspondence problem is both a technical issue, and a problem in communicating 
subtleties between mathematicians and implementers; Shaefer comments: 
"These observations seriously beg the question of the value of formally verified 
specifications if such specifications neither serve as the basis for coding nor as a 
formal basis for determining that the subtleties of system source code are 
semantically linked to the subtleties of formally proven abstract specifications or to 
the subtleties of the design" 
It is natural to consider if this problem can be resolved by extending formal methods to 
other parts of the lifecycle (e. g. from specification to implementation); this was considered 
at the time that the TCSEC was written, but discounted as beyond the state of art for 
realistically sized systems. Shaefer records a more recent consensus on scalability: 
"Many experts estimate the maximum number of lines of formally verified 
specifications or code that could be produced if all the nation's experts were to pool 
their resources to be well under 50,000 lines per annum. " 
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He also notes practical problems with implementing information-flow style policies; in 
particular that certain areas of code contain a `superabundance' of flows that make it 
difficult to distinguish between harmful and harmless information flows. Rushby's [198] 
suggestion that security should focus on a `separation kernel', which would have simpler 
properties, would mitigate this problem, but at the expense of excluding important areas of 
security policy from the analysis. 
Summary. The use of a formal design process is not yet practical for large secure 
systems. Note that these reservations apply to formal design, as required by security 
standards. Formally based analysis processes, such as model checking and static analysis, 
have proved successful on larger systems and code bases, in both security and safety 
applications, but that is beyond the scope of this review. 
3.7. Security Modelling 
There is a huge literature dedicated to security models, much of which is concerned with 
the definition of confidentiality, or `non-disclosure'. Some authors do not distinguish 
between the type of model described here and the more application oriented descriptions of 
policy described in section 3.3. For example, Anderson describes a `security policy model' 
as: 
"a succinct statement of protection properties ... Its 
key points can typically be 
written down in a page or less. " (see section 7.2 of [199]) 
However, the policy models described in section 3.3 tend to be less succinct and more 
application oriented, those described here are generally very abstract, and often limited to a 
single type of security property. 
The earliest security models were formulated as an access control matrix, following the 
seminal work of Lampson on operating system protection domains [200]; the most 
influential model was due to Bell and LaPadula [201] and the inclusion of its requirements 
in the TCSEC [51] ensured that it has remained the most common point of reference for 
implementation (e. g. [202]). The Bell-LaPadula model expresses security as set of 
constraints on low level system operations (e. g. write, execute, read) and it enforces a 
mandatory security policy by ensuring that read and write operations only result in the flow 
of data to objects of equal or higher classification that its source. 
The Bell-LaPadula model has a concept of a `trusted subject' (one that was allowed to 
downgrade the classification of data); this is structurally useful, since it allows evaluators to 
readily identify privileged software, but as Landwehr observes [203], it is also clear that 
without trusted subjects this model is too restrictive, and with them it is not restrictive 
enough; in other words some policy constraints could usefully be applied to the `trusted' 
parts of the system. Landwehr's response to this problem is the first application-specific 
model. He provides a clearly structured informal model, with a formal counterpart to allow 
Approaches to the Design and Specification of Secure Systems 71 
analysis of security assertions; his security definitions take the application into account, for 
example they include data structures (containers) that hold messages of several 
classifications at once. This model is a landmark development, unfortunately its closest 
descendents are the application specific policies (see section 3.3) rather than subsequent 
work on security modelling. 
At the same time the `non-interference' model was produced by Goguen and Meseguer 
[70]. This provided a framework for writing security properties (for example, see [204]) 
although it has mostly been applied to confidentiality. It uses an abstract, rather than an 
operational, model of a system, but the authors showed that the two could be related by 
`unwinding' [205], that is, fording operational constraints that satisfy abstract non- 
interference non-disclosure properties. A more recent paper on what can be enforced by an 
operational policy concludes that unwinding is not possible for all information flow policies 
[206]. 
Another model that is often regarded as significant, although little direct development 
has followed, is the Clark-Wilson model for integrity [84]. Its value is that it addresses 
integrity, as opposed to confidentiality, and it enforces policy via `permitted 
transformations'. This model essentially provides an abstract protection model, since no 
specific policies are mandated. 
Reviews of this early work abound [207,208]. LaPadula [208] observes that the 
traditional emphasis of models has been on internal or operational requirements, and gives a 
taxonomy of other `stages of elaboration' that deserve more attention, including enterprise 
descriptions, trust objectives and external interface requirements. 
Further definitions of Information Flow. Most subsequent work on modelling has 
followed from non-interference and dealt with variations of the non-disclosure problem - 
policies that are slightly stronger or weaker in various regards, or that allow some non- 
determinism, particularly in input streams. Early variants were Sutherland's work on non- 
deducability ('low' users should not be able to deduce anything about `high' users) [209] 
and McCullough's `hook-up' model [210]. The significance of the hook-up model is that it 
raised the question of composability by making a case that it is not possible to compose 
non-interference secure subsystems into a secure system. This question has not been fully 
resolved, for example, Williams [211] discusses hook-up security but also highlights a 
further problem: covert channels due to execution timing. 
Concerns about non-deterministic input, or the issue of inference, have given rise to a 
further range of models that fall into two types: possibilistic [212,213] and probabilistic 
[61,62]. Possibilistic models define properties in terms of all possible traces that may result 
from an input; probabilistic models try to quantify information flow using standard 
information theoretic measures. 
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In summary, despite much work, there is no universal or satisfactory security model of 
information flow, but standard (probabilistic) information measures can be used as metrics 
for the strength of information flow mechanisms. 
Privacy. Recently, researchers have proposed models of privacy; predominantly these 
express privacy as the number of individuals in a given set from which an individual can be 
distinguished using known attributes or measurements [214,215]. The degree of privacy is 
located in a lattice over the set of possible identities (i. e. top is identification as a single 
individual and bottom is unable to distinguish an individual from any other), making the 
comparison of measurements and similarly expressed policies tractable in the same way that 
classification and clearance can be compared to manage confidentiality (see section 2.3.1 
and [69]). Lattice based policies have also been used to encode purpose [216); this model 
assigns lattices to both `well formed transformations' and also privacy data, in order to 
establish an authorization relationship between them. The similarity between these models 
and mandatory access (non-disclosure) policies is striking, some authors even identify the 
need for privacy labels to be attached to mobile data [217]. 
The `degree of set membership' approach to quantifying privacy has been convincingly 
challenged from an information theoretic perspective [63,64] and it seems likely that 
information measures will be more valuable for quantifying privacy, even if they do not 
provide a template for implementation. 
These approaches to privacy have strong parallels with confidentiality models, but other 
approaches describe abstract systems that simply provide various types of anonymity. The 
most influential of these is Chaum's mix network [218], which prevents an observer linking 
the sender and receiver of a given message by preventing the message from being 
distinguished from many others. Many anonymity implementations can be modeled as mix 
networks, although they may not have been derived in that way (see [219] pp127-137, 
[2201), and unlinkability can be used as the basis of system-level privacy models [5]. 
Trust. Pervasive system researchers are concerned about the broad question of trust. 
Several researchers [221-224] have suggested that trust should be regarded as a metric of 
the expected behaviour of a remote device, or group of devices; trust metrics of this sort 
could support risk management by providing an estimate of the likelihood of security- 
relevant events. Typically, many trust recommendations are combined to provide a metric 
for the expected outcome of an interaction, similar in principle to the trust model between 
users on web-based auction sites [225]. There is little known about the emergent behaviour 
of such protocols, but convergence of trust estimates in such a network is possible, given a 
low proportion of malicious nodes [226], or restricted types of policy [227]. These 
connections between trust protocols and system properties are interesting, but it is too early 
to judge their potential value in system development. 
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Summary. Most security models, including those for privacy, have been directed 
toward information flow and they are of value in refining security concepts and quantifying 
the quality of individual security mechanisms. Unfortunately, little of this work is directly 
applicable to the design process for distributed systems: 
" there is no generally accepted definition for information flow; all the proposals have 
strengths and weaknesses; 
" the problems of dealing with exceptions (trusted subjects) in stand-alone machines will 
predominate in large systems; and 
" partitioning or composing components with information flow properties has not been 
resolved, it varies depending upon the chosen model. 
There are few results that link trust models and protocols to the system level, but trust 
measures have the potential to contribute to risk assessments, so these models may become 
more significant as they mature. 
3.8. Conclusions 
The degree to which the TCSEC [51] has been cited indicates its importance as a 
milestone in the development of secure systems, but most of the methods that originate 
from that source (assurance, formal development, security modelling) are more appropriate 
for the development of security components or mechanisms, rather than distributed systems. 
The difficulty in using information flow based models for distributed system development 
is equivalent to the problem of refinement from those models, which is well summarized by 
Jacob [196]: 
"... in general, we cannot break a security specification, expressed as an intersection 
of ignorances, into pieces and carry out a simple stepwise refinement" 
None of the other approaches to secure system specification or development provide a 
solution to the problem of partitioning and developing operationalized requirements for 
distributed systems, but they each contribute important ideas: 
Risk management provides decision criteria that allow security needs (goals and, 
subsequently, requirements and mechanisms) to be judged in the context of system 
stakeholders' concerns about their assets. These methods need to be developed to apply 
to virtual or collaborative situations, and better abstractions are needed to prevent the 
analysis of large systems from being overwhelmed with detail. Baskerville's vision of 
reasoning about security design via abstractions that are independent of physical 
deployment is still relevant and important, but little progress has been made in that 
direction. This possibility is one of the motivations for the SeDAn framework, since it 
identifies the scope for a fundamentally better approach to risk analysis. 
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Policy focused research has established the need to match security goals and constraints 
to business models. Although this work has focused on access style policies and 
(mostly) hierarchical business models, there are examples of policies for health systems 
and workflow that illustrate the possibility of compact, but relatively complete, 
statements of requirement for realistic systems. Perhaps the most significant 
development needed in this area is a better understanding of collaboration and 
distributed business models. 
Requirements engineering provides a bridge to standard system engineering practice, 
and several of the recent ideas in this field have the potential to assist distributed system 
design. The most promising is goal-based refinement, since it provides clarity about the 
nature of system goals and objectives, although its use to develop operationalized 
security requirements may be limited. 
From the perspective of secure system development there is a considerable difference in 
philosophy between the risk-management approach and the others, all of which seek to 
develop security requirements in a top-down fashion. In a risk-based method a security 
requirement is only needed if it adds value to the system, in the sense that the cost of the 
mechanism is justified in terms of the risk it mitigates; a system will not necessarily include 
mechanisms to support all the possible security objectives, or defend against all possible 
attacks. Almost without exception, the other approaches to security try to be `complete', in 
the sense that they result in a full implementation of all possible security requirements, and 
this is a fundamental source of weakness. 
In the non-security literature, researchers have identified the need to integrate security 
into the design process [228,229]. There are a few instances where this has been attempted 
[230,231], usually by adding non-function attributes to UML designs, but the most relevant 
work has been carried out by the requirements community and is summarized in sections 
3.4. and3.5. 
In his review of requirements engineering, Nuseibeh lists challenges, which include: 
" "bridging the gap between requirements elicitation approaches based on contextual 
enquiry and more formal specifications and analysis techniques; 
" richer models for capturing and analysing non-functional requirements; and 
" better understanding of the impact of software architectural choices on the 
prioritization and evolution of requirements. " [228] 
Devanbu identifies some very similar needs: 
" "integrating Security Considerations smoothly into early life-cycle activities 
" unified modeling approaches to integrate the engineering of both functional 
requirements and security requirements. 
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" the development of architectures and designs that are easier to adapt to rapidly 
evolving security policies. " [229] 
It is significant how well these views reflect the perspective of security engineering 
presented in this chapter. The problem of how to manage the early part of the design 
process in a large distributed system, integrating both security and functionality to derive 
operationalized requirements at the level of individual systems or services, remains an open 
question. Risk-based approaches offer significant advantages, since they provide metrics for 
the value of security requirements, but the system abstractions and abstract reasoning 
needed for mature use of risk-analysis have yet to be developed. The integration of security 
and mainstream system engineering is an important area for development. 
3.9. Summary 
A range of development approaches are used in security system engineering, and they 
are not mutually exclusive, for example security modelling may be followed by a formal 
design process, or policy development may be used to set a protection strategy which is 
later subject to risk analysis. Most of these approaches originate from the assurance 
requirements of the TCSEC [94], which are now embodied in the Common Criteria [16], 
and none provide a fully satisfactory approach to the design of systems, particularly large 
distributed systems. 
Risk analysis is different and important, because, unlike the top-down methods, it places 
a value on security requirements: security features are only required if they are justified by 
the risks they defend, and if there are no simpler and cheaper ways of mitigating the same 
risk outside the system (e. g. by insurance). However, risk analysis has progressed little 
beyond checklist-based approaches; the vision for how risk-based analysis should develop 
is characterised by Baskerville: 
"The principal objective of third-generation design methods is the abstraction of the 
problem and solution space. The most effective means of discovering the ideal 
solution is achieved by modelling the essential attributes of the information problem, 
and its solution. " [1371 
This vision is still open, but it identifies the scope for a fundamentally better approach to 
risk analysis using system abstractions, and is an important motivation for the framework 
described in the remainder of this thesis. 
The remaining chapters in this part of the thesis explore the models and requirements for 
an improved approach to security design. The next chapter considers the value of reasoning 
about systems early in their lifecycle, and shows that it is both possible, and worthwhile, to 
analyse security in a high-level system design. 
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Chapter 4. Good and Bad Security Design 
Security analysis of a system implies that it is possible to reason about security in a 
high-level design; it is not sufficient to simply decompose systematic security goals into 
operationalized requirements, it is also necessary to assess the quality of the resulting 
security design. Defects introduced in the early part of a system's lifecycle are both 
expensive and difficult to redress later, and security defects may become so deeply 
embedded that they are prohibitively expensive to mitigate [232]. 
But is this possible? Security is about the whole system environment - the business 
processes, guards and gates - as well as Information Systems. Potential vulnerabilities, that 
are an important part of classical risk-analysis, are features of an implementation, not a 
design. The information system design is therefore only part of the security picture; even 
setting aside the business environment, both the implementation of a system and its 
subsequent deployment introduce new security risks and requirements. So the question 
remains: given a high-level system design, is there enough information available to make 
value judgements about security, and are these productive in terms of the quality and 
security of the resulting system? 
The purpose of this chapter is to show by example that it is possible to reason about 
security in a system design, and that this is productive, because security problems can be 
both recognised and corrected at this stage. The sections that follow give examples of 
reasonable high-level functional design patterns that have poor security properties, and 
show how they can be corrected. These patterns are just elements of a design; the chapter 
finishes by giving two practical examples of applications built using these patterns: a 
payment process and a formal business-to-business workflow. As well as showing that it is 
possible to use `good' design patterns in practice, these worked examples also illustrate the 
level of detail needed in a system design: there must be just sufficient detail to show the 
major functional breakdown of the system and expose the critical internal assets. 
This chapter: 
" clarifies what is meant by a System Design; 
" shows that it is possible to recognise, and correct, security problems in such a design; 
" describes patterns of good security design, and discusses their application; and 
" shows that individual design patterns can be combined to implement complete 
applications. 
From the security perspective, the assets that matter most in emerging systems are those 
that cross boundaries between organisations (see section 2.4), and these include documents 
that record and implement distributed workflows. For example, in a business-to-business 
environment these documents include contracts, purchase orders, invoices, and payments. 
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Distributed workflow systems are therefore an important class of system; they are widely 
used to implement business functionality, and where they bridge collaborating organisations 
they naturally include security concerns. For this reason, this chapter uses workflow as a 
concrete point of reference; the design examples are typical of those proposed in the 
literature on workflow security, and the worked examples illustrate both a conventional 
(enterprise) workflow application, and a collaborative distributed system. 
In detail, this chapter is organised as follows: 
" section 4.1 describes what is meant by System Design. Although the applications will 
vary, the criteria introduced here define the level of design used throughout this thesis; 
" section 4.2 describes the background to security in workflow systems, including typical 
security requirements and existing technical approaches. This briefly identifies the 
security issues that are discussed in section 4.4; 
" section 4.3 introduces security design principles. The rest of this thesis is concerned 
with systematically evaluating security in a system design, but this chapter must rely on 
established, but ad-hoc, design criteria; 
" section 4.4 is the core of this chapter; it gives examples of problem templates (patterns) 
that are reasonable from a functional perspective, but not consistent with the security 
principles outlined in section 4.3. For each problem template, design patterns are given 
that have similar functionality, but improved security characteristics. Application notes 
relate each problem and its solution to workflow systems; 
" section 4.5 provides two concrete examples that show how the preferred design patterns 
of the previous section can be used in complete applications. These examples are both 
workflow systems; the first is a payment system and the second shows a diagnostic 
collaboration between two organisations; and 
" section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
Supplementary material can be found in appendix A, which describes the diagram 
conventions used in this chapter. 
4.1. What Is a System Design? 
Both the requirements engineering and the security policy approaches to secure system 
engineering (see chapter 3) establish operationalized requirements, or control requirements 
in security terms, which are claims about a system that can be readily tested. Policies and 
requirements can both exist at several levels of abstraction, from general business goals to 
very detailed implementation requirements (see section 3.3). Here we will use the term goal 
for top-level objectives that are not specific to any given implementation, and requirement 
for specific claims about a system or its parts that can be directly tested in an 
implementation. 
Goals may be subject to analysis, which furthers the understanding of the business 
problem, but the process of developing requirements is one of design: decisions are made 
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about the functional breakdown of the system, resulting in an implementation model to 
which requirements can be attached. 
Object oriented enthusiasts may object that `functional breakdown' implies a specific 
design methodology; this is not the intention. Object orientation may help with the analysis 
of some systems, but at this level it is just another way of partitioning a system for 
implementation. By `functional breakdown' we simply mean the decomposition of a 
system into parts against which testable requirements can be readily expressed. 
For example, consider a business goal to obtain payment for goods that have been sold. 
Business analysis adds to the understanding of the goal and its environment by establishing 
the types of good, the types of purchaser and the likely means of invoicing and payment. 
The next step, creating a business process that implements the goal, is design. Choices 
must be made about the business functions that will support the goal, the transactions or 
services they offer, and the records that flow between them. This is a high-level system 
design: it shows the big picture of how the goal will be implemented, and identifies the 
primary concrete assets in the system. No mention has yet been made of information 
technology: the business functions may be implemented by manual processes or contractual 
arrangements, as well as automated information flows. The primary concern of this thesis is 
to design information systems, but there is no reason in principle to prevent the same 
approach being used for other types of implementation. 
One result of a design process is that it exposes a new level of detail, and therefore a 
more detailed account of the assets in a system. This is true at all levels of design, but the 
assets exposed by the system design are particularly interesting from a security viewpoint, 
because they are more meaningful in business terms than subsequent implementation detail. 
For example, the design of the payment workflow exposes internal documents (ledgers, 
authorisations) that are relevant to the business, since they record the partial execution of 
contracts. If the payment system was a business-to-business system, rather than an 
enterprise system, then the scope of internal assets exposed in this way could be even wider; 
they may include letters of credit, invoices and contracts. Some of these assets may be 
indirectly referenced by a system goal (e. g. reconcile payments with company accounts), 
but this is a different matter from identifying the actual ledger on which payments are 
recorded, and its security concerns. Exposing concrete assets in this way is therefore useful 
in its own right: it is easier to elicit stakeholder security concerns given specific assets, than 
to draft meaningful and precise goals in abstract. 
On the other hand, a detailed design may expose implementation features that are hard 
to associate with business goals. Infrastructure items such as PKI management software 
(public key repositories etc), application servers, and databases, are hard to relate directly to 
business concerns; they may have tangible value, but this may be only incidental to the 
business. The same can be said of all detailed design, some features (e. g. the usability of an 
interface) are of interest to stakeholders; however, the more detailed the design becomes the 
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harder it is for business stakeholders to reason about the significance of the design artefacts 
in business terms. 
These considerations establish criteria for a System Design that is appropriate for 
security analysis: 
9 the functional structure of the system should be exposed, in particular identifying 
significant internal business assets and their use; 
" sufficient functionality should be included to allow requirements to be expressed in 
operational terms; in other words it must be possible to identify requirements with 
specific system functions, and subsequently test that they have been met; and 
9 the design should not include infrastructure, or design features, that are distant from the 
business stakeholders' understanding of their requirements. 
Modern design practice separates design and implementation from deployment; this 
promotes independence between design and infrastructure, and allows more flexibility in 
the lifecycle of an application. For example, applications designed to support a small 
number of users from a single in-house web-server can be re-deployed to a cluster to extend 
the service to a large customer base, or services deployed in the context of one application 
can be re-used in a completely different situation, perhaps changing the mappings between 
the service and the user roles in the system environment. Focussing on the analysis of a 
system design is consistent with this separation of application and deployment: it allows the 
analysis of the application, without commitment to a particular deployment. 
System specifications that directly describe business processes are a possible type of 
system design. For example, in web-services technology, business processes are often 
implemented via specialised workflow descriptions that specify process flow, the services 
that implement the workflow, and the documents that flow between the services (for 
example, BPEL4WS [233]). This level of description is consistent with the system designs 
described here: it shows the major services in a system in sufficient detail to allow the 
placement of operationalized requirements, and exposes assets that flow between the 
services, many of which can be directly understood by business stakeholders. 
In summary: 
"a high level design is one that exposes the main functional breakdown of the system, 
sufficient to express meaningful requirements and expose the principal internal assets; 
and 
" the benefit of this level of design is that it is deployment neutral, consistent with the 
descriptions used to define web-services and business processes, and can be readily 
understood by business customers. 
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4.2. Overview of Workflow Security 
Definitions. A Workflow process, or just process describes the requirement for a 
managed and structured flow of work and documents; workflow processes include formal 
procedures such as contractual exchanges [39], as well as less structured collaborations 
[128]. A workflow sub-system, or component implements the planning and enactment of a 
process, usually with other functions. A workflow service is a workflow component 
deployed as a standard service in a service-based architecture. A control is a protection 
feature, or countermeasure, intended to counter a security threat; controls are usually 
constraints on the system functions, for example access controls. 
In addition to their core planning and enactment processes, workflow sub-systems 
provide a range of supporting functions [234], including: 
" user interface management, to provide notification to users involved in the workflow, 
filtered views of tasks and progress, and access to results and applications; 
" application launching, to implement automated steps in a workflow plan; and 
" monitoring, to provide an overview of the performance of the system and of individual 
processes. 
Workflow security is concerned with these peripheral functions, as well as process 
enactment, so it includes requirements that apply to the data and services used in the 
execution of a process. There are a wide range of process-related security requirements [40, 
234-237], but the most important are: 
" Process Integrity: Ensuring that applications are invoked, or users notified, only in 
appropriate circumstances. This includes both static and dynamic constraints [235]; 
static constraints can be pre-planned (e. g. Approval before Payment). Dynamic 
constraints are properties of a particular process history. For example, some 
requirements for Separation of Duty [238,239] (e. g. Approval and Payment authorized 
by different people) or binding [240] (e. g. one person must carry out both actions) are 
dynamic, since the constraint on the process will vary, depending on who carries out the 
first action. 
" Provenance: Recording the derivation of data, decisions or actions [88,89,241]. 
" Data Integrity. In workflow systems this is often concerned with preserving process 
records. For example, quality systems, such as ISO 9000, require records to be kept 
when quality procedures are followed, and the records must be "legible, incorruptible, 
and accessible" [242]. 
" Confidentiality: Constraining the visibility of workflow processes to users, and 
controlling the users' access to application data. 
A large proportion of the published work on workflow has focused on separation of duty 
as a critical problem; a common approach to achieving separation of duty is to specify 
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constraints on the planning process [240,243,244] or matchmaking that assembles the 
constraint from policies attached to web-services [245]. Some authors base process 
constraints on Role Based Access control, naturally incorporating confidentiality into their 
formulation. [246-248]. 
Demonstrating that a planning template meets a constraint is difficult, because it is 
necessary to show there are no noncompliant paths. Systems that allow the dynamic 
creation of plans, or distribute workflows between several organizations, complicate 
constraint checking because the complete workflow process is not available at any one 
point, making it difficult to evaluate all possible paths. There are therefore inherent 
difficulties in implementing process integrity by constrained planning. 
A related concern to separation of duty is conflict of interest; for example, preventing a 
service from processing a competitor's data. In its most general form this is a dynamic 
constraint, and is similarly difficult to achieve if the workflow is fully distributed, for 
example if the process thread is passed from service to service without central co-ordination 
[239]. Workflows arranged in this way do not inherently maintain a single coherent history, 
so the alternative is to use simpler static types of policy, such as conflict of interest classes 
[249], or to make the process history universally available, for example, by broadcast [246]. 
While most authors view separation of duties as a logical constraint on a process, an 
alternative approach is to maximize the number of different services performing the actions 
in a given process [245]. This metric is used to optimise the planning process, with the 
result that plans tend to avoid conflicts by spreading activities across more services. This 
has yet to be justified in the light of user requirements, but from the perspective of this 
chapter it is simply another planning constraint. 
A further complication is dealing with constraints that can be over-ridden. One approach 
is to prioritise constraints and allow the ability to over-ride as a user privilege [240], further 
complicating the enactment process. 
Role-Based access control is the usual approach to user privilege; however, a user's 
access to data may need to vary depending on activity, so the process type is often included 
in the access control decision; one implementation extends this to Task Based access control 
[248] which includes the process and also the current action (or task) in the access decision. 
There are few studies of secure provenance, or of workflow availability. Provenance 
architectures are usually trusted logging systems [88], and one approach to availability is to 
introduce planning constraints that ensure that at least one service is available for each 
activity in a plan [247]. 
Most of these approaches implement security requirements by constrained planning, 
sometimes with the addition of specialized access controls. This has the effect of combining 
complex enactment functionality and demanding security requirements, which is intuitively 
a poor security design. These approaches are the source of the problem design patterns 
described in section 4.4; however, before security design can be explored further, better 
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criteria are needed for what constitutes good design practice. The next section describes 
established security principles that provide these criteria. 
4.3. Established Security Design Principles 
The purpose of this chapter is to show by example that it is possible to recognise good 
and bad security features of a system design. This thesis provides a systematic way of 
exploring a design in the light of security goals, by determining how effective it is in 
mitigating security risk. However, before this systematic approach has been described, it is 
necessary to use established, but more ad-hoc, criteria for the quality of a security design. 
Design principles for secure software are well-understood; for example, Viega and 
McGraw [250] list 10 principles, three of which are particularly relevant to high-level 
designs: 
" be reluctant to trust; 
" execute all parts of the system with the least privilege possible; and 
" keep it simple. 
To trust is to place reliance on something, and here it has two aspects. The first is that 
the security of the system depends on all of its security controls, so any function that 
implements a security control is relied on to support the security of the system. The second 
is that trust in an object means that it will not be checked. For example, a Certificate 
Authority in a Public Key system is taken as absolutely trustworthy, the procedures that 
justify that trust are outside the information system. One design tactic that reduces the 
overall amount of trust in a system is to ensure that security controls are placed close to the 
assets they protect. To do otherwise increases the number of attack paths (see Glossary), 
with the result that more system functions must be constrained by security controls. For 
example, relying on a workflow system to manage access control will result in moving the 
protection of data away from its immediate environment to the workflow service, 
undesirably extending the need for trust to the workflow system, and perhaps to 
intermediate components. 
It is important to distinguish between function and guarantee. Reducing the need for 
confidence, or trust, in a workflow component may not change its function; constraints that 
are enforced outside the workflow service must still be observed by the plan if it is to be 
successfully enacted. What is removed is the need to guarantee the behaviour of this 
component, because a planning failure is protected against by a separate security 
mechanism. 
Privilege is often a problem for workflow systems, since they are able to invoke 
applications. Most workflow processes interact with multiple users, so it is difficult to 
restrict them to the privilege of just one. Often, therefore, a dedicated `workflow user' is 
used to invoke applications. Given the large number of applications that a workflow 
component may be able to invoke, this may result in it acquiring considerable privilege. 
84 System Design Patterns: Problems and Solutions 
The `keep it simple' principle is a reminder that behavioural guarantees and functional 
complexity are not easily combined; it is difficult to predict the performance of a complex 
function under all circumstances, and it is therefore hard to have absolute confidence in any 
specific aspect of its behaviour. For example, a typical workflow enactment system includes 
routing and other user data, which are filtered to limit the access of each user. Data 
confidentiality depends on the filter mechanism, but also on other infrastructure within the 
workflow component, including identity and authorization management, cache management 
and an underlying process database. Workflow planning and enactment functions are 
relatively complex, so this is an example of implementing security within a complex 
functional mechanism. 
The design solutions that follow will be guided by the three security principles above; in 
particular noting the importance of keeping security controls as close as possible to the 
assets they protect, and minimising the functionality that has to be trusted to uphold security 
constraints. 
4.4. System Design Patterns: Problems and Solutions 
Section 4.2 identified the primary security requirements for workflow: the 
confidentiality of application data, the integrity of the process, and the provenance of 
workflow artefacts. This section presents a typical workflow system configuration for each 
of these requirements, shows why it is problematic from a security perspective, and how it 
can be corrected. Because these design concepts are not limited to workflow, each is first 
presented in an application-neutral format, and then followed by a description of its 
relevance to workflow system design. 
The process of reworking a poor design into a better one is also known as refactoring. 
This is most often applied to program design, following the work of Fowler [251], but is 
also found in other disciplines, such as formal methods [252]. Refactoring carries the 
implication that a bad design can be recognized, and Fowler's book has a chapter of bad 
smells that serve this purpose. A recent survey [253] divides refactoring into identifying 
problems, selecting the target pattern or operation, and ensuring that behaviour is preserved 
afterwards. This definition brings quality assessment and program transformational 
techniques into the topic, but few authors address these at the system level. 
The refactoring described here is concerned with restructuring system designs, rather 
than programs, and the bad smells are the problem templates, which are patterns of suspect 
design. Refactoring can be described as either a process, or in terms of a trigger (a smell) 
and a desired result, the latter approach is used here. 
The description of each refactoring is in three parts: the problem template, the refactored 
solution, and a description of how this case applies to workflow-oriented system design. 
Problem Templates name and describe the problem; their purpose is to help non- 
specialists recognize system configurations that are risky from the security perspective. The 
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term Problem Template has been used, rather than antipattern, because that term has several 
different interpretations in the literature. The term problem does not imply that these 
templates are always incorrect, there may be good design reasons for these configurations, 
but they do suggest security issues that need to be consciously resolved. 
Refactored solutions provide target patterns for good practice that are separately named 
and given implementation independent descriptions. The refactoring of some problems is 
context-dependent, so alternative patterns are documented where necessary. The purpose of 
this chapter is to provide worked examples, not define a pattern language, so short 
descriptions are given for each pattern, rather than the longer and more comprehensive 
documentation that is normal within the patterns community. Of course, the target patterns 
may either guide refactoring, or simply serve as design templates. 
Four refactorings are described below; the first two (Delegated Access, Composite 
Data) are concerned with confidentiality, the third (Detached Policy) with integrity, and the 
last (Asymmetric Evidence) with Provenance and Accountability. 
This section uses a simple formal payment process to illustrate security concerns: a 
payment instruction is drafted, approved, and then passed to a paying officer for payment; 
the approval and payment must be authorized by different people. This scenario is used in 
several of the refactorings, and is consolidated in a complete worked example in section 4.5. 
Diagram Conventions. Services and data items are as shown as simple stereotypes (see 
figure 4.1). Solid arrows between services show service invocation and may include details 
of the messages sent. Dashed arrows indicate the flow of information, where the diagram 
does not need to show the messages between the services; this may be either a service 
invocation, or a response. These are information flow diagrams, and there is a complete 
syntax for these diagrams in appendix A. 
In a service based architecture all data items would be accessed via a service and this 
encapsulation is shown by the outline service around a data item; data managing services 
are shown explicitly only when they play a significant part in the description. Services and 
data within an outline service boundary are local to each other, but any other objects may be 
remote. Organization (security domain) boundaries are shown if they are significant. 
F-1 
Service II11 --Data 
Flow 
---º® 
... ... 
Data Item 
Invoke Service 
with Data item managed Message by a local Service 
Figure 4.1. Diagram Conventions 
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4.4.1. Delegated Access Management 
Delegated access management occurs when a remote service is made responsible for the 
distribution and access control of confidential data, and the data owner determines the 
access policy. The characteristic problem template is shown in Figure 4.2; it can be 
recognized by the presence of an intermediate service that manages access to confidential 
data items. 
Data 
Recipient 
dential Intermediate 
ED, 
------------- Service Item 
t hen Servic 
Psers .................. : 
Figure 4.2. Problem Template: Delegated Access Management 
Of course, any service that receives a confidential data item is required to police its 
access, and the distribution of confidential data cannot be eliminated. However, designers 
should beware of this arrangement if- 
" the intermediate Service has no other use for the data item; or 
" the intermediate service is intentionally providing an access management service. 
In either of these cases the designer should consider an alternative, since this 
arrangement will: 
" add to the trust required in the intermediate service; 
" increase the number of locations in which confidential data is stored; and 
" place policy synchronization requirements between the intermediate service and the 
original data domain. 
This template has the pre-condition that that the data owner determines the access 
policy; if not, the refactoring may not apply. For example, in the case of content filtering to 
remove pornography (e. g. the pattern at [254]), the administrator of a client site may wish to 
impose an access policy independent of the data origin; the solution in this case is to apply 
access controls using an intermediate service located within the administration with the 
restrictive access policy. 
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4.4.1.1. Refactored Solution: Distribution by Reference 
This problem can be refactored, as shown in figure 4.3, by distributing references rather 
than data items, and ensuring that they can be resolved only by the intended recipient. 
Confidential 
----------'-' 3 Data Item 
( 
referen ces 
Reference Reference 
Figure 4.3. Security Design Pattern: Distribution by Reference 
This solution assumes that there is a functional need for the intermediate service to 
provide data to the recipient; if not, it can simply be eliminated. The data service provides a 
reference to the data item that is opaque, in that it neither carries content nor confers access 
(1); this can be safely distributed (2). The reference can then be used to request the data (3), 
which is mediated via access controls local to the data item (4). 
This allows the intermediate service to carry out a task that is functionally equivalent to 
data distribution, without the need to trust it with the actual data, resolving the problems in 
the original template. 
An alternative solution to this problem is to encrypt the data; this simply transfers the 
problem to managing cryptographic keys rather than data items, which may be 
straightforward in the case of a single data recipient, or rather complex if the access policy 
is dynamic. 
Neither this pattern, nor encryption, is able to keep the existence of data confidential; if 
this is a requirement, then further specialist security design is needed. 
4.4.1.2. Typical Workflow Application 
Workflow sub-systems often construct lists of documents for their users; these include 
textual documents, database query results, and process records that range from formal 
contracts to informal annotations. Because a workflow sub-system serves many users, and 
implements many process instances, if any of this data is confidential, then the sub-system 
is the intermediate service in this template. 
A refactored system would store references to data items (e. g. URLs) in the workflow 
service, and only these references would be provided to users; the ability of users to resolve 
the URLs then depends upon the normal system access control policy. This arrangement 
maintains the functional aspects of the workflow service (e. g. managing and providing work 
lists) while removing the need for it to be trusted to maintain the confidentiality of the data. 
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4.4.2. Composite Data 
The composite data problem arises when the granularity of data items provided by a 
service does not match that of the access control policy. The characteristic template, shown 
in figure 4.4, can be recognized by the need for an intermediate service to provide filtered 
views (selected parts) of data items before they can be distributed. 
.: 
Recipient I 
om _____ 
----- 
______ ataFilterin 
------ 
' Data Itern ervice 
.................. :.: 
Recipient 2 
Figure 4.4. Problem Template: Composite Data 
Some types of composite data, such as databases, hold very fine grain elements; others 
result from the bundling of items that may be functionally related (for example a data item 
and metadata describing its provenance) but which have markedly different security 
concerns. This design is undesirable in both cases, although the choice of refactoring 
depends on the granularity. 
The disadvantages of this design are similar to those for Delegated Access Management, 
since this arrangement will: 
" add an additional trusted service (the filter); 
" increase the number of locations in which confidential data is stored; and 
" place policy synchronization requirements between the intermediate service and the 
original data domain, which may be difficult to achieve if the policy is dynamic. 
4.4.2.1. Refactored Solution: Match the Granularity of Data to Access Controls 
There are two ways of refactoring this problem, depending on the degree of granularity 
of the underlying data; both are shown in figure 4.5. The coarse grain pattern can be 
employed if the original data items aggregate a small number of distinct components, such 
as the data and metadata described above. In this case the data can be partitioned into items 
that are atomic from the security as well as the functionality perspective. If the data cannot 
be restructured in this way, it must be treated as composite. 
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Recipient I Recipient 2 
.............. 'ý. i........ 
Data Item I Data Item II 
....... 
ata filtering 
service 
Composite 
Data Item 
(a) Coarse Grain (b) Composite 
Figure 4.5. Security Design Patterns: Match Data Granularity to Access Controls 
The coarse grain solution (a) is preferred because the resulting data objects can be 
managed by normal system access controls, with the result that their distribution and 
management is straightforward. 
The composite refactoring (b) simply incorporates the data filter in the managing service 
for the data item, localizing access constraints and policy management. This resolves policy 
synchronization and is also in keeping with integrity management for data (see section 
4.4.3, below) but it leaves the security designer with other problems that must be handled 
on a case-by-case basis. There are two common reasons why the simple coarse grain pattern 
cannot be used, and they both occur in database design: either the security concern is not 
mapped directly to the fine-grain data items, or there is a functional requirement to deliver 
non-sensitive summaries of confidential data. 
An example of the first case might be a database of financial transactions, where the 
security goal is to maintain the confidentiality of information about overall company 
performance, such as profit. Profit is a function of all the transactions in the database, so it 
can be determined by aggregation, despite the relative insignificance of any individual 
transaction. 
An example of the second case is a database containing employee information, where 
the security goal is to protect the confidentiality of each individual's salary. In this case data 
items are readily identified with the confidentiality requirement, but it may be possible to 
construct intersecting queries, each of which returns aggregate (non-sensitive) information, 
the intersection of which allows the inference of a particular individual's salary. 
In both these cases there is a straightforward conflict between security and functionality 
requirements, sophisticated filtering techniques such as inference management provide 
possible solutions, but each case must first be considered as a requirements problem. 
Of course, access control granularity is implementation dependent and a system 
designer may anticipate the availability of finer grain policy enforcement mechanisms, such 
as filtering of XML documents. The principle remains, however: if system stakeholders 
have significantly different concerns about two classes of data, then they should be 
separable by the fundamental access control mechanisms of the system 
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4.4.2.2. Typical Workflow Application 
The combination of data and metadata, mentioned above, is a common feature in data- 
oriented systems. Metadata provides information about otherwise anonymous data sets (e. g. 
instrument recordings) by recording their provenance (e. g. creation date, experimental 
parameters and calibration). From the integrity perspective there may be an advantage in 
keeping metadata and data together as a composite item. However, data without its 
metadata may be relatively meaningless; if this is the case, then treating associated data and 
metadata as different items (figure 4.5a) may allow the raw data to be processed in a 
distributed system with less concern about its confidentiality. 
Metadata may also be also used in workflow enactment to determine the process path. It 
is therefore important to consider if metadata (without data) also matches this problem 
template (figure 4.4), and should be sub-divided according to use (figure 4.5a) or requires 
the composite pattern (figure 4.5b). A supplementary strategy is to implement workflow 
decision points as external services, restricting the extent that data need to be provided to a 
common workflow service. 
Collaboration processes often need to attach annotations to system objects, such as 
process results or documents, and these annotations may have independent security 
implications. In extreme cases they may amount to a contract or a command, in more 
informal circumstances they may be private comment on otherwise public data. Workflow 
sub-systems that handle annotations and data items as composite objects, and filter their 
availability depending on the user, match this problem template and should be refactored 
accordingly. For example, if a data item is a public document with a commercially 
sensitive annotation, then it should be implemented as two separate linked records, rather 
than a single compound item. This approach allows normal system access controls to police 
the protection requirement, rather than depending on bespoke filters to provide selective 
views. 
After this refactoring, it may be necessary to distribute the resulting data by reference 
(see section 4.4.1.1) to avoid the Delegated Access problem. 
The most common example of composite data is a database, and localized filtering of 
such data (figure 4.5b) is often implemented using database views, or virtual tables [250]. 
4.4.3. Detached Policy 
Integrity constraints limit the way data items can be changed, to preserve their content 
or to maintain consistency with other data, or with the external world. The detached policy 
problem arises when a remote service is responsible for the integrity of a data item. The 
characteristic template, shown in figure 4.6, can be recognized by integrity requirements 
(data integrity policies) that are enforced by services other than those that directly manage 
the associated data item. 
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Managing 
service 
Data Item 
Figure 4.6. Problem Template: Detached Policy 
The separation of the policy enforcing service from the data item may be designed to 
allow: 
" the managing service for the data item to service requests from many remote users; or 
" the remote service to manage a range of different data types. 
In the first case, the integrity of the data item depends on the policies of all the services 
that may access it. In the second case the remote service is relatively complex and it may be 
difficult to show that the integrity policy is upheld in all possible circumstances. Either of 
these result in a brittle system, in that small changes to a component or policy may have 
unforeseen consequences for the integrity of the data. 
4.4.3.1. Refactored Solution: Localize Policy Enforcement 
Integrity management was first described by Clark and Wilson [84] and the refactoring 
of this problem follows their principles, which restrict data updates to well-formed 
transactions; this is the function of a data-managing service. However, this is not sufficient; 
in a distributed environment a critical factor is how close this service is to the data item. 
The problem in this template is that the integrity-managing service is remote, increasing the 
opportunity for failure. 
Moving policy enforcement close to the data item it protects is the essence of the 
refactoring (see figure 4.7a). In a distributed system, `close' may be meaningless if the 
integrity policy is to maintain consistency between data items that are not co-located. This 
requires an elaboration of the local enforcement pattern, shown in figure 4.7b. 
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Figure 4.7. Security Design Patterns: Localize Policy Enforcement 
In the simple local enforcement pattern (figure 4.7a), the only means of accessing a data 
item is via a local service that enforces the whole integrity policy for that item. The benefits 
of using a local service to ensure integrity are: 
" the minimum number of components are needed to implement the integrity policy; 
" the policy is expressed in a single place; and 
" the policy is enforced in the same administrative environment as the owner or custodian 
of the data. 
An important variation of this pattern is shown in figure 4.7(b). When the policy 
requires consistency between data items that are not co-located, then the best solution is to 
factor the policy into rules about specific data items, and the need for agreement across the 
distributed system. The former can be located close to the managed data items using the 
preferred pattern; the distributed constraint can be reduced to requiring agreement between 
two or more managing services before updating their respective data items. 
The benefit of this arrangement is that the distributed function can be simple and 
uniform. This allows the Agreement Service in figure 4.7(b) to be implemented as 
infrastructure, rather than an application specific mechanism, and the primary integrity 
controls to remain local to the data items they protect. 
4.4.3.2. Typical Workflow Application 
The implementation of process constraints (see 4.2) needs to be considered in the light 
of this template. They often amount to data integrity requirements, but if they are enforced 
in the workflow component by constraining the plan or its enactment, rather than by 
services local to the data, then the design matches this problem template. 
For example, consider the requirement for separation of duties (different Approval and 
Payment officers). This could be enforced at the payment service with an access restriction 
that the service invoker and approver are different. The process of finding suitable people to 
complete the tasks of approval and payment may be a complex planning problem, but 
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policy enforcement can be disassociated from this complexity and moved close to the 
service that makes the payment. 
Refactoring in this way requires the workflow system to provide evidence of the 
approval and payment authorizations to the payment service, and this exposes the need for 
integrity in process records. The straightforward solution is to regard critical process 
records (e. g. those used for authorization or evidence) themselves as documents, and 
therefore subject to this pattern. There are further benefits in recording critical decisions as 
documents, these are discussed below (see section 4.4.4.2, below) and featured in the 
worked examples in section 4.5. 
The most widespread example of an Agreement Service (figure 4.7(b)) is the two-phase 
commit protocol used between database systems to ensure that the data have been updated 
consistently, or not at all. In this case the Agreement function is pessimistic (waits until all 
parties can complete) and uses synchronous protocols. There are also examples of 
optimistic Agreement functions (e. g. BPEL4WS [233]) where one of the updates is allowed 
to proceed, and if the second fails then the managing service for the first data item is 
expected to be able to undo its update. 
4.4.4. Asymmetric Record 
The asymmetric record problem arises when two parties (organizations, projects, 
individuals) with differing interests collaborate to produce data, but where the record is 
maintained by just one of them. The characteristic template is shown in figure 4.8. 
Domain A Domain B 
.................. 
Service A Service B 
Evidence 
Record 
Figure 4.8. Problem Template: Asymmetric Record 
This template is significant if. 
" the two parties are in different administrative domains; and 
" the evidence is a matter of record for them both. 
Data is a matter of record if it is valuable to both parties, for example, if it records a 
contract or its execution. This encompasses a broad variety of records including recording, 
accounting and charging for the use of equipment or specialized services, and access to 
electronic products such as journals. Not all data of this type matters: organizations do not 
choose to account for all the services they provide and may regard some accounts as of 
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marginal value. However, in circumstances where there may be a dispute between two 
organizations about their interaction, systems designed in this way deny critical data to one 
of the parties. 
This problem is intuitively obvious, but it is sometimes difficult to identify. The reason 
is that it can be recognized only in the light of a security asset risk analysis that determines 
what assets matter to which parties and the respective threats and impacts of loss to each. 
Security risk analysis is not always integrated in distributed system engineering, resulting in 
this type of security anomaly. 
4.4.4.1. Refactored Solutions: Distributed Evidence, or a Trusted Third Party 
There are two ways that this problem can be refactored; both are shown in figure 4.9. 
These solutions are described using two parties, but they can readily be extended to multiple 
domains. 
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Figure 4.9. Security Design Patterns: Fair Records 
The web-services approach to the problem of maintaining fair records follows directly 
from the general principle that contractual protocols should be self-documenting, in that 
each transaction should contain all necessary evidence of entitlement to a service [255]. The 
result is the pattern of Figure 4.9a, where each party is able to build its own transaction 
record. The two evidence records do not have to be identical, although often they will be. 
The second option (figure 4.9(b)) may be needed to meet unusual security requirements, 
such as mutual anonymity or unlinkability between the participating domains. For example, 
trustees feature in some electronic cash systems [256]. The use of a trusted third party does 
not, in general, reduce the quality of the evidence that service providers need to supply, so 
this should only be used if it is indicated by specific requirements for third parties, for 
example to implement escrows. 
4.4.4.2. Typical Workflow Application 
Workflow systems may manage formal contractual flows (e. g. purchase orders), or 
collaborations that involve commands, instructions, decisions or confidential data being 
passed between collaborating companies. For example, manufacturing companies may 
negotiate component specifications, the purchase of goods may involve sub-contracts with 
suppliers, and healthcare applications may need to transfer confidential records or diagnoses 
  k. 
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[257]. This information may be the subject of later dispute, perhaps to demonstrate contract 
specification, compliance or due diligence. Even records of resource usage or tasking may 
need subsequent validation if one of the parties suspects misuse of their resources. 
In these circumstances it is obvious that the record of interaction between the parties 
cannot be held by any single participant (figure 4.8) and that the system should be designed 
to provide each with a useable record of any critical interactions (Figure 4.9a). 
The Detached Policy template (see section 4.4.3), introduced the need for documents 
with self-contained authentication to ensure the integrity of process records that authorize 
action; the need for an authoritative record of the interaction between two parties is further 
motivation for this method of process recording. Web services standards allow documents 
to be incrementally written and signed [258]. This can be used to document a process in a 
manner that can be transported, stored, referenced and indexed. It also allows compatibility 
with policy enforcement points that can extract this information to enforce security 
decisions. 
The preservation of a workflow record as a series of documents, provides further 
benefits, since it: 
" allows workflow records to be policed by normal system access controls; 
" provides a natural provenance recording mechanism; 
" provides a standard mechanism for transporting `work in progress' across 
organizational and security boundaries; and 
0 is intuitively similar to existing business processes that are enacted by sequences of 
signed documents [39]. 
These concerns apply to workflows that span domains, but the same principles may be 
applied to service invocation within a domain. The former is a question of contract or 
process provenance, the latter may be useful to provide a chain of accountability for Audit 
purposes. 
4.4.5. Summary 
This section has provided problem templates that allow developers to recognize 
functional configurations that are poor practice from a security perspective, and patterns 
that show how they should be refactored. This demonstrates that it is possible to identify 
security problems in a system design, and correct them. 
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The resulting design guidance can be summarized as follows: 
" Pass data by reference, not value. Where possible, document access should be managed 
via normal distributed access controls. 
" Match the granularity of documents to the access control system. If necessary partition 
composite documents (such as data and metadata) to allow access to be managed 
separately. 
" Move integrity management close to the data it protects. Data integrity should be 
managed by a local managing service, not by constraints on a remote enactment 
process. 
" Remote application invocation must be able to demonstrate authorization. Where 
processes span multiple security authorities or organizations, each invocation across the 
organization boundary must be self-documenting, and allow the remote domain to 
establish the basis of accountability on which it is to act. 
The final part of this chapter complements the individual design patterns by showing 
that they can be usefully combined into practical applications. 
4.5. Worked Examples of Distributed Workflow 
This section provides two examples of applications built using the patterns described 
above. The purpose of the examples is to clarify the use of the patterns, and show that they 
can be combined to construct realistic applications. 
The two sub-sections below respectively illustrate security design issues in established 
workflow systems, and emerging distributed systems. The problem of separation of duty 
features prominently in existing workflow literature, so the first example is an enterprise 
payment system. 
Distributed workflow systems are characterised by local processes within a global 
context: the overall workflow thread is divided into exchanges between the collaborators 
(e. g. exchange of contracts, or patient data), and processes internal to each collaborating 
organization that support the global activity, while protecting local assets and other 
concerns. 
4.5.1. Payment Process 
This example describes an authorization and payment system, including separation of 
duty, which is a significant feature in workflow security. The scenario is: any company 
employee can raise a payment order, but it must then be authorized and the payment 
approved before the accounting system makes the payment. In order to reduce the risk of 
fraud, different people must carry out the authorization and approval steps, although 
managers in the company have the ability to do either. The status and details of the payment 
order should be visible to the initiator and to company managers only. 
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The role of the workflow service is to ensure that the process is carried out in a timely 
and efficient manner. This example describes normal operation, but a real process would be 
more complex: it would ensure timeliness by selecting users who are available, allow 
escalation of difficult cases to a manager, and handle rejected requests. 
A document of record provides a transportable and secure account of the process, while 
still allowing it to be managed by a workflow service. The process produces and delivers 
payment requests, so these documents stand as process records. The documents can be 
stored in a standard access protected file system, and digital signatures can be used to 
signify authorizations that are eventually consumed by the accounting system. The overall 
process is shown in figure 4.10. 
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The process is started by a user who creates a payment request (1) and invokes the 
workflow service by providing the request reference (2). The workflow then provides the 
reference to a user who is permitted to authorize payments (3a) and who has the authority to 
access the document and digitally sign it (3b); the same procedure is carried out for 
approval (4a, 4b). When these tasks have been completed, the workflow is able to present 
the reference to the accounting system for action (5). The accounting system is able to 
obtain the document (6) and check that it has been authorized and approved before making 
the payment; finally the accounting system appends a record to the payment request 
indicating that the task is complete (7). 
The security protection in this system is located in the access control to the document 
file, the signing process, and the accounting service. 
The document can be created by any user, who restricts its access to the originator and 
to company managers. At this stage there is no integrity requirement, any of those with 
access can change the document prior to its authorization. 
When a manager wishes to authorize or approve a payment request, the document is 
retrieved, digitally signed and replaced. In this way the approver countersigns the 
authorization signature as well as the original document. This process provides payment 
authorization and also ensures the subsequent integrity of the document: if the document is 
changed after it has been signed, then this can be detected. The originator does not sign the 
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request, because in this example there is no security requirement to guarantee the identity of 
the originator; evidence is only recorded when it is needed, not for every action. 
The invocation of the accounting system by the workflow service does not authorize the 
action; the accounting service makes the payment and carries out the associated 
bookkeeping if it is satisfied that two different managers have signed the payment request. 
Writing a completion annotation to the request document allows the accounting service to 
confirm completion to the originator, without providing access to company ledgers. 
From the security perspective this design separates the workflow functionality from data 
and process protection mechanisms; it also naturally provides a transparent incremental 
journal of payment requests and fully protects the company accounting system. 
This design uses three of the four patterns described in the previous section: documents 
are managed by reference (4.4.1.1), process integrity (including separation of duties) is 
managed at the boundary of the service that makes the payment (4.4.3.1), and the 
invocation of the payment service references a request that is self contained with the 
authority and accountability needed to permit the action (4.4.4.1). 
4.5.2. Formal Collaboration 
In this example, a formal process flows between two workflow systems situated in 
different organizations. The interaction is contractually significant in some way, and it 
requires one or more of the partners to base its decisions on proprietary data, which must be 
protected. For example, the initiating organisation could be a manufacturer, who uses 
confidential design information to construct component specifications, which are then used 
to request tenders from a sub-contractor [257]. This general pattern of a process dependent 
on local confidential information, part of which is then extracted and released to another 
party, can be found equally in controlled release of information in healthcare [259], and in 
many other distributed applications, including crime [260], and military coalitions [261]. 
A worker in the first domain is alerted to the output of a workflow process, and needs to 
request action from a different domain, in this case to negotiate a price for the supply of 
components against some specification. This collaboration is formal, because the exchange 
may later become the basis of a contract, but the complete system specification that 
prompted the process is confidential to the first domain. The process continues with other 
workflow actions, including the return of the process thread to the original domain, but this 
fragment is sufficient to show how a formal interaction between two collaborating 
organizations can be constructed. 
The role of the workflow service is to automate the processing that produces the original 
specification, alert the user, and then act on the user's decision to transfer processing to a 
different organization. In this case the document of record is a component specification; this 
can take many forms, web-service implementations have already been mentioned (see 
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section 4.4.2.2), Kumar [257] describes routing slips, with a similar function. The overall 
process is shown in figure 4.11. 
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Figure 4.11. Worked Example: Formal Collaboration 
The workflow service invokes a Query service on some reference data (1), which 
determines that a component needs to be built to comply with a system specification; the 
specification is assembled by the query service and stored for future reference (2). The 
service returns a result reference to the workflow service, perhaps with limited metadata to 
allow the service to determine the next action (3). The workflow service determines the 
need for a user decision, so a user is alerted (4) and provided with the reference. The user 
reads the system specification (5), and determines a course of action, which is recorded in a 
component specification. This specification includes only those details that are needed by 
the sub-contractor. The whole document is then signed (6), and its reference is provided to 
the workflow service (7). The workflow service routes the reference to the sub-contractor's 
workflow invocation service (8), which is able to retrieve the component specification (9), 
check and record the authorization, and invoke its own workflow system (10). 
The security protection mechanisms are in the access control to the document file, the 
signing process, and the workflow invocation service in the second domain. The design of 
the process ensures that the component specification is separate from the system 
specification, allowing the document access control to limit remote access to information 
that can be shared. Standard protection mechanisms (firewalls, access controls) are used to 
prevent direct external access to any other system components. 
The workflow service in domain B is protected by an invocation service that is able to 
confirm proof of authorization in the form of a remote document, before continuing the 
process thread. The purpose of the authorization document is to provide proof that the 
request originated from an authorized individual in the first domain. As with all cross- 
domain interactions there is a prior trust arrangement that allows domain B to check the 
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authenticity of the authorization; for example, certificates issued at domain A may be 
traceable to a Certificate Authority that is acceptable to domain B, and domain A may 
publish details of the individuals authorized to sign the request in a publicly-accessible 
directory. (For a more detailed description of a possible workflow trust arrangement, see 
Milosevic [39]) 
An important feature of this design is that both domains have evidence of the 
interaction, and of the authority by which it was invoked. 
This design uses all the patterns described in the last section: the workflow systems 
manage data by reference (4.4.1.1) and are therefore not required to protect the 
confidentiality of specifications; the component specification is kept separate from the 
system specification, thus controlling the granularity of data objects to ensure that they can 
be managed by the document access control system (4.4.2.1); integrity protection is close to 
the component it protects in both the query service (protecting reference data), and the 
second domain (protecting the sub-contractor's processes) (4.4.3.1); finally, the remote 
invocation is self-documenting (4.4.4.1). 
4.5.3. Implementation Issues 
This chapter has shown that it is possible to recognise good and bad security design, and 
that good design practice does not just work for isolated patterns, but can be applied to 
complete workflow applications. However, in practice there may be a need to compromise 
between security and other concerns, and this section describes some common issues: 
" trust in the information required for workflow routing; 
" the functional performance (e. g. execution speed, or more generally cost in resource 
terms) of the workflow system; and 
" the functional performance of the security infrastructure. 
Routing Information 
Section 4.4.2.2 noted the importance of information used by the workflow service to 
make routing decisions; the problem is that the presence of this information may require the 
workflow system to be trusted. 
The strategies in this chapter can always be used if the trust requirement is integrity: 
security is about essential guarantees not correct performance, and the two can be separated. 
Integrity guarantees can be implemented outside the enactment system, even if the same 
information is required inside the system to ensure correct routing. The two examples above 
illustrate this process. 
Confidentiality is more difficult; if an item of data is essential for routing, and it is 
confidential, then the workflow system must protect that confidentiality. In some systems it 
may be possible to move routing decisions to an external component or service, but the 
more general strategy is simply to minimise the trust requirement to that which is essential 
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for enactment. For example, just because the workflow system needs information for 
routing decisions, there is no need for it to manage the availability of that information to 
users - that can still done outside the workflow service. Trust is not a binary measure: it can 
still be minimised even if there are residual requirements. 
Performance of the Workflow System 
The core concern is usually the rate at which routing decisions can be made, and often 
this depends upon the speed with which the routing data can be accessed. The patterns 
proposed here are either neutral, or improve the core enactment performance. Minimising 
the data handled by the enactment system reduces the size of the supporting database, often 
increasing the proportion of routing information that can be memory-cached. Removing 
other forms of trust, such as user data management, reduces the security overheads in the 
enactment component. For example, passing data by reference (e. g. URLs in place of whole 
pages, see section 4.4.1.2) is common for performance reasons and version management, as 
well as security 
Performance of the Security Infrastructure 
Removing security from the enactment system tends to improve its performance, but it 
does introduce overheads elsewhere in the system. In some cases there will be little extra 
cost, since the components will already support the necessary security functions. For 
example, in the data-by-reference case, the original data repository will provide the same 
security, and similar volume handling, regardless of the routing of the data. However, the 
integrity patterns require cryptographic signatures, and these operations are computationally 
expensive. Most signature operations will be invoked by users, in which case their latency 
is probably acceptable (i. e. the latency of the security operation is insignificant when 
compared with the latency of invoking the user). If this is not the case, then designers need 
to carefully balance the design of the security system against the need for system 
throughput. 
Implementation Issues Summary 
There are two potentially difficult implementation cases: when the workflow routing 
data is itself confidential, and if the overhead of integrity signatures is significant in system 
terms. In most cases, however, the design approaches proposed in this chapter can be 
applied easily, and may even enhance system performance. 
4.6. Summary 
This chapter has shown that it is possible to recognise and correct security problems in a 
system design, by presenting matching examples of good and bad practice and by showing 
that these isolated patterns can be usefully combined to built representative applications. 
This is important, because defects early in a system's lifecycle are notoriously hard to 
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correct. Security is therefore no different from any other design feature: although there is 
plenty of room for error in the implementation, deployment or operation of a system, all 
these factors do not have to be considered in advance. It is possible to study a design in 
isolation and identify, and correct, security defects. 
An important distinction that underpins this chapter is the difference between function 
and guarantee. Reducing the need for confidence, or trust, in a system component may not 
change its function; what is removed is the need to guarantee its behaviour. Reducing the 
number of complex functions that need to be trusted in a system provides a double benefit: 
it allows security to be located in simpler mechanisms, whose performance may be easier to 
characterise, and it reduces the number of points of attack. 
Section 4.1 describes what is meant by a System Design. It is important to design in 
sufficient detail to expose the functional (or service) breakdown of the system; this provides 
a framework against which requirements can be expressed, and allows the identification of 
concrete assets. However, to ensure that security requirements and goals are properly 
captured, the design should be at a level of detail that allows stakeholders to reason about its 
components as business assets; this implies that a system design should avoid 
implementation detail. 
The examples of good and bad practice in this chapter are general security design 
patterns, which have wider relevance than workflow; however, collaborative applications 
are important in emerging systems, so workflow has been used as a concrete point of 
reference throughout the chapter. This includes two worked examples, which show that 
these patterns can be combined to build practical applications. The first is a payment 
system, which requires separation of duty, and thus demonstrates a typical enterprise 
workflow problem; the second is part of a contract negotiation between a company and a 
sub-contractor, and involves a controlled, auditable, collaboration, which is representative 
of a range of emerging distributed applications. 
This chapter uses established principles to judge the validity of a design in security 
terms. The most relevant principles are: 
" be reluctant to trust; 
" execute all parts of the system with the least privilege possible; and 
" keep it simple. 
These are valuable ad-hoc guides to good practice, but the remainder of this thesis 
establishes an analysis framework that provides a more systematic way of judging the 
validity of a design, using risk-assessment as its basis. The patterns in this chapter identify 
some the security features that need to be accommodated by such a framework, but they do 
not provide a comprehensive set of requirements. This is the subject of the next chapter, 
which identifies security features that are expected in system designs, and which therefore 
need to be accommodated in the analysis framework. 
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Chapter 5. Essential Features of a Security Design 
The process of security design decomposes goals, or security objectives, into security 
requirements. The goals, and the types. of system to which they apply, were discussed in 
chapter 2; they can be categorised by the usual keywords of confidentiality, integrity, etc, 
but to be meaningful as goals rather more information is needed about their intent. Security 
requirements are of a different character to systematic goals or objectives. They specify 
controls, or constraints, on specific system functions, and relate closely to possible 
implementation mechanisms, such as access controls or encryption. The purpose of this 
chapter is to explore these features, because they determine the types of security 
requirement that must be supported by SeDAn. 
The term `security feature' is deliberately loose, since it is necessary to identify both 
specific requirements for security controls, and more general design configurations that 
need to be supported. These include structural and contextual information about secure 
designs, often in the form of a patterns or statements of good practice. 
Unlike the goals described in chapter 2, security functions are extensively described in 
the general security literature, and their requirements are consolidated in pattern collections. 
The benefit of using pattern collections as reference points is that they record good practice 
that is found in many different situations. 
Unfortunately, there is no straightforward way to show that a set of security features is 
sufficient for a wide range of applications. There is therefore a degree of choice in what 
features are represented; that choice is made on the basis of usefulness, and by arguing from 
a risk perspective about the balance between security complexity and confidence in an 
implementation. To expose these issues the chapter discusses the implementation of three 
typical web-services applications; they can be constructed using the security features 
identified in the first part of the chapter, but also highlight design complexity which, it is 
argued, should be avoided, rather than accommodated. 
In summary, this Chapter: 
" describes the essential security features that need to be modelled in a system design. 
Common security requirements, and the context in which they are used, are derived 
from established security patterns; and 
" discusses the implementation of application scenarios that use these features, in 
particular exposing the- need to-balance-complexity against security confidence. 
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In detail, this chapter is organised as follows: 
" section 5.1 describes primitive security features that originate from the security patterns 
literature. The section reviews five common design patterns: access points; policy 
enforcement and decision points; user roles and attributes; sessions; and availability 
patterns. It also introduces a further pattern, end-to-end messaging, which is 
fundamental to service-based architectures; 
" section 5.2 describes three application scenarios that are typical of those found in the 
web-services literature: message-level firewall, business workflow, and identity 
federation. These provide concrete examples of how the patterns in section 5.1 are used, 
and expose important design trade-offs between risk and complexity that are faced by 
the security designer, 
" section 5.3 summarises the essential security features; and 
" section 5.4 concludes the chapter. 
The patterns referenced in this chapter are useful summaries of design practice, but they 
are not usually the primary sources for the security issues they describe. Supplementary 
information can be found in standard computer security texts [68,199,250]. 
Definitions 
This chapter uses the term `policy' extensively, since many of the existing design 
patterns are concerned with access control. In all cases policy should be read as `access 
policy'. 
5.1. Security Features 
This section identifies security features that may be needed in a system design; the 
starting point is security patterns, because they summarise established security practice. 
Security patterns were first described by Yoder and Barcalow [262] and have matured to 
the point that the Open Group have published a security pattern collection [263]. This 
collection describes the objective of a security pattern as a "nugget of instructive 
information that captures the essential structure and insight of a family of proven 
solutions ". The Open Group collection is divided into two groups: patterns that are 
concerned with availability, and those that deal with "protected systems". Although these 
are described as design patterns, much of the detail is concerned with the design of security 
infrastructure, rather than system design as defined in section 4.1. 
Although there are other types of security pattern in the literature, including design 
methods based on patterns [264-267], Yodler and Barcalow's work and the Open Group 
collection are the most relevant. Many of the patterns from these two sources are similar, so 
the sub-sections below use information drawn from both. The patterns Full View, Limited 
View, Secure Access Layer [262] and Secure Communication [263] are not discussed, since 
they are about user interface presentation or implementation, but not design. 
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The final pattern in this section is drawn from the web-service security architecture 
white-paper [268]. This pattern is important because it describes the fundamental building 
block for security in these emerging systems. 
5.1.1. Single Access Point, or Guard 
"Set up only one way to get into the system, and if necessary create a mechanism for 
deciding which sub-applications to launch" (Single Access Point pattern at [262]). 
"Structure a system so that all access by clients to resources is mediated by a guard 
which enforces a security policy" (Protected System pattern at [263]). 
One of the security principles in section 4.3 was "be reluctant to trust", and that section 
suggested that one way that this can be achieved is by placing security controls close to the 
asset they protect. An alternative strategy is to protect the whole system by creating and 
policing a system boundary, in the same way that a single security gate guards the entry to a 
building complex. 
Reference monitors in operating systems and, more generally, policy enforcement points 
(see section 5.1.2, below) are implementations of this pattern, whereas network firewalls are 
not, since they do not usually discriminate between clients. The mechanism that implements 
a controlled access point must be invoked on every request, be unbypassable, uncorruptable, 
and must have a means of evaluating its access control policy [263]. 
In practice, even stand-alone systems have multiple access points (e. g. network ports), 
so this pattern reminds designers to simplify access routes and control arrangements, even if 
the ideal of a single entry point is infeasible. In distributed systems, identifying access 
points may be difficult: clients may access the system at several different locations, perhaps 
via systems administered by different authorities, each with different access policies and 
system standards. 
There are two possible single-access point design patterns, both of which are shown in 
figure 5.1. The first is the case where the user directly accesses the system (figure 5.1a); in 
this case the connection to the user has so little functionality that it is negligible (dumb 
terminals in client-server systems may be an example, although there are few current 
terminal devices that are not programmable). In the second case the user accesses the 
system via independent client software, for example, a web-browser on a separate terminal 
(figure 5.1b). In both cases the main elements of the pattern are the same: the identification 
of a user access point, and a policy that controls access. 
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Figure 5.1. Single Point Access Patterns 
In almost all modern systems the implementation follows the indirect pattern of figure 
5.1b. The access point is often an entry point to a suite of applications, such as an 
application host (e. g. a web-server), a database, a workflow system or an enterprise portal. 
The user invariably uses a remote terminal, which may be anything from a tightly controlled 
enterprise-administered machine, to a user-administered machine connected via the Internet. 
Even where systems support `direct login', this is often via a remote client. 
Leaving aside relatively unconstrained user access (e. g. anonymous guest accounts 
limited only by resource availability) it isn't possible for the intermediate clients in scenario 
5.1b to escape responsibility for security: in most cases some degree of user authentication 
is required, and there may be a need to authenticate data as coming from the user (integrity), 
or ensure that data is supplied to only an authentic user (confidentiality). 
Although the indirect scenario is the most common implementation, a system design can 
use either representation, because the same security requirements will be determined for the 
connections to the users, however they are implemented. Which design model is used is 
likely to depend on how meaningful the intermediate clients are in system terms. For 
example, some systems may have several different classes of intermediate client (internal, 
dial-in, intemet, customer network) that are significantly different in business or security 
terms; in this case there may be a value in including them in the system design. Other 
businesses may simply accept connections from the Internet, in which case there may be 
little added value in modelling the web-browsers in the system design. 
In summary, although most systems do not have single access points, a system design 
should: 
" explicitly identify all user access points; and 
" minimise the number of user access points. 
Security requirements associated with this pattern must be able to: 
" enforce user access controls; and 
" enforce requirements for user authentication, and the confidentiality or integrity of the 
path between the user and the access point. 
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5.1.2. Policy Enforcement Point and Policy Decision Point 
"Isolate policy enforcement to a discrete component of an information system; ensure 
that policy enforcement activities are performed in the proper sequence" (Policy 
pattern at [263]). 
" [A Check Point is an] object that encapsulates the algorithm for the company's 
security policy" (Check Point pattern at [262]). 
These patterns promote the separation of security mechanisms from other functionality. 
Although the Open Group pattern describes a policy enforcement point, this also includes a 
policy object, which is essentially a policy decision point'. This decision point is essentially 
the same as the check-point described by Yoder and Barcalow. The terms Policy 
Enforcement Point and Policy Decision Point are synonymous with Access Control 
Enforcement Function (AEF) and Access Control Decision Function (ADF), respectively, 
in the ISO access control framework [269]. 
A Policy Enforcement Point is a system component through which access to services or 
data is channelled, and whose function is to ensure that each access is consistent with a 
specific access policy. The access may be via a local procedure call to an operating system 
function, a remote procedure call, or more generally a message sent from another object or 
system. Typical implementations are the kernel of an operating system and the access sub- 
system of a web-server. The actual policy checking is delegated to a policy decision point, 
which is a service that encapsulates the system's access policy. 
A policy decision is usually a decision to grant or deny access2. At its simplest an access 
policy is a collection of permissions, each specifying access from a client to a target'. The 
client is often a user identity, but may also be a role, a set of users defined by arbitrary 
attributes (see section 5.1.3, below), or the identity of a machine. The access types depend 
upon the target; for example, if the target is a record in a file system the options may be the 
familiar `read, write or append'. More generally, the access type is a named operation 
within a service. 
This pattern is summarised in figure 5.2. 
1 This is an object oriented design, so a policy object will naturally make policy decisions. 
2 Some distributed systems have more general policy decision types, for example, to deliver decisions that are 
conditional upon other evidence about the client, or that require particular protocols or services to be part of the 
access arrangement 
3 Security literature often uses the terms subject and object for the client and target of an access, respectively 
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Figure 5.2. Policy Enforcement Pattern 
The single access point described in the previous section is an instance of this more 
general design scenario. The pattern separates the specification of functions (operations in 
this diagram) from their associated access policy. The policy is usually attached to a service 
that contains a number of operations, and these are the targets of the policy. The most 
straightforward access policies are based on the identify of the client, or subject, requesting 
access, and systems may support a range of different subject identifiers, such as user name, 
user role, organisation or server identity. 
This type of policy, which simply restricts access from identified subjects to operations, 
is the simplest possible; however, it is common for more factors to be needed as input to the 
access control decision. For example, file systems control access on the basis of operation 
and file name, and some web-services systems introduce a context, which specify the end- 
user's application, project, or some aspect of the current session. All this additional 
information, and more, can be encapsulated in a claim. 
A claim is simply some data that reliably originates from one of the identifiable 
principals in the system (e. g. a user), or is the result of a chain of claims that can be traced 
to such a principal. Claims may be used to assert simple attributes, such as user membership 
of a project team, or more complex application-oriented information, such as `organisation 
is a certified supplier'. A claim is therefore a general way of binding extra application- 
oriented data into the access decision. 
Arbitrary claims are common in web-services scenarios and can be accommodated by 
more advanced access policy languages (e. g. XACML [270]) and associated decision 
engines. These protocols allow simple policies to be framed that permit access to an 
operation depending on the value of a supplied attribute, or much more complex 
arrangements where the policy is a logical equation over many different attributes, supplied 
by different principals. The extent that arbitrary policy complexity is a good idea in practice 
is discussed further in section 5.2.2. 
In summary, a system design should: 
9 separate access controls from the system functions that they protect; and 
" associate access controls with services or deployable units that execute a group of 
functions or operations. 
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Security requirements that are needed to support these patterns include: 
9 controls that manage access to functions or operations, based on a range of different 
message characteristics and a stated policy; and 
9 authentication of the data used to make access control decisions. 
5.1.3. The User: Roles, Subject Descriptors and Attributes 
"Role objects ... 
define the permissions and access rights that groups of users have" 
(Roles pattern at [2621). 
"[Subject descriptors] provide access to security-relevant attributes of an entity on 
whose behalf operations are to be performed "(Subject Descriptor pattern at [263]). 
The first definition captures one aspect of user management by role: grouping users and 
defining access policies in terms of groups. This is both more scalable, and more stable over 
time, than writing access policies that depend on individual user identities. In a distributed 
system it is more scalable because users' home organisations can be made responsible for 
assigning the roles they adopt, and changes to users or job functions are then a local, rather 
than a global, problem. This form of policy is stable over time because it factors deciding 
which users have which roles from the rules that specify the business functions that the 
roles are permitted to access. 
However, there is a more important aspect to the use of roles, which is mapping a 
system to the organisation that it supports (see section 3.3). One criterion for a system 
design is that it should be comprehensible in business terms (see section 4.1), so role-based 
policies are a natural choice to support this objective. For example, roles can be used to 
identify the participants in a business process (e. g. `company buyer', `system design 
authority'), providing a direct interpretation of the system in business terms, and an 
important bridge between the system design and business stakeholders. 
The subject-descriptor pattern [263] is an implementation pattern; it encapsulates user 
attributes behind an interface, decoupling the mechanisms used to authenticate attributes 
from their use by an application. This introduces the issue of policies based on more 
general user attributes. A role might be regarded as just one attribute of a user, there are 
many others: qualifications, employer, nationality, location, preferences ... 
Access control systems can base decisions on other attributes as easily as they can on 
roles; for example, an academic system might allow access to a remote library by 
authenticating an individual's course of study, rather than their name. This arrangement has 
similar benefits of scalability to role-based management, and may also support privacy, 
since it can be combined with attribute management and release control policies [5,271]. 
Of course, a user attribute is a claim, as described in the previous section; it is an 
arbitrary statement, authenticated by some authority, which is later referenced by an access 
policy. This raises an important question: is this a counter-example to the suggestion in the 
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previous section that arbitrary claims should be used warily? Furthermore, does the same 
concern apply to role attributes, despite their relationship to business functions? 
There are two main factors to be considered, business relevance and risk relevance. The 
distinguishing feature of a role is that it can be related to the business environment; the 
services provided by the system can be directly related to meaningful categories of staff, 
and hence to the business processes and organisations they support, and this categorisation 
may also be helpful in eliciting the motives of potential attackers. 
The second issue, risk relevance, is also related to the ability of business stakeholders to 
distinguish between classes of use of a system. Consider an academic system that needs to 
allow students on various courses to access a remote library. The home institution running 
the courses could authenticate the students as individuals and provide them with attributes 
(signed claims) that identify their course; the library could then base its access control 
decision on these attributes. 
From the perspective of either the remote library, or the home institution, it may be 
difficult to distinguish between courses in terms of security risk; there are probably much 
more important privilege and risk distinctions between `student', `staff academic' and 
`system administrator'. This is very similar to the users of a multi-user system: in overall 
risk and design terms they are simply unprivileged users. This doesn't mean that they hold a 
single identity: each must be separately accountable, and they should not be able to interfere 
with each other's work. The roles used in web-based systems often take this a step further 
by defining coarse degrees of system privilege (`guest', `user', `administrator') rather than 
business function, because these distinguish the major categories of threat (for example, see 
[272]). 
So there is a difference in type and granularity between roles, which can be associated 
with business functions and with possible attackers (e. g. `student', `administrator'), and 
finer grain attributes and controls (e. g. `member of computer science course'). The former 
are a natural part of a system design, because they relate to the business purpose of the 
system and the main security risks that the operator wishes to mitigate. The degree to which 
the latter are modelled at the system level depends on the functional need, and the extent 
that they introduce useful distinctions of risk. 
In summary, a system design should: 
" provide a bridge between the design and the business and threat environments (see also 
section 4.1); role-based access policies are important for this purpose; and 
" include finer degrees of user separation or privilege only if necessary. It may be 
possible for a system design to include finer grain distinctions between users as general 
requirements (e. g. user separation) or by representative roles, rather than by 
enumerating all possibilities and attributes. 
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5.1.4. Sessions 
"[A Session Object] holds all of the variables that need to be shared by many 
objects" (Session pattern at [262]). 
"[A Security Association defines] a structure which provides each participant in a 
Secure Communication with the information it will use to protect messages to be 
transmitted to the other party... "(Security Association pattern at [2631) 
"[A Security Context provides] a container for security attributes and data relating to 
a particular execution context, process, operation or action" (Security Context 
pattern at [263]). 
A session is a temporal association between two system components, or a user and the 
system. Sessions bind related activities together, for example to ensure that either all, or 
none, of the elements of a single transaction are completed. In the security sense sessions 
are primarily used for performance or user convenience. Establishing security related 
information is expensive (for example authentication by checking the chain of signatures in 
a Public Key system) so most systems incur these overheads only once, during the initial 
contact between the user and the system, and then maintain this information for as long as it 
is safe. 
Session information is maintained in a session context; in the case of a user 
authentication the context would include the user's identity, but it may also include other 
information such as the means of authentication, location of the user, user security 
preferences and other information such as the time of creation. In web systems the context 
is often available to the application' as well as the infrastructure, and may contain 
information that is not used by the primary access control system. 
Not all systems are able to use sessions; in particular, asynchronous messaging systems, 
such as those used in some web-services designs, may not be able to maintain temporal 
continuity, and under these circumstances each message must be self-contained. Sessions 
may represent relationships between applications, or lower level bindings, such as 
communication links. 
There are two aspects to sessions, the implementation of a session object, or security 
context, and the association that the session represents; these patterns focus on the session 
context and its implementation. However, none of this is critical in a high level design, 
since unlike the functional context in a transaction system, security sessions are primarily 
about the efficient implementation of security infrastructure, and some forms of 
" implementation do not use them. 
4 Strictly, the context attributes are mapped to the application via a deployment descripor, rather than made available 
directly. 
112 Security Features 
In summary, from the design perspective: 
" sessions and their related security contexts are implementation caches for security 
information, and do not normally appear in a system design. 
5.1.5. Availability 
The Open Group Guide [263] has a number of patterns that are concerned with 
availability, but there are no comparable patterns in Yoder and Barclow [262]. The Open 
Group patterns include: 
"[A Checkpointed System] can be recovered and restored to a known state in case a 
component fails. " (Checkpointed System pattern at [2631) 
[A Standby System, allows] the service provided by one component [to] be resumed 
from a different component. " (Standby pattern at [2631) 
These patterns all provide functional configurations that support various availability 
goals. Availability goals are important security requirements, and recovery functions are 
often needed to mitigate the impact of security attacks. (see section 2.3.3). 
. 
Availability goals are implemented by both functional and non-functional requirements. 
For example, to be recoverable, a system must include a function that records its state; the 
checkpoint pattern provides one solution (the Memento in section 7.1 of [263]), but others 
may include journaling, manual backups or the duplication of persistent storage. These 
records are of little value if they can easily be destroyed, so there will also be a non- 
functional requirement for integrity, which may by implemented by mechanisms ranging 
from long-term storage in a remote bunker, to the simple cyclic use of recording media. The 
recording mechanism is a functional requirement, whereas the integrity mechanism is a 
security requirement that constrains access to the recorded data. 
In summary, availability is an example of a security goal that cannot be conveniently 
described as either `functional' or `non-functional'. Some availability goals give rise to both 
functionality and security requirements. The nature of security goals is discussed further in 
the next chapter (see section 6.3.2). 
5.1.6. Messages, and End-to-End Communications Security 
The most significant feature about web-services protocols is that the security model 
features end-to-end rather than point-to-point communication. (See Web Services Security 
Model Principles in [268]) This is facilitated by the messaging protocol, which is layered 
above the communications network, and a security model that protects the integrity and/or 
confidentiality of messages in transit via intermediate services [258]. The end-to-end 
pattern is shown in figure 5.3, and this should be contrasted with the point-to-point pattern 
in figure 5.2, where the access policy mediates the client that directly invokes the service. 
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Requester Intermediate Web-Service 
Figure 5.3. End-to-End Messaging Pattern 
Web-services protocols also allow end-to-end security protection on partial messages: 
messages may be partially encrypted, and chains of integrity can be constructed whereby 
part of a message is signed by the first service, while other parts remain unprotected, but 
may subsequently be signed by intermediate services. Integrity or Confidentiality may also 
be nested, for example a second service can encrypt a previously encrypted message. The 
equivalent authentication behaviour (countersigning) was exploited in the worked examples 
in section 4.5. 
Section 5.1.2 introduced claims and policies, and that description is equally valid here; 
however, the previous discussion did not distinguish between point-to-point and end-to-end 
communication. In practice a system designer may need to specify both types of access 
policy: which clients are allowed direct access to a service, and also the remote messages 
that may use those paths to invoke an operation. 
For example, in figure 5.3, service 3 has an access policy that allows service 2 to make a 
point-to-point connection and transfer a message; service 3 also has a message-level access 
policy, which allows a message from service 1 to invoke an operation. 
Web-services security models also include mechanisms to distribute (push) or obtain 
(pull) security tokens (e. g. Public Keys, Kerberos tickets). These mechanisms are 
intentionally very similar to those used to distribute and obtain claims, but since they are 
implementation features of the security infrastructure they are not described here. 
From the design perspective: 
" the Web-Services security pattern allows security services to be built end-to-end, 
effectively creating a tunnel through intermediate services. 
The security requirements needed to support this pattern are: 
9 message confidentiality: that a message, or part of a message, is understood by only a 
specific remote service; 
" message Integrity, or Authenticity: that a message, or part of a message, originated from 
a known principal (e. g. a user, system or organisation); and 
" message access controls, that restrict the flow of messages to services, based on the 
identity of a remote client, user, or a specific claim. 
The scenarios below show how the basic patterns described in this section are used to 
build applications. 
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5.2. Typical Application Scenarios 
The previous section presented security features from the patterns literature and from 
the web-services architecture white paper. These features are common in practice, so it is 
straightforward to argue that they may be necessary in a system design. Unfortunately there 
is no straightforward way of showing that a set of features is sufficient for all types of 
system design. There is, therefore, a degree of choice in what features are represented, and 
that choice is made on the basis of usefulness (that the features set can be used, in practice, 
for realistic applications) and by arguing from a risk perspective about the balance between 
security complexity, and confidence in an implementation. 
This section explores three typical web-services applications, with both aspects of 
feature choice in mind: they provide scenarios that can be constructed using the features 
described in the last section, and they expose potential complexity (see section 5.2.2, below) 
which, it is argued, should be avoided rather than accommodated. 
Modern protocol specifications are a rich source of application scenario, since it is usual 
to document the scenarios that motivate the development of a new standard. The most 
significant standards in the web-services domain are published by W3C and OASIS, and 
both these organisations use scenarios as part of the standards process. (e. g. [273]). The 
purpose of this section is not to review scenarios, but to use a small representative selection 
to explore design practice, and a good source for this purpose is the web-service security 
architecture white-paper [268] which summarises scenarios that influenced a range of 
subsequent standards. 
Three representative scenarios are presented: the message firewall, a business 
application, and an identity federation system. They each show applications of the end-to- 
end message model (5.1.6) and highlight design issues associated with access policies and 
policy enforcement (5.1.2) 
5.2.1. A Message-Level Firewall 
Because the integrity of messages can be protected end-to-end, security policies can be 
applied at several points along the message chain, this allows an intermediate service to take 
on some, or all, of the access policy checking that would otherwise be carried out at the 
target. The firewall scenario [268] is shown in figure 5.4 
Claim 
Requester Policy policy 
er rice 3. ervice 4 
No valid 
claim) 
Figure 5.4. Message Firewall Scenario 
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Although this scenario is titled 'firewall', it is not a firewall as usually deployed in the 
network layer. Such a firewall makes its primary access decisions based on network 
addresses and ports, rather than access control policies at the message layer. The type of 
higher-layer functionality described here would supplement, not replace, a normal network 
firewall. 
The firewall in this scenario could deal with `boundary' protection, or it could take on a 
range of other security functions, including ensuring that only messages with appropriate 
claims are forwarded to the web service. In this scenario it allows messages from an 
authorized requester, which is able to present a valid claim, to attempt to access the web 
service, while messages from the unauthorized requestor are blocked. 
If the intermediate service in this example carries out all the access policy checking 
required by the web-service, then it is effectively a policy enforcement point (see section 
5.1.2), but although this illustrates that these scenarios are relatively universal, because they 
can describe infrastructure as well as applications, this is not of great importance in a 
system level design. The most important use of a firewall in a design is between a group of 
web-services and some external clients, in which case policy elements common to the group 
can be implemented in the firewall and the service specific policies can be associated with 
each service separately. The invocation service in the collaboration example in section 4.5.2 
is an example of this use of a firewall, since it guards the whole domain from inappropriate 
messages. 
Chapter 4 described some problems with intermediate services, and the need to place 
security requirements close to the assets they protect (4.4.2,4.4.3). This scenario may 
increase the overall amount of trust required in a system, because trust is also required in 
the firewall, or reduce it because the firewall deals with a common access policy that would 
otherwise be repeated in many other services. 
The design implications are: 
" because messaging is end-to-end, it is possible to build intermediate services that take 
over some, or all, of the access policy checking that would otherwise occur at an 
endpoint; and 
" the standard network firewall function may not be explicitly included in a system 
design, since it is an infrastructure feature, but this design scenario is useful for other 
forms of common boundary protection. 
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5.2.2. Enforcing a Business Workflow 
This application scenario is typical of many where a requester obtains a token from an 
authority before providing it as part of a service invocation. The scenario illustrated here 
is 
representative of those at the reference [268], but the details of how the requester asserts 
its 
own identity with security tokens has been omitted to avoid implementation detail, and 
typical messages have been added to clarify the flow of claims in the system. 
Manufacturer 
Parts 
Suppli er 
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Countersigned Service Offer 
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Figure 5.5. Business Policy Enforcement Scenario 
In this scenario there are three organisations, a parts supplier, a car manufacturer and a 
dealership. The parts supplier wishes to offer a service to the dealership, perhaps to respond 
to an invitation to tender for the supply of some parts, but the dealership will only use parts 
that are accredited by the manufacturer. The parts supplier must ensure that it can provide a 
claim that its parts are accredited. 
Typically, the Parts Supplier first requests a claim from the manufacturer, the message 
making the request (1) provides evidence of the identity of the Supplier, and information 
about how the claim will be used. The manufacturer signs the whole request binding the 
purpose of the claim to the identity of the supplier (2), who provides that claim to the 
dealership in support of a service offer (3). 
There are two ways of constructing transactions of this sort, `pull' and `push'. This is a 
push scenario, since the requestor obtains a token and pushes it to the service where it is 
consumed. A pull scenario is described in section 5.2.3, below. 
This scenario is powerful and flexible, but it highlights some of the dangers in using 
arbitrary claims to encode application constraints. 
First, this scenario contains complexity that may not be evident at first sight. The claim 
includes the identity of the Parts Service, and is authenticated (e. g. digitally signed) by the 
Manufacturer. However, two identities alone are not sufficient to convey the claim's 
meaning: the manufacturer is not asserting that the parts service is an authorised petroleum 
refinery, that all parts manufactured by the supplier have been qualified, or that the 
accreditation is valid for ever. Somehow the type of business, its products, their validity, 
quality arrangements, and other caveats inherent in commercial contracts need to be 
codified in the claim and interpreted by the access decision system. Business oriented 
ontologies (systems of classification) and access policy languages (e. g. [270]) are emerging 
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that are expressive enough to describe claims of this sort, but the problem remains: the use 
of arbitrary claims introduces considerable complexity into the supporting security 
mechanisms, and complexity is not consistent with implementation confidence (see 4.3). 
A second issue with this type of design is that it is often understood to mean that 
businesses are prepared to collaborate based solely on the available electronic claims, but in 
practice this is an unlikely business model. Business tend to qualify suppliers based on a 
range of indicators: they may carry out quality inspections, financial background checks, 
negotiate bulk discounts and even require specific social or ethical practices. There may be 
a long-term contractual framework between customer and supplier that guarantees certain 
levels of business in return for different types of service quality, and there may be a process 
of review that relates future business to past performance. Although an extreme design 
approach might be to encompass all these factors in an access policy, in practice it may be 
better to accept that considerations of this sort are inside the risk management boundary of 
the business, but external to the information system. 
An analogy is the arrangement by which a Certificate Authority (CA) issues an identity 
certificate. Most of the arrangements for identity verification, and many of those that 
safeguard private keys, are in business processes outside the information system [274]. An 
identity certificate from a CA is a single token, and a consuming system must either accept 
it, or not, based on a trust relationship with the CA that has previously been established 
outside the system. 
The problem with claims, therefore, is the potential complexity of the application 
information they may need to codify. The designer must choose how much business 
information it is useful to represent in an access policy, and to what extent that the overall 
quality of the security implementation is better served by simpler tokens that stand for trust 
relationships established outside the system. 
In summary, this scenario demonstrates the flexibility of the web-services security 
models in a typical business situation, but highlights the choices faced by a designer in the 
use of the claims model for distributed authorisation. The primary design implication is: 
arbitrary claims should be used warily. Encoding complex information and rules in the 
access policy system may not contribute to the reduction of system risk, and may reduce 
overall confidence in the system-level behaviour of the security implementation. 
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5.2.3. Identity Federation 
Federation is a process whereby different organisations or authorities agree to share, to a 
controlled extent, identities or attributes issued or authenticated by the others, or by an 
authority that acts as a trusted third party. The current web-services federation protocol 
[275] provides protocol and services building blocks that can be used to construct a range of 
different types of federation, but the underlying security patterns are those described in 
section 5.1. 
A common configuration for federation systems is the `pull' model for claims, and one 
version of this is described in the scenario entitled federation using trust chaining [268], 
which is outlined in figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6. Federation Scenario using Trust Chaining 
The client in this scenario is Alice, who wishes to use a currency converter service. The 
service is owned by Business456, and although Alice does not have a prior arrangement 
with this company, she is a member of Adventure456, a company that has an established 
trust relationship with Business456. Alice's identity may simply be traceable to 
Adventure456, or she may use the process described in the previous section to obtain a 
token which allows her to claim membership (messages (1) and (2)). This token is presented 
to the currency service to obtain a service (3). The Currency service does not recognise 
Alice, or Adventure456, as legitimate users, so the token is passed to the Business456 
federation service (4). This service is aware of a previously agreed trust relationship with 
Adventure456, and returns a token (5) that allows Alice to use the service. 
These tokens usually convey identity information or other personal attributes, such as 
organisational membership, and the trust relationship that enables the federation is outside 
the information system. This arrangement avoids the trap of complexity described in the 
previous section, so federation systems are likely to be used to facilitate distributed policies 
based on user roles and organisations, and can extend to other user attributes, such as 
working groups or projects. 
Two other aspects of federation need to be mentioned, token implementation and 
identity management. Nothing in this chapter specifies the nature of the tokens used to 
communicate claims. Web-services standards allow a wide range of token types (e. g. see 
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[276]) and although a distinction is made between claims and references (i. e. the former is 
self contained, such as a signed token, and the other needs to be resolved, such as a URL or 
pseudonym) in practice the distinction is far less clear: Public Key signatures usually need 
to be resolved back to a Certificate Authority, and pseudonyms may still need integrity or 
confidentiality protection. 
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Figure 5.7. Federation Scenario using Identity Management 
Identity management systems (e. g. using the Shibboleth protocol [271]) are a particular 
type of federation system; remote services typically use a pull scenario to obtain claims, 
after receiving pseudonyms as the primary token. If this scenario were implemented using 
such a system, then the message flow would be as shown in figure 5.7. The main difference 
is that the remote service pulls the claim, in the form of authenticated user attributes, 
directly from the home organisation (Adventure456), rather than from its own organisation 
or a trusted third party. 
An identity management system is another example of a security infrastructure that can 
be implemented using the patterns of the previous section, but may not necessarily appear in 
a system level design. In most system designs it is sufficient to identify the basis of the 
access policy (e. g. role, user, organisation, service - see section 5.1.3) rather than specify 
how this information is distributed in the implementation. 
In summary, the scenarios described here, federation and identity management, use 
simpler forms of claim (e. g. user identity, role, organisation) than those described in the 
previous section, and are therefore preferable, because the access policies and associated 
message claims are less complex. The infrastructure mechanism that distributes identity 
may not be need to be included in a system level design, since it is unlikely to be 
meaningful in a business context. 
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5.3. Essential Design Features 
This chapter has identified a relatively small number of security features, which are 
essential in a system design, and must therefore be correctly modelled in SeDAn. The 
important design patterns are single access point (5.1.1), policy enforcement (5.1.2) and 
end-to-end messaging (5.1.6). 
In order to address the requirements identified in this chapter, a system design must: 
" explicitly identify all user access points (5.1.1); 
" separate access controls from the system functions that they protect (5.1.2); 
" associate access controls with services or deployable units that execute a group of 
functions or operations (5.1.2); 
" provide a bridge between the design and the business and threat environments; role- 
based access policies are important for this purpose (5.1.3); and 
9 allow security services to be built end-to-end, effectively creating a tunnel through 
intermediate services (5.1.6). 
The security requirements required to support these design features are: 
" user access controls (5.1.1); 
" user authentication, and the confidentiality or integrity of the path between the user and 
the access point (5.1.1); 
" controls that manage access to functions or operations, based on a range of different 
message characteristics and a stated policy (5.1.2); 
" authentication of the data used to make access control decisions (5.1.2); 
" message confidentiality: that a message, or part of a message, is understood by only a 
specific remote service (5.1.6); 
" message Integrity, or Authenticity: that a message, or part of a message, originated from 
a known principal (e. g. a user, system or organisation) (5.1.6); and 
" message access controls, that restrict the flow of messages to services, based on the 
identity of a remote client, user, or a specific claim (5.1.6). 
The source material from the patterns and web-services communities has a strong bias 
toward access policies, and these are well represented in this chapter. The previous chapter 
included other security issues, such as services that constrain the flow of confidential 
information; it is notable that requirements of this sort are absent from the `normal' security 
design patterns surveyed here. It would be convenient to show that the requirements 
identified in this chapter are sufficient to support the security goals identified in chapter 2; 
however, this evidence suggests that although these requirements may be necessary, other 
types of requirement will also be needed. 
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5.4. Summary 
Section 5.1 identifies a core set of security features that it is necessary to represent in a 
system design; these are summarised in section 5.3. These security patterns, design features 
and security requirements provide the baseline that must be correctly modelled by the 
security analysis framework. 
The primary design patterns identified in this Chapter are single access point (5.1.1), 
policy enforcement (5.1.2) and end-to-end messaging (5.1.6). The patterns and application 
scenarios encapsulate good system design practice, which includes: 
" identify all user access points, and minimise the number of access points in a system 
(5.1.1); 
" make access controls explicit, and identify access policy enforcement with services or 
deployable units that manage a group of functions (5.1.2); 
" avoid the complexity introduced by arbitrary claims (e. g. `certified supplier') in place of 
simpler security tokens (e. g. identity, organisation) (5.2.2); and 
" use role-based access policies, to provide a bridge between the design and the business 
environment (5.1.3,5.2.3). 
Web-Services allow end-to-end security, as well as point-to-point security (5.1.6). This 
is an important enabling pattern. For example, it is possible to build intermediate services 
that take over some, or all, of the access control that would otherwise occur at an endpoint 
(5.2.1), or alternatively construct secure applications that communicate via an untrusted 
intermediary (5.1.6). 
The second part of this chapter discussed three typical application scenarios; these can 
be implemented using the features previously described, but more significantly they 
illustrate that value judgements are needed about the benefits of implementing business 
processes directly in complex access policies. Designers are faced with a trade-off between 
security complexity and implementation quality, and more elaborate policy structures may 
not be the best overall solution in business risk terms. 
This chapter also concluded that business goals for a system are not simply `functional' 
or `non-functional'; goals such as availability give rise to both functional and security 
requirements (5.1.5). The next chapter deals with this problem in more detail, since it places 
security design analysis in the context of established risk management methods, and 
describes the relationship between business goals and security requirements in more detail. 

123 
Chapter 6. Security Risk Management: the Context for 
Analysis 
Risk is the only viable criterion for deciding that security requirements are justified in 
the light of stakeholders' goals and concerns for a system (see chapter 3). The evaluation of 
a system design from a security perspective must therefore be based on risk management 
principles. This thesis shows how to analyse a system using risk-based methods, but that is 
not the whole story; such an analysis will be carried out in the context of a risk management 
process, perhaps based on BS7799 [135], which may in turn be part of a wider approach to 
information security governance. 
This chapter describes the underlying principles and concepts of risk-based reasoning, 
and places them in the context of established management methods and processes. This sets 
the context in which security design analysis will be conducted, and specifies the main 
analysis artefacts. Relating these artefacts to established management methods shows how 
the analysis framework developed in this thesis can be used in the context of these methods, 
and also introduces the main components used in the analysis process. 
In more detail, this chapter: 
" describes the context of security risk management and its place in IT governance; 
" explains the essential concepts of risk management, develops a generic model for 
process artefacts, and shows how this model relates to established management 
methods; 
" shows how risks are quantified by presenting typical metrics and definitions; and 
" explores the nature of security goals and control requirements, and shows how the 
components of risk analysis can be used to support traceability between goals and 
requirements. 
The conceptual framework for risk management (the first two bullets) summarise 
established practice. Linguistically justified risk levels, and the use of concrete asset 
outcomes (concerns) to support traceability from security goals to requirements are 
developed here as essential precursors to the risk analysis framework presented in the 
following chapters. 
This chapter is organised as follows: 
" section 6.1 provides an overview of security risk management. It starts with a brief 
discussion of the wider context of IT governance, and then describes established 
definitions of attacks, threats and risk management. These basic definitions are used to 
derive a risk management model, which is the common denominator between 
established management methods. The section concludes by showing how this model 
relates to established methods; 
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" section 6.2 presents a risk quantification scheme that shows how asset impact, attack 
likelihood and risk can be quantified, and how their definitions are linked; 
" section 6.3 explores the definitions of security goals and requirements in the light of the 
risk model. The literature is ambiguous on these topics, but the underlying security 
issues are quite straightforward. This section concludes with a traceability model that 
shows how goals, concerns and requirements are related; and 
" section 6.4 summarises the chapter. 
This chapter introduces a number of risk management terms, these are briefly defined 
where they are introduced, and further definitions can be found in the Glossary. 
6.1. Risk Management Overview 
The analysis of a design is only part of the risk management process, so the analysis 
framework developed in this thesis must be compatible with established management 
methods. This section describes that wider context and develops a model for the main 
artefacts that are used in security risk analysis. The model is the bridge between established 
risk management methods and the security design analysis framework (SeDAn) developed 
in this thesis. 
IT risk management is part of the wider wide context of IT Governance, so this section 
starts with a outline of this wider viewpoint (6.1.1). 
The essentials of risk management are based on two established concepts: the nature of 
an attack and the measure-correct-implement cycle of improvement that is the basis of most 
technology management. These underlying concepts are explained in sections 6.1.2 and 
6.1.4 respectively; they are then combined in section 6.1.4 to derive a generic model of the 
main artefacts used in the process of risk management. 
This model characterises most of the established risk management methods, so it is first 
described in general terms, and then used to contrast. the distinctive features of these 
methods. (section 6.1.5). This highlights the essential differences between these methods, 
and shows how the generic model, which is used to set the context for security design 
analysis, is related to established practice. 
6.1.1. Information Security Governance and Organisational Risk 
Risk management not only provides the basis for security value judgements (see section 
3.2), but is generally useful in management situations where a balance must be achieved 
between opposing, but essentially different viewpoints. An extreme example of such a 
trade-off is the balanced scorecard approach to company management [277], which seeks 
to balance such varied outcomes as financial performance, customer satisfaction and 
internal process development. Within projects, opposing aims may include functional 
performance, cost, and adherence to schedule, as well as security. 
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The means by which such opposing objectives are achieved and measured are equally 
varied; they involve personnel strategies, such as recruitment, staff screening, and training; 
processes to deliver outcomes and audit progress; and organisational management, 
governance, responsibility assignment and benchmarking. Whatever methods are used, 
there is inevitably a measure-correct-implement cycle, which provides feedback on the 
effectiveness of the management strategies and opportunities to tune, correct, and redirect 
the processes. 
In the context of an organisation's information systems, this very broad management 
perspective is known as Information Security Governance, or sometimes IT Governance; it 
is concerned with all aspects of performance and dependability, and encompasses the full 
range of management strategies. There are a number of governance frameworks that address 
this very wide context (e. g. CoBiT [278]) and one of the benefits of taking such a broad 
perspective is that it provides a context within which to evaluate the coverage of approaches 
to security risk management. For example, Bornmann and Labuschagne [279] assess three 
security risk management methods (CRAMM [139], OCTAVE [136], CORAS [144]) 
against criteria derived from CoBiT. They conclude that CRAMM does not deal with Risk 
Managements and OCTAVE does not support many of the possible control objectives. 
The established risk management methods therefore work within the wider context of 
corporate governance, quality, and management. However, the level of detail in these 
standards varies significantly; for example, BS7799-2 is a management framework that 
specifies the need for risk analysis, but does not specify a method, whereas other methods 
are more prescriptive. This nested management context is inevitable: broad standards can 
set the context but not provide the detail to cope with specific circumstances. 
In the same way, the security design analysis framework developed in this thesis fits 
into wider security risk management processes. The following sections establish the basis 
for this context by developing a generic model for risk management, and show how it 
relates to established practice. 
6.1.2. Attacks 
The underlying model of a security attack is given in figure 6.1, following the generally 
accepted definition in RFC2828 [280]. 
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Figure 6.1. The Generic Attack Model 
5 This is perhaps a mistaken critique of CRAMM, since BS7799 does specify risk management and CRAMM is 
usually employed in the context of BS7799. However, the authors usefully show how management processes can 
be contrasted using a governance framework. 
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The terms used in this chapter are defined in the Glossary, but figure 6.1 illustrates how 
the important concepts are related. Security is usually concerned to defend against attacks 
that are intentioned by an attacker or adversary, although they may sometimes be more 
general threat actions (e. g. fire, flood, lightning). An attack may exploit a vulnerability, 
obtaining access to an asset, and resulting in a negative outcome, or impact. A Threat Path 
is the complete path of attack from attacker to asset; a countermeasure, or control, blocks a 
particular threat path. A Threat is a complete potential attack, including the threat path and 
the impact. 
A Risk is the combination of the likelihood that a threat is realised, and its negative 
impact. There is no standard word for the undesired impacts associated with a particular 
asset; the term Concern is used here to refer to asset outcomes that stakeholders wish to 
avoid. 
This attack model does not require an information system, so it is completely generic. In 
practice, however, an information system will usually embody the asset (in some cases the 
asset is the entire system); depending on the scope of the analysis, vulnerabilities and 
controls may be inside or outside the system, or both. 
Countermeasures of any sort cost money, and also restrict the functioning of the system; 
this attack model provides the rationale that justifies countermeasures: a control may be 
worthwhile if the potential threat path is otherwise complete. In other words, there is an 
attacker who may utilise an exploitable path to an asset, and system stakeholders are 
concerned about the impact. 
Risks are usually quantified, at least to the extent that they can be ranked for 
management purposes. This quantification is either to a coarse linguistic scale, or to a 
probability. In either case, the factors that contribute to the risk metric are those in this 
attack model: 
" the likelihood of an attack; 
" the ability of the attacker to exploit a path to an asset, using a combination of normal 
system functions and vulnerabilities, or defects; and 
9 the degree of the impact. 
Several subsidiary concerns contribute to each of these factors. The likelihood of an 
attack may not be a constant, but depend on events such as product or contractual lifecycles. 
The ability of an attacker to exploit a particular vulnerability may depend on the skills and 
resources of the attacker, the motivation for the attack (e. g. does it need to be plausibly 
deniable, or is it for bravado), and the attacker's access to the system. In practice, risk 
analysis methods combine these factors into just two measures: the degree of impact and the 
likelihood of the event, and these are used to specify the position of each threat in a two- 
dimensional risk matrix. These metrics may be further combined to produce a single risk 
level, allowing risks to be ranked in terms of significance. The quantification of risk in 
business terms is discussed further in section 6.2, below. 
mbký 
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This attack model defines the nature of a risk, and therefore specifies the inputs and 
outputs of risk analysis. The inputs are: 
" Assets and Concerns: The parts of the system that matter to stakeholders, unwanted 
outcomes for those assets, and the impact of each of those outcomes; 
" Attackers: The potential attackers, their important characteristics in terms of access and 
capability, the assets threatened by each attack, and the frequency of attack; and 
" The System: The system must be understood in sufficient detail to allow vulnerabilities 
and threat paths to be identified, and control requirements to be positioned. 
Risk analysis results in the identification and quantification of threats, which may in 
turn require the addition of countermeasures, or controls, to the system. The overall process 
of obtaining these inputs, assessing risks, then deciding if controls are justified, is known as 
Risk Management. This is described in the next section. 
6.1.3. Risk Management 
The attack model of the previous section provides the starting point for risk analysis, but 
the purpose of analysis is to allow management decisions to be made about system security. 
The response to a risk may be to accept it, or mitigate it by: 
" requiring controls inside the system (e. g. access control); 
" requiring controls outside the system (e. g. separation of duties, rotation of roles); 
" reducing the impact (e. g. by restricting the use or deployment of the system); and 
" offsetting or transferring the risk (e. g. by insurance). 
A typical risk management process is illustrated in figure 6.2; the step numbers correspond 
to those given in BS7799-2 [135], which is the basis of the description in this section. 
1. Define: 
1 2. Define: System scope 
3. Risk Analysis ........ 
Risk Evaluation 
4/5. Manage Risks 
7 
Required Controls 
6. Document & Implement .......... 
Figure 6.2. A Typical Risk Management Process 
There are two precursors to risk analysis: establishing a system policy and defining the 
scope of the system. Section 3.3 discussed the use of security policies, but those policies 
are generally at the level of specific access controls; BS7799-2 uses policy in the 
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management sense: it establishes management commitment to the process, and defines 
security goals for the system. Some standards also use the term mission to specify the 
system level goals [281]; to avoid confusion between alternative uses policy, the term 
Security Goal will be used here to refer to management level security objectives. 
The scope specifies the system under study. The `system' may be an organisation, IT 
system, a set of business processes, or even a process that spans several organisations. The 
purpose of the scope is to limit the management process to a clearly defined boundary, and 
identify enough about the system to enable analysis. Although BS7799-2 only specifically 
mentions that asset information is delivered to the analysis step, the functionality of the 
system must also be established, for example by identifying its management processes. An 
analysable system model is needed to ensure that vulnerabilities and threat paths can be 
identified, and that control requirements can be appropriately positioned. 
Step 3 is risk analysis. The inputs and outputs of analysis were outlined in section 6.1.2. 
In addition to system information there is also a need for a specification of the security 
environment, including the security goals, asset concerns and potential attackers. The output 
is a risk assessment that lists threats and their relative risks. 
The next step is to decide how each risk should be managed. BS7799-2 splits this 
process into two separate activities: decisions about how to manage each risk (step 4), and 
the selection of control requirements (step 5). The management decision about which risks 
to mitigate is made in the context of the security goals for the system; for example, there 
may be externally mandated requirements about how certain assets should be protected (e. g. 
management of personal information). The controls that are possible in a given system are 
often quite limited, so risk management tools and methods may specify a list of possible 
controls, from which security requirements are selected; BS7799-2 takes this approach. 
The final step is to document the results and implement the management decisions. The 
documentation should be more than just a record of the required controls; most systems will 
be subject to change in their lifetime, so documentation should include a risk-based 
rationale. Some management processes, including BS7799-2, also require negative 
documentation: reasons why certain controls are not required. 
Of course, this is not the linear process suggested by figure 6.2. There is often internal 
iteration, and the final step changes the system baseline, requiring the analysis to be 
repeated before decisions are implemented. 
This process can be combined with the elements that characterise risk, described in the 
previous section, to derive a generic model for the artefacts used in risk management. This 
is the model described in the next section. 
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6.1.4. A Generic Model of Risk Management 
This section presents a generic model of risk management, derived from the essential 
elements of the last two sections: the components of an attack and the management process. 
The purpose of the model is to: 
" define the important components used during security risk analysis; and 
" show how these components relate to established risk management methods. 
The relationship to established risk management methods is described in the next 
section (6.1.5), which places this model in the context of BS7799 [135], OCTAVE [1361, 
NIST Risk Management Guide [134], and Morda [281]. This section describes the model in 
terms that apply generally all these methods. 
The model is shown in figure 6.3. The components of this model are artefacts 
(documents, models), not processes. The most significant attributes of each component are 
also shown, and the flow through the diagram shows dependencies between components, 
dependencies shown dotted are not explicit in all the methods listed above. 
Context and Scope 
Security System External 
Goals Bonn Assumptions 
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! SCI'IDý------- 
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Threat Likelihoood 
Risk 
Assessment 
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(Security 
Documentation 
Figure 6.3. Generic Risk Management Components 
The context for risk management is set by the system scope, and by security goals. The 
scope defines the system boundary and includes important features of the environment, such 
as the actors, roles, and the organisations that participate in the system. The security goals 
are business level security objectives for the system; as well as including stakeholders' 
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objectives they may also reference external constraints and restrictions, such as the need for 
security assurance, accreditation, or statutory obligations, such as data protection. 
Attackers are also a part of the system environment; the attributes assigned to attackers 
depend upon the analysis method, but they are usually sufficient to specify: 
" the types of vulnerability they are able, or prepared, to exploit; 
" the security goals they may target; 
" their degree of access to the system; and 
" the frequency of attack. 
The first three relate attackers to other parts of the risk model; exploitable vulnerabilities 
and degree of access are both needed in the search for threat paths. Security goals are 
needed to identify the assets that may be targeted by an attack. Other threat factors may be 
taken into account, including motivation or an attacker's objectives, but those listed above 
are the primary attributes because they relate attackers to other parts of the attack model 
described in section 6.1.2; other factors can be regarded as contributing to the evaluation of 
these attributes. 
The last attack attribute, frequency, is a major factor in determining threat likelihood, 
and can also be used to account for contributing factors such as opportunity. 
In order to search for threat paths it is necessary to have a description of the system in 
sufficient detail to allow identification of its information flows, potential vulnerabilities, and 
critical assets: an analysable system model. The nature of this description depends on 
system being analysed. If the system is an organisation the system model may be a set of 
business processes; alternatively, the analysis of a computer system may require a system 
design, as defined in chapter 4. The most common systems analysed by current methods are 
either organisations and their processes, or implemented information systems, with services, 
software and hardware. The process-based security risk analysis described here is often 
supplemented by checklist-based evaluation of best practice, and the latter is the more 
common approach to organisational assessment. Some of the management frameworks 
contain both process and checklist based methods (e. g. OCTAVE [136]), but further 
discussion of checklist-based organisational risk assessment is outside the scope of this 
thesis. 
Not all the assets in a system will have the same security concerns, and so it is necessary 
to identify which assets matter, how concerns about those assets relate to security goals, and 
what particular unwanted outcomes are the concern of the system's stakeholders. Assets 
may also be characterised in ways that indicate what types of threat path are viable; for 
example, leaking confidentiality via traffic flow may be a concern in military systems, but 
not in an industrial setting (see section 7.5.2). Whatever other attributes are used, asset 
concerns are always identified with an impact, which is the loss or damage to the 
organisation resulting from the specified outcome. In a similar way to risk, the impact can 
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be quantified using a coarse linguistic scale (e. g. Low/Medium/High) or in other ways that 
suit the application; this is discussed further in section 6.2. 
Vulnerabilities are system features that facilitate attacks; they are usually 
implementation defects, although they can also be design or process features. Of course, a 
feature is a vulnerability only if it can facilitate an attack (see section 6.1.2), so 
vulnerabilities are always qualified by their accessibility to attackers and the assets they 
expose. The search for vulnerabilities can be carried out in one of three ways: 
" starting with a list of known system defects, or with defects determined by automated 
evaluation tools; 
9 starting with an asset of concern and searching for vulnerabilities that may facilitate an 
attack; and 
0 starting with the Attacker and searching for ways to exploit the system. 
The first two are `bottom up' searches. The technique of starting from a published list of 
vulnerabilities, or using an automated probe to determine which known vulnerabilities are 
present in a system, is an important review technique for operational systems (for example, 
OCTAVE uses this approach [52]). The process of starting from the attacker and 
determining if the tree of possible actions facilitates an attack is known as threat or attack 
tree modelling [281,282]. The processes of working from vulnerabilities to attackers, or 
attackers to vulnerabilities are analogous to the safety analysis methods of hazard analysis 
and fault tree analysis, respectively [283]. 
The result of vulnerability analysis is a list of threats: the possible paths by which 
attackers may damage assets, and the vulnerability that facilitates each path. 
The threat likelihood is the overall likelihood that a threat will be realised; it combines 
the frequency of attack, and the likelihood that the attacker will be able to exploit a 
vulnerability, into a single measure. The measure used is compatible with that used for risk 
and impact: either a probability or a coarse linguistic scale. 
The risk assessment is a combination of the two main factors of impact and likelihood, 
and provides a risk rating for each threat. The assessment may be a two-dimensional metric, 
or the two factors may be combined to produce a single risk level. The advantage of the 
second approach is that it provides a ranking of the risks in the system, but even then it is 
usually necessary to retain the two separate measures to inform the risk management 
process that follows. 
The last two artefacts, Management Strategy and Documentation, were described in the 
management process overview (section 6.1.3). The management strategy includes the 
controls required to protect the system, but also includes explicit decisions about how to 
manage risks, for example if they are to be accepted or transferred, instead of controlled. 
The final documentation records both decisions and rationale. 
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6.1.5. The Generic Model compared to Established Risk Management 
Methods 
This section describes how the risk management artefacts in figure 6.3 relate to 
established risk management methods, in particular highlighting any distinctive 
characteristics or emphasis in their practice. The purpose of this comparison is not to 
provide a detailed account of these methods, but to show that the generic model, which 
forms the basis for SeDAn, can be related to all these approaches, and so the analysis can be 
used in a wide range of management frameworks. 
BS7799-2 specifies requirements for Information Security Management Systems 
[135]. The process specified in this standard was outlined in section 6.3; it requires a 
management policy (including security goals), scope, risk management strategy and 
documentation, but the other elements of the generic model in figure 6.3 are grouped within 
a single `risk analysis' process. This process considers threats, vulnerabilities, assets and 
impacts, so the same ground is covered, although the standard does not specify how. 
A distinctive feature of this standard is that it contains a checklist of controls under a 
diverse range of headings (e. g. personnel security, security of third party access) derived 
from a catalogue of best practice in the first part of the standard [17]. The process 
documentation is not only expected to specify why controls are used, but also why elements 
of the checklist have been omitted. The catalogue of best practice in the first part of the 
standard identifies risk management as a necessary practice; in this way risk management is 
set in the context of good organisational practice, but the standard maintains a clear 
separation between the two. 
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation) similarly 
combines checklist-based evaluation of good practice with process-based risk assessment, 
but they are both combined into a single process, which is shown in figure 6.4, (from figure 
3.1 in [52]). 
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Figure 6.4. The OCTAVE Process 
At a superficial level the components of the OCTAVE process map directly to the 
model given in the last section. However, unlike BS7799, which sets risk analysis in the 
context of a good practice, the OCTAVE process includes a parallel evaluation of 
organizational practice against a set of checklists. As a result, although the artefacts are 
similar, many of the process steps are concerned with elicitation and examination of current 
organizational practice. This difference is characterised by the inputs to phase 3, which are 
not analysable system models or policy statements, but context that is built by 
brainstorming with specific groups of employees (e. g. managers, operators). OC'I'AVI is 
therefore more suited to the review of an organisation, including its information systems, 
rather than a system. Although the mapping between the generic model in figure 6.4 and the 
OCTAVE artefacts is direct enough to allow system design analysis to he used in the 
context of OCTAVE, the organisational focus of this method makes this less likely. 
The original OCTAVE method did not include assessment of the likelihood of attacks, 
preferring to discover threat paths starting from assets of concern; however, the practical 
guide to OCTAVE [52] does describe how to rate attack likelihood on a coarse linguistic 
scale. The current OCTAVE practice in modelling attacks and vulnerabilities is therefore 
comparable with the generic model in figure 6.3. 
The NIST Risk Management Guide for Information Technical Systems [134] describes 
a process for risk assessment with components that are almost identical to those in the 
generic model. The process does not distinguish between context and system description, 
but with that exception the same components are identified, and the mapping is so direct 
that figure 6.3 can be interpreted as the NIST process. Like BS7799, the application of best 
practice is distinguished from risk assessment, and is described in a separate publication 
[284]. The NIST process is intended to be general enough to support any stage in the 
lifecycle of an IT system, and although it is sufficiently widely scoped to include the 
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environmental and organisational context of a system, it is primarily aimed at system, rather 
than organisation, evaluation. 
One contrast between the NIST process and BS7799 is the placement of the risk 
management action. In BS7799, the risk management strategy is made before controls are 
selected. The NIST approach is to select and document control requirements as part of the 
risk assessment, but these are technical recommendations, which are later reviewed in a 
separate risk mitigation process. The risk mitigation process considers a wide range of 
management options inside and outside the system, a cost-benefit analysis, and includes the 
expectation that there may be acknowledged residual risks. 
Unlike the three previous examples, Morda (Mission Oriented Risk and Design Analysis 
[281]) is not yet widely deployed, but it is of interest because its primary focus is the 
attacker or adversary. The artefacts of this process can also be directly mapped onto figure 
6.3; the system context is set by a representative set of operational scenarios that define the 
mission, and the method is more specific than others on the need for an analysis-focussed 
system description. The adversary focus means that vulnerability analysis is conducted 
using attack trees, but the distinctive feature is the degree to which adversaries are 
modelled. 
The attributes of an adversary in Morda include the attack objective (i. e. the system goal 
that is subject to attack), resources, sophistication and risk tolerance. These factors are used 
to predict an adversary's behaviour with respect to the system, and are also used in a 
sensitivity analysis that helps decision makers assess the robustness, or otherwise, of control 
recommendations. 
In summary, the generic model in section 6.1.4 maps exactly to the artefacts used in the 
NIST method, perhaps because this contains the most comprehensive description of risk 
analysis, and it maps well to the other methods discussed. Of these methods it is less likely 
that OCTAVE would be used in the context of a system design, because of its focus on the 
elicitation of organisational practice. 
6.1.6. Summary 
Established risk management methods are based on a straightforward model of a 
security attack, placed in the context of standard technical management practice. This 
section has explained these background concepts, and used them to derive a generic model 
of the artefacts (documents, models) used in risk management. The final section (6.1.5) 
validates this model by contrasting it with established risk management methods. 
The remainder of this chapter adds more detail to the generic model. The next section 
presents a risk quantification scheme, which gives metrics for impacts, attack likelihood and 
overall risk rankings. Section 6.3 then describes the traceability relationship between 
security goals, asset concerns, security requirements and implementation controls. 
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6.2. Risk Quantification: Typical Metrics 
There is no single or correct quantification scheme for risk. One feature that 
distinguishes different risk methods is the extent that they use probabilistic or coarse 
linguistic quantification (see section 3.2). Probabilistic scales tend to be used where the 
result has to be expressed directly in financial terms (e. g. cost of ownership, or return on 
investment) and where there is good actuarial basis for the underlying data. Attacks by 
hackers, and incidents of lightning strikes or fires, can all be quantified; however, the 
frequency of attacks that are less likely or less well publicised, for example from 
competitors, cannot be estimated from existing statistical samples [143]. As a consequence, 
much of the input data to risk management is subjective, and this means that an essentially 
qualitative characterisation of risk, using a coarse linguistically defined scale (e. g. High. 
Medium, Low), is often the best way to quantify risk without introducing misleading or 
spurious precision. Quantification schemes given in the established methods discussed 
earlier in this chapter [134,136,282] are all based on coarse measures. 
The metrics that need to be quantified are: 
" impact: the cost or damage resulting from an unwanted outcome to an asset; 
" likelihood: the frequency of attack; and 
" risk Level: the combination of these, to allow risks to be ranked. 
The metrics for impact, likelihood and risk are usually defined in the context of the 
system or business that is to be analysed; this aligns their interpretation with the needs and 
understanding of the stakeholders of the system. For example, factors that could be used to 
categorise impact include [52]: 
" reputation; 
" accreditation; 
" customer rating; 
" compliance with legislation; and 
" financial performance. 
The usual practice is to give criteria that map a definition in these terms to a short scale; 
for example, a 10-30% drop in customer numbers indicates a medium impact [52]. 
This section presents a quantification scheme that shows how likelihood and impact are 
defined, and how they are combined to give a single metric for risk. This scheme is 
arbitrary, because best practice is to define the criteria in the context of the problem, but it 
has proved useful in practice [8]. It is also a good starting point for discussion with system 
stakeholders, since it is defined in terms of financial performance, which is an important 
issue for many practical systems. 
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Impact 
The simplest expression of commercial impact is bottom-line financial performance. 
Although this is not the only company performance indicator, it does bring a powerful focus 
to security requirements elicitation. Often, stakeholders will assess too many asset concerns 
as critical; however, if the metrics are related to concrete business performance then a more 
realistic prioritisation results. Suitable definitions of financial impact are given in table 6.1. 
Table 6.1. Impact Criteria 
Level Numeric Criteria 
Value 
High 3 Will prejudice part of the business, sufficient to impact the 
financial results of the business over a long period. 
Medium 2 Will have a perceptible result on the bottom line of the business, 
but no serious long-term effect in subsequent years. 
Low 1 May carry a significant cost, but a number of incidents can be 
absorbed by the business in any year. 
It is possible to make a case for a scale of impact that has a `zero' value of `trivial 
impact'. This does allow the risk analysis process to include the nuisance cost of extremely 
large numbers of attacks with almost zero outcome, but it has the disadvantage that system 
stakeholders might assign the zero level to all assets not in a higher category. A practical 
compromise is to use a zero level in stakeholder elicitation, signifying `the cost is not zero, 
but it is so small that further analysis is not justified', and use the three levels, as given 
above in the subsequent risk analysis. 
Likelihood 
The likelihood of an attack is the combination of a number of factors that are exposed 
during risk analysis (see 6.1.2). Different risk methods have different ways of evaluating 
and combining these factors, but the final value for likelihood is simply a frequency of 
occurrence. Although a three-point scale is often used, it is more practical to work with a 
four-point scale. The justification for a slightly longer scale is that very large differences of 
timescale need to be accommodated: from seconds to tens of years. 
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There are two reasons for this wide time span: 
" attack likelihoods range over an inherently broad span. Attacks from hackers may 
occur at a rate of several per minute, yet it may still be necessary to quantify events that 
are rare in a system's lifetime; and 
" there is often a strong focus on annual financial results. In this case there are two 
timescales that are significant to stakeholders, the financial year and the system lifetime. 
It is necessary to distinguish attacks that are common, possible, or unlikely in each 
timeframe. 
Definitions of attack likelihood that reflect these considerations are given in table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. Attack Likelihood 
Level Numeric Expected Significance 
Value per Year 
High 3 >3 Several attacks are expected per year, this includes 
very frequent attacks that are expected every day. 
Medium 23 to 0.3 An attack is likely in any given year. 
Low 1 0.3 to 0.03 This attack is not likely in any given year, but can be 
expected during the lifetime of a system (typically 10 
years). 
Unlikely 0<0.03 This attack is an unusual occurrence; most systems 
would not experience the attack in the course of their 
lifetime. 
Risk 
Risk is a combination of impact and likelihood (see 6.1.2). An important property of the 
metrics defined above is that their linguistic product can be read directly in business terms. 
For example: 
" High impact, Low likelihood: Is expected to prejudice part of the business ... at some 
point during the system's lifetime; and 
Low impact, Medium likelihood: Is expected to cause significant cost ... at least once a 
year. 
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Given this linguistic approach to combining impact and likelihood, it is straightforward 
to categorise entries in the two-dimensional risk matrix in terms of overall business risk: 
" High risk: Deploying a system with unmitigated high risks will probably result in 
significant damage to part of the business, causing long-term financial impact (e. g. an 
event during the life of the system, with serious long term impact; once a year attacks, 
with significant impact on each year's profit); 
" Medium risks: Deploying a system with unmitigated medium risks will probably result 
in a bottom-line financial impact in one of the years that it is operational; and 
" Low risks: Attacks are either unlikely, or may occur but can be absorbed financially. 
Businesses may choose to deploy a system with unmitigated low-level risks in return for 
the operational benefit of the system, but it is unlikely that a business would wish to deploy 
a system subject to medium or high risks; usually some form of mitigation would be 
required at this level. 
The mapping of the complete risk matrix to these risk levels is given in table 6.3. 
Table 6.3. Risk in Business Terms 
Frequency 
Unlikely (0) Low (1) Medium (2) High (3) 
High (3) Medium (3) HIGH (4) HIGH (5) HIGH (6) 
Impact Medium (2) Low (2) Medium (3) HIGH (4) HIGH (5) 
Low (1) Low (1) Low (2) Medium (3) HIGH (4) 
The risk level can be expressed in business terms (High, Medium or Low, as defined 
above), or as the combination of the numerical metrics for likelihood and impact. Both 
these methods rank risk in the same way; however, the business definitions are not 
conveniently linear: a numerical risk of 4, on a scale of 1-6, is qualitatively high in business 
terms. Note that these orderings are derived by linguistic combination, not from arithmetic 
summation; for example, if a `zero' impact category was introduced it would be necessary 
to derive a new line in the table using linguistic definitions, and the non-linear nature of risk 
would mean that it would be unlikely to preserve the current arithmetic ordering. 
Summary 
Risk quantification schemes define levels for impact, likelihood and risk. They usually 
use coarse linguistic measures, or short numeric scales, with definitions that are specific to 
the system, organisation or business under study. This section has given an example of such 
a scheme based on financial criteria, and shown how overall risk level can be linguistically 
related to the definitions of impact and likelihood. 
The metrics given here are used in the analysis examples in the remainder of this thesis, 
and in the case study in chapter 15. 
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6.3. Security Goals, Concerns and Requirements 
The term goal is used to signify a business objective for a system and the term 
requirement is used to describe an operationalized specification: one that applies to a 
specific system component or function and specifies a security control, which can be 
readily tested in an implementation. These terms are consistent with their use in the 
requirements and engineering communities, except that some researchers would use 
`strategic goal' to denote a business objective, because methods based on goal refinement 
develop progressively more concrete goals (see section 3.5). 
The purpose of this section is to clarify what is meant by security goal and security 
requirement and show how they are related to the components of the risk management 
model: attacker, asset, impact, and security control. 
The reason for this discussion is that the direct refinement relationship between 
functional goals and functional requirements does not apply to security. Security goals do 
not simply refine into security requirements for two reasons: 
" security is a `system' property, so the positioning of security requirements, and the 
controls that implement them, is not simply related to the natural focus of security 
goals, which is the set of assets; and 
" security goals for a system often require behaviour (extra system functions) as well as 
security controls. 
This section explores these issues, and concludes with a traceability model that 
summarises how security goals, concerns and requirements are related. 
6.3.1. Asset Concerns and Security Requirements 
There is no standard word for the undesired impacts associated with a particular asset, 
so the term Concern is used here to refer to asset outcomes that stakeholders wish to avoid. 
The relationship between attacks, countermeasures, and asset concerns is described in 
section 6.1.2, which describes threat paths. The most straightforward definition of a security 
requirement is a constraint on a function [178]. 
The problem in defining security requirements is that they are not straightforward to 
derive from business objectives. The nature of a threat path gives a very clear illustration of 
this problem. Security controls are needed somewhere on paths between attackers and assets 
of concern. Although it may be economical design to put controls close to related assets the 
placement of any given control is essentially arbitrary, and can be influenced by a wide 
range of design and security considerations; boundary protection (such a network firewall) 
is a common case where controls are remote from the assets they protect. 
An undesired outcome or asset concern is not an operationalized requirement, since it is 
not directly testable; it states a form of system objective, and the required controls may be 
arbitrarily remote from the asset. However, controls or countermeasures do meet the criteria 
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for operationalized requirements. Since the purpose of controls is to block threat paths, they 
are inevitably restrictions or constraints on components of the system. Control requirements 
are therefore identifiable as security requirements, but their arbitrary placement on threat 
paths mean that there is no simple refinement relationship between the required business 
outcome, which is avoiding the asset impact, and the position of the control. 
6.3.2. Security Goals 
In the same way that a system model is needed before functional requirements can be 
assigned to components, specific assets need to be identified before undesired outcomes, or 
concerns, can be identified. This may be a simple boundary view of the system, exposing 
assets visible at the interface, or a more developed design. In either case it is clear that asset 
concerns are more concrete than business goals, because they apply to specific system 
components. Security goals can provide a context that allows the pertinence of asset 
concerns to be judged, so there is a direct traceability relationship between security goals 
and concerns. 
Unfortunately, the chain from security goals to asset concerns and then, indirectly, to 
controls is not sufficient on its own to deliver business security objectives. There are two 
issues why security goals may require more that a protection regime: 
9 no design or implementation is perfect, so although protection is important, it is 
necessary to back this up with detection; and 
" many business goals need to be implemented using both functional and non-functional 
requirements, to the extent that it may be misleading to describe business goals as either 
functional or non-functional. 
The first issue is evident in the functions needed to support availability. This is often 
described as `prevention of denial of service', and assumed to be non-functional because 
this phrase implies prohibition. However, as noted in section 2.3.3, many of the 
mechanisms needed to support availability are concerned with detection, recovery and 
audit; all these are behavioural requirements, not constraints. 
Provenance goals provide a good example of the second issue (see section 2.3.2). 
Provenance means that some aspect of the lifecycle of an asset must be recorded, and this 
means that assets associated with such a goal must have related provenance records and 
recording mechanisms. For example, a provenance record for a document may be its change 
history, together with the identity of the users who made the changes. These records are 
themselves data assets and the recording mechanism is a function, which may be part of an 
existing system service (e. g. document editor), or may be separate. So provenance goals 
give rise to both additional assets and functional requirements. The integrity of provenance 
records needs to be preserved, so these goals also give rise to control requirements. 
A further example from chapter 2 is privacy, for which the requirements are determined 
by statutory and ethical guidelines rather than by a design process. Privacy goals are 
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supported by both functional requirements (e. g. for data subjects to consent to the use of 
their personal data) and also control requirements (e. g. data confidentiality). 
In summary, business level security goals give rise to functional requirements, and also 
motivate asset concerns; asset concerns are not requirements by any of the usual criteria, but 
analysis of threat paths motivates the need for control requirements, which are constraints 
on system functions, and these are security requirements. 
6.3.3. Traceability from Goals to Requirements 
The relationships between security goals, functional requirements, concerns, security 
requirements and implementation controls are summarised in the traceability model of 
figure 6.5. The type of relationship is named in the diagram; the dotted boxes represent an 
unspecified system path between an attacker and an asset. 
Security Goal 
,........: 
`Attacker 
- Frequency of attack 
Asset 
Control 
Figure 6.5. Traceability between Goals and Requirements 
Security goals, including most of those described in chapter 2, give rise to functional 
requirements, and also motivate protection concerns for assets. The nature of these concerns 
will be explored further in the next chapter, but they identify unwanted outcomes, which are 
usually related to the disclosure of information, or the unwanted modification of data. 
The concern will be associated with a specific impact, or cost, to a stakeholder, and will 
be linked to one or more assets, which are components of the system. 
An attacker, or threat agent, may target individual assets, but more generally targets a 
security goal, which identifies a set of assets as targets. 
The components shown dashed represent an arbitrary path through the system, between 
the attacker and an asset of concern. The purpose of a security control is to block such a 
path, so control requirements are placed at any suitable point in the system. This is 
essentially the problem in analysing and refining security goals into protection 
requirements; the `system' nature of security properties means that there is no simple 
relationship between the asset concern and the type or location of the control requirement. 
Although it is not straightforward to decide by normal refinement, or design, where a 
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control should be placed, controls are still associated with the concerns that they defend, so 
the rationale for each control can be traced back to a set of concerns and the associated 
threat paths. 
In requirements terms, a security requirement specifies the need for a control, which is a 
constraint on the behaviour of a system component. Because there are many paths between 
attackers and assets, many control requirements are needed to support any particular goal; a 
collection of control requirements is often known as a security policy, or protection 
strategy. The term protection strategy is used in this thesis, to avoid confusion over 
different use of term `policy'. 
6.4. Summary 
This chapter has described the basis of security risk management. Risk analysis and 
management methods exist in nested management contexts, the most general are IT 
Goverance Frameworks such as CoBiT, followed by management frameworks such as 
BS7799. Within these, specific methods of analysis or management are applied to particular 
problems. This hierarchy is important, since it allows an analysis method, such as the one 
developed in this thesis, to be widely applicable, without the need to invent a new 
governance framework. 
The first part of this chapter (6.1) derives a model for the components (documents, 
models) used in security risk management, and shows that this model applies generally to a 
range of established management methods. Established security risk analysis and 
management methods are based on well-understood models of attack (6.1.2) and technical 
management (6.1.3), which give rise to the artefacts used in risk management, modelled in 
figure 6.3. A comparison of this model with established risk management processes (6.1.5) 
highlights some interesting comparisons between these methods, but more significantly 
shows that they fundamentally share the same analysis model. This shows that an analysis 
method using this model can be used to support existing risk management processes. 
The final sections of this chapter are concerned with quantification and traceability. The 
metrics used to quantify impact, attack likelihood, and risk are problem specific; however, 
financial measures are often relevant, and they provide a good starting point which can be 
expanded to include other critical performance factors. A quantification scheme based on 
financial performance is described, and it shows how the factors of likelihood and impact 
can be linguistically combined to meaningfully rank risks (6.2). This scheme will be used in 
the application examples in the following chapters. 
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The final section (6.3) describes traceability between security goals and requirements in 
the risk management model. Although the literature on this subject is not consistent, the 
underlying security issues are straightforward: 
" security goals give rise to both functional and control requirements; 
" security goals can be traced to asset concerns, which are not operationalized 
requirements but more concrete security objectives; 
" controls cannot be obtained by straightforward refinement of security goals, since they 
relate to blocking threat paths, and their placement is not directly determined by the 
asset concerns they defend; and 
" controls can be traced to the asset concerns they defend, and also identified with threat 
paths, or specific threats. 
This is summarised in the traceability model of figure 6.5. Traceability within system 
engineering is an important objective; most systems are subject to functional iteration, and 
traceability allows the original design and security rationale to be maintained during the 
system's lifecycle. Understanding the traceability between the components of the security 
risk management process is therefore an important precursor to integrating system design 
analysis with standard system engineering practice. 
This chapter has set the context within which an analysis process can work. It provides a 
model for the components that are used in risk analysis, and established the elements of 
traceability that can be used to support system engineering. The next chapter will provide an 
overview of the new security design analysis framework. 
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PART 2: SECURITY DESIGN ANALYSIS 
Part two describes a novel risk analysis framework, SeDAn, in detail. It begins with an 
overview, which is illustrated by a worked example, and then develops of each part of the 
framework in detail. The requirements for each framework component are grounded in the 
context established in part 1; the value and limitations of the framework are reviewed 
against these criteria, and in further worked examples. 
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Chapter 7. Overview and Worked Example 
The first part of this thesis demonstrates that it is both possible and productive to 
analyse security in a system design, identifies the security features that are needed in such a 
design, and describes the context of risk management in which such an analysis is carried 
out. This chapter introduces the second part of the thesis, which describes the SeDAn 
analysis framework. 
The starting point for security risk analysis is the generic model of risk management 
presented in the previous chapter (figure 6.3). In a systematic analysis process all the 
components of that model must be expressed at a compatible level of detail, and in a form 
in which relationships (e. g. between attackers and assets of concern) can be established and 
navigated. The effect of different types of security requirement must be clearly understood, 
and the process of analysis must be specified unambiguously. These topics are grouped into 
five main themes, each of which is described in detail in subsequent chapters. 
" the design of the system and its security environment: what information must be 
provided for risk analysis, and how it is represented (chapter 8); 
" how the system design is interpreted in security terms (chapter 9); 
" the security requirements available to the designer, and what they achieve (chapters 10 
and 11); 
" risk-based Security Design Analysis: the detail of how this is achieved, and how the 
overall process is managed in practice (chapter 12); and 
" implementation and life-cycle issues, in particular the obligations security requirements 
place on an implementer (chapter 13). 
In general, each of these chapters has an introductory section that places them in 
context, usually summarising requirements from previous chapters, a specification section 
that explains the relevant detail, followed by either worked examples or a discussion of their 
application which shows that they serve the intended purpose. The description of security 
requirements follows the same format, but is divided into two chapters (10 and 11), the 
second of which includes some significant worked examples. 
Part 2 of this thesis covers much ground, but these topics are all different facets of a 
single problem: to describe the risk-related components of the system in a compatible way, 
analyse the security consequences, and set appropriate control requirements. The purpose of 
this chapter is to provide a complete overview of SeDAn, to set the detailed material in the 
subsequent chapters in context. 
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This chapter: 
" introduces the analysis framework and describes its major components and their 
functions; and 
" uses a worked example of a complete security analysis to introduce the important 
underlying concepts and show how the separate elements of the framework contribute 
to the overall security risk management process. 
Although this chapter introduces and explains the concepts and decisions at the core of 
SeDAn, it inevitably sacrifices detail in the interest of providing a complete overview. 
These omissions are rectified in the chapters that follow. 
In detail, this chapter is organised as follows: 
" section 7.1 provides an introduction to the analysis framework and its main 
components; 
" section 7.2 introduces the scenario that is used as a worked example throughout this 
chapter. It gives UML models for the system design, and shows how UML is also used 
to model the security environment; 
" section 7.3 builds on the traceability model derived in section 6.3.3, to describe how 
requirements traceablity is maintained between security goals and requirements, and 
how this improves the quality of guidance available to an implementer, 
" section 7.4 introduces threat analysis, in particular explaining its relationship to 
information flow, how deferred deployment is handled, and how risk profiles link the 
security design to the wider considerations of organisational, process, personnel and 
environmental risk. Analysis tooling is briefly described, since tool-generated reports 
are used in the worked example; 
" section 7.5 shows a worked example of threat analysis. In the process it introduces some 
additional concepts, including the degree to which paths through the system are 
exploitable, and the use of pattern-based requirements to better relate the security 
management strategy to the system practitioners' (designers, implementers) view of the 
system. The section closes by discussing risk metrics for security requirements, and the 
evaluation and management of external threats; and 
" section 7.6 concludes the chapter with a brief summary of the core SeDAn concepts. 
Supplementary material can be found in appendix A, which describes UML and 
information flow diagrams, both of which are used in this chapter. 
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7.1. Introduction to the SeDAn Framework 
SeDAn is described as a framework because it provides a toolkit for analysts who need 
to evaluate the security of a system design and build an appropriate set of security 
requirements. This evaluation takes place within the context of the risk management 
methods and standards described in the previous chapter, so the main components in the 
framework are those that are identified in the generic risk model (see section 6.1.4): 
" the System Context or Scope, and its Security Goals; 
" potential attackers and their goals; 
" the System Description, or functional design; 
" asset Concerns, which are unwanted security outcomes for particular assets; 
" the Protection Strategy, which is recorded within the system as a set of security 
requirements; and 
" the Risk Assessment, which is an assessment of the threats, or exploitable paths within 
the system. 
This is illustrated in figure 7.1. The system scope, security goals and attackers are all 
part of the wider security environment of the system, and may be shared with, or derived 
from, a governance or risk management process. The system design and its protection 
strategy are part of the information system functional design, and may be shared with, or 
derived from, a system engineering process. Asset concerns are shown as part of the 
environment, but they are specific to assets in the information system and in some cases 
may be produced by the information system requirements management process. 
The Security Environment 
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Figure 7.1. Analysis Framework Components 
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The System Model 
The SeDAn framework provides an interface specification for these artefacts, but not a 
process for their production, since they will be produced by existing governance and 
engineering methods. SeDAn assembles these components into a single coherent system 
model, and provides the process and detailed analysis techniques for security design. 
To allow the analysis of large systems in practice it is necessary to have a physical tool 
-a software assistant for the analyst - but that is just an implementation of the real toolkit, 
which is a framework that shows how to consistently document the various elements of the 
overall system model (the syntax), and an understanding of how the combined model 
should be interpreted from a security perspective (the semantics). 
The core framework component is the functional design, because in a conventional 
design process this description is the repository for design information, and is the primary, 
or perhaps only, model that is maintained during the system's lifetime. An important 
objective of this framework is that it should be integrated with standard engineering 
processes; this means that the system description should be a standard UML design, and 
that any security requirements that emerge from the analysis process should be documented 
in relevant parts of that design. 
Before a system can be analysed from a risk perspective it is necessary to supplement 
the functional design with information about the security environment, including its security 
goals, related outcomes for particular system assets, and potential attackers. This results in a 
complete model of the system and its security environment, providing sufficient 
information to allow threat analysis. 
Although the overall system is a single system model for analysis purposes, the 
framework divides it into two elements: the functional design and the security environment. 
Separating these two elements is desirable, since it is compatible with their separate origins, 
allows each to be updated independently, and minimises divergence between the functional 
design needed for security analysis and that normally used by system designers. 
For each of these two elements of the system model, chapter 8 defines: 
"a metamodel, which identifies security relevant features; 
"a description of how these features are interpreted in security terms; and 
"a profile that specifies how they can be documented in UML. 
The function of the metamodel is to define what a system model means, and this is 
separate from the question of how it is written in U ML. In the next section (7.2) a system 
model is introduced by example; however, the detail of the metamodel is left to chapter 8. 
Deployment 
The systems considered here may span several organisations, or security 
administrations, and the deployment of services to organisations is not necessarily known 
when the application is designed: service-oriented systems defer deployment decisions, in 
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extreme cases until run-time. These factors present new problems for system design 
analysis; essentially, the notion of `ownership' is no longer straightforward. This problem is 
pervasive: security goals, data items, and service deployments may each have relationships 
to several organisations and not simply inherit one `owner'. For example, two different 
organisations may have security goals relating to the same data item, or a service may be 
deployed to more than one organisation. More flexible modelling of systems with respect to 
organisations is a distinctive feature of SeDAn, and this topic is introduced in section 7.4.2. 
Information Flow 
Another key aspect of the framework is how a system is interpreted in security terms. 
SeDAn maps the functional design and its security environment to an information-flow 
graph. The vertices of the graph are data items and the functional behaviour of the system 
determines edges that represent the potential flow of information; services are therefore 
mapped to sets of edges that characterise their security behaviour in terms of information 
flow. This topic is introduced in section 7.4.1 and covered in more depth in chapter 9; it 
provides a framework within which security requirements can be interpreted, and hence the 
formal link between requirements and the functional design. 
Requirements 
Security requirements are constraints on the functional model of the system: they 
specify that some system behaviour must not happen. Some constraints, such as access 
control, are relatively straightforward to interpret in design terms, but others may prohibit 
more subtle types of behaviour. For example, services that manage database transactions 
may be expected to constrain data values to be consistent with arbitrary application-specific 
criteria, often related to other databases, or the state of external processes. These more 
complex types of requirement build on the traceability model developed in the last chapter 
(see section 6.3.3) to relate requirements to their purpose, and this topic is explained in 
section 7.3. 
A further problem with requirements is the need to relate subtleties of the system that 
are understood by the designer or implementer, to those understood by the security analyst 
or modeller, if they each use significantly different representations, then it may be difficult 
to ensure that the understanding of one is transferred to the other. For example, it is possible 
to specify a requirement as a set of prohibited behaviours in the underlying information 
graph, but this is unlikely to be useful or meaningful to a system practitioner. The approach 
taken in SeDAn is to define requirements that are meaningful in design terms, either 
because they are explicitly traceable to requirements, or because they correspond to 
recognisable design patterns. The worked analysis in section 7.5.3 illustrates one case where 
a requirement pattern is necessary; chapter 10 covers this ground in more detail. 
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Analysis 
The final component in the framework is the analysis process itself. Conceptually, 
analysis simply follows the information flow in the system, identifying threat paths between 
attackers and assets of concern. A threat may be ignored because the level of risk is 
acceptable, but otherwise threats can be mitigated in one of three ways: 
" by setting requirements for technical security controls within the system; 
" by changing the functional design; and 
" by mitigating the risk outside the system. 
Each of these options is directly reflected in the analysis framework. Requirements and 
functional design are represented directly, while risks mitigated outside the system (e. g. by 
manual procedures, insurance, or recovery mechanisms) result in a change to the security 
environment, often by reducing the impact assessment of a particular asset concern. 
There are two complications in determining threat paths, the first is access type and the 
second is exploitability. Different attackers may have different types of access to the 
system (normal user, system administrator, external) so the means of access of an attack 
must be interpreted in a meaningful way, bearing in mind that service deployment may not 
be completely specified. The analysis process can also be better matched to realistic 
systems by selectively excluding threat paths that are not exploitable. The analysis process 
is described in chapter 12, but these core topics are explained below: section 7.4 describes 
access types and section 7.5.2 describes the approach to path exploitability. 
This section has outlined the components of the analysis framework and distinctive core 
issues embodied in SeDAn. The next section introduces the scenario to be used as a worked 
example, and presents its functional model and related security environment. 
7.2. Modelling the System 
This thesis is concerned with the analysis of a system model, not with the process of 
design or requirements engineering that is used to either build a functional model, or elicit 
its security goals. As a consequence the modelling focus is on giving a model that can be 
widely used, rather than dealing with the process of how the model is obtained. 
As outlined in the previous section, the complete system description has two main parts, 
the functional design and the security environment, the latter includes the system context, 
asset concerns and identifies potential attackers. Chapter 8 provides a more detailed account 
of these system models, but this section illustrates their use with a scenario that is used as a 
worked example throughout the remainder of this chapter. Although two meta-models are 
given in chapter 8, one for the functional design and one for the security environment, it is 
usual practice to divide up the material into convenient packages for presentation. In this 
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section the security environment is divided into two parts: the system context and goals, and 
potential attacks. 
The models given below are in UMI., because that corresponds to current design 
practice, and one of the goals of SeDAn is to integrate with the system engineering process. 
The UML needed in SeDAn is quite conservative, in the sense that it is a small, well- 
accepted subset of the language, but for the purpose of this section the semantics of each 
diagram are summarised individually. A summary of the UML used in this thesis is 
provided in appendix A. 
7.2.1. UML Functional Design: the Estate Agent Scenario 
The scenario used in this chapter describes a single service that manages information 
about houses for sale by an estate agent. It is used by client systems in two different 
organizations: the Estate client offers a service to manage the underlying data, and is used 
by a manager in the estate agent; the Broker is an external client that allows another 
organisation, or perhaps members of the public, to conduct searches for properties of 
interest. The functional design is shown in figure 7.2. 
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0.! 
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«servier» 
HouseRegister 
+ updateEntry(House) : void I 
+ getHouse(String) : House 
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+ houseDetails: 
+ price: 
+ accessCount: 
Figure 7.2. Estate Agent scenario: Functional Design 
This type of design is typical of how UML is used to model service-oriented systems; it 
shows the services (Broker, HouseRegister, Estate) as classes, and the operations and their 
data signatures as methods. A service is a facade: it defines an interface to service 
functionality, rather than directly encapsulating data in the normal object-oriented way. 
Other relevant objects needed in the system design, such as persistent data or other internal 
components of service state, are represented as separate classes (e. g. House). 
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To facilitate security analysis, it must be possible to unambiguously identify the intent 
of the design, in particular: 
" classes that will be implemented as services; 
" classes that provide operations directly to users; 
" data types that are part of a service's state; 
" data types that are transmitted as messages; and 
" associations that may be navigated to call an operation in a service. 
The first three features are stereotyped <<service», <<client», and <<manages>> 
respectively, to ensure that they are correctly identified. Any UML class can be a data type, 
or more generally, an asset, and any navigable association between services, including 
clients, may result in an operation call. 
The flow of information between services is determined by the operations available to 
each service and their respective data types. In this case the House service provides two 
operations: updateEntryO with a parameter of House and no return value, and getHouseO 
which has a search string as a parameter and returns a House object. updateEntry( is 
intended to be used to manage the House data; getHouse( is a search operation. 
This model includes stereotypes to make the service structure explicit, but it is otherwise 
a standard high-level functional design. 
In summary, the security relevant features of a functional design are the services, 
operations and their data signatures, data that is part of a service's state, and associations 
between these components. These need to be unambiguously identified in the UML model. 
There may also be security relevant information that is not usually present in a design: some 
data items may be identified as assets of concern. 
As the analyses proceeds, security requirements are added to the functional design; a 
final view of this design, with its requirements, is presented at the end of the worked 
analysis in section 7.5.5. 
To complete the system specification it is necessary to add a security environment to the 
functional design; this is the subject of the next two sections. 
7.2.2. The System Context and Security Goals 
The security environment is often divided into several different viewpoints that 
correspond to different parts of the generic risk management model (see section 6.1.4). The 
security environment for this scenario is presented in two parts: the potential attackers 
model, which is described in the next section (7.2.3), and the system context, which is 
shown in figure 7.3. 
The metamodel for the security environment defines a number of stereotypes, which are 
used to identify classes with particular security significance. The primary function of the 
resulting UMI, model is to expose the relationships between classes stereotyped in this way. 
The system context diagram, below, uses stereotypes for «userRole», 
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«organisation», «securityGoal» and «assetConcern»; the model of potential 
attackers also uses «userAttack», «adminAttack» and «externalAttack». These 
are explained by example in the following text, and defined in chapter 8. Stereotypes are 
defined in a UML Profile (see appendix A and section 8.1), which can also declare tags, 
which are class properties. The tags used below are defined in this way in chapter 8. 
The model in figure 7.3 identifies two organisations, and each has a single user role. 
There is single security goal: the EstateAgent organisation must ensure the integrity of its 
business assets (Businesslntegrity). 
«userRole» «organisation» «securityGoab» «assetConcem» 
Managr 
11 
EstateApent BusinessIntegity Houselntegity 
tags tags 
impact -2 assetType - managed 
direction - toward 
flowType - all 
«userRole» «organisation» .' impact -2 
Guest Broker 
Unwanted outcome: loss or unauthorised Syste=: House 
modification of critical business data, + houseDetails: 
specifically houseDetalls and price + price information. + accessCount: 
Figure 7.3. Estate Agent scenario: System Context 
The security goal is decomposed into undesired security outcomes, and in this system 
there is just one: loss of integrity of House data. This is documented as the Houselntegrity 
asset concern and its association to the Businesslntegrity goal traces its derivation. This 
concern specifies that the impact on the business of a successful attack on any related asset 
is 2 (medium impact, see section 6.2) and since this is an integrity goal the direction of 
threat is toward the asset. The flowType attribute specifies what types of path are 
exploitable for this concern; its function is described in section 7.5.2, below. 
An important part of the concern is its informal specification; it will allow an 
implementer to clarify the function of any security requirements that are traceable to this 
concern. 
One class from the functional design is referenced in this model: House is associated 
with the Houselntegrity asset concern. This association specifies the asset that is the subject 
of the concern, and this is further qualified by the assetType tag of managed. This tag 
specifies that the concern applies only to data that is part of a service state, not data of the 
same type transmitted in messages between services. 
There are other implied links between these models. The system design identified some 
classes as clients, so by default the user roles in this model have access to the operations 
defined in those classes. 
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The information in this model would usually be collected as part of a standard security 
requirements elicitation; in practice these objects would reference additional textual 
information about the intent and scope of the organisations, roles, security goals and 
concerns; the formal information in this model is just sufficient to relate to other 
components in the framework to facilitate analysis. One aspect of the environment 
metamodel not illustrated by this example is that it allows almost arbitrary association 
multiplicity (e. g. several organisations can share goals, or roles), this is discussed further in 
chapter 8. 
7.2.3. Potential Attackers 
The second part of the security environment is shown in figure 7.4, this specifies 
attackers and their goals in the same way that the context was specified: by using pre- 
defined stereotypes to classify particular types of attack. 
«usaRole» «organisation» 
Guest Broker 
ausaAttacbº KadminAttack» eexteraalAttack* 
Free Advert Fake Record Deface_Systan 
taol tags tag; 
frequency -2II frequency -I frequency -3 
«csecurityGoab» 
Busmesslntegty 
tags 
impact -2 
Figure 7.4. Estate Agent scenario: Potential Attackers 
The Organisation, UserRole and SecurityGoal classes in this view are the same as those 
specified in the system context. There are three possible types of attack, from system users, 
administrators (or organisations) and external attackers, because each of these has a 
different type of access to the system (see section 7.4). This example shows one of each, all 
directed at the only security goal, Businesslntegrity. Although the motivation of attackers 
may be of interest, we are primarily concerned with identifying the targets of attack, hence 
the identification of attacks with security goals. User attacks are associated with one or 
more roles that might originate the attack, and similarly administration attacks identify 
organisational attackers. For example, the Guest user might attempt to place a free house 
advert: the Free Advert attack on the integrity goal. This model is a straightforward UML 
formulation of the information that would be gathered during the attacker elicitation phase 
of a risk assessment. 
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These models show how both the functional design and its security environment are 
represented in UML: the standard system design is annotated, if necessary, with stereotypes 
that distinguish services, clients and managed data. The system context, asset analysis and 
attacker models, that may have been elicited in tabular form, are straightforwardly 
represented in UML. Finally, asset concerns are added to the functional design to link the 
two models. Although it may be convenient to regard the functional design and security 
environment as two separate models, they technically form a single consistent model of the 
system, which contains enough information for threat analysis. 
7.3. Traceability and Requirement Specification 
The definition of Information Flow for security applications has been the subject of 
considerable research and discussion, but we are simply concerned with what can be 
observed about a system [285]. This is a satisfactory definition, both for the purpose of 
defining security controls or constraints, and for enumerating possible paths of attack. 
However, the risk management viewpoint may subsequently discard some theoretical 
information paths because they are transmitted via mechanisms that are marginally 
exploitable (see section 7.5.2), or because the paths are of such low risk that stakeholders 
are prepared to accept the risk in return for the operational benefit of the system. 
It is straightforward in principle to interpret system design models in information-flow 
terms, but the analysis results must be integrated into the system engineering process, and 
any resulting security controls must be meaningful to system practitioners as well as 
security analysts. There are two important problems: 
" the need to manage and record decisions arising from analysis, to preserve the value and 
relevance of the analysis; and 
" the need to relate system subtleties understood by system practitioners (designers and 
implementers) to those understood by security analysts. 
The first problem is discussed further below; the second is introduced in the worked 
example in section 7.5.3. 
Stakeholder Concerns document information about the threat to an asset, but not any 
particular path of attack. For example, they specify the impact to the stakeholder if the 
concern was realised, provide traceability to system goals, and document critical 
information aspects of the asset. Each security requirement (or operationalized 
requirement) is traceable to a concern, which clarifies exactly what aspect of information- 
flow the requirement is expected to constrain. 
For example, consider the getHouse( operation in the HouseRegister service (see figure 
7.2), whose primary function is to select and return house information that matches some 
search criteria. This operation also updates an accessCount attribute in each selected House, 
to allow the popularity of different types of property to be measured, and to allow the estate 
agent to judge the effectiveness of its promotions. 
158 Traceability and Requirement Specification 
The extent that this amounts to an unwanted information flow depends on the concern 
that the stakeholder has for the House asset; assuming the concern is to protect the integrity 
of houseDetails and price data, threat analysis would identify a potential information flow 
path through the getHouse( operation, causing the analyst to specify a security requirement 
to constrain that operation. This security requirement is specific to the concern: 
" it documents an implementation requirement for this operation to protect houseDetails 
and price information; and 
" the analysis process ignores the requirement when searching for threat paths for other 
concerns. 
This control does not necessarily change the intended implementation of the system. In 
this case getHouse( was never intended to update houseDetails or price, but only the 
accessCount attribute. The problem is that because this operation is able to update attributes 
of the House asset it could also update the wrong attributes. This security requirement 
therefore documents a link between the concern and the service that may be significant for 
an implementer or evaluator, and may need to be understood if changes to the service's 
function are proposed. Controls of this sort are different in type from the functional 
components that they constrain: functional specifications place a lower limit on information 
flow (at least this must happen) whereas constraint requirements specify an upper limit (the 
flow must not include this information). 
In this example there is a simple link between data and information6. This is not always 
the case; the relevant data may not be separately identifiable in a design, or even in an 
implementation, and the only information available may be the coarse mapping between a 
concern and a concrete asset. For example, the concern may be to prevent the leakage of 
information that can be obtained only by aggregating database records; the database is a 
coarsely defined asset that is meaningful to system stakeholders, but it isn't possible to 
identify a specific record that should be restricted. The approach described here identifies 
threat paths and ensures that requirements are placed to block those paths, but specifies the 
requirements by reference to the concern that motivated them. This preserves information 
about the security requirement, but defers decisions about its implementation, allowing a 
security architecture to be developed that assigns security requirements to the components 
of a distributed system, given only a coarse system-level mapping between information 
concerns and concrete data. (Deferred requirements are described in detail in section 9.1. ) 
6 This is for the sake of example; in cases that are this simple it may be better to simplify the protection problem by 
dividing the asset into two parts. See the Composite Data problem in section 4.4.2. 
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Maintaining the traceability of flow concerns in this way has two significant benefits: 
" it exposes and documents security assumptions that may otherwise have remained in the 
mind of the original system designer, and 
" it maintains traceability between security requirements and goals, via asset concerns, 
resulting in specific and meaningful control requirements: the implementer, evaluator or 
subsequent designer is provided with criteria for information flow constraints on a case- 
by-case basis. 
This process is evident in the worked analysis later in this chapter, which also explores 
how requirements defined in this way can be valued in terms of risk (see 7.5.5). Each 
control can be traced to the risks that it defends, and this can provide implementers and 
evaluators with a metric for the sensitivity of security mechanisms. 
The next section provides a preliminary discussion of the analysis process, to prepare 
the ground for the worked example in section 7.5. 
7.4. Security Analysis Overview 
The purpose of security analysis is to determine threats, or exploitable paths that allow 
attackers to cause specific undesired outcomes to particular assets. Risk analysis methods 
often describe the analysis process as threat analysis (starting from the attacker) or 
vulnerability analysis (starting from the asset or the system) but the essence is to determine 
a catalogue of complete threats (attacker, path and asset), and establish the risk metric 
associated with each. The use of `threat' in SeDAn does not imply a particular direction of 
discovery. 
The concern of this framework is to establish a systematic way of cataloguing threats, 
particularly in the context of service-oriented designs expressed in UML. There are three 
types of attacker. users, organisations, and external attackers. The underlying threat 
discovery method is the same for all: the functional design and security environment are 
mapped to an information flow graph, then paths are found in the graph between attackers 
and assets of concern. However, the mapping of attackers to the underlying model depends 
on the type of access the attacker can exploit, and the following sections describe these 
variations. Section 7.4.1 describes the information flow graph model and paths to and from 
normal system users. The subsequent sections describe the analysis of threats that arise 
from organisational attackers (section 7.4.2) and those that originate via mechanisms that 
are outside the system design (section 7.4.3). 
7.4.1. Paths of Attack 
Threat analysis regards the attacker as the originator of a tree of actions that may create a 
path to an asset of concern. These paths are generally blocked by security requirements (or 
operationalized security requirements), which require either standard protection measures 
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(e. g. operating system access controls) or constrained applications. When extra security 
requirements are added in response to a risk, they block a path identified in the analysis. 
It is possible to identify information paths in a system design. The framework 
introduction (section 7.1) noted that information flow in a system can be modelled as a 
graph, with data items at its vertices and information flows determined by the behaviour of 
services. This model is quite general, since it can simply be expanded to accommodate 
whatever behaviour is required, in the same way that state based models can be expanded to 
represent more detailed behaviours. This is discussed further in chapter 9, but it is clear that 
it is not sufficient to represent the estate agent scenario by a single vertex per operation. 
Even the simplest access controls constrain individual clients, so the most basic information 
flow graph requires a pair of nodes (call, return) for each combination of operation and 
client. The information flow associated with the example system is shown in figure 7.5. 
Guest Manager 
Primary Concern: Integrity 
Figure 7.5. Information Paths in the System Design 
This figure returns to the diagram conventions established in chapter 4; in the remainder 
of this thesis diagrams of this sort are used to describe information flow, whereas system 
representations are given in UML. Where appropriate, data items are labelled with both 
their data type and also the operation with which they are associated. Information flows 
within services are not shown unless they are constrained, since the default behaviour of a 
service is to allow all inputs to influence all outputs. 
This diagram shows the information flow between the clients and the HouseRegister 
service, the House data managed by that service, and information flows between the clients 
and the two user roles. There is an integrity concern specified for House data; without any 
constraining security requirements the obvious direct paths of attack follow the flow of 
information from the Guest user to the House data. (The vertices used by a direct attack are 
shown shaded. ) Less direct paths are also possible, and these are discussed in the later 
sections of this chapter (sections 7.5.2 and 7.5.3). The Manager is not shown shaded on this 
diagram, because this role is not identified as an attacker in figure 7.4. 
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Security Requirements specify constraints that block such paths, and must be 
implemented as controls in the final system. The pattern of information flow across the 
system depends upon the direction of the associated concern (confidentiality or integrity); 
the essence is that it is possible to identify chains of dependency, rooted at assets of 
concern, and document requirements that block these paths. Concrete examples of such 
requirements are given in the worked example in section 7.5. 
The type of information flow analysis outlined here - expanding the data items in the 
system into a flow-graph - is systematic and efficient. On examples this small it can also be 
seen to be intuitively appealing: at this level of detail it is roughly what an analyst does by 
`staring at the system'. 
This discussion has assumed that the Guest user is the attacker; user roles have a simple 
relationship to the system because they access specific operations in specific services. Other 
types of attacker have a more complicated access relationship, and these relationships must 
be explored to explain how threats from these sources are evaluated. 
7.4.2. Service Deployment and Attacks from Organisations 
The standard risk process identifies classes of attacker in order to distinguish between 
different frequencies of attack, degree of access to the system, and level of resource or 
sophistication. The last of these is concerned with the type of vulnerability that an attacker 
can exploit; for example, bribing an employee is typically more expensive than external 
hacking. Since this is implementation dependent, it cannot be factored into a system-level 
analysis, but the other factors, frequency of attack and type of access, can be used directly. 
The usual access distinction is between insiders and outsiders, but modem systems are 
distributed across security domains whose organizations may have conflicting security 
requirements, so it is also necessary to represent different administrations. The primary 
categories of access are therefore: internal user, administrator, and external attacker. If the 
system spans several organizations with different security concerns it is necessary to 
represent each separately, so a particular analysis may need to include several organizations 
and their internal user roles. 
Deployment puts part of the system into the domain of a particular administrator, so to 
complete the chain of risk between asset and attacker it is necessary to be able to express 
constraints on the deployment process and determine which parts of the system could be 
deployed to any particular administration. SeDAn solves this problem by associating 
deployment requirements with minimal deployable elements, known as Deployment 
Groups. 
A deployment requirement is simply a constraint that specifies an administration to 
which a deployment group may not be deployed. A deployment constraint can be regarded 
as a form of administrative access control: instead of specifying that a particular client may, 
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or may not, access a service, it specifies that a particular organisation may, or may not, host 
a deployment group. 
By the definition of the level of abstraction of the system description, services are 
atomic units of software deployment. A deployment group is therefore a service together 
with the data items it consumes or produces, as shown in figure 7.6. These groups are 
straightforward to determine; services and data items must be chosen at the right level of 
abstraction, but no further design decisions are needed. It is not necessary to identify which 
data items are persistent, the fact that they are inputs or outputs to a service mean that they 
are deployed with that service. 
Guest Manager 
----- ---ý Broker Deployment Group 
Ar' A, 
«dient» <<client>> 
Broker Estate 
------------------- 
u ate Entry. ca get ouse. ca teEntry. call get ouse. ca 
ouse Strin House Strin 1updateEntry. returnj get ouse. ret 
i up ate ntry. return get ouse. re 
Ovoid) (House (void) House 
--- ---- ------- " 
<<service- 
HouseRe ister 
House Primary Concern: Integrity 
HouseRegister Deployment Group. 
___ __---- -___ ---_- ---. -_. -. -. _. -' 
Figure 7.6. Deployment Groups 
Deployment groups are used to specify the source of an attack when it originates from an 
organisation, so the analysis process is to find a path between an asset of concern and any of 
the data items within a deployment group that may be deployed to that organisation. For 
example, in figure 7.6 the Broker deployment group (named after its service) may be 
deployed to the Broker organisation, which is identified in figure 7.4 as a possible attacker. 
This provides the Broker organisation with access to the data items, shown shaded, that are 
inputs to updateEntry( and geiHouseo and hence a direct means of attacking the House 
asset. 
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7.4.3. External Attacks and Risk Profiles 
SeDAn distinguishes between attacks that use mechanisms outside the scope of the 
system design, and those that use design features directly. The former are known as external 
attacks, the latter are attacks from either users or organisations. 
It is important to distinguish external attacks from unanticipated user roles that otherwise 
use standard system functions; the latter can be directly modelled in the security 
environment. For example, consider the design of a financial system. It may have a number 
of roles associated with its workflow (e. g. manager, accountant, administrator) but the 
company in which it is deployed may also have other systems and other roles (e. g. 
marketer, designer). If the system design ignores the other potential roles in the overall IT 
system, then it may allow some functions to be accessed by `all roles' which are safe in the 
limited context of the accounting system but not if the implementation uses a common 
identity infrastructure - foreign roles may acquire inappropriate privileges in the financial 
system. It is not necessary to model every possible role in an organisation, unless they are 
distinctive in some way (e. g. have different attack profiles), but it is often necessary to 
include a role of `other user' to account for this situation. 
Similar considerations apply to organisations: there may be circumstances where the 
organisations associated with a system cannot be fully enumerated (e. g. a system with many 
customer relationships) so a small number of representative organisations are identified; in 
these circumstance it may also be necessary to include unprivileged organisations in the 
security environment model to test that they are handled correctly. Again, the test for what 
should be included depends on the distinctions that need to be made between attackers. 
Provided other roles and organisations are considered when the security environment is 
modelled, then these problems can be accommodated, but true external attacks are those 
that exploit vulnerabilities outside the scope of the design description. Examples include 
theft or destruction of computers, social engineering, wiretapping, and exploiting services 
that are offered accidentally, rather than by design. 
These attacks exploit functionality that is not in the system design, so requirements that 
constrain the functional design can never fully protect assets of concern'. However, 
analysing external attacks quantifies the degree to which any component (service, data etc) 
of the system can be used as an attack vector. Essentially, analysis of threats arising from 
external attacks assumes that every part of the system is subject to external attack. Threat 
analysis determines the extent that each system component can attack an asset of concern, 
and this allows the calculation of the risk to the system of that component being subverted 
by an external attack. 
7 Of course it is possible to design security requirements that minimize the number of system services that need to be 
misted (i. e. that may be able to effect unwanted security outcomes on any of the assets in the system). This is a 
normal design aim and usefully reduces the parts of the system vulnerable to external attack. One of the useful 
outcomes of the external analysis described here is that it allows such strategies to be quantified. 
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The result of an external attack analysis is a risk profile for a component, which specifies 
the risks to which the system would be exposed should the component be subverted. In this 
case `component' is any part of the system model, so this analysis may apply to services, 
service associations or users. The risk profile indicates the extent to which the component 
must be protected in its implementation context. For example: 
" servers that host services may need to be protected against both physical theft, and 
implementation defects, such as buffer overflows that allow attackers to exploit 
unplanned access paths. The risk profile indicates the degree to which the server must 
be protected from its environment, and the required quality of its software 
implementation; 
" associations between services may be implemented as communications. The risk profile 
may indicate the need for communications security; and 
" users may be subverted by social engineering. The risk profile may indicate the 
sensitivity of particular users, perhaps motivating user education or two-person business 
processes. 
Essentially, external analysis decomposes the systematic risk environment of the system 
into risk profiles that characterise each element of the system from the risk perspective. This 
provides a mechanism for understanding how much dependence is placed on individual 
components, and relates a system to its full implementation context, including its physical, 
and social environments. 
In summary, attackers are classified as belonging to one of three access categories, so 
there are three ways of constructing paths from assets of concern to attackers: 
" Internal Users. These are part of the system design, so threat paths are sought between 
assets of concern and normal system users, usually grouped as roles; 
" Administrators or Organizations. The system is divided into deployment groups, which 
may be deployed to one or more organisations. Threat paths are between organisational 
attackers, via system components in associated deployment groups, to assets of concern; 
and 
" External. External attacks directly threaten every component of the system, via access 
mechanisms that are outside the scope of the system design. Threat analysis determines 
the risk of subversion of each component, and results in a risk profile which 
characterises the degree of protection required 
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7.4.4. Tooling 
The modelling and analysis principles developed here provide important insights for the 
design of service oriented systems, and for building security requirements that take proper 
account of the security risk environment. However, tooling is important if these methods are 
to be used on systems of any size or complexity; the analysis of paths to users can be 
conducted by inspection for small systems, but discovering threats arising from 
administrative or external attackers may involve evaluating collections of paths rather than 
single threats, and is therefore unlikely to be systematic unless it is supported by 
automation. 
A model-checking tool is able to exploit the systematic nature of this analysis process to 
guarantee that the analysis is complete, and modelling information flow as a graph has the 
benefit that efficient methods are available to implement path discovery. 
SeDAn is therefore supported by an integrated set of tools, the Security Analyst 
Workbench (SAW), which builds a formal model of a system from its UML description, 
and supports information flow model-checking, interactive setting and checking of security 
controls, and round-trip engineering of security documentation back into the UML design. 
An outline description of the tool is given in chapter 14, and the threat paths presented 
below are tool generated. Short paths are intuitively obvious, but even extremely simple 
systems benefit from automated model checking to expose less obvious threats. 
7.5. Analysing the Estate Agent Scenario 
This section presents a worked analysis of the Estate Agent System described in section 
7.2. The threat paths discovered during this analysis provide the background to a number of 
important analytic issues, including the exploitability of different types of path (7.5.2) the 
need for requirements patterns (7.5.3) administrative and external attacks (7.5.4 and 7.5.5 
respectively) and the review of a complete protection strategy (7.5.5). 
7.5.1. Access Controls and Information Flow Constraints 
This section begins a worked analysis of the Estate Agent System described in section 
7.2. The first threats to be considered arise from attacks by system users; in this case there 
is only one: an attack from the Guest user directed at the House asset. The most direct paths 
of attack are considered first, which simply means that the analysis begins with the shortest 
possible path and then considers longer or more indirect threats. The shortest path 
corresponds to the normal behaviour of the system, since no access controls have yet been 
defined. 
Threat paths are reported by the Security Analyst Workbench using a path trace, which 
is reproduced below for this direct path, and will be used throughout the thesis for the same 
purpose. The path trace has two parts, the header and the trace. The header specifies the 
asset concern which is the target of attack, it also reports the length of the path that has been 
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found and the risk level (see section 6.2). Each line in the trace corresponds to an 
information carrier in the system: either a message to or from an operation, or a managed 
asset that is an element of state. For messages, the operation name, direction and invoking 
service, or user role, are given; for managed data the managing service is given together 
with the asset type. If the role of a target of concern, operation or asset is identifiable it is 
also reported. The direction of information flow is always top to bottom; so, for example, 
in the case of a confidentiality threat the target is first and the attacker last, and in the case 
of an integrity threat the attacker is first and the target last, as shown here. Any arrows on 
the right margin are not part of the tool output, they have been added to identify lines 
mentioned in the text. 
This is the direct path described above: 
Concern : Houselntegrity Searching from: all_roles *** Path length=2 ; risk=4: 
.. Operation............ Broker. guestAccess(in) in role: Guest called 
from: Guest 
.. Operation............ HouseRegister. updateEntry(in) called 
from: Broker 4 
.. Managed Data.... HouseRegister/House 
This path shows the Guest user accessing the updateEntry( operation via the Broker 
client (arrowed), which in turn legitimately modifies the House data. The risk level of four 
indicates a high level of business risk (see section 6.2). Access control is therefore needed 
in the HouseRegister service to prevent access from the Broker client to the updateEntryO 
operation. The Estate client requires access to the updateEntry( operation, so a second 
access constraint is also needed to prevent the Guest user accessing the Estate client 
interface. 
The next threat may be less obvious: 
Concern : Houselntegrity Searching from: all_roles "** Path length=2 ; risk=4: 
.. Operation............ Broker. guestAccess(in) in role: Guest called from: Guest 
.. Operation............ HouseRegister. getHouse(in) called from: Broker 4 
.. Managed Data.... HouseRegister/House 
The getHouse( operation in the HouseRegister service is able to modify House data 
associated with that service (both lines arrowed), so the Guest user may use this operation 
(which can be accessed legitimately) to mount an attack. What is needed is a constraint on 
the getHouseO operation to ensure that it will protect the integrity of the House data. The 
system designer never intended that getHouse( should modify the attributes of House data 
that are informally identified by the concern (see section 7.3 for detail); so adding this 
constraint does not change the intent of the design. However, it documents the control 
requirement, so that this security rationale is not lost in the designers mind, but retained in 
the UML model of the system. 
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Security analysts would easily determine these access control requirements by 
inspection, although perhaps few would explicitly document the flow constraint on 
getHouseO. The information-flow model of this system at this stage is shown in figure 7.7. 
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Figure 7.7. Information Flow with Initial Security Requirements 
This illustrates how the requirements are modelled in the underlying graph. Access 
control requirements are straightforward, since they remove complete sets of behaviour, 
usually including removal of the data nodes that vector the attack. The flow constraint, 
however, is a limitation on how the service behaves. Its meaning can be determined only by 
reference to the original concern, in this case to maintain the integrity of House data. It is 
easy to imagine circumstances where the getHouseö operation changes the data, but still 
meets this integrity flow constraint, for example it may update a counter to indicate how 
many times each House object has been accessed (see section 7.3). 
It is also obvious from this information-flow diagram that there are other possible paths 
between the Guest attacker and the House data asset. These are the subject of the next two 
sections. 
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7.5.2. Path Exploitability and Information Flow via Traffic 
The paths discovered so far have been simple and intuitive, but there are less obvious 
information-flow paths in the system: 
Concern : HouseIntegrity Searching from: all_roles *** Path length=4 ; risk=4 : 
.. 
Operation............ Broker. guestAccess(in) in role: Guest called from: Guest 
.. 
Operation............ HouseRegister. getHouse(in) called from: Broker 
.. 
Operation............ HouseRegister. updateEntry(return) called from: Estate 4 
.. 
Operation............ HouseRegister. updateEntry(in) called from: Estate 4 
.. 
Managed Data.... HouseRegister/House 
This is also shown diagrammatically in figure 7.8. 
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-ý3 
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Broker 
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get ouse. ca 
(String) 
-service>> 
HouseRegister ---------------- 
--------- <<client>> Estate 
u teEntry. ca 
(House 
u to ntryseturn 
void 
---------------------- 
Primary Concern: Integrity 
Figure 7.8. Threat Path via a void Operation Return 
In this path the Guest calls getHouse( via Broker, legitimately. This operation 
influences the return value of updateEntryo, called from Estate (arrowed in trace), which in 
turn influences the value of a parameter of a subsequent call to updateEntryO (arrowed in 
trace), which legitimately updates the House data. 
At first sight this threat path seems arcane, and the first reaction of many analysts would 
be to argue their way out of problems of this sort. There are two arguments that could be 
used to suggest that a path can be ignored. The first is its length, and the second its 
exploitability. 
Very short paths are usually trivially exploitable (e. g. the attacker simply calls the 
update0 operation). Long paths are less likely to be exploited, because the longer the path 
the higher the chance that it contains a step that is not realistically exploitable. On the other 
hand, many practical attacks involve multiple steps, (for example passing an application 
script though a number of services to a database - effectively tunnelling the attack between 
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the user and the asset). Attackers may be forced to use long paths because one-step 
vulnerabilities are more obvious to system practitioners. Path length is not therefore a good 
indicator of exploitability; attacks on well-designed systems often use several steps to 
achieve their goal. 
Exploitability, however, is an important criterion. Does the possibility of signalling a 
single bit per call via a void operation return present a viable path of attack? Military 
security experts, who worry about a subverted program (Trojan horse) inside a system, 
signalling confidential data to an outsider, would argue that the total information flow 
achieved through such a mechanism (in bits/s) could be significant, and worse, subverted 
software is in a position to be selective about its choice of data (e. g. leaking cryptographic 
keys or passwords). On the other hand, few commercial systems would be concerned about 
the leakage of data via traffic', and it is even harder to fmd an argument that such a path 
could be used to subvert commercial integrity. 
This form of information path is an example of communication via traffic: the pattern or 
volume of service calls in a system presents an opportunity to convey information 
indirectly. However, since traffic mechanisms can be distinguished in a design model (such 
as the void return) then it is possible for an analyst to make a choice about which are 
included in the analysis, and which excluded. This does not quite amount to a commercial 
security/military security switch, but it does allow the flow analysis presented to the 
designer to be more realistically tailored to stakeholders' real concerns. 
The type of path that can be used to attack an asset is therefore a choice that must be 
made by the analyst and SeDAn provides for this to be recorded as an attribute of a concern 
(see section 7.2.2): the flowType specifies the types of path that are exploitable, either data 
(traffic flows are not viable attack routes) or all, in which case these types of flow may be 
significant. 
In summary, the activity of calling a service is an information flow, but the extent that 
flows of this type are exploitable depends on the stakeholders' risk model. The 
exploitability of traffic paths is regarded as an attribute of a concern (not a system): this 
allows the analysis behaviour to be tuned to the needs of specific goals and asset types, 
while avoiding the need to artificially add requirements to deal with paths that are not 
exploitable. 
8 Commercial systems would certainly be concerned about the leakage of passwords or other means of acquiring 
system privilege, but there is little evidence that signaling via traffic is necessary if a system has already been 
subverted by implanting Trojan software - there are usually better communication options available. 
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If the void return paths in this example were excluded from the analysis because they 
were not considered exploitable, the problem would not be completely solved: there would 
no longer be a path via the updateEntry( return, but the other operation, getHouseO, returns 
data, which also supports an information path: 
Concern : Houselntegrity Searching from: all_roles *** Path length=4 ; risk=4 : 
.. Operation............ Broker. guestAccess(in) in role: 
Guest called from: Guest 
.. Operation............ HouseRegister. getHouse(in) called 
from: Broker 
.. Operation............ HouseRegister. updateEntry(return) called 
from: Estate 
.. Operation............ HouseRegister. updateEntry(in) called 
from: Estate 4 
.. Managed Data.... HouseRegister/House 
Figure 7.9 presents the equivalent information flow diagram. 
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. Strip 
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return 
(House) 
«service» 
HouseRegister ---------------- ----------------------------------- 
House Primary Concern: Integrity 
Figure 7.9. Indirect path of attack via an Operation Return 
This threat cannot be disregarded, because it represents a real potential threat path and a 
high risk, even though it is somewhat indirect. This is an instance of a relatively common 
attack strategy: the attacker presents a service (Estate) with a malicious object of the correct 
type, which is inadvertently used. For example getHouseo may be used by the Manager to 
obtain House data, which is then edited and used to update the database. Cross-site scripting 
is a well-known attack of this type. 
An appropriate security requirement is therefore required somewhere on this path to 
protect the system. The obvious place for the constraint is the HouseRegister service, since 
the designer probably does not expect getHouse( to return results influenced by different 
calls to the same operation. 
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A control can simply be added to express this flow constraint, but this is not a very 
satisfactory way to resolve paths of this sort; if extra operations are added to HouseRegister, 
the number of possible constraints between them grows in proportion to their square. 
However, system designers have a much simpler view of this problem: a Stateless operation 
instance does not directly influence the outcome of other operation instance, and this is 
quite a common design feature since it makes the whole behaviour of a service easier to 
predict. A better solution to individual flow constraints is therefore to define a stateless 
pattern that can specify this type of control: 
Stateless: there is no direct information flow between the input of a stateless 
operation and any other operation within the same service. 
Of course, a stateless operation may support information flows to elements of the 
service state, or to operations in other services that are called as part of the operation's 
function. Since stateless operations are architectural properties of a design, they do not need 
to be traceable to specific information flow concerns; this pattern is defined in section 
10.2.3.2. 
This is an example of a constraint pattern, which defines a set of information flow 
restrictions between parts of the system. Defining requirements as information flow 
patterns can improve communication between the designer and analyst, and provide more 
succinct guidance to the implementer about the intent of the control. It also significantly 
reduces the number of requirements needed to define common security configurations. 
In summary, it is useful to define requirements that are patterns of flow constraints. 
Such patterns better match the designer's or implementer's understanding than a very large 
number of primitive constraints, and are more compact and scalable. Stateless is an example 
of such a pattern. 
The addition of this stateless requirement removes the last threat path from the Guest 
user to the House asset, but there are still administrative and external attacks to consider. 
7.5.4. Administrative Attacks and Service Deployment 
Administrative attacks arise because it may be in an organisation's interest to attack the 
security goal of another organisation. Many service-based or distributed systems span 
multiple organisations, so one of the distinctive features of SeDAn is that the threat model 
allows an analyst to specify these forms of attack. Threats arising from administrative 
attacks are discovered in a similar way as user paths, as described in section 7.4.2. 
In the Estate Agent scenario the Broker organisation may attack the integrity goal, but 
there is no requirement within the system that prevents the deployment of the 
HouseRegister deployment group, and hence the House data, directly to the attacker. This 
is, presumably, not the intention of the system designer, so a deployment constraint must be 
added to specify that the HouseRegister service should not be deployed to the Broker 
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organisation. However, this does not resolve all the administrative threats, since the 
deployment of the Estate client to the Broker organisation also provides a path of attack: 
Concern : Houselntegrity Searching from: all_orgs *** Path length=1 ; risk=3 : 
.. Operation............ HouseRegister. updateEntry(in) called from: Estate 
.. Managed Data.... HouseRegister/House 
Because the Estate client is deployed to the Broker organisation, that organisation is 
able to use the updateEntry( operation, to attack the House data. The deployment of the 
Estate client to the Broker organisation must therefore also be constrained. 
This completes the administrative analysis: to prevent the administrative attack 
identified in the attack model, the HouseRegister and Estate services must not be deployed 
to the Broker organisation. 
In a simple system these attacks are straightforward to identify and resolve, and the 
similarity of deployment constraints to access controls is evident. However, in larger 
systems, administration attacks prove to be less easy to identify intuitively, or to correct. 
The industrial scale study in chapter 15 includes design problems that arise from this 
source, and which were identified only by systematic analysis. 
7.5.5. Review of Complete Protection Strategy 
The previous sections have reviewed the Estate Agent system and identified the need for 
security requirements including access controls, behavioural constraints on services, and 
restrictions on how services may be deployed. It is straightforward to show that these 
requirements are sufficient, since no more threat paths can be identified within the model, 
but it is possible that more requirements than necessary have been set. Requirements need 
to be reviewed to ensure they are collectively logical and economical: logical in that they 
constrain appropriate services, and economical because requirements imply trust in the 
implementation, and therefore the fewer the better. 
Because the threat analysis described here is systematic it is possible to evaluate a set of 
requirements by removing individual requirements from the system one at a time and 
evaluating the threats that emerge. This provides a risk-based metric for the value of each 
requirement, and identifies over-constrained systems by identifying requirements that serve 
no purpose. The resulting risk metric may be useful in determining the degree of assurance 
required in the implementation of a requirement, or even the strength of mechanisms to be 
used. 
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This process is not practical for even small systems by hand, but is very straightforward 
given machine support; evaluating the security requirements in the Estate Agent system 
produces the following result: 
Requirements required at class: Estate 
NoDeploy to Broker ... Risk Level =3 to Admin 
DenyAccess (Guest »> Estate. manageList) *********" No Path 
Requirements required at class: HouseRegister 
NoDeploy to Broker ... Risk Level =3 to Admin, 
No Access (Broker »> HouseRegister. updateEntry) . 
Risk Level =4 to User 
ConstrainFlow for Houseintegrity (HouseRegister. getHouse. all_roles »> 
House. all_roles) ... Risk Level =4 to User 
Stateless operation: HouseRegister. getHouse ... Risk Level =4 to User 
Evaluation of even this simple system is revealing. The analysis report lists each 
requirement?, and the level of the highest risk threat that it defends. The risk metrics are 
what would be expected from the analysis above, but there is one surprise: the access 
control from Guest to the manageList( operation in the Estate service is not necessary. This 
is because after protecting the user threat, a deployment restriction was added to counter an 
administrative attack. If a client is no longer deployed to an organisation, then it cannot 
service its users, so this access control requirement has become redundant. However, after 
removing the unnecessary access control, the valuation changes: 
Requirements required at class: Estate 
NoDeploy to Broker ... Risk Level =4 to User 
The deployment constraint, originally introduced to counter an administration risk at 
level 3, now defends the higher risk user attack, and this results in a higher risk metric for 
this requirement. 
In summary, the process of setting security requirements may result in an over- 
constrained system in which some requirements are unnecessary1°. The valuation process 
allows this to be detected; it also provides risk-based metrics for requirements that reflect 
the threats actually protected by a requirement, as opposed to the reason the requirement 
was originally introduced. 
9 Access controls can either be listed as positive or negative, and there are pros and cons to both (see section 9), 
however here we need to specify requirements that, when removed, increase behaviour, so it is appropriate to use 
the access-deny form. 
10 Of course, a security designer may deliberately over-constrain a system. This is known as defence-in-depth, see 
section 12.3.1.1. 
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The security requirements needed in the Estate Agent system are therefore: 
No Requirements set at Broker 
Requirements at Estate 
NoDeploy to Broker 
Requirements at HouseRegister 
DenyAccess (Broker »> HouseRegister. updateEntry) 
NoDeploy to Broker 
ConstrainFlow for Houselntegrity (HouseRegister. getHouse »> House) 
Stateless operation: HouseRegister. getHouse 
This scenario was, of course, chosen to be as simple as possible and yet provide 
examples of some of the core analysis concepts, so there are perhaps more requirements 
than would typically be required in a system of this size. The access control requirements 
would be well understood by most security practitioners, but most of the other requirement 
elements are not as readily identified, illustrating the need for a systematic means of 
determining requirements in even very simple systems. 
In order to achieve full integration with the system engineering environment, the 
requirements are usually recorded as part of the UML design, as shown in figure 7.10, 
rather than as a separate list. 
Within the functional design, requirements are assigned to the service in which they 
need to be implemented, providing a direct link between the analysis and implementation. 
The access control requirements, however, are not in the same form that they appear above. 
It is usual for access requirements in real systems to be default deny based, meaning that 
accesses which are not explicitly allowed, are not permitted. The access requirements 
exported to the UML are therefore in this form; for example, if unrestricted access is 
allowed, a requirement is added that specifically allows this behaviour. The result is more 
verbose, but provides a link to future systems that may able to formulate access 
requirements automatically, given a suitable design. The resulting set of access permissions 
can also be regarded as recording the topology of the system that was analysed. 
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Figure 7.10. The Estate Agent System including Security Requirements 
7.5.6. Evaluating the Risk Profiles 
External attacks were introduced in section 7.4.3. Because external attacks are defined 
as those that use mechanisms outside the system design model, the resulting risk profiles are 
evaluated for the guidance of implementers, but are less likely to directly result in control 
requirements than threats arising from user or administrative attacks. Of course, there are 
cases where external risks are so unacceptable that this evaluation results in a re-design of 
the system, or changes the strategy for placing controls to reduce the trust required in one 
part of the system. This would generally occur when it is known that some services are, 
because of their deployment, more vulnerable than others, and either the system design or 
the security requirements can be re-arranged to reduce the external risk levels associated 
with those components. 
External risks can be evaluated with respect to any of three categories of system object: 
deployment groups (services and their associated data, see section 7.4.2), navigable 
associations between services, some of which will be implemented as real communication 
channels, and also system users. Evaluation of the Estate Agent system results in the 
following risk profiles: 
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Table 7.1. Risk Profiles for Estate Agent System 
System Object at Risk Level Concern 
Class Estate 5 Houselntegrity 
Class HouseRegister 5 Houselntegrity 
navigable association Estate»> HouseRegister 5 Houselntegrity 
User Manager »> Estate 5 Houselntegrity 
Since there is only one concern in this system, and one external attack, the risk levels 
and concerns are the same for each risk. The level is higher than that of other threats, 
because of the higher frequency of external attacks. More significantly, this is the complete 
list; there are no external risks for the Broker client, the Guest user, or the Broker to 
HouseRegister communications. This is because the security requirements have effectively 
isolated the Broker client and its users - in other words external threat evaluation 
demonstrates that this part of the system is untrusted, or contained, from a security 
perspective. This is a stronger test than merely checking that there are no security 
requirements that must be implemented by a particular service; this demonstrates that it is 
not possible to use the service to attack the system's security goals. 
Note that the Guest user role is not an external attacker, this is a user with legitimate 
access to Broker and to getHouseo, an external attacker is someone who is able to use non- 
standard means of access to the system (see section 7.4.3). 
Risk Profiles provide an important link to the wider system context; they provide a good 
metric for motivating the need for physical or electronic isolation of services from the 
environment, and even indicate the degree of trust placed in individual user roles. 
In this scenario the exposure of the communication path between the Estate Client and 
the HouseRegister service is acceptable because they are presumed to be within a single 
physical boundary. If this were not the case, (e. g. the service was accessed from a client via 
the internet) then it would be necessary to protect this link within the system, thus reducing 
its external exposure. The requirements introduced so far are not sufficient for this purpose, 
but requirements that specify communications security are included in chapter 10. 
The interpretation of the risk profile of a user is also significant: the threat is via both 
the individual filling the role, and the connection between the user and the client service. 
The latter may be significant if the user is not directly accessing the client; this topic is 
discussed in section 5.1.1. 
In summary, external threats can be evaluated in a similar way to user and 
organisational threats, and this evaluation results in risk profiles that provide an important 
link to the wider system, personal and organisational risk environment. 
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7.6. Summary 
This chapter has introduced the second part of this thesis by providing an overview of 
SeDAn. Following an introduction to the framework (7.1), a system scenario is introduced 
that is used as a worked example throughout the rest of the chapter. 
The scenario is first presented as a functional design in UML, highlighting the features 
that must be identifiable in such a design to allow security analysis (7.2.1). This is the 
designer's representation, but it does not constitute a complete system for analysis: it is also 
necessary to model the system context (organisation, user roles security goals), asset 
concerns, and potential attackers (attackers, access types and goals). This security 
environment is also modelled in UML and presented in sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3. 
The chapter presents two complementary views of SeDAn, the first introduces key 
framework concepts (7.3,7.4) and the second provides a complete worked analysis of the 
scenario (7.5). These sections provide an overview of many of the core concepts in the 
framework, including: 
" how security requirements relate to the traceability model developed in section 6.3.3, 
and how traceability improves the specification of requirements (7.3); 
" the use of an underlying graph-based information flow model to provide an intuitive, 
systematic and efficient evaluation of threat paths (7.4.1 and 7.5.1); 
" the assessment of systems that feature deferred deployment, multiple administrations, 
and attacks from administrations; including the need for deployment requirements 
(7.4.2,7.5.4); 
" the quantification of risk profiles, by the analysis of attacks via mechanisms external to 
the system model, to provide a link between a system and its physical and 
organisational context, and to investigate the security containment of parts of a system 
(7.4.3,7.5.6); 
" the isolation of threats that are vectored via traffic flows rather than the movement of 
data, and their optional exclusion from the analysis of commercial systems (7.5.2); 
" the expression of requirements that correspond to well-understood design patterns, and 
therefore relate well to the designer's understanding of a system (7.5.3); and 
" requirement evaluation, which assesses the sensitivity (risk metric) of individual 
requirements in a set, and identifies redundant requirements (7.5.5). 
The following chapters add detail to this overview. Chapter 8 describes UML 
modelling; chapter 9 explains how security is modelled in this framework, and how this 
supports the definition of security requirements; chapter 10 defines the security 
requirements supported in SeDAn, followed by worked examples of their use in chapter 11; 
chapter 12 describes the analysis process, and chapter 13 explores implementation and life- 
cycle issues. 
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Chapter 8. Modelling the System 
The previous chapter included a worked example, which showed how systems are 
modelled in SeDAn, and how such models are usually divided into two main parts: a 
functional design and a security environment. The former is as close as possible to the 
high-level design that would normally be used by system practitioners, and the latter sets 
the security context of the system by modelling the other artefacts of the risk management 
process, as described in chapter 6. 
The function of the system in the previous chapter was outlined, and its security 
implications were explored, but no general description was given that explains what models 
are possible in SeDAn, how they relate to real systems, or how they should be represented 
in UML. That is the purpose of this chapter, which distils the material presented in chapters 
5,6 and 7 into a succinct template for models that can be used by a system designer. In brief, 
it describes: 
" the functional and environmental models used by SeDAn, their meaning in system 
terms, and how they relate to each other, and 
" how to represent these models in UML. 
The organisation of the chapter mirrors these objectives. The first section describes how 
metamodels, profiles and system models interrelate, providing an overview of how the 
material in the following three sections is linked. Section 8.2 then introduces the SeDAn 
metamodel, which describes the types of system that can be modelled in SeDAn. This 
explains what the resulting models mean in terms of the systems they describe, and how 
they follow from the requirements developed in previous chapters. 
The meaning of the model is separate from the question of how it should be represented 
in UML, which is specified in section 8.3 using a profile. The profile provides the 
information necessary to configure UML design tools for use with SeDAn, and also 
provides a reference guide to SeDAn stereotypes, their meaning and use. The profile for the 
security environment model is straightforward, but the representation of the functional 
model is a balance between: 
" minimising the divergence between SeDAn models and standard system designs; and 
" establishing the relationship between a functional design and its security environment. 
Finally, examples are given that show how the worked example in chapter 7 uses the 
modelling representation described in this chapter. 
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In detail, this chapter is organised as follows: 
9 section 8.1 introduces metamodels, profiles and models, and shows how they relate to -- 
each other, 
" section 8.2 describes the SeDAn metamodel and its two main components, the security 
environment and the functional design. It explains how these should be interpreted in 
system terms, and how they follow from the requirements developed in previous 
chapters; 
" section 8.3 presents a profile that specifies how the system model should be written in 
UML. This is similarly divided into environmental and functional components; 
" section 8.4 gives an example of a system model, drawn from chapter 7, and shows how 
it relates to the metamodel developed in this chapter, and 
" section 8.5 concludes the chapter. 
This chapter describes what SeDAn models represent for the system practitioner, in 
terms of the system implementation and its environment, but not how they are interpreted in 
the security analysis process. The next chapter (9) describes the security interpretation of a 
system; the security requirements listed in section 8.3.2.1 are defined in chapter 10. 
Other supplementary material can be found in appendix A, which provides a summary 
of the UML features used in this thesis, including profiles, and appendix B, which provides 
a formal account of the functional metamodel described in section 8.2.2. 
8.1. The relationship between Metamodels, Profiles and Models 
This section describes how models are related to metamodels via profiles, since this 
provides the rationale that links the three parts of this chapter: metamodel (8.2), profile (8.3) 
and example models (8.4). 
Figure 8.1 presents a fragment of a metamodel and a corresponding system model, and 
shows how they are related. In this diagram the arrows between the layers are not part of 
UML, but have been added to clarify how each layer references the layer above. Relevant 
UML syntax, including customisation using profiles, is described in appendix A. 
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The top layer in figure 8.1 is a fragment of the SeDAn metamodel. The metamodel is 
presented in two parts, the security environment and the functional design; the fragment 
here is from the functional metamodel in figure 8.5. The metamodel describes the types of 
system that SeDAn is able to model, and its description in section 8.2 includes the rationale 
for modelling choices, and semantics that explain what each part of the metamodel 
represents in a real system. 
Figure 8.1 shows three metamodel components from the model in section 8.2: 
" IABSnucT SERVICE, which models services; 
" AASSET TYPE which classifies assets; and 
" , MANAGES which can be used to represent a range of special relationships between 
services and assets, including identifying data that are part of a service's state. 
The bottom layer in figure 8.1 is part of the system example in figure 8.9; it contains 
three components that correspond directly to those in the metamodel: 
"a service (HouseRegister); 
"a particular type of asset (House); and 
" an association that signifies that the HouseRegister service manages a collection of 
House assets. 
The middle layer is part of the profile described in section 8.3. The purpose of a profile 
is to specify how models should be drawn in UML, and its stylised format allows the 
configuration of design tools for application specific language extensions. 
For example, this profile introduces a stereotype, <<service», which represents the 
tABSTP4CT SERv1CE in the metamodel. This stereotype extends a UML metaclass, which 
itself is a stereotype, <<interface». Within UML the «interface» stereotype is defined 
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as extending the UML metaclass Class, so it includes all those elements that can be 
embedded in a class, such as operations and attributes. 
This profile therefore customises a specific UML diagram element, «interface», by 
assigning a new stereotype name, <<service». When that stereotype is used in a model, 
its meaning is conveyed by the referenced metamodel component, tABSTCT SERVICE. A 
complete stereotype specification may also include tags and constraints; these are described 
in appendix A. 
The other components in the profile of figure 8.1 do the same job. The UML element 
assigned to JM4JAGES is an association, rather than a class, but is stereotyped in the same 
way. Although the UML definition of a profile is a collection of stereotype definitions, it is 
often necessary to map elements of an application metamodel to unstereotyped UML, and 
this is defined in the table that relates an unstereotyped UML Class to an AASSET 7 E. 
It is more straightforward to navigate the model/profile/metamodel structure if similar 
names are used for related components. However, there is a considerable difference 
between a metamodel component and the stereotype that names a model entity, so the 
following typographical conventions are used to ensure they can be readily distinguished: 
" all metamodel names are prefixed with 't, and metamodel model element names are 
capitalised. (e. g. : CLIENT'); and, 
" stereotypes are always given in their standard UML format: they are delimited by 
guillemets and begin with lowercase (e. g. <<client»), the only exception to this rule 
is when they are declared in a profile diagram (see figure 8.1), following standard UML 
notation. 
The remainder of this chapter presents these layers in detail. The next section describes 
the SeDAn metamodel, followed by section 8.3 that presents a profile that customises the 
UML language for SeDAn modelling. Finally, section 8.4 gives examples of models that 
use the language features defined in the profile. 
8.2. The SeDAn MetaModel 
SeDAn must interpret a system in a consistent and meaningful way in order to ensure 
that its analysis is systematic. The framework therefore needs a generic model of a whole 
system, which essentially specifies what the analysis framework understands by `a system'. 
The metamodel presented here is a model that explains the type of system that can be 
represented in the framework. The important distinction is that the models presented in this 
section define what kind of system can be represented, section 8.3 specifies how such 
systems are represented. 
Requirements for the features that need to be modelled are established in chapters 4 to 7, 
and these requirements are referenced and summarised in the sections that follow. In 
general, the approach is to give the simplest model that will meet the requirement; there are 
many elaborations that are possible, some of which are well established in the security 
Modelling the System 183 
literature (e. g. role hierarchies) but the priority of this thesis is to demonstrate the feasibility 
of a complete framework; elaborations can be added later, depending upon the requirements 
of real applications. 
An important objective for SeDAn is to utilise, as far as possible, standard UML 
functional designs, so the metamodel is designed to allow system models to be divided into 
two parts: a security environment and a functional design. This division is shown in the 
package diagram in figure 8.2. 
Environment Fundion 
wmport» 
Figure 8.2. Package Diagram of the SeDAn System MetaModel 
The Functional package makes use of components defined in the Environment package, 
so the security environment will be described first in the sections that follow. 
8.2.1. The Security Environment 
The security environment specifies the context of a system, filling in gaps that are 
relevant to analysis but often not included in a functional design. The requirements for this 
model have already been established in previous chapters; they include the need to model: 
" users in terms of roles (a role is a group of users), to provide a bridge to business 
process requirements (see section 5.1.3); 
" the main artefacts in risk management, which are: actors (modelled as user roles), 
organisations, security goals, attackers, asset concerns and security requirements. (See 
section 6.1.4 and figure 6.3). Traceability requirements determine how these should be 
related (see sections 6.3.2,6.3.3 and figure 6.5. ); and 
" three different types of attacker, each of which has a distinctive means of access to the 
system: a normal user, an organisation or administration, and an external attacker (see 
section 7.4. ). 
These requirements are incorporated in the security environment metamodel shown in 
figure 8.3. The main elements of the model are described under three main topics: 
organisations, asset concerns and attacks. 
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Figure 8.3. The Security Environment MetaModel 
Organisations 
An 
, 
ORGANISATION models a real organisation or any other domain of security 
administration. For example, a large company may have several operating divisions, or 
different physical sites. These may need to be modelled as different organisations if they 
have different security characteristics, such as distinctive security goals or attack motives. 
One of the distinctive features of this model, compared to previous UML models that 
support risk management (e. g. the CORAS UML profile [286]) is the flexibility with which 
an organisation is represented. Most models have a hierarchical relationship between 
organisations and services, goals or users; this is, effectively, an `ownership' relation that 
associates a single organisation with each part of the system. The SeDAn model is much 
more flexible, since it allows several organisations to share the same user role, goal, or 
service. This allows the representation of a system prior to its deployment by modelling 
what is known, rather than making fixed organisational bindings, and also allows more 
subtle relationships that exist in collaborative distributed systems to be modelled in a 
compact way. For example, it is helpful during requirements elicitation to group security 
requirements in as succinct a form as possible (e. g. organisations X and Y share goal xxx; 
external hackers target goals A, B and Q. The multiplicities available between the 
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components of this model allow security requirements grouped in this way to be modelled 
directly. (See figure 8.8 in section 8.4 for an example. ) 
An 
, 
tORGANISATION may have a number of , 
tUsER ROLES, which can be used to 
distinguish between business-relevant categories of user or different degrees of system 
privilege or access. The model allows the same user role to be assigned to different 
organisations; this is a valid requirement in some collaborative systems, and may introduce 
ambiguities of privilege and data ownership that will be faithfully reflected in the SeDAn 
threat analysis. 
An 'ORGAN1sATJON may also have a number of tSECuR n' GoALs that are high-level 
security business objectives. Security goals may give rise to , 
tFUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
and AASSET CONCERNS. An JASSET CONCERN is a specific undesired outcome which is 
identified with one or more assets in the functional design. Functional requirements are 
shown in this model for completeness, but are not used in SeDAn. 
Asset Concerns 
An JASSET CONCERN captures attributes of the relationship between a security goal and 
an asset, in order to facilitate analysis. The attributes are of two types, they specify 
information about the unwanted outcome (fimpact, tdirection, toutcome) and they allow 
the analyst to specify the types of threat paths that are exploitable (#dataPathOnly, 
#managedAssetOnly). An tAssET CONCERN is more than a simple association class; it 
records a more concrete security objective than a business goal, and should be provided 
with an informal description that conveys this information. This is the function of the 
Joutcome attribute, which describes the particular unwanted security outcome that defines 
the concern. (See section 6.3 for an explanation of goals, concerns, and requirements. ) The 
other attributes of . 
''ASSET CONCERN are formal parameters that are used in the analysis 
process: 
timpact is a measure of the damage to a business if this concern were realised against a 
particular asset. SeDAn uses qualitative impact measures on a coarse scale of 1 to 3. 
(See section 6.2. ) A'SECuRI ' GOAL also has an optional impact attribute, which 
signifies the overall maximum impact to a business if that security goal was violated. 
Overall impact levels are often elicited with security goals, and they provide a useful 
upper bound for individual asset concerns. If an impact value is set for a security goal, 
the impact attribute of each related asset concern must be the same, or lower. 
'direction specifies if the direction of attack is towards the asset (e. g. inappropriate 
modification of the asset) or away (unwanted information flow from the asset to an 
attacker). At the asset level it is always possible to classify concerns in this way, but that 
does not mean that the only possible goals or concerns are integrity or confidentiality. 
Chapter 9 discusses the specification of concerns in more detail. 
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JdataPathOnly specifies what types of path are exploitable for this concern. Section 
7.5.2 explains that it is possible to discount some types of information flow because they 
have steps that are carried via traffic flow (i. e. the existence of a message, as opposed to 
the data it carries). The removal of paths of this type from the analysis is a matter of 
judgement, so specifying the type of path allowed for each concern allows the behaviour 
of the analysis to be fine-tuned to the requirement. If IdataPathOnly is true, then only 
information paths carried by data will be analysed for this asset concern, otherwise 
traffic paths will also be analysed. 
ImanagedAssetOnly identifies a subset of the assets to which the concern is linked. 
Services and asset types can be related via #MANAGF. S in the functional metamodel; for 
example, to allow a model to distinguish persistent service state, such as a database. If 
the #managedAssetOnly attribute is true then only these instances of an asset type will 
be regarded as attack targets, and not other instances of the same asset type, such as 
those passed as parameters to operations. 
Attacks 
An JA7TAcK targets a particular security goal with a . 
tfrequency attribute that specifies 
how likely the attack is, expressed on a qualitative scale of 0-4. (See section 63. ) In the 
same way that the attributes of LASSET CONCERW specify the information needed for 
analysis, but not the whole informal requirement, the #ATTACK type contains sufficient 
information for analysis, but should be supplemented with informal information outside the 
model. 
The tfrequency of attack is influenced by many aspects of the attacker, so it may be 
determined by subjective qualitative judgement, or summarise the findings of a more 
complex elicitation model. 
An attack is directed toward a security goal, and that means that all assets traceable to 
that goal via concerns are potential targets. Although it is possible to model the motivation 
of an attacker (see section 6.1.5), for risk analysis it is sufficient to know where the attack 
will be directed, and the only targets that matter are, by definition, the security goals of the 
system. 
Section 7.4 discussed the need to distinguish between attackers based on their type of 
access to the system. An . 1tAT ACK 
is therefore not used directly in a UML security 
environment model; instead, attacks are modelled as one of three sub-classes: 
. 
tADMIN ATTACK., 
. 
USER ATTACK or #EXTERNAL ATTACK. An #ADMJN ATTACK must be 
associated with one or more 1ORGAMSl77ONs, and a #UsER ATTACK with one or more 
tUSER_ROLEs, to indicate the organisations or users that are the potential attackers. 
One significant modelling question is the degree to which the external context of the 
system should be modelled directly, for example, by introducing additional users and 
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organisations. This issue is discussed in section 7.4.3; essentially, a model will often need to 
include a representative `other organisation' and `other user role', to represent organisations 
and users that are not foreseen in the system business requirement, but may have access to 
the normal interfaces of the system. External attacks are qualitatively different; they 
describe attacks that use unspecified mechanisms, in other words mechanisms that are not 
legitimate implementations of the system design, such as wiretapping, the use of 
unspecified services that are offered by mistaken configuration, and physical attacks. 
Social engineering attacks should be taken into account when evaluating the type and 
the likelihood of an attack from a normal system user. Persuading a user to carry out an 
action for an attacker, or theft of a user's identity, both result in actions that, from the 
system perspective, originate from the user rather than an external attacker. 
Summary 
The security environment model provides a limited number of types that are sufficient 
to model the contextual information required in a risk management process. Other important 
documentation about goals, concerns or attackers, is also needed, and must be recorded 
informally. 
8.2.2. The Functional Design 
The design of the functional metamodel has two main objectives: 
9 to allow the use of models that are as close as possible to those used in the course of 
normal system development and 
" to be sufficiently generic to apply to a range of implementation architectures. 
Some design examples were given in chapter 4, which also defined what was meant by a 
system design and identified the main features that need to be exposed: the functional 
structure ... in particular ... internal 
business assets and their use. (See section 4.1. ) 
Further requirements were identified in chapter 5, and summarised in section 5.3; they 
include the need to: 
" explicitly identify all user access points (5.1.1); 
" separate access controls from the system functions they protect (5.1.2); and 
" associate access controls with services of deployable units that execute a group of 
functions or operations (5.1.2). 
Other requirements from chapter 5 are concerned with security requirements, and these 
are described in the next chapter. 
Both UM L interaction diagrams and class diagrams are used to support requirements 
elicitation, analysis and system design. Their use together provides traceability between 
user scenarios and the high level system design, exposing the main services and their 
operations. Systems designed in this way can either be modelled using synchronous method 
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calls (including parameters and return values) or in a more message-oriented style where 
asynchronous messages trigger actions in remote services. In a high-level design, the 
operations of both types of model can be represented by standard UML methods, although 
these are usually thought of as synchronous. Asynchronous messages can simply be 
modelled without a return value, or with a return value that encapsulates a possible method 
exception. It is therefore possible to model an abstract service using the standard UML 
«interface» stereotype. For example, Grenmo et al [287] use this modelling approach, 
noting the value of maintaining a direct relationship between interaction and class diagrams: 
"UML interaction diagrams will work smoothly with this notation: method calls 
versus messages is actually a fine distinction in the UAL sense. " 
There are more elaborate ways to model services in UML; for example, it is possible to 
use components that reflect a specific implementation architecture, such as web-services; 
abstract services would be modelled as portTypes, and bindings to ports, services etc could 
be identified. However, the more generic approach developed here is preferable, because: 
" it defers, as far as possible, deployment commitments; 
" it is not bound to specific implementation architectures; and 
" it supports requirements management by integrating naturally with interaction diagrams. 
The Core Functional Model 
The complete functional model includes an account of how the functional design is 
related to the security environment, but before that is introduced an abbreviated model will 
be described, which clarifies the design approach. This is shown in figure 8.4. 
This model supports the simplest possible set of behaviours, and can therefore be used 
to model services invoked via either synchronous or asynchronous channels. There are two 
main types in the system, the tABSZRAcT SERVIcE and the tASSET TYPE: 
An tABSTR4CT SERVICE represents an interface, or facade, to a service. (For example a 
web-services port type. ) It offers a number of $OPERA77oxs that may be used to model 
service operations, methods, procedures or message bindings. An #ABSTR üCT SERVICE 
invokes JOPET7ONs that are offered by other services. Often, however, a service is 
modelled as simply invoking another service, and hence some or all of its operations; 
this is represented by jUsEs, which specifies this relationship between 
JABS CT SERVICES. 
An LASSET TYPE is used to model any other component of the system; for example, data 
types that are used as message parameters, or stored persistently. The binding between 
JASSET TYPE and $OPERA11ON signifies that the only valid parameters or return types 
are those defined within the model. 
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The tMANAGEs relation may also bind an LASSET TYPE to antABSTRACT SERVICE. This 
allows a designer to identify assets that have a special relationship to a service. Although it 
is often used to identify persistent data, such as a database, it can be used to identify any 
AASSET ? YPE of particular security significance. 
Only one other feature is identified in this metamodel, and that is the subset of 
, 'ABSTRACT SERYICEs that can be directly accessed by a user. These are tCL= 
components, and can be used to identify services provided by a user's desktop, or those 
offered to users by more indirect means, such as from a web-server. Modelling user 
interaction is discussed in section 5.1.1, as part of the single access point pattern. 
The fundamental SeDAn functional model is therefore simple and generic, and provides 
the flexibility to be mapped to a range of implementation architectures. The complete 
functional metamodel builds on this core to specify how the functional design and security 
environment are coupled, as shown in figure 8.5. 
The complete Functional Metamodd 
The complete metamodel in figure 8.5 is based on the functional core presented in 
figure 8.4, but has additional features, which are: 
" extra components to support security; and 
" associations between the functional design and the security environment. 
One extra component must be added to the core design model to support security: the 
, 
tSECURI7Y REQUIREMENT, which is bound to an'ABsr cT SERVICE. 
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This model represents an abstract system design, so there is no direct representation of 
the infrastructure that supports a physical service; however, it would usually be the concrete 
infrastructure that implements a security requirement. It could be argued that it would be 
better to identify real services and associate requirements with them, rather than associate 
requirements with abstract services. This approach has not been taken, since it would imply 
a particular deployment. Associating security requirements with abstract services will 
ensure that the requirements are correctly placed in a subsequent implementation, and that 
is sufficient at the system design level. 
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Figure 8.5. Functional MetaModel 
The functional metamodel in figure 8.5 also identifies relationships to the security 
environment, which are: 
" : ASSET TYPE to LASSET CONCERN; 
" tSEcuRITY REQUIREMENT to : ASSET CONCERN; 
" : ABSTRACT SERVICE to : ORGANISATION; 
" $CLrNT to $UsER RoLE; and 
" LASSET to : USER ROLE. 
An LASSET CONCERN is an unwanted security outcome (see section 8.2.1), the relation to 
. 'ASSET T YPE specifies the assets to which the concern applies. The relation to 
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'SECU REQuREmENT specifies traceability between requirements and the concerns they 
defend; some security requirements are specific to certain asset concerns, whereas others 
are more generic (see section 7.3). 
The relation between '`ABSTRACT SERVICE and JORGANISA77ON specifies the possible 
organisations to which a service can be deployed, the multiplicity toward JORGANISAThON 
allows a range of possible deployments to be specified, rather than a single binding. 
The relation between 'Cz. r and JUsE ROLE specifies the roles that may access the 
operations supported by that service. 
tAssEr models a concrete asset, which is classified by . 
tAss TYPE, and is included in 
the metamodel to allow the ownership of assets to be specified. Consider the following 
scenarios: 
"a service is to be deployed to two or more organisations, and only the data appropriate 
to each organisation will be deployed with each instance of the service; or 
" an ASSET 7YPE may be a data item, such as a user account, where it is necessary to 
assert ownership in order to express security properties. 
In both these cases, 'AssE7's need to be classified by owner as well as type, since for 
security purposes it is not sufficient to treat all instances of the type as identical. The model 
therefore allows LASSET to be classified by 'Usw ROLE. There is not a separate 
classification by tORGAMSÄT7oN, since tUSER-ROLE will normally be finer grain than 
tORGAN1sl77ON, and it avoids separation contradictions that could occur if two organisations 
use the same role. (i. e. this model avoids arbitrarily resolving the resulting ambiguity for 
some of the cases). 
Summary 
The functional model used by SeDAn is generic and can be used to represent operations 
invoked by synchronous or asynchronous channels. In addition to modelling the core 
functional system, the metamodel includes security policies which are bound to abstract 
services, and relations to components in the security environment. This meets the 
requirements outlined at the start of this section: to identify the services, user access points, 
and security policies within the functional design. 
At first sight this metamodel is somewhat distant from the objective of minimising the 
divergence between a conventional system design and a SeDAn functional model. 
However, many of the relationships described above can be inferred from the environmental 
specification, and constrained by appropriate security requirements. Although this is an 
issue of importance to a designer, it is a question of how the models are represented in 
UML, rather than their underlying structure, and that is the subject of the remainder of this 
chapter. The practical representation of systems that comply with these models is first 
presented formally as a UML 2.0 profile in the next section, then by example in section 8.4. 
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8.3. The SeDAn UML Profile 
Profiles were introduced in UML 2.0 [288], to provide a consistent mechanism for 
extending the UML meta-model, in other words for customising UML for a particular 
application. Section 8.1 describes how profiles relate models to their metamodels, and 
appendix A introduces the syntax and content of a profile. 
This profile explains how to represent systems in SeDAn, and also acts as a reference 
guide for stereotypes used in the framework; it is straightforward to use this information to 
configure a UML 2.0 design tool to support SeDAn modelling. This profile is used 
throughout this thesis to present system models, but the UML representation of a system 
model is only a small part of the overall framework. the mapping of the design syntax to the 
metamodel is relatively easy to change; for example, users may wish to use a different 
profile for the functional model, to match an existing design process or target architecture. 
The profile declares a number of stereotypes, and the specification of each stereotype 
includes its base class, semantics and any applicable properties or constraints. 
The semantics given for each stereotype are brief summaries of the more detailed 
semantics given for the metamodel in the previous section; they provide a useful quick 
reference for how to interpret each stereotype, not a complete account of the metamodel. 
Tags are limited to the stereotypes in which they are declared; each is documented by a 
tag name, the name of the metamodel type that it represents, the tag value, and its 
multiplicity. 
Constraints ensure that the use of the profile conforms to the metamodel. Where 
constraints describe associations, the direction of the association is of no consequence, 
unless otherwise specified. Constraints are primarily used to limit the possible associations 
and multiplicities between stereotyped classes to those specified in the metamodel. 
The profile below is divided into two sub-sections, describing the security environment 
and functional design respectively. Each is introduced with a profile diagram, then the 
stereotypes declared in that diagram are defined. 
8.3.1. The Security Environment Profile 
This profile implements the environment metamodel in figure 83. The only components 
that are not included are $ A7TAcr, which is not required since only the sub-types of attack 
need to be represented, and JFUNC IONAL REQv ßx1', which is not used in SeDAn. The 
other types are modelled directly as stereotypes that extend the U ML base class of Class. 
This is depicted in the UML profile diagram in figure 8.6. 
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Figure 8.6. Security Environment Profile Diagram 
The security environment metamodel components map directly to stereotypes. This 
profile is particularly straightforward because there are few constraints on the associations 
between metamodel components, in order to maximise the flexibility of the model. 
However, the resulting model may seem counter-intuitive, because particular organisations, 
attacks, etc will be modelled as classes (e. g. see figure 8.8), although it is perhaps more 
natural to think of them as instances or objects. The reasons for this modelling choice are: 
" the need to give values to properties, for example the impact of an Asset Concern; and 
" the need to associate some of these elements to elements of the functional model: strict 
UML does not allow an association between a class and an object, since it would cross 
between levels in the UML meta-hierarchy. 
83.1.1. Stereotype userAttack extends Class (represents 'USER ATTACK) 
Semantics 
A «userAttack» represents an attack that originates from one of the specified roles in 
the system, and uses the normal functionality of the system to facilitate the attack, including 
access via a <<client>> service (see section 83.2.2). Classes with this stereotype must 
have an association to one or more user roles and one or more security goals, to identify the 
attack agents and goal targets respectively. 
The frequency tag specifies the frequency of attack (0... 3); the interpretation of this 
scale is application specific, but a possible interpretation is given in section 6.2. 
Properties 
Table 8.1. Properties in the UML Profile for «userAttack» 
Tag Name Represents Type Multiplicity 
frequency . frequency UML:: Dataypes:: Integer I 
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Constraints 
" The frequency property is range limited: 0.3 
" The only valid associations from «userAttack> classes are to «userRole» and 
«securityGoal» classes; there must be at least one association to each. 
8.3.1.2. Stereotype adminAttack extends Class (represents tAD. tizw ATTACK) 
Semantics 
«adminAttack» represents an attack which originates from one of the specified 
organisations in the system, uses the normal functionality of the system to facilitate the 
attack, but accesses the system via a deployment group (a service and any associated data 
which is deployed to that organisation, see section 7.4.2). Classes with this stereotype must 
have an association to one or more organisations and one or more security goals, to identify 
the attack agents and goal targets respectively. 
The 
, 
frequency tag specifies the frequency of attack (0... 3); the interpretation of this 
scale is application specific, but a possible interpretation is given in section 6.2. 
Properties 
Table 8.2. Properties in the UML Profile for «adminAttack» 
Tag Name Represents Type Multiplicity 
, 
frequency 'frequency UNL:: Dataypes:: Integer 1 
Constraints 
" The f equency property is range limited: 0.3 
" The only valid associations from «adminkfack» classes are to «organisation» 
and «securityGoal» classes; there must be at least one association to each. 
8.3.1.3. Stereotype externalAttack extends Class (represents JEA7'E¢NAL AFf4cx) 
Semantics 
«ex1ernaL4ttack» represents an attack which originates from outside the system. It 
uses the normal functionality of the system to facilitate the attack, but is able to access the 
system at any point by mechanisms not specified in the system design. Classes with this 
stereotype must have an association to one or more security goals to denote the goal targets. 
The attacker is not part of the standard system model, so it is not identified, but may be 
identified in the naming of the class (e. g. hackerAttack). 
The frequency tag specifies the frequency of attack (0... 3); the interpretation of this 
scale is application specific, but a possible interpretation is given in section 6.2. 
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Properties 
Table 8.3. Properties in the UML Profile for «externalAttack» 
Tag Name Represents Type Multiplicity 
frequency frequency UML:: Dataypes:: Integer 1 
Constraints 
" The frequency property is range limited: 0.3 
" The only valid associations from «externalAttack» classes are to 
«securityGoab> classes; there must be at least one such association. 
8.3.1.4. Stereotype organisation extends Class (represents JORGAMSA77O1v) 
Semantics 
An «organisation» represents a distinct security administration, regardless of legal 
status. For example, it may be necessary to represent an actual organisation or domain as 
several classes, if they have distinctive security attributes. It is also advisable to routinely 
introduce an `otherOrganisation' class in a system model. (See section 7.4.3. ) 
Properties 
None. 
Constraints 
" «organisation» classes may only have associations to «adminAttack», 
«userRole», and «securityGoal» classes. 
83.1.5. Stereotype userRole extends Class (represents tUSER ROLE) 
Semantics 
A «userRole» represents a temporal group of users with a distinctive business role 
or level of system privilege. It may be necessary to routinely introduce an `otherUser' class 
in a system model. (See section 7.43. ) 
Properties 
None. 
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Constraints 
«userRole» classes may only have associations to «userAttack» and 
«organisation». classes. 
«userRole» classes must have at least one association to an «organisation» 
class. 
8.3.1.6. Stereotype securityGoal extends Class 
Semantics 
«securityGoal» represents a business level security objective for a system, and 
should be amplified by an informal explanation. 
The impact tag is optional; if present it sets the upper bound for impacts associated with 
any asset concerns that are traceable to the goal. 
Properties 
Table 8.4. Properties in the UML Profile for «userAttack» 
Tag Name Represents Type Multiplicity 
impact *impact UML:: Dataypes:: Integer O.. 1 
Constraints 
" The impact property is range limited: 1... 3 
" «securityGoal» classes may only have associations to «userAttack», 
«adminAttack», «externalAttack», «organisation» and <<concern>> classes. 
" «securityGoal» classes must have an association to at least one «organisation» 
class. 
8.3.1.7. Stereotype assetConcern extends Class (represents FASSET CONCERN) 
Semantics 
An «assetConcern» specifies. an unwanted security outcome, which will be 
associated with one or more assets in the system. Concerns are generally determined by a 
stakeholder review of the assets in the system. The formal properties in this class are 
sufficient to facilitate analysis, but informal annotation is also essential to characterise the 
basis of the concern as an implementation reference. 
mlký 
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The properties associated with a concern are discussed in detail above (see section 
8.2.1), but in brief. 
9 impact is a measure of the damage of the unwanted outcome, in a range 1.. 3; 
9 direction specifies if the underlying information flow is toward the asset (e. g. integrity) 
or away from it (e. g. confidentiality); 
" flowType specifies what types of path are exploitable for this concern. A value of `data' 
causes traffic-flow paths to be ignored; 
" assetType specifies if all associated assets are targets; a value of `managed' selects only 
those that are the target of a <<manages>> association from a service; and 
" outcome is an informal description that clarifies the protection objective, it is not 
implemented as a tag in the stereotype, since UML notes are used to capture informal 
descriptions. 
Properties 
Table 8.5. Properties in the UML Profile for «ussetConcern» 
Tag Name Represents Type Multiplicity 
impact timpact UNII.:: Datatypes:: Integer 1 
direction tdirection UML:: Enumeration: 1 
[toward, from] 
, 
flowType 'dataPathOnly UML:: Enumeration: 1 
[data, all] 
assetType tmanagedAssetOnly UN L:: Enumeration: 1 
[managed, all] 
Constraints 
" The impact property is range limited: 1... 3 
" «assetConcern» classes must have exactly one association to a «securityGoal» 
class. 
" If the associated «securityGoal» class has an impact tag, the impact value in this 
(«assetConcern») class must be the same, or less, as the impact value of the goal. 
Note: «assetConcern» classes will also have associations to classes in the functional 
design that represent assets, and may be referenced for traceability in the definitions of 
some types of security requirement. 
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8.3.2. Functional Design Profile 
The functional design profile is not a straightforward mapping from the metamodel of 
figure 8.5 to stereotypes, since the objective is to use standard UML functional models 
where possible. There are two issues: the representation of the core functional design, and 
how relations between this and security environment are represented and constrained. 
. 
}ASSET TYPE and JABS TRACT SERVICE are the core elements of the functional 
metamodel, so the representation of these components determines how a design is written in 
UML: 
" Stereotypes are not needed to identify UML classes that represent tASsET TYPE. any 
class that is not otherwise stereotyped (i. e. with a SeDAn-specific stereotype) is an 
tASSET T YPE. Such a class is automatically brought into the scope of the security 
analysis if it can be mapped into the metamodel (for example, if it has an association to 
an «assetConcern» class, or is named as a parameter in an operation). 
" An #ABSTCT SERVICE could be represented as a standard UML «interface>> class, 
which would automatically inherit UML operations, parameters and return types and 
navigability between associated services. However, the need to include security policies 
as properties in an tABSTRAC _SERVICE requires a new stereotype to be defined, so an 
tABSTRACT SERVICE is represented as a <<service>> stereotype that extends a standard 
UML <<interface». 
The representations of KLIENT, #SECURI1Y REQUIREMM t M4NAGES and the 
association to jAssET CoNCF. Rv follow directly from these core decisions: 
" #CL1E1v7'is given as a <<client>> stereotype that extends a <<service»; 
" 1SECUx177' REQUIREMENT is represented as a tag that can be added to a <<service>> 
class; 
" the association between an #ASSET CoxcEU and #ASSET TYPE is represented as an 
unstereotyped association between an «assetConcern» class and any unstereotyped 
class; and 
" . MANAGES is represented as a <<manages>> stereotyped association between 
<<services>> classes and unstereotyped classes. 
mIchý 
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This representation only requires a small number of stereotypes to be added to a 
standard system design to clarify its structure: 
" <<service>> stereotypes are added to identify abstract services; 
" <<client>> stereotypes are used to indicate services that are directly accessible by 
users; 
" security requirements are represented as tags in <<service>> or <<client>> classes; 
«assetConcerns» need associations to the classes to which they refer, and 
«manages» stereotypes need to be added to associations between <<services>> 
and asset classes, for example to identify persistent data that is part of a service's state. 
This achieves the close mapping between SeDAn models and standard functional 
designs that is the objective, but there are a number of relationships between the functional 
and environmental models that have yet to be described. In general, these relations can be 
inferred from the underlying system model, and constrained by suitable types of security 
requirement, rather than explicitly added to the functional design. 
This design approach is not simply about minimising the divergence between a standard 
system design and the equivalent SeDAn model, it is also ensures that the resulting model is 
conservative from a security perspective: as far as possible, a design should be interpreted 
as having the maximum functionality possible, and constraints explicitly recorded as 
security policies. This subject is discussed further in chapters 9 and 13, because there are 
inevitable limits; for example, the general naming of classes is assumed to be consistent 
with the implementation. 
Three relationships in the metamodel fall into this category: JABSTRACT SERVICE to 
. 
tORGAMSATION, . CLIENT to #USER ROLE, and tASSEr to JUSER ROL. & 
The relation between 'ABSTuCT SERVICE and ORGANISATION describes the possible 
deployments for a service. This could be represented as an association between 
<<service>> or <<client>> classes in the functional model and «organisation» 
classes in the security environment. However, this amounts to an explicit deployment 
binding, and an objective of SeDAn is to facilitate the analysis of abstract designs before 
deployment commitments have been made. The alternative is to specify which deployments 
are not permitted, from the set that can be inferred from the functional and environmental 
models. This is the approach taken in SeDAn, and is introduced in section 7.4.2. 
Essentially, deployment to an organisation is treated in a very similar way to access control, 
in which a security requirement specifies what accesses are permitted from the set that can 
be determined by navigable associations between services. The deployment relation is 
therefore not shown in a UML diagram, but it is inferred: all possible relations are assumed 
between these classes, unless there is a security requirement that restricts a service's 
deployment. 
The relation between'CLwxr and, USER ROLE specifies which roles have access to a 
particular service. This relation is between <<client>> classes in the functional design and 
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«userRole» classes in the security environment. This relation is not shown explicitly in 
a UML diagram, but inferred by the following rules: 
" if a client may be deployed to an organisation, then all the user roles in that organisation 
may potentially access the operations of the client; and 
"a client is a service, so it may contain security policies that further restrict access from 
user roles to client operations. 
The relation from, tASSET to jUsF-R RoLE represents the ownership of individual assets. 
This effectively classifies instances of classes within the UML functional design as being 
owned by particular user roles. This relation is not shown explicitly in a UML diagram, but 
is specified by certain security policies that classify asset instances by role or organisation 
(e. g. an authentication claim). 
An alternative to this approach to binding to . 
/USA ROLE would be to classify services 
and asset instances directly in the functional design, by allowing the system designer to 
introduce associations to a UserRole class. This has been avoided because of the 
consequence for the design. If the ownership distinction is to be meaningful, it often has to 
be made in many places throughout the system: the chain of data and services between the 
primary data and the user interface must be correspondingly identified with user roles. 
Many designers would make the primary distinction but avoid making the consequential 
bindings; however, a structured security analysis of the system will force the correction of 
such an omission. The danger from the designer's perspective is that the design may then 
become cluttered with role bindings. The modelling approach taken here avoids that 
problem by allowing the specification of data ownership as a security property, allowing a 
cleaner functional design and better separation of security and functional components. 
The mapping described here between the functional metamodel and its UML 
representation implies some overall constraints on the use of this profile: 
" classes identified as jAssE7: _TYPE 
(e. g. by an association to an «assetConcern» 
class) must not have a stereotype from this profile; and 
" parameters in the signatures of operations or messages must match a known type, i. e. 
either a built-in type, such as Integer or String, or a class in the model in which they 
occur. 
There is an alternative to the minimal profile presented here, and that is to extend a 
wider range of UML 2.0 metaclasses (e. g. port, connector) to implement a profile that is 
specific to an implementation architecture, such as web-services at (for example, see [289]). 
This approach would allow more faithful modelling of web-services, at the expense of 
architectural flexibility and simplicity. The approach presented here allows the designer to 
focus more on the system, and less on the implementation detail. 
Modelling the System 201 
Because many elements of the functional metamodel are not represented directly as 
stereotypes, table 8.6 cross-references elements of the functional metamodel to their 
representation. 
Table 8.6. Representation of Functional Metamodel Elements in the Profile 
Metamodel Representation 
1tASSET Ti'PE Any UML Class without a SeDAn-specific stereotype. 
ItASSET Not modelled by the user directly, but constrained by security 
requirements. 
tAasrc1' SERvxcE <<service>> defined in section 8.3.2.1 
'tCLLENT <<client>> defined in section 8.3.2.2 
'SECURITY REQu1R ' Tags on <<service», see section 83.2.1 and chapter 10 
JOPE Z477ON Any operation within a «service» (or «client») class. 
JUsES Any navigable association between <<service>> (including 
«client») classes. 
. ItMANAGES «vages» 
defined in section 83.2.3 
The profile for the functional design is given in figure 8.7. 
«metaclass» 
interface 
T Represents: #ABsn 4cT SERwi 
«stereotype 
service 
Represents: 
$C1EM 
< type . 
client 
«metac ass» 
Association 
Represents: T 
I mans 
Figure 8.7. Functional Design Profile Diagram 
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8.3.2.1. Stereotype service extends «interface» (represents'tABSTRACT SER17CE) 
Semantics 
A service represents an JABSTRAC _SERVICE, which may be thought of as a portType, 
interface, or facade. It offers a range of operations, which may be invoked by other services. 
An association between classes with the <<service>> stereotype is regarded as having the 
potential to invoke operations; in this case the navigability of the association is significant 
Only navigable associations will have the potential to invoke operations, so the model 
makes the conservative assumption that, unless constrained by a security requirement, all 
navigable associations between services allow access to the operations of the target service. 
The properties associated with a <<service>> are security policies that specify 
constraints on its deployment and behaviour. The rationale for these properties is described 
chapter 10, together with their specification. 
Properties 
Table 8.7. Properties in the UML Profile for <(service>> 
Tag Name Represents Type Multiplicity 
NoDeploy . SECURITY REQUIREMENT UML:: Dataypes:: String 0.. * 
PermitAccess 
, tSECURl77 REQUIREMENT UML:: Dataypes:: String 
0.. * 
RefuseToAccess #SECURITY REQUIREMENT UML:: Dataypes:: String 0.. * 
DataSeparation SECURITY REQUIREMENT UML:: Dataypes:: String 0.. * 
DeploySeparation ISECURITY REQUIREMENT UML:: Dataypes:: Boolean 0.. 1 
EnforceSeparation #SECUPJ1Y REQUIREMENT UML:: Dataypes:: String 0.. * 
ConstrainFlow #SECURI1Y REQUIREUENT UML:: Dataypes:: String 0.. * 
Stateless $ SECU Y REQUIREMENT UML:: Dataypes:: String 0.. * 
TypeRestrictedFlow : SECURITY REQUIREMENT UML:: Dataypes:: String 0.. * 
AssertConfidentiality ISECURITY REQUIREMENT UML:: Dataypes:: String 0.. * 
ClaimAuthentication ISECURITY REQUIREMENT U L:: Dataypes:: String 0.. * 
RequireConfidentiality ISEctoulZREQUIREMENT UML:: Dataypes:: String 0.. * 
RequireAuthentication #SECUIRITY REQUIREMENT UML:: Dataypes:: String 0.. * 
Constraints 
. <<service>> classes have at least one operation. 
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8.3.2.2. Stereotype client extends <<service» (represents''CLIF, WT) 
Semantics 
A <<client>> represents a <<service>> class whose operations can be directly invoked 
by users. User roles do not need to be directly associated with a client in a functional 
design, the relationship is inferred using the rules specified above (see the introduction to 
section 83.2). 
Properties 
No additional properties. 
Constraints 
No additional constraints. 
83.2.3. Stereotype manages extends Association (represents tMANAGES) 
Semantics 
The manages stereotype is used to identify associations to classes of particular 
significance to a service; for example it may be used to indicate persistent data or service 
state. It interacts with the assetType property in an asset concern as follows: if the assetType 
is "managed", then attacks on that data type must be via a <<manages>> association. This 
allows a user to specify that attacks are directed at data in its persistent location, not to other 
instances of the same type, for example used as operation parameters. 
Properties 
None. 
Constraints 
"A <<manages>> association must be between a <<service>> or <<client>> class 
and any other class not stereotyped in this profile. 
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8.4. Practical Examples 
The last chapter provided a simple example of a system, and this includes most of the 
modelling features that have been described in this chapter. This section therefore 
reproduces that model, with annotations and a small enhancement, as a concrete example of 
a system model. As usual it is presented in two parts, the security environment in figure 8.8, 
and the functional model in figure 8.9. 
One user role shared 
between two 
orpnisations 
auserRole» 
Guest 
I uusaRole» 
M anaga 
«orgaisation» 
Broka 
«uscAttack* «admmAttack» «adanalAttack» 
Free 
-Advert 
Fake Record Deface System 
tags tags tags 
frequency 2 frequency -1 frequency `3 
Several organisations may 
share the same security goal 
asecurityGoal» KassetConcern» 
«orpnisation» BusinessIntegity HouseIntegrity 
EstateAgent 
tags tags 
impact -2 assetType - mane 
direction = toward «orpnisation» 
another 
flowType = all 
mmPacxý2 
Unwanted outcome. loss or unauthorised 
modification of critical business data, 
specifically or price information. 
Figure 8.8. Example Security Environment 
Figure 8.8 is the complete security environment, so it combines figure 7.2 and 7.3 from 
the previous chapter; it also adds a new organisation (anOther) and an association between 
the Guest user role and the EstateAgent organisation. These additions illustrate the 
flexibility provided by the multiplicities in the metamodel: essentially any meaningful 
grouping can be modelled. The structure of this model directly follows that of the 
metamodel in figure 8.3. 
Figure 8.9 is the same as the functional model in the previous chapter (see figure 7.1), 
but has been annotated to show SeDAn-specific modelling features that are defined in this 
chapter, together with references to related metamodel components. The structure of the 
environment model was straightforward, because its stereotypes directly reflect the 
metamodel; however, the mapping of the system model is less obvious because of its use of 
standard UML where possible. 
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Figure 8.9. Annotated System Example 
Essentially, to convert a UML system model into one that can be used by SeDAn it is 
necessary to: 
" add <<service>> stereotypes to identify abstract services; 
" add <<client>> stereotypes to identify services that are directly accessible by users; 
" represent security policies as tags in <<service>> or <client>> classes; 
" associate «assetConcern»classes to the asset types to which they refer; and 
" add <<manages>> stereotypes to associations between <<services>> and asset 
classes, if required; for example, to identify persistent data that is part of a service's 
state. 
Standard UML constructs (operations, parameters, classes) are used where possible. 
Security related requirements, including deployment restrictions, user access to clients, and 
the identification of instances of some classes with particular user roles (i. e. data owned or 
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identified by particular users) are all specified by a combination of the security environment 
and the security policies. (See the introduction to section 8.3.2. ) 
8.5. Summary 
This chapter has described how a system is modelled in SeDAn, what this model means, 
and how it is represented in UML. The models developed here reflect the requirements 
established in earlier chapters, but do not elaborate them further than necessary: the primary 
objective for SeDAn is to demonstrate a complete systematic approach to security analysis, 
rather than meet specialised requirements. This chapter summarises these requirements, and 
references the detailed discussion of these topics in chapters 4,5,6, and 7. 
This chapter follows the established three-layer structure: metamodels are linked to 
system models via a profile, which specifies how UML is customised for a particular 
application. This three-layer model is explained in section 8.1, and the three following 
sections each describe one of these layers. 
The metamodel describes what systems can be modelled within SeDAn, and its 
description in section 8.2 explains what this underlying model means in system terms. The 
following section (8.3) specifies how these models can be represented in UML, by 
presenting a UML profile. This provides enough information to allow tools supporting 
UML 2.0 to be configured to support SeDAn, but the stylised format of these profiles also 
provides a ready reference for the syntax and semantics of the UML stereotypes used for 
system modelling. 
An objective of the SeDAn framework is to allow the widest possible range of system 
designs to be used, with as few security-specific changes as possible. To achieve this, the 
system model is divided into two parts: the functional design and the security environment. 
The model for the functional design is as generic as possible, and only requires a few 
additions to an existing design: stereotypes to identify services and clients, and the 
association of assets to asset concerns in the security environment. Other bindings between 
the functional model and the security environment (e. g. assets to users, services to 
operations) are induced from the underlying model, and constrained by security 
requirements. The final section (8.4) uses examples from chapter 7, updated and annotated, 
to highlight important modelling features. 
This chapter has focussed on how the system model should be understood by a system 
practitioner, the next chapter describes how this model is interpreted in security terms. 
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Chapter 9. The Security View of the System: Asset 
Concerns and Security Requirements 
The previous chapter described how the various components needed for risk analysis are 
consolidated into a single SeDAn system model, and how this can be represented in UML. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe how such a system is interpreted from a security 
perspective, in particular 
" how security requirements for services are specified; 
" the information model, which is the basis for both requirements specification and design 
analysis; and 
" how these allow SeDAn to support the security goals identified in chapter 2. 
It may not be obvious that a separate information model is needed, except perhaps for 
the convenience of efficient analysis; however, the information model does more than 
interpret the system model from a security perspective, it has an important part in allowing 
the specification of security requirements. The problem arises because it is necessary to 
support security requirements that constrain the behaviour of services (see section 7.5.1), 
but a system design is likely to specify only the interfaces to services, not their detailed 
behaviour. SeDAn resolves this problem with deferred requirements, which are specified in 
two parts: 
" informal semantics that specify the meaning of the requirement, and are documented by 
the related asset concern; and 
9 the service, and its behaviour in information terms, which are specified formally in the 
information model. 
These requirements are described as deferred, because the informal semantics can be 
properly interpreted only in terms of a detailed functional design or implementation. In 
order to allow such requirements to be reflected in the security analysis, the information 
model provides a generic framework for the behaviour of services in which service 
constraints can be expressed, in addition to representing the information flow implied by the 
system model. 
Deferred requirements can be regarded as separating the location of the security 
requirement, which is determined by the information constraint, from its semantics, which 
are specified informally as part of the asset concern. This allows SeDAn to support the wide 
range of security goals described in chapter 2, and highlights the importance of asset 
concerns as intermediate security objectives. 
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This chapter is divided into three main sections, corresponding to the topics outlined 
above: deferred requirements, the information model, and supporting security goals. The 
detailed organisation of the chapter is as follows: 
" section 9.1 introduces deferred security requirements, contrasts them with fully 
specified requirements, and describes the relationship between requirements and 
concerns; 
" section 9.2 describes the SeDAn information model and how it supports the 
specification of requirements. Other important features of the model are also described, 
including implementation assumptions and information typing; 
" section 9.3 reviews the effectiveness of the approach to security specification described 
in this chapter. It is divided into three sections, the first two discuss possible limitations 
resulting from the structure of the SeDAn information model, and how these are 
avoided. The third section reviews how well each of the security goals described in 
chapter 2 are supported; and 
" section 9.4 summarises the chapter. 
Supplementary material can be found in appendix B, which provides a formal account 
of the information model. Individual security requirements are described in chapter 10, and 
worked examples for each type of requirement are presented in chapter 11. The security 
goals discussed in this chapter are described in detail in chapter 2. 
9.1. The Specification of Security Requirements 
The focus of much practical security is access control; access requirements are, in 
principle, straightforward to specify and model, since they constrain associations that are 
present in the system model. Unfortunately, there are security requirements that cannot be 
directly specified in terms of the system model, particularly the specification of constraints 
on the behaviour of services. Both types of requirement are needed because of the nature of 
security protection (This topic was introduced in section 7.5.1 and explored further in 
section 11.4, below. ) 
Security objectives are expressed in business terms (top level goals) or in a more 
concrete form as unwanted outcomes to particular assets (concerns). However, although 
asset concerns are concrete objectives, the security mechanisms or controls that protect such 
assets may occur anywhere in the system, since attackers may use any available form of 
access to realise the unwanted outcome. (See section 63.3 on tracability between goals 
concerns and requirements. ) For this reason security design is a systematic problem, 
meaning that an analysis of the complete system is needed to demonstrate that a security 
objective has been met. 
For example, consider the fragment of a service-oriented system shown in figure 9.1. 
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Attacker 
requirement ra 
sa sb 
re uirement re 
sc Isd 
da concern ca 
Figure 9.1. Attacking an Asset via Services 
In the system of figure 9.1, an attacker has access to two services (sa, sb) that invoke 
further services (sc, sd, se) to update a data asset (da). An asset concern (ca) identifies an 
unwanted outcome related to da, for example, the prevention of unauthorised modification. 
However, there are several paths between the attacker and the asset, so there are a number 
of options for how the resulting threats can be defended. It is obvious by inspection that a 
single security requirement is not sufficient to protect all the possible threat paths; at least 
two are needed, for example ra and re. 
These two requirements may be of different types. For example, service sa may offer a 
management interface which normal users should not access, and the potential attacker is 
such a user, in this case ra is a straightforward access control. Requirement re is unlikely to 
be as straightforward. Given the system configuration it is unlikely that all access between 
sb and se should be prohibited, so the requirement re must constrain the operation invoked 
by sb, rather than prevent it; perhaps by allowing read-only access to da. 
This example highlights important issues that arise because asset concerns and security 
goals are systematic, whereas requirements constrain individual components: 
0 it is necessary to analyse the whole system to check that the set of security requirements 
is effective; 
" there is not necessarily a direct relationship between security objectives (concerns) and 
the placement of the security requirements that they motivate; and 
" there are often many options for the type and placement of security requirements to 
protect a particular asset concern: systematic properties give rise to design choice. 
The last bullet is the basis of the common claim that only experts can design protection 
strategies and their supporting security requirements. Because design choices are needed, 
the specification of security requirements is a matter of judgement, in which expertise is 
valuable. However, there is still a place for a systematic analysis of the system to inform 
those choices. The function of SeDAn is to provide this systematic analysis, not to 
automatically specify security requirements. 
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Deferred Requirements 
The example in figure 9.1 also illustrates the difference between fully specified and 
deferred requirements. The access control, ra, can be fully specified within the system 
design, since access is represented as an association in the SeDAn system metamodel. This 
is not the case for the requirement re, which is of the form: 
service se 
must protect da from sb 
to prevent modification of da. 
The functionality of service se is not specified in the system design, which does not 
even distinguish between read and write access to elements of the service's state. This 
requirement cannot therefore be fully specified in terms of the system design"; it has three 
parts: 
" the service which must implement the requirement; 
" the context of the requirement: which messages at the interface to the service, or which 
assets within the service's state, are constrained; and 
" the protection objective, which is specified informally by reference to the asset concern. 
This type of requirement is described as deferred, because the semantics of the 
protection objective are informal, and can be properly interpreted only in terms of a detailed 
functional design or implementation. 
A more concrete and detailed example of a deferred requirement is given in section 
7.5.1, which describes a situation where a security requirement constrains the behaviour of 
a service. The requirement is: 
the HouseRegister service 
must protect House assets from getHouseo inputs 
to avoid unwanted Houselntegrity outcomes. 
The HouseRegister service, getHouse( operation, and House assets are components of 
the system model (figure 7.2), these set the context of the requirements, but its meaning 
depends on the asset concern, Ho uselntegrity. This deferred requirement is in the same form 
as the previous example, and illustrates the importance of the asset concern in conveying 
the meaning of the requirement. 
II It could be argued (particularly by those with a formal security background) that a better option than a deferred 
requirement is to add design detail to both the service and the asset, allowing the requirement to be fully specified. 
There are instances where this is certainly the best option (see the Composite Data Problem Template in section 
4.4.2), but there are also cases where this would anticipate or prejudice the design. 
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Summary 
Security requirements are placed in response to threat paths within a system, they are either: 
" fully specified, in other words they constrain elements of the system model; or 
" deferred, in which case they constrain a sub-system, such as a service, are scoped by 
elements of the system model (assets, operations etc), and have an informal objective 
which is specified by reference to an asset concern. 
This approach to specifying requirements is a compromise between a fully formal 
approach to security, and informal requirements management. The former requires a system 
to be modelled in sufficient detail to allow the full specification of any functional 
constraints, the latter does not benefit from a systematic analysis of the system topology 
(see chapter 3). SeDAn resolves these problems by modelling aspects of the system that are 
necessary to show how security requirements protect asset concerns, while avoiding the 
need to specify services in detail. This is one of the core innovations in SeDAn, since it 
solves the hard problem of decomposing systematic concerns into security requirements, 
without unduly constraining the design; or equivalently, it allows security analysis at an 
earlier stage in the design process. 
In simple examples, such as figure 9.1, the attack paths are intuitively obvious. It is easy 
to imagine that they would become much more complicated in a real system, and even the 
example in chapter 7 includes threat paths and requirements that are not obvious at first 
sight. Risk analysis must take account of any security requirements that have been 
specified, but the approach to requirements described in this section raises an important 
question: a deferred requirement, does not constrain behaviour specified in the system 
model, so how is such a requirement interpreted in a systematic risk analysis? From the 
analysis perspective, threat paths may be blocked by deferred requirements, but how is it 
possible to conclude that a path has been blocked, if the requirement is not fully specified? 
To solve this problem, SeDAn provides a generic model for how services behave in 
security terms, as part of the Information Model, which is the basis for analysis. The system 
design is mapped to this model for analysis, including deferred requirements. The second 
part of this chapter describes that model, and its implications. 
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9.2. The SeDAn Information Model 
The purpose of the information model is twofold, it provides: 
"a framework for expressing security requirements; and 
"a representation of the system on which it is straightforward to perform risk analysis. 
The risk analysis process is described in chapter 12. However, the information model is 
not simply an efficient intermediate representation for fording threat paths; its form 
determines the type of analysis that is possible, and it provides the basis for specifying the 
deferred security requirements described in the previous section. 
The information model mirrors the information flows that are specified in the system 
design; however, it also provides a generic model of two aspects of an implementation that 
are not usually part of a system model: 
" the behaviour of services; and 
" information types. 
These additions allow the specification of requirements that cannot be expressed 
directly in terms of the system design. 
Services are modelled by simply enumerating all possible service behaviours, given the 
services, operations, and relations in the design. In other words, the information model 
faithfully maintains the interfaces to services, and the relationships between services, while 
assuming that their internal behaviour supports all possible information flow between inputs 
and outputs. Deferred requirements constrain this generic service behaviour, and although 
these constraints are not specified in terms of service design, they represent valid 
behavioural constraints, and can therefore stand as implementation requirements. 
Information types are concerned with characterising information-flow paths in the 
system. The topic was introduced in section 7.5.2, which distinguished between information 
signified by events (`traffic') as opposed to values ('data'), and was concerned with threat 
path exploitability. Information types are also necessary to support communications and 
message security requirements; for example, a communications confidentiality requirement 
(e. g. encryption) renders a data flow into a traffic flow. 
The following sub-sections describe the information model in detail. The first 
introduces the model and how it relates to a real system; this is clarified in section 9.2.2 by 
a more detailed account of how the information model is represented as a graph, then 
section 9.2.3 highlights the critical modelling assumptions implied by this approach. 
Section 9.2.4 describes how different information types are distinguished, and how the 
typing system is also used to characterise the interaction between the system and external 
attackers. 
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9.2.1. Introduction: Representing Information in the System 
The information model represents only the information-flow aspects of a system; its 
underlying form is a simple directed graph, as shown in figure 9.2. 
Figure 9.2. Information Flow Graph 
The system is regarded as a set of information carriers and behaviours, which are 
mapped to graph vertices and directed edges, respectively. Information carriers represent 
data or events in the functional model, and the behaviours model the effect of system 
functions. The graph is directed, and information paths in the graph may be cyclic. Users 
(strictly, user roles) are modelled as sources or sinks of information. A role may be both, 
but the risk analysis processes does not follow information paths through user roles. 
Information Carriers in the System Model 
Section 7.4 showed how information flow can be used to trace paths of attack. The 
information graph presented with that example (figure 7.5) was simplified to provide an 
overview of the topic; the complete graph is shown in figure 9.3, which provides a more 
detailed illustration of how users are modelled. 
Manager Guest 
guestAccess. returnI ;I guestAccess. reIwii ;I manageList. retum 
House Primary Concern: Integrity 
Figure 9.3. Typical System Information Paths 
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In figure 9.3 most of the information carriers are operation parameters that provide 
inputs or outputs to services. Although this example includes only single data types in each 
call or return, from the information perspective the number of data types carried by each 
message is of no importance: it is not possible to distinguish the information capacity of 
individual data types, so any number of parameters are regarded collectively as a single 
information carrier. The exceptions are messages without parameters: the void returns in 
figure 9.3 are examples of events, and these are discussed in 9.3.3, below. The other 
information carriers present in this system are the users, and the House data asset. 
Although there is no need to distinguish between different data items in the same 
message, it is necessary to distinguish different instances of the same message type. Clearly, 
an operation invoked by one client will receive different messages from the same operation 
invoked by another, and these may carry different information. These different messages 
are therefore distinct information carriers. 
The previous chapter (see section 8.2.2) also identified the need to classify data by role, 
because it is necessary to be able to express security requirements in terms of data 
ownership. For example, assets, such as user accounts, may be identifiable with particular 
user roles. This distinction must be reflected in security goals and correctly analysed, so 
instances of assets classified by different owners are distinguished as distinct information 
carriers. 
In summary, the information carriers in a system are messages and other assets, such as 
managed data. The number of data items within a message does not distinguish it from an 
information perspective, but it is necessary to distinguish messages that differ by: 
" source; 
" destination; or 
" user-role. 
SeDAn maintains traceability between information carriers in the system model (e. g. 
data types, operation names etc) and the graph vertices that they determine. This allows 
threat paths that have been determined by analysis to be related to components in the 
system; this traceability does not change what the model can represent, but is important in 
practice. 
Services 
Figure 9.3 also shows how services are viewed in information terms: a service simply 
routes information between inputs and outputs, which may include managed assets, 
messages, or the input and return parameters of operations. This is not an arbitrary choice, 
but reflects what is known about a service in a system design: a design may show that a 
service supports a number of operations, but these signify interfaces rather than independent 
functional components within the service. All that is known is that there are certain inputs 
and outputs, but not how the functional structure of the service will be implemented. In 
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concrete terms, the implementation of operations may vary from well-isolated independent 
processes, to different interfaces to the same application instance. It is therefore not possible 
to make any assumptions about the internal structure of a service implementation at the 
system design stage. 
From the information perspective, therefore, a generic model of a service is a set of 
behaviours that relate each of its inputs to each of its outputs. Deferred requirements on 
services constrain these behaviours. 
In summary, it is possible to maintain a mapping between graph vertices and 
information carriers in the system, but the relationship between a service's information 
behaviour and its functional specification is unknown, and can be established only during 
implementation. 
Users 
Figure 9.3 also shows how users are modelled; they are regarded as active subjects, 
rather like services. The messages that flow between users and client operations are distinct 
information carriers, allowing the information flow between users and individual operations 
to be constrained by security requirements such as access controls. The distinction between 
users and services is that users are regarded as sources or sinks of information, so threat 
paths are traced to and from users, but not through them. 
9.2.2. The Information Model as a Graph 
The previous section introduced the SeDAn information model; in summary: 
" information flow is represented as a directed graph; 
" the vertices of the graph represent information carriers, that are components of the 
system model (e. g. messages, assets); and 
" service behaviour is modelled as possible information flow between a service's input 
and output information carriers. 
These modelling decisions result in a graph which is more specialised than that shown 
in figure 9.2; a typical SeDAn information graph is shown in figure 9.4. 
: vl f" N- sl 
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Figure 9.4. The Information Graph: services encapsulate behaviour and vertices 
represent information carriers 
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The previous section related information carriers to graph vertices. The structure of the 
graph in figure 9.4 makes this relationship explicit: 
" vertices represent information carriers, and have exactly one service as their input and 
one service as their output; 
" the edges of the graph are partitioned between the services of the system. The only 
information flow between services is via vertices; and 
" users are represented as active subjects, similar to services, in that they can invoke 
operations in client services; however, unlike services, users are regarded as sources or 
sinks of information. 
The graph vertices are derived directly from information carriers identified in the system 
model. For example, va and vb model the call and return of an operation in service s3, 
invoked by service sl. Vertices can equally represent asynchronous messages (vc) or data 
that is part of a service's state (vi). Unless constrained by a security requirement, a service 
is able to route information from all its inputs to all its outputs. For example, in service s2 it 
is possible to distinguish nine distinct behaviours (and hence, graph edges) that route 
information between {user, vf, vc} and {vf, vd, vc}. 
This form of graph is as general as that in figure 9.2, although it is not quite identical; to 
represent the arbitrary graph in figure 9.2 it is necessary to duplicate some vertices, because 
of the restriction that all edges in or out of a vertex belong to the same service. This 
duplication may be necessary in practice; for example, vertices va and vc in figure 9.4 may 
result from a single multi-cast message directed to two services. 
Multiple Graphs 
The semantics of deferred requirements are not fully defined, since part of their 
specification is informal. As a result, deferred requirements associated with different asset 
concerns are not necessarily comparable. In other words an information flow constraint 
traceable to one asset concern does not, necessarily, protect a different concern. For this 
reason the SeDAn information model is not represented as a single information graph, but a 
set of graphs, one for each asset concern. 
This formal separation of asset concerns allows SeDAn to analyse a wide range of 
different security properties (see section 9.3, below). For example, availability can be 
analysed, because a concern can be related to the availability of a particular result, and 
information paths from potential attackers to that result can be determined. Requirements 
placed on services in these paths are traceable to the availability objective. Information flow 
analysis determines possible locations for security requirements, while the informal asset 
concern (availability) specifies the property required of the implementation. 
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9.2.3. Critical Modelling Assumptions 
Although the information graph is capable of representing arbitrary information flow, 
its relationship to the system design embodies assumptions that are central to the SeDAn 
framework. The critical assumptions are that: 
"a system can be decomposed into services; 
" the only information flow between services is via identifiable information carriers; and 
" the structure of services and information carriers is consistent between a system design 
and its implementation. 
These assumptions are appropriate to service-oriented systems that comprise services 
communicating via messages. In these systems, individual services may be deployed to 
physically separate systems, but however they are deployed the implementation is likely to 
preserve the isolation between services. However, if two deployed services are able to 
communicate via a mechanism that is not present in the design, then this introduces a 
behaviour that was not anticipated in the analysis, with undefined consequences for 
security. 
This is a special case of the general principle that information flow in an implementation 
must be a subset of that analysed (e. g. see [196]); in other words the implementation must 
not add behaviour from a security perspective, for the analysis to remain valid. The reason 
that independence between services is particularly important in SeDAn, is that the essential 
feature of the framework is to partition the system into components with undefined but 
enumerable information flows (the services), where the information flowing between these 
partitions is defined by the system model, and is stable in implementation terms. This 
partitioning allows security objectives to be decomposed systematically as far as services 
without the need to model individual service functionality in detail. 
9.2.4. Information Types 
Section 7.5.2 distinguished between two different types of information: traffic and data. 
The former is limited, and conveys events such as the volume and timing of messages, but 
not their content; the latter is potentially unlimited, since the information capacity of data 
types used in a system design is not bounded. These distinctions are important because 
some types of asset concern are unlikely to be realised by threat paths that utilize traffic 
flow; the example given in section 7.5.2 was commercial database integrity, perhaps a more 
common example is commercial confidentiality. 
Information types are also important to allow the specification of certain security 
requirements; for example, communications confidentiality (e. g. encryption) renders a data 
flow into a traffic flow. 
This distinction is recorded in the information model by giving each vertex a type; two 
of these types are Real and Void; and these signify that the vertex carries data flow, or that 
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it is restricted to traffic flow, respectively. The term Void implies that the vertex is derived 
from a system event; in other words the corresponding information carrier in the system 
does not have an associated type. 
These two types are sufficient to characterise threat paths within the system model, but 
further types are needed to model the effect of communications security; these are needed to 
account for. 
" the accessibility of information to external attackers; and 
" information flow resulting from end-to-end message protection. 
External Attacks 
Access to a system via a mechanism outside the system model is analysed by SeDAn as 
an external attack (see section 7.4.3), and one purpose of communications security12 is to 
protect against such attacks. External attacks are modelled as direct accesses by the attacker 
to any of the graph vertexes, resulting in an information flow either to or from the attacker. 
This introduces a third party to each vertex, in addition to its source and destination service, 
so the categorisation of a vertex as representing either traffic or data needs to be 
supplemented with other types that characterise the potential accessibility of a vertex to an 
external attacker. These types are Confidentiality and Integrity, as illustrated in figure 9.5. 
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Figure 9.5. Confidentiality and Integrity Vertex Types 
Consider encryption, again, with reference to the Confidentiality vertex in figure 9.5. 
The vertex represents a system message which carries a data item, but service sl encrypts 
that item, rendering the vertex into traffic, as opposed to data (1). The external attacker has 
a direct path to the message, for example by wiretapping, but because the data has been 
12 Communications security can also be used to protect an end-to-end flow of messages from intermediate services. 
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encrypted the attacker is able to extract only traffic information (2). However, if the attacker 
injects data (3) then this may be inadvertently accepted by service s2 (4). A Confidentiality 
node therefore supports a traffic flow from its source to an external attacker, and a data flow 
from the attacker to the target service. The reverse pattern applies to an Integrity vertex: an 
external attack is able to obtain the information, but not misrepresent it. 
End-to-End Messages 
A final vertex type is needed to distinguish end-to-end information flow arising from 
communications security requirements. Consider encryption again; an intermediate service 
used to relay encrypted data observes only traffic information, but the intended recipient is 
able to decrypt the data, conveying arbitrary information to the end point. It is not possible 
to infer the end-to-end information path from the transitive closure of edges in the 
information graph, since the end-to-end information flow is different in type to the 
intermediate information carriers. SeDAn models security features of this type with 
information vertices that directly link the end-points in the communication. Vertices of this 
sort do not have counterpart information carriers in a functional design, but they are inferred 
from security requirements, so they are given a distinctive type: Virtual. 
Summary 
The vertex types are summarised in table 9.1. 
Table 9.1. Vertex Types 
Type Information Flow to Vertex Information Flow from Vertex 
Real data data 
Integrity data traffic 
Confidentiality traffic data 
Void traffic traffic 
Virtual data data 
The first four types in table 9.1 form a lattice, with Real at the bottom and Void (the 
most constrained) at the top. Only Real or Void vertices are determined directly from 
information carriers in the functional model. Integrity or Confidentiality vertices result from 
security requirements that constrain the related information carrier, but these constraints can 
change the type of only Real vertices. If both Integrity and Confidentiality constraints are 
applied the result is a Void vertex. The lattice is shown in figure 9.6. 
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Figure 9.6. The Lattice of Vertex Types 
The typing of vertices in the information model allow the effect of communications 
security requirements to be modelled, in particular their effect on the accessibility of assets 
to external attackers and intermediate services. 
9.2.5. Summary 
The SeDAn approach rests on an important assumption: that it is possible to model a 
system as set of services, where the means of information flow between the services is 
identified in the system model, even if the functional behaviour of the individual services is 
not fully specified. 
The information model is a graph, where vertices correspond to information carriers 
between services, and the edges of the graph are partitioned between the services. User 
roles are regarded as information carriers. 
Information is characterised as either data or traffic, the former conveys unrestricted 
information, whereas the latter represents event information, which may indicate the 
number or duration of system actions. Vertices in the information graph are typed to denote 
the information they carry (see table 9.1), and their relation to external attackers who may 
access information independent of the system design (e. g. by wiretapping). A separate 
vertex type (virtual) is used to model end-to-end information flow that arises from 
communication (message) security requirements, but has no direct counterpart in the system 
model. This typing allows communications security requirements to be modelled. 
9.3. Review of the Effectiveness of SeDAn Security Modelling 
The previous sections describe an innovative approach to the specification of security 
requirements, supported by an information model. The core insight is that a system can be 
partitioned into services, or sub-systems, and security requirements that constrain service 
behaviour can be expressed in generic terms without the need for a full functional definition 
of each service. The resulting information model allows the systematic evaluation of the 
effectiveness of security requirements (constraints on functions or services) in protecting 
against concerns (unwanted outcomes for specific assets), and allows a wide range of 
different security concerns to be supported. 
This solves the hard problem in security design - moving from systematic security 
properties to constraints on individual functions - but it also determines the nature of asset 
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concerns and the types of security requirement that can be supported. An important question 
is therefore the extent that the model described in this chapter is able to support realistic 
security goals. The purpose of this section is to review the information model from that 
perspective; three topics are covered, the first two explore limitations implied by the 
structure of the information model, and the third reviews the extent that asset concerns are 
able to express the protection objectives of the security goals established in chapter 2. The 
following sections cover each of these topics in turn: 
" section 9.3.1 explores possible limitations resulting from the graph representation of 
information flow; 
" section 9.3.2 explores possible limitations resulting from the model of a service as `pure 
behaviour', in other words without state; and 
" section 9.3.3 reviews the ability of asset concerns to express the security goals identified 
in chapter 2 (confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy, and accountability). 
9.3.1. Information Representation Limitations 
The information model is a graph which is mapped to information carriers in the system 
design. This model can be made as expressive as necessary, by expanding the number of 
vertices in the graph to enumerate properties of interest; in other words, many vertices are 
used to model the information carried by a single component in the system model. For 
example, a set of vertices, distinguished by ownership, may be used to model a single UML 
class representing a data asset. 
Taken to an extreme, this type of modelling can result in very large graphs, so in the 
interests of scalability the properties enumerated are limited to those that are essential. 
Section 9.2.1 describes how messages (or operation parameters) are mapped to vertices: 
those with a different source, destination or user role are distinguished as separate vertices, 
even if they originate from the same UML class. 
These scalability concerns result in the omission from the graph of any model of the 
sequencing of operations, and this introduces the problem of how to express security 
requirements based on temporal constraints. In SeDAn, this problem can usually be 
avoided, because deferred security requirements provide a mechanism to incorporate 
incompletely specified constraints. The example in figure 9.7 clarifies the approach. 
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Figure 9.7. Temporal Security: Enforcing a Sequence 
Figure 9.7 shows a system where two different users are required to perform an action in 
sequence: one originates a purchase order and the second must approve it. They access the 
system through separate services (sa, sb) and the asset (the purchase order) is managed by a 
third service, sc. The unwanted outcome of the asset concern is an incorrect transaction 
sequence: the organisation wishes to prevent an approver writing `blank cheques'. Two 
roles are identified to ensure that neither can act alone, so each role is a potential attacker. 
Because both user roles are potential attackers, one or more security requirements is 
needed in the paths between these roles and the purchase order asset. Requirement rc on 
service sc constrains the behaviour of the service to ensure that an incorrect transaction 
sequence is prevented. The information model is able to show that a security requirement 
placed in this position is able to constrain the paths between both users and the asset", but 
the specification of `sequence' is informal, and must be interpreted later in the system 
development. 
Summary 
The essence of this example is that information paths are used to solve the critical 
problem in system security design - the placement of security requirements - without 
necessarily needing to be able to fully interpret the requirement. This approach is just as 
effective for temporal constraints as for other constraints on behaviour, and avoids the need 
for detailed temporal security modelling within the information model. 
13 Although the placement of this security requirement is intuitively obvious, this solution is incomplete. A 
systematic analysis of this system would reveal the need to authenticate the user roles to service sc, so requirement 
rc does not suffice on its own. There are a range of solutions that are not detailed here, and also other ways of 
designing such a system. This problem is similar to separation of duty, which is discussed in section 4.5.1. 
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9.3.2. Service Model Limitations 
The information model, described in section 9.2, divides a service specification into 
information carriers and `pure behaviour'. For example, the input and return parameters of 
an operation are modelled as sets of information carriers, which may be assets of concern, 
while the functionality of a service is simply modelled as information flow between its 
inputs and outputs. 
One implication of this model is that it is not possible to attach a concern to a service: 
concerns are unwanted outcomes to assets, not services. This distinction can cause problems 
with system stakeholders who are asked to identify security requirements, because they may 
assign security objectives to services". These informal objectives relate either to hidden 
service state or to behaviour, they can both be accommodated, but the issues are different 
for each. 
Service State 
Since the behaviour of a service is modelled as information flow between all possible 
inputs and all possible outputs, service state in terms of a `memory' is redundant. In other 
words, everything that has ever been input has been modelled, so there is no need to 
condense history into a service state. However, state is modelled explicitly in a system 
design if it has business significance, which includes the need to identify security concerns. 
For example, user accounts, payment records, and product information are all important to a 
business, and need to be represented as assets; the resulting assets are indicated by a 
<<manages>> relation in a system model, and assigned security concerns. 
There are some elements of a service's state that are not obtained from its inputs, and 
which are not business assets in a transactional sense; these are reference data provided as 
part of the service's configuration. Examples may include algorithms, price discount tables, 
and product specifications. Security concerns expressed for a `service' may relate to 
reference data (e. g. algorithm confidentiality), in which case the relevant asset is included in 
the system model, and assigned a concern in the usual way. 
Concerns and Services 
The most common objective quoted for service behaviour is availability. Availability 
goals carry a wide range of system implications, but leaving these aside, a stakeholder 
objective for the `availability of a service' is probably intended to suggest that the 
continuity and accessibility of that service is important. Service objectives of this form are 
usually misplaced, since the availability of a service is of little value if the results never 
14 During requirements elicitation is important to capture stakeholder concerns, rather focus too pedantically on 
modeling practice. Our practice is to allow the stakeholders to state security objectives in whatever terms of they 
prefer, and test and rationalize them later. For this reason some SeDAn case studies record some security 
objectives by service at the asset analysis stage. The other benefit in allowing this practice is that it provides an 
alternative elicitation viewpoint to assets. 
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reach the client. The client usually needs the results to be available, and attaching the 
concern to the correct component (the result) rather than the service ensures that all aspects 
of its delivery are taken into account. (Availability is discussed further in section 9.3.3.4, 
below. ) 
Summary 
It would not be difficult to add service state to the information model, but this approach 
has not been taken because these cases suggest that there are benefits in avoiding a 
simplistic association of a concern to a service. It is important to expose business data that 
must be observable from a security perspective, and the service model focuses the attention 
of requirements management on identifying these assets. 
It is easy to confuse `service' with `software' and wonder if this section is suggesting 
that software integrity is of no concern. Software integrity ensures that the configuration of 
a service is predictable, and perhaps that it has been developed and managed using 
appropriate processes. From the point of view of a system design, software integrity is 
simply an implementation mechanism, which must be considered in the context of the risk 
profile for the service. Implementation issues are discussed further in chapter 13. 
9.3.3. Supporting Security Goals with Asset Concerns 
The information model described in this chapter effectively defines a requirements 
framework - it determines what SeDAn security requirements are able to specify, and hence 
the properties they can represent. Little has been said about specific requirements (they are 
described in the next chapter), but these are all specified in terms of the models that have 
now been described: 
" the system model; 
the information model, and deferred requirements; and 
" information typing. 
The success of this approach to security modelling depends upon the expressiveness of 
asset concerns: if concerns can be specified that adequately support security goals, then 
requirements follow directly, since the information model can be used to determine threat 
paths between attackers and asset concerns, and requirements either constrain the system 
model, or are specified by reference to asset concerns. 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the extent that asset concerns are able to 
support the security goals identified in chapter 2 (confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
privacy, and accountability). Each of these goals are discussed in separate sub-sections, 
below, following a general discussion of goals and asset concerns. 
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9.3.3.1. Decomposition of Goals to Concerns 
The properties of a concern were described in detail in section 8.2.1, and named in the 
profile in section 8.3.1.7. Briefly, they are: 
" impact, which quantifies the damage to the business if the concern was realised; 
" direction, which specifies if a threat path is directed towards, or away from, the asset; 
" flowType, which specifies if traffic paths are to be analysed; 
" asset Type, which specifies if only managed assets are potential targets; and 
" outcome, which is an informal specification of the protection objective. 
The first four properties are formal parameters that are sufficient for the discovery of 
threat paths and are included as attributes in the relevant UML profile, but it is also 
important that the meaning of a concern (the outcome) is specified informally. Deferred 
requirements depend upon the clarity of the associated concern to convey their meaning to 
an implementer, but the formal properties of a concern specify only its scope in respect to 
risk analysis. 
Because an important element of a concern is an informal specification, it is important 
to clarify what can be specified, and what cannot. 
A concern is a protection objective: it is associated with a particular asset, and specifies 
an unwanted outcome to that asset. This framework is concerned with security, so the 
analysis is limited to outcomes that may result from potential attacks. For example, it is 
possible to state `lack of timeliness' as a concern, which is traceable to a `timeliness' goal. 
If attackers are identified who target that goal then the analysis will expose threat paths 
from those attackers to the asset, and security requirements can be placed that block these 
threats. This analysis does not consider functional performance. A functional analysis might 
show how speed response budgets for different components in the system combine to 
demonstrate that overall response times will be met. Important as this is, it is not a security 
issue. So in SeDAn, concerns are security objectives, and the information model does not 
support any form of functional reasoning. 
A good check on the specification of a concern is the attacker test: 
An objective related to an asset is only a security concern if it is possible to envisage 
a possible attacker. 
Section 2 described a number of security goals (confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
privacy, accountability) and these often include functional as well as protection 
requirements (see the discussion in section 6.3.2). As a result it is usually not possible to 
refine a security goal by simply determining the assets to which it applies, and then 
associating those assets with goal-related concerns. 
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The general approach to refining security goals is to: 
" determine the functional requirements implied by the goal"; then 
" ensure that the system design meets those requirements; then 
" review all assets to see what concerns are required to support each goal. 
This functionalityfirst approach to goal decomposition is important, since it: 
" clarifies the contribution of functionality and protection to each goal; and 
" ensures that security analysis is carried out on a complete system. 
Section 9.2.3 highlights the problem that adding functionality to a system after security 
design analyses may invalidate the protection strategy. SeDAn does not define a specific 
goal refinement process, but the functionality-first approach is needed to ensure that both 
the functional design and the set of asset concerns are complete before security design 
analysis. This is reflected in the overall analysis process in chapter 12, and in the review of 
security goals below. 
9.3.3.2. Confidentiality 
Confidentiality goals usually apply to categories of business assets, such as: 
" pre-release financial results; 
" company product plans; and 
" design information. 
It is often possible to directly identify the assets that carry the business information 
described by a goal, and associate a concern with each such asset. The most straightforward 
confidentiality goals do not imply additional system functionality, but this is not an 
invariable rule: multi-level security systems may need special handling facilities (e. g. 
downgrading and interfacing) and even business systems may need related management 
functions (e. g. to specify Chinese walls). If such functionality is a feature of a 
confidentiality goal, then the functionality-first principle outlined above should be followed. 
Chapter 2 distinguishes two main types of confidentiality: the protection of data at a 
particular location (also known as discretionary confidentiality), or the protection of data 
wherever it is located (mandatory confidentiality). In the system model, an asset which has 
a specific location can designated by a «manages» relation from the associated service, 
and the protection scope similarly specified in the concern (i. e. by setting an assetType of 
managed). An assetType of all signifies that the concern applies to all assets of a class, 
wherever they are used in the system. Managed assets are often database entries; assets that 
need to be protected regardless of their location include infrastructural security assets such 
15 This thesis is not concerned with goal refinement, but a further complication is the effective elicitation of goals. 
Often it is better to elicit concrete objectives, including concerns, from which draft goals can be consolidated. If 
this process of consolidation is used to develop goals it is important that resulting security goals are re-interpreted 
in terms of functionality and protection, and not just left as a collection of similar protection requirements. [2901 
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as cryptographic keys, militarily classified information, and electronic products, such as 
movies. 
Summary 
The managed property of an asset concern allows the specification of both types of 
confidentiality: the confidentiality of a particular asset at a specific location (e. g. a database) 
or the confidentiality of mobile data wherever it is located (e. g. personal information, 
military documents or electronic products). 
9.3.3.3. Integrity 
Integrity has a wide range of possible interpretations, to the extent that it is rarely 
meaningful to record `integrity' as a system goal without clarifying the intent. The simplest 
form of business integrity is the maintenance, without change, of critical records such as 
audit information or financial data. Other common integrity goals involve consistency 
(between data, or between data held in a system and an external process) and provenance, 
which requires the history of an asset to be recorded. 
Integrity goals can be supported by concerns where the direction of attack is toward the 
asset. This implies that an attacker may wish to influence some aspect of the asset; the 
unwanted outcome may include modification, deletion, prevention of correct updates, or 
setting values that are inconsistent with some other asset; the threat paths are the same. 
The relationship between integrity goals and asset concerns is not usually direct; 
integrity goals often require additional functionality, which may itself require protection. 
For example, most scientific experiments have provenance goals, since it is important to 
record how results are obtained. The first step in decomposing such a goal is to determine 
which assets correspond to `results'; this provides a list of items that are the subjects of the 
goal. For each of these it is necessary to determine what provenance data is relevant; in a 
scientific experiment this may include calibration information, environmental information, 
and equipment test results. Functions then need to be identified to ensure that this data is 
generated and recorded in association with the results. A goal decomposition of this sort 
may identify new assets and functions that need to be added to the system design. Finally, it 
is possible to identify the assets to which protection objectives (concerns) apply; in this 
example they include both the experimental results, and also the related provenance data. 
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Figure 9.8. Decomposing a Provenance Goal 
This process is illustrated in figure 9.8. The security goal (1) is for the provenance of the 
results of service se. This leads to the identification of extra functionality in the service (2) 
in order to generate matching test results and calibration information. These assets, as well 
as the original result data all need integrity protection, so concerns are associated with all 
three assets (3). In this example it is assumed that data used by the service (e. g. test data) is 
documented in the output, but in some cases a new provenance goal would be created for 
the input data, and the goal decomposition would cycle until complete. 
This illustrates the need for the functionality-first approach outlined above; without it 
both functionality and asset concerns are easy to overlook. 
Summary 
The direction attribute of an asset concern allows the specification of threats toward an 
asset, and hence a range of integrity constraints. Integrity constraints are of many different 
types; deferred requirements allow the semantics of the particular problem to be reflected in 
the requirement, but it is also necessary to ensure that the functionality associated with an 
integrity goal is established before the protection objectives (concerns) are set. 
9.3.3.4. Availability 
Availability was used as an example in section 9.3.2, in which it was argued that 
availability concerns apply to results from services, rather than the services themselves. An 
availability concern can be analysed in exactly the same way as any other, despite the fact 
that the threat path is not exactly the same from the attacker's perspective: a denial of 
service attack is usually directed at somewhere on the information path to the asset, rather 
than directly at the asset, which is the more likely case for an integrity attack. 
Denial of service attacks are usually directed towards deployed services, often by 
external attackers, whereas most of the previous examples have been concerned with attacks 
directed against assets by system users. Figure 9.8 illustrates the threat path that results 
from a denial of service attack by an external attacker. 
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Figure 9.9. A Denial of Service Attack 
Figure 9.9 shows a simple database query system. Data are processed by a service (sb), 
which returns query results to a presentation service (sa), and which in turn provides a 
presentation view to a user. A denial-of-service concern is associated with the result 
queryPresentation. (See section 9.3.2 for why this concern is related to a result, not a 
service. ) 
An external attack directed against a service is analysed as an attack against the service 
Deployment Group. Deployment Groups were introduced in section 7.4.2, they comprise a 
service and all its immediate inputs and outputs; in other words, all the assets that are 
directly available to an organisation in which the service is deployed. External attacks were 
introduced in section 7.5.3, and exploit access mechanisms outside the system design; for 
example, access via a buffer overflow, or an operation that that is not part of the design and 
has been installed inadvertently. 
There is a threat path from a potential external attacker (who is targeting an availability 
goal), to deployment group sb, allowing the attacker to modify the query result (2), which in 
turn (3,4) prejudices the asset of concern. In this case, as is usual with external attacks, the 
risk can be evaluated, but must be revisited and mitigated during implementation - there are 
no abstract security requirements available that mitigate dynamite attacks on physical 
infrastructure. The benefit in evaluating external risks is that it quantifies the 
implementation risk for each service. In a similar way to security requirements, SeDAn 
partitions the external risk problem for an implementation, so that it is expressed in terms of 
individual system components rather than the system as a whole. (External risks are 
discussed further in chapter 12. ) 
This example does highlight one aspect of deferred requirements that is a matter for 
caution. It would be possible to specify a security requirement for service sa to `defend' the 
denial of service attack. From the perspective of the information model this would be 
sufficient to defend the threat path from the external attacker, but it is not functionally 
possible for service sa to make the availability of the output (queryPresentation) 
independent of the input (queryResult), which is how such a requirement should be 
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interpreted. A requirement placed on sa to defend this threat would not, therefore, be 
implementable. The analyst therefore needs to consider the constraint implied by a deferred 
requirement and ensure that it is consistent with the functional model of the system; this is 
yet another reminder that establishing a protection strategy is a design process which is 
informed by analysis, and not something which is easily automated. 
The availability concern in this example was identified as `denial-of-service', and this is 
consistent with the `attacker test' suggested as a way of determining if the specification of a 
concern was appropriate. However, as described in chapter 2, availability is a much wider 
subject, and an availability goal is likely to imply the need for other system features, 
including: 
" functional performance (e. g. sufficient machine power/bandwidth for peak loads); 
" the detection of inappropriate but otherwise legitimate use (e. g. selfish user behaviour); 
" the detection of external attacks and intrusions; and 
" recovery functions. 
These all give rise to functional requirements, some of which need to be supported by 
asset concerns. Compared to integrity goals, availability goals are weighted more towards 
specifying functionality than protection. 
Summary 
Availability goals have similar issues as integrity goals: deferred requirements allow the 
semantics of the particular problem to be reflected in the requirement, but it is also 
necessary to ensure that the functionality associated with the availability goal is established 
before the protection objectives (concerns) are set. 
This example also demonstrates the need for caution in specifying deferred 
requirements. The analysis process will correctly determine possible paths of attack, but 
since the deferred requirement is partly informal, the analyst must ensure that the constraint 
implied by any deferred requirements is consistent with the functional design of the system. 
9.3.3.5. Privacy 
Privacy, and other ethical and statutory obligations, generally impose collections of 
system goals, each of which is managed in its own right. For example, a business goal of 
`comply with data protection and human rights legislation' is interpreted as a list of security 
goals that are contained within statutes and related documentation (advice, orders), or 
established as best practice. These include protection goals (e. g. confidentiality and 
integrity of personal data) as well as functional requirements (e. g. users must be able to 
access and correct records held about themselves, data must be deleted after use). As a 
consequence there is no distinctive goal of `privacy' that requires special treatment; each of 
these obligations are treated as a separate system goals. For a system designer, problems of 
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interpretation relate to the subsidiary obligations (e. g. "what does `delete data' mean? ") and 
not usually the headline business goal. 
Summary 
Privacy goals do not result in new patterns of requirement, since legislation, regulation 
or ethical frameworks result in specific objectives for integrity, confidentiality and system 
functions. 
93.3.6. Accountability 
Accountability is required to record the use of resources, or an individual's actions. 
There are generally two parts to an accountability system: recording, and storage and use. 
Both these parts require specialised system functionality, and also need to be supported by 
protection requirements. Recording functions must be able to determine the origin of 
actions or events, so ownership or authenticity of data is an issue, and they also need to 
ensure that the production of records is not hampered. These considerations give rise to 
integrity and denial-of-service concerns. Accounting data are used by charging systems and 
for business or operational analysis; the main asset concern in the storage and use of records 
is usually integrity. 
The process of determining what asset concerns are needed to support an accountability 
goal is the same as outlined above: the required functionality needs to be specified first, 
then assets are reviewed to identify protection objectives, or concerns. 
Summary 
Accountability goals determine the need for functionality, which is then supported by 
protection requirements for integrity and availability, which can be supported as described 
in the previous sections. 
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9.4. Summary 
The problem of finding threat paths in a system, and determining if they are defended by 
security requirements, amounts to identifying the information flow. How a system is 
interpreted in information terms therefore determines what can be specified and analysed. 
The SeDAn analysis rests on an important assumption: that it is possible to model a 
system as a set of services, where the means of information flow between the services is 
identified in the system model, but the functional behaviour of individual services may not 
be fully specified. Requirements are similarly treated: deferred security requirements 
constrain the behaviour of services, are scoped by elements of the system model, but rely on 
the informal specification of an asset concern to convey their meaning. (9.1) 
The problem with incompletely specified requirements is that they need to be 
interpreted to allow threat path analysis: does a particular requirement block a path, or not? 
The information model solves this problem by providing a generic model of service 
behaviour. The information model is a graph, where vertices correspond to information 
carriers between services in the system model, and the edges of the graph are partitioned 
between the services. Information is typed to distinguish between events ('traffic') and data, 
and to identify its accessibility to external attackers. (9.2) 
The final part of this chapter (section 9.3) reviews the extent that the security goals 
described in chapter 2 can be supported by asset concerns. It is necessary to develop the 
functional implications of a security goal before asset concerns are assigned, to ensure that 
all assets and concerns are identified, and the security analysis is based on a complete 
system. Concerns are different in type to security goals; the latter may require functionality 
as well as protection objectives, the former identify only protection outcomes, and are 
associated with specific assets. The combination of formal attributes of a concern and 
informal specification is sufficiently expressive to support the wide range of security goals 
discussed in chapter 2; for example availability and provenance can be supported as well as 
both mandatory and discretionary confidentiality. The traceability of deferred requirements 
to concerns ensures that these objectives are reflected in the resulting security requirements; 
however, the analyst must ensure that such requirements are consistent with the functional 
design of the system (9.3.3.4). 
Section 9.3 also discusses temporal constraints (93.1) and protection objectives for 
services (9.3.2). Although the information model limits how these are expressed, SeDAn is 
able to accommodate them in practice. 
This chapter has discussed how security requirements are specified in general terms; the 
next chapter provides the detail by constructing a taxonomy of SeDAn requirements, then 
giving specifications for each. 
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Chapter 10. The SeDAn Requirements Catalogue 
A large number of different security requirements have been described in the preceding 
chapters, ranging from user access controls to information constraints on the behaviour of 
services. This chapter consolidates the requirements discussed so far into a single coherent 
catalogue. The result is a unique perspective on what constitutes a security requirement, as 
well as a working catalogue of the requirements that are supported by SeDAn. 
As noted in chapter 5, there is no straightforward way to demonstrate that a set of 
requirements is complete, or sufficient for all applications; however, the objective of 
SeDAn is to accommodate the widest possible set of systems, so the full range of security 
requirements that have been identified are accommodated, even if the expressiveness of 
individual requirements is restricted. 
The objectives of the chapter are: 
" to catalogue the security requirements supported by SeDAn; and 
" to specify each security requirement in detail. 
The organisation of this chapter mirrors these objectives. The chapter begins by 
reviewing the security requirements described in previous chapters, and consolidating them 
into a working taxonomy of security requirements. The taxonomy provides the `big picture' 
view of the detail presented earlier, it identifies the main types of requirement and clarifies 
their function in relation to the generic system model introduced in chapter 8. By providing 
a single framework of requirements that need to be supported by SeDAn, it also identifies 
some security requirements that were not previously evident. 
SeDAn supports at least one security requirement for each category in the taxonomy; 
the definition of each type of requirement includes the system context in which it is used, 
and the effect of the requirement in information-flow terms. As described in chapter 9, 
some requirements are defined by how they constrain a system design model (e. g. access 
control) but others are deferred, and are defined in both generic information-flow terms and 
by reference to the concern they defend, pending their final interpretation in an 
implementation. 
In detail, this chapter is organised as follows: 
" section 10.1 reviews the security requirements described in previous chapters, explains 
how they are classified, and derives a requirements taxonomy which identifies the main 
types of requirement to be supported by SeDAn; 
" section 10.2 is the SeDAn requirements catalogue; it includes a requirement for every 
category in the taxonomy, and specifies each in turn, using a similar structure to that 
used to define patterns: it provides a motivation, summary, context, description and 
discussion of the consequences of each requirement; and 
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" section 10.3 concludes the chapter. 
Supplementary material can be found in appendix B, which gives a formal definition of 
the primitive constraints on which these requirements are defined, and appendix C, which 
lists the syntax for SeDAn requirements as they appear in UML tags. Information flow 
diagrams are explained in appendix A, and the defmition of deferred requirements is in 
chapter 9. Chapter 11 shows how these requirements can be used in practice. 
10.1. Types of Security Requirement 
The security requirements outlined in previous chapters are so wide-ranging and 
different that it is hard to focus on the `big picture'. What is needed is a coherent 
classification of requirements that puts each of these in context. Such a classification would 
establish the range of security requirements that are possible, what they achieve, and allow 
missing requirements to be identified. 
This section provides that big picture, in the form of a security requirements taxonomy. 
The taxonomy consolidates the material in the previous chapters, identifies the main types 
of requirement, and places them in a framework that clarifies their function in relation to the 
system metamodel introduced in chapter 8. 
This section is in two parts. The first is an overview of security requirements that have 
been identified in previous chapters. The second derives the taxonomy of requirements to be 
supported by SeDAn, which are specified in the remainder of this chapter. 
10.1.1. Review of Requirement Types 
Security requirements were introduced in general terms in section 6.3; a security 
requirement is usually a constraint, in other words it acts to limit the range of behaviour in a 
system. The most familiar constraints are access controls that determine what operations 
users may perform, and these controls need to be supported by user authentication 
mechanisms. These features are well established in the security literature; they were 
summarised in chapter 5 as: 
" access controls (5.1.1); and 
" user authentication, and the confidentiality or integrity of the path between the user and 
the access point (5.1.1). 
Most operations within a system are not invoked directly by a user, or the users `trusted 
path', but from software working on behalf of a user. More generally, access control is 
concerned with messages that invoke operations, and how the messages are authenticated. 
Chapter 5 identifies the need for. 
" controls that manage access to functions or operations, based on a range of different 
message characteristics and a stated policy (5.1.2); 
" authentication of the data used to make access control decisions (5.1.2); and 
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" message access controls that restrict the flow of messages to services, based on the 
identity of a remote client, user, or a specific claim (5.1.6). 
The last requirement introduces the need for end-to-end security. An implementation 
may use different mechanisms for point-to-point access control compared to end-to-end 
security, so although the underlying requirements are similar, they may be achieved in 
different ways. 
For example, a firewall could isolate a back-office system located on a separate sub- 
network in such a way that no access is permitted between external clients and internal 
operations. This provides coarse communication-level access control based on the position 
of different components in the network. On the other hand, remote clients could be allowed 
access to a system based on signed messages, and a chain of trust that allows the signatures 
to be verified. 
It is therefore useful to distinguish between message-level requirements and point-to- 
point access controls, since they often use different implementation mechanisms. 
The other well-established security requirement is communications security. Chapter 5 
identifies the need for: 
9 message confidentiality: that a message, or part of a message, is understood by only a 
specific remote service (5.1.6); and 
" message integrity, or authenticity: that a message, or part of a message, originated from 
a known principal (e. g. a user, system, or organisation) (5.1.6). 
Communications security is often related to attacks on actual communications (e. g. 
wiretapping), but in system terms it is equally significant as a mechanism for managing the 
need for trust in intermediate services. The system examples in section 4.5 show how 
message integrity helps to avoid the need for trust in a complex workflow enactment 
service. 
These requirements are widely understood, but the previous two chapters have 
highlighted three other types of security requirement: 
9 constraints on the information-flow behaviour of a service; 
9 the classification of assets by role; and 
" deployment constraints. 
The worked example in section 7.5 highlighted the need to constrain the behaviour of 
services. The concept of a service or operation that is trusted to protect the data that it 
manages is well established for some applications (e. g. databases, see section 4.4.3); and 
these constraints are different in kind to access controls. Access controls are implemented 
by security infrastructure, separate from application functionality, because it is possible to 
identify `choke points' (e. g. in the communications layer) and relatively straightforward 
access policies. More general behavioural constraints restrict particular values or data 
transitions within an application context (e. g. consistency between ledgers in a financial 
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system). In the end such constraints result in binary decisions, but the process that 
determines the allowed behaviour is so application specific that most of the security 
mechanism must reside in the application rather than the infrastructure. 
The need to classify assets by role is described in section 8.3.2. The underlying 
requirement is not in doubt: security requirements often relate to ownership (e. g. users must 
access only their own accounts) and an essential precursor to an access control of this type 
is to identify the ownership of the assets in question. Classification of an asset by ownership 
is therefore a property that is needed in support of other security requirements, in the same 
way that messages are authenticated in support of access control. 
Deployment constraints were described in section 7.4.2, and feature in the example in 
section 7.5.4. One aim of SeDAn is to allow the analysis of service-based systems prior to 
deployment (i. e. without concrete bindings between abstract services and their host 
organisations or servers). However, security administrations are potential attackers, so a 
mechanism is needed to constrain the organisations to which services can be deployed. 
This is a brief overview of the security requirements identified in the forgoing chapters. 
The next section condenses these into an taxonomy, which is the basis for the SeDAn 
requirements catalogue. 
10.1.2. Security Requirements Taxonomy 
This taxonomy consolidates the security requirements reviewed in the previous section. 
The main distinctions between requirements are first summarised; these provide the root 
classifications for the taxonomy, which is then presented in detail. The requirements 
described here are all control, or protection requirements; security goals may also need to be 
supported by functional requirements, such as audit or logging, as described in section 6.3. 
There is a broad distinction between security requirements that are defined as 
constraints on the system metamodel (see section 8.2) and those that are deferred. The 
former include direct access controls (limiting which services or users invoke which 
operations) and the classification of assets by role. The latter include constraints on service 
behaviour and security requirements on messages. Deferred requirements are specified by a 
combination of their information flow characteristics and the outcomes they defend. The 
latter are defined informally by reference to the associated asset concern, so their full 
system interpretation is deferred until later in the implementation lifecycle (see section 9.1). 
Messages can be modelled in a system design (SeDAn simply regards them as types of 
asset), but the security features of a message are difficult to capture in a functional model. 
For example, consider confidentiality: a designer may use different UML classes to 
distinguish between encrypted and unencrypted forms of the same data, but is not able to 
fully represent the information-flow consequences of encryption (see section 10.2.4, 
below). For this reason message security requirements are also deferred, since some of their 
important characteristics cannot be directly represented in a system design. 
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The broad categories of access, classification, service behaviour and messaging, provide 
the root classification for the taxonomy, which is then extended systematically by using the 
types available in the metamodel appropriate to each branch. The result includes all the 
requirements surveyed in the previous section, and also identifies some additional 
requirements that are described below. 
The taxonomy is presented in figure 9.1. The arrows indicate categorisation or "is a" 
relationships. SeDAn requires at least one way of expressing a security requirement for 
each leaf node; the names of these requirements are shown in italics under the relevant 
node, and are defined in section 10.2, below. 
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Figure 10.1. Security Requirements Taxonomy 
The System Design branch of the taxonomy is concerned with requirements that are 
defined in terms of the SeDAn metamodel (see chapter 8); usually by constraining or 
specifying relations in the system. Access controls from a user or a service, deployment 
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constraints, and the need to classify data by role were all identified as requirements the 
previous section. 
Two forms of access control are provided, the target form (PermitAccess) in which a 
service determines what accesses are allowed to an operation which it hosts, and the source 
form (RefuseToAccess), where a service constrains itself not to access a remote operation. 
The need for this variant is described in section 4.4.1: in distributed systems there are cases 
where the access requirement is a concern of the administrator of the source of an access, 
rather than the target (e. g. to deny access to pornography). 
In the absence of concrete bindings between services and organisations it is necessary to 
constrain where a service can be deployed, and the relation between services and 
organisations in the SeDAn metamodel represents this constrained deployment. However, 
there is a security design choice between two possible interpretations of constrained 
deployment. The alternatives are that either. 
" an instance of the service will eventually be deployed to a single organisation, no 
commitment to a particular deployment is implied, but the available choice is restricted 
by deployment constraints; or 
" instances of the service may be deployed to many organisations, the set of possible 
deployments is limited by deployment constraints. 
Classification of a service by organisation specifies the second of these: it implies that 
only the assets associated with an organisation will be deployed with a particular service 
instance, or in other words, that deployment does not give an organisation direct access to 
assets that are unambiguously owned by another organisation. The default position, that a 
service is not classified by organisation, means that an instance of a service, and all 
associated assets (regardless of ownership) may be deployed to any organisation to which 
there is no deployment constraint. 
Deferred requirements constrain the behaviour of services. This includes managing 
information flow to and from assets that are part of a service's state (managed assets) and 
determining what messages may be output by a service. Because messages have end-to-end 
behaviour, and often require the co-operation of the services at both ends, message security 
is a special case that must be treated separately. 
The distinction between primitive information-flow constraints and constraint patterns 
was described in section 7.5.3. Although it is possible to formulate requirements on service 
behaviour using primitive constraints, this approach is not realistically scalable for practical 
systems, not does it communicate the security intent well to system practitioners. Constraint 
patterns allow the specification of more meaningful generic policies. There are three model 
elements that could be used as parameters of such patterns: operation, asset and role. The 
taxonomy therefore identifies the need for three pattern types. 
The division of message requirements into integrity and confidentiality follows 
established practice for communication and message security requirements. 
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SeDAn supports at least one type of requirement for each category in the taxonomy, 
and these requirements are defined in the next section. Message security requires two 
different security requirements per category, since the implementation of end-to-end 
communications security requires matching source and target constraints. Figure 10.1 cross- 
references the taxonomy to the SeDAn requirements catalogue in the next section. 
In summary, the taxonomy identifies the main types of security requirement that must 
be supported by SeDAn. Security requirements are broadly divided into those that are 
expressed directly in terms of the system model, and those that are modelled in information 
terms, but whose functional interpretation is deferred to a later stage in the system 
development. Further classification is based on the components of the system model that are 
constrained, and this highlights the need for some types of constraint that have not been 
exposed in previous chapters: the classification of services and additional constraint 
patterns. The next section specifies each of these requirements in detail. 
10.2. The SeDAn Requirements Catalogue 
SeDAn supports a security requirement for each category in the taxonomy, by using the 
simplest specification for each that is useful in practice. The cost of this approach is that it 
may not be possible to fine-tune requirements to some situations, but the benefit is that the 
resulting requirements set is as broad as possible. This section defines these security 
requirements in detail. 
Each requirement is described using the same main headings: 
" the introduction motivates the need for the requirement; 
" the summary gives a natural language syntax for each requirement, identifies the main 
components in its specification, and outlines its function; 
" the context presents a typical system context in which the requirement is used; 
" the definition describes how the requirement modifies information flow with reference 
to the context; and 
"a consequences section describes issues that arise in the use of the requirement. 
The security requirements are presented in sections that correspond to the major four 
categories in the taxonomy: access controls, classification, service constraints and 
messaging. 
Interpretation Note: 
The context diagrams in this section are often incomplete in some sense (e. g. missing 
access constraints to achieve their notional purpose); these diagrams are not presented as 
worked examples, their only purpose is to set the context for the description of a particular 
requirement. Worked examples are presented in chapter 11. 
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10.2.1. Access Constraints 
The accesses that are permitted in a system define the basic topology which supports all 
possible system behaviour, and on which all other security requirements depend. The 
taxonomy divides access requirements into two main types: standard (point-to-point) access 
controls and deployment constraints. The former determine which components may invoke 
operations within the system, the latter specify constraints on the organisations that may 
host particular services. 
10.2.1.1. Access Constraints - to Operations 
Access controls are used at several layers in a system, including the communications, 
messaging and application layers. The access constraints that are directly expressed in terms 
of the system model are those at the communications layer, and they determine if users or 
services are allowed direct access to particular operations. 
Access management at the messaging layer is specified using message policies (see 
section 10.2.4, below), and application level requirements are specified with constraints on 
service behaviour (see section 10.23, below). 
Summary 
PermitAccess from «userRole» to operation 
PermitAccess from remote <<service>> to operation 
RefuseToAccess operation in remote <<service>> 
Access controls are usually embedded in the service which hosts the target operation, 
the PermitAccess requirements are of this type, and they allow access from a particular user 
role, or service, to a named operation within the service in which the requirement is placed. 
It is also possible to specify that a service will not use an operation, even though it is 
available. In a system design this is likely to be the exception rather than the rule, so this 
form of access control is specified as a constraint. RefuseToAccess specifies that a service 
will not access a particular remote operation, even if the access is otherwise permitted. 
Context 
*client* 
"ervke* cl 
S1 
I+ opi(pz=). rctum 
t to RefuseToAccess - operation op 1 st cl PermitAccess - service s1 to op 1 PennitAccess - userRole ul to op 
«usaRole» 
ul 
Figure 10.2. Access Control System Context 
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The system context for access control is shown in figure 10.2. Access control 
requirements are used when: 
" there is a navigable association between a service (sl) and another service (c]), which 
supports one or more operations; or 
" when a service (cl) is directly accessible to users. In SeDAn, a service that is directly 
accessible to users is stereotyped <<client». 
Definition 
Refuse to Access 
operation op] at cl Permit Access: client cl 
service sl 
services! too ration o 
-: *operation opI 
userRole ul 
je alto operation 
0P1 "' 
Peý"Rt 
a 
Figure 10.3. Access Control Information Model 
Access controls specify what direct information flow is possible between a subject (sl 
or ul) and a target operation. The absence of an access permission, or the presence of a 
denial, results in no information carriers between that service and the related operation, 
since any actual messages are ignored. 
Consequences 
Access controls constrain associations in the U ML system design, since navigable 
associations between services suggests that access is necessary for functional reasons. 
Although most security requirements are expressed in `deny' form, access controls are the 
exception, for two reasons: 
" it is established practice to specify access controls as `default deny'; and 
" it ensures that the security requirements for a system record the complete topology of 
the system that was present when it was analysed. 
However, it is sometimes more convenient for an analyst to consider only the exceptions 
to associations in the system design; this change of viewpoint is straightforward, and so 
some of the analysis reports in the Security Analysis Workbench include 'DenyAccess' 
requirements. These are not complete security requirements and therefore do not appear in 
the requirements catalogue; they specify exceptions to the access permissions implied by 
navigable associations in the UML model, for the convenience of analysis. 
It may be feasible to determine if access controls have been specified that hinder the 
functional performance of the system (see Liveness, section 12.3.3). However, if the 
associations in the system model have been derived by workflow modelling, for example 
using interaction diagrams to capture business processes, then a significant mismatch 
between the navigable associations between services, and system access permissions, may 
also indicate a liveness conflict between security and functionality. 
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10.2.1.2. Access Constraints - to Services (Deployment) 
Deployment constraints specify where services may be deployed, effectively providing 
access controls between a service and possible host organisations. 
Summary 
NoDeploy to «organisation» 
This security requirement specifies that the service in which the requirement is placed 
should not be deployed to a particular organisation. 
Context 
«clieat» 
cl 
tags 
NoDeploy - of 
«organisation» 
of 
«organisation» 
o2 
«usaRole» 
ul 
«usaRole» 
u2 
Figure 10.4. Deployment Constraint System Context 
The system context for deployment is shown in figure 10.4. The deployment constraint 
may name any organisation that is specified within the system model. 
Definition 
userRole ul 
(in organisation oI) 
client cl 
userRole u2 NoDeploy of 
Figure 10.5. Deployment Constraint Information Model 
A deployment constraint has consequences for both access control and risk analysis. 
The access control aspect is shown in figure 10.5; only user roles that are associated with an 
organisation to which a client can be deployed are allowed to access that client. This 
constraint also applies to the authentication of messages: a service may only authenticate 
messages from user roles associated with the organisations to which it may be deployed 
(see section 10.2.4.1, below). 
The risk analysis implication is that organisations have direct access to any system 
components which are deployable to that organisation; as a result, attacks from 
organisations may be via these components. The components associated with a service are 
any information carriers (messages, assets etc) that are directly accessible by the service; 
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this is known as a Deployment Group and is named after the associated service. 
Deployment groups were introduced in section 7.4.2, and are further described in section 
12.2.2. 
Consequences 
Deployment specifies the default accesses between users and clients, and may be further 
constrained by standard access controls. 
10.2.2. Classification 
Classification requirements specify that instances of classes in the system model are 
classified by ownership, for security purposes. There are two possible security 
requirements, that specify the ownership of assets and services respectively. 
10.2.2.1. Classification - of Assets 
Security goals often relate to ownership (e. g. users must access only their own accounts) 
and an essential precursor to implementing a goal this type is to identify the ownership of 
the assets in question. Classification of an asset by user role specifies that it is possible to 
distinguish between instances of an assetType that belong, in some sense, to different 
individuals. Classification by role can also support the separation of different organisations' 
assets, assuming that user roles are distinct between organisations. 
Summary 
DataSeparation of assetType 
This requirement specifies that a service will maintain the distinction between instances 
of an asset, on the basis of user role. 
Context 
<(service" auserRole» 
sl ul 
tags 
u l R DataSeparation = asset al e» 
user o 
u2 
manars» 
al «userRole» 
u3 
Figure 10.6. Data Separation System Context 
The system context for data separation is shown in figure 10.6. This requirement applies 
to assets that have a <<manages>> association from the service on which the requirement 
is placed. 
244 The SeDAn Requirements Catalogue 
Definition 
service sl 
Data Separation of asset al 
A A16 
81. U1 81. U2 Sl. u3 
Three vertices, one for each 
possible user role. 
Figure 10.7. Data Separation Information Model 
A data separation requirement classifies the instances of an asset type into subsets, one 
for each user role; the service is required to prevent direct information flow between these 
subsets. In the absence of other forms of classification, the asset is represented as one 
vertex per user, as shown in figure 10.7 
Consequences 
This requirement specifies that it is possible to determine the ownership of instances of 
an asset, and that that service will maintain that distinction. This is rarely enough on its 
own, since it does not require other aspects of the service (e. g. the handling of incoming 
messages) to maintain separation by role. Two other security requirements are often used in 
conjunction with this to support separation goals: message authentication and separation 
enforcement. 
10.2.2.2. Classification - of Services (Separate Deployment) 
The need to distinguish a service deployment pattern where a service may be deployed 
to several organisations, but each hosts only its own assets, was motivated by the taxonomy 
in section 10.1.2. 
Summary 
DeploySeparation 
This requirement specifies that a service will maintain the distinction between instances 
of all its information carriers (assets, messages etc) by organisation. 
The SeDAn Requirements Catalogue 245 
Context 
«client» 
cl 
«seR7ce» 
S1 
+ op I (p arm) : return 
tag 
DeploySepmration - true 
vmanages» 
I al 
aorpmisation» 
o2 
«userRole» 
u3 
Figure 10.8. Deploy Separation System Context 
The system context for deploy separation is shown in figure 10.8. Deploy separation 
may be specified at any service; it is effective only if there are several organisations in the 
system environment. 
Definition 
client cl 
service sl 
111 
111 
111 
ul cl. opl. i. u2 c1. op1. tu3 
cl. opl. r. ul cl. opl. r. 1 cl. o 
of service sl 
al. ul al. u2 
I' 
al. u3 
Service sl prevents direct information flow 
between roles from different organisations 
Figure 10.9. Deploy Separation Information Model 
Deploy separation identifies all the information carriers in the deployment group of a 
service by user role, then specifies that direct information flow within the service is 
permitted only between information carriers whose user roles are associated with the same 
organisation (i. e. information flow is not permitted between shaded and unshaded vertices 
in figure 10.9). 
In the example in figure 10.9, the access from client cl to operation opl results in six 
distinct types of information carrier (direction x user), and the asset is also classified into 
three instances, one for each role. It is not practical to illustrate the individual constrained 
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information paths in sl, because there are 16 separate constraints, representing the 
deployment of the service to two physically separate locations. 
Consequences 
The underlying asset classification is by user role, but deploy separation is a function of 
an organisation. In most cases, user roles are not shared between organisations, and this 
produces the same result as if the assets had been classified by organisation. However, if a 
user role is associated with two organisations, then this separation model reflects the 
underlying uncertainty by allowing assets with the common user role to exchange 
information with assets from both organisations. 
10.2.3. Service Constraints 
Security constraints on service behaviour amount to specifying that a service will 
uphold certain restrictions on information flow between its inputs and outputs, to protect a 
specified concern. 
The simplest type of constraint (ConstraintFlow) allows the specification of arbitrary 
policies whose meanings depend on the asset concern that they defend. Most requirements 
could be constructed from this basic constraint, but in practice this approach is not scalable, 
and does not communicate the protection intent well to system practitioners (see section 
7.5.3). Three constraint patterns are defined that specify more generic and meaningful 
requirement patterns; these constrain a service by operation (Stateless), asset (Type 
Restricted) or role (Enforce Separation). 
10.2.3.1. Service Constraints - Primitive (Constrain Information Flow) 
The ConstrainFlow requirement allows the specification of fine-grain constraints on 
service behaviour, it is needed to express exceptions and fine distinctions to service 
behaviour that are critical in security terms. In order to be meaningful to system 
practitioners, the constraint is expressed in terms of component names from the system 
design. 
(For an example of the distinction between referring to vertices in the information 
model, and names in the system model, contrast the vertices in figure 10.9 with the system 
in 10.8. ) 
Summary 
ConstrainFlow from source [and «userRole»J[at location] 
to destination [and «userRole»J[at location] 
for assetConcern 
This requirement specifies that information flow from source to destination is 
constrained in the way specified by the named asset concern. The "[]" brackets indicate that 
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optionally the source and destination may be qualified by user roles and location. If they are 
qualified by role the constraint applies only to assets or messages classified by that role. 
The source and the destination names are either: 
9 userRoles; 
" operations; or 
" asselTypes. 
The optional qualification by location is either local or remote, specifying that a named 
operation is either within the service to which the requirement applies, or at a remote 
service. This might seem superfluous, since all operations are modelled as distinct (see 
chapter 8), so it is possible to tell from context if an operation is within a service. However, 
it is possible for authenticated messages to flow via intermediaries back to the service from 
which they originated. Under some circumstances, therefore, it is necessary to specify that a 
service constrains information flow to one of its own operations, remotely. 
Context 
asavice» «s vices 
sl s2 
«userRole» 
«client» ul 
cl 
+ op l(param) : return 
aassdConcaI» 
tags scl 
ConstrainFlow - from op 1 to userul for concern acl 
vages» 
«savice» 
s3 
at 
+ op2(param) : return 
Figure 10.10. Constrain Flow System Context 
The system context for constrain flow is shown in figure 10.4. The source and 
destination names available to the ConstrainFlow requirement in cl are the local operations 
(opl ), local users (u]), accessible remote operations (op2), and local managed assets (a]). 
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Definition 
service sl service s2 IIýuserRoleul T 
sl. opl. i s2. opl. i I ul. opl. i 
sl. opls s2. opls ul. oplS 
------------------- 
Constrain 
client cl 
FTow op] to u'1`jor concern acl 
cl. op2. i 
asset al service s3 
Figure 10.11. Deployment Constraint Information Model 
The corresponding information model is shown in figure 10.11. ConstrainFlow 
prohibits information flow between all vertices that match the source and destination names, 
respectively. In this case the requirement specifies that the operation op] does not result in 
an information flow to user ul. There are two possible inputs that correspond to op], so 
paths from both of these to the user ul are constrained. Using a user role as a source or 
destination name implies an actual user, so this is valid only for a <<client>> service; this 
is different from the qualification of source or destination by role, which would distinguish 
between vertices that are classified by role, as shown in figure 10.9 
This requirement names a specific asset concern, so this constraint only applies to that 
concern. 
Consequences 
Although there is a limited amount of pattern matching implied by the names used in 
this requirement, in practice it is very fine-grain. As far as possible this requirement should 
be used to specify only critical exceptions to security policies; a large number of 
ConstrainFlow requirements are often better replaced by a constraint pattern. 
10.23.2. Service Constraints - pattern - by Operation (Stateless) 
The stateless pattern corresponds to a common implementation strategy in which 
instances of operations are isolated from each other. It is often used in data retrieval 
systems, where one instance of a query operation does not have a direct influence on the 
results returned from any other instance of the same operation. 
bk6 
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Summary 
Stateless operation 
This security requirement specifies that inputs to an instance of the named operation do 
not influence the results of any other operation instance. 
Context 
«usaRo1c» 
ul 
Figure 10.12. Stateless System Context 
The system context for stateless service constraints is shown in figure 10.12. The 
requirement can name any operation within the service in which it is placed. 
Definition 
service sl service s2 userRole ul 
sl. opl. i ]{I s2. opl. i I ul. opl. i 
sl. opl. r J s2. opl. r J ul. opl. r 
 "-----' ----- ---------- 
-``-==- = =:: ------------ 
cl Stateless on1 
Figure 10.13. Stateless Information Model 
Figure 10.13 shows the information model that corresponds to the system in figure 
10.12. There are three system elements that may invoke operation op], two services and a 
user, so the model is able to distinguish three different instances of the operation. The 
stateless constraint prohibits information flow between the input of the specified service 
(opl) and the output of any other operation within this service. There is no constraint on 
information flow between vertices that represent invoke and return messages of the same 
operation instance (for example, sl. opl. i to sl. opl. r is not constrained) 
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Consequences 
This pattern will often relate directly to infrastructure protection mechanisms; for 
example, some application servers and most operating systems are able to maintain 
protection boundaries between processes that are instances of the same application. 
Stateless is used to describe this type of isolation, but this should not be confused with not 
maintaining application state. This information model does not distinguish between 
messages sent at different times which, in all other security respects, are identical (e. g. the 
same source service authenticated in the same role, to the same remote operation), so it does 
not take a position on how application state is maintained. 
10.23.3. Service Constraints - pattern - by Asset (Type Restriction) 
Operations in the same service often use common data types within their signatures. 
This is particularly the case in services that manage file or data systems. For example, if a 
service provides access to a database of `customer' information, the customer type will be 
input to update operations, and result from search operations. If the customer asset is 
confidential, then it may be necessary to specify that information flow from the customer 
asset is allowed only to operations which explicitly use that type. 
Type restriction is a constraint pattern that matches an asset, or a component which 
includes a unique asset (e. g. an operation with a single parameter), and constraints the 
information flow from, or to, other assets of the same type. 
Summary 
TypeRestrictedFlow of name for «assetConcern» 
This security requirement specifies that information flow either to or from the name 
component is constrained by the service in which the requirement is placed. The name 
component is either. 
" an assetType with a <<manages>> relation to the service; or 
" an operation with a unique identifiable type in the direction of the constraint; for 
example, if the constraint is away from the named operation, it has a single input 
parameter. 
In common with the ConstrainFlow requirement, the meaning of this constraint pattern 
is dependent on the associated asset concern. The direction parameter in the asset concern 
specifies if information toward, or from, the asset is constrained, as described below. 
IL 
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Context 
1 «service» 
sl 
«servic e» 
s2 
+ op l(al) : String 
+ op2(int): al 
tags 
TypeRestrictedFlow = type al for concern acl 
<ananages» 
((Service/ 
s3 
al 
+ op3(boolean, &I): void 
«assetConcan» 
acl 
tagt' 
direction (toward, from) see text 
Figure 10.14. Type Restricted Constraint System Context 
The system context for type restriction is shown in figure 10.14, the type restriction 
must name an asset type or an operation with an identifiable asset type (see summary) 
within the scope of the service. In the case of service s2, asset type al appears as a managed 
asset, as a parameter and return value in local operations (op], opt) and in the parameter list 
of a remote operation to which the service has access (op3). The direction tag in the asset 
concern determines the pattern of constraints that are applied, both possibilities are 
described below. 
Definition 
service sl 
I s1. opl i_ sl. opi sl. op2. i sl. oplr, 
service s2 
"-----. 
; 'Type Restricted.... 
rFl.. 
ow. ". 
= 
toward al 
t for concern ac] 
X 
s2. op3. i s2. op3. r 
: 'asset ai'r` service s3 
Figure 10.15. Restricted Flow Toward Type, Information Model 
Figure 10.15 shows how a type restriction toward an asset is interpreted; the shaded 
vertices are those that match the type in the requirement. 
The aim of restricting information flow toward a type is to manage how it is modified; 
this may be an integrity requirement to prevent inappropriate modification, or a more subtle 
intent, such as denial of service. This type restriction requires that the only information flow 
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to the named component (asset al) is from components with a matching type. It is specified 
in the form of a constraint: this requirement prohibits information flow from information 
carriers not derived from al, to the named asset. 
Figure 10.16 shows the case of a type restriction from the named component. This, for 
example, is concerned to protect the confidentiality of al. In this case the only possible 
information flow from al to an information carrier not including type al, is to sl. opl. r. 
Service sl 
TT 
SI. Opý T si. op2.1 sl. op2. i' 
II Service s2 Type Restricted Flow from al 
II 
- for concern acl 
s2. op3. i I s2. op3s 
al -', Service s3 
Figure 10.16. Restricted Flow From Type, Information Model 
A minor complication is that some information carriers are derived from mixed types. 
(Recall from chapter 9 that multiple data types in a single message are regarded as a single 
information carrier. ) s2. op3. i is an example of such a case. In this case the intent is 
uncertain, so there are no constraints to or from such vertexes, allowing the analyst to fine- 
tune any constraints that are required using ConstrainFlow. 
This pattern also retains information flow between an instance of an operation and its 
own return message. For example, if sl. opl. i had been named as the object of protection, 
information flow to sl. opl. r would be permitted, despite that fact that it is otherwise 
forbidden by the type matching. 
Consequences 
The definition of this constraint is conservative, since it does not constrain the two 
uncertain cases: operation signatures with mixed types and information flow to the return of 
the same operation instance. Both these can be constrained using ConstrainFlow 
requirements, if required. 
The semantics of this constraint pattern (i. e. exactly what kind of information flow 
restriction is required) must be clarified by the concern, to ensure that an implementer 
understands the intent of the requirement. 
This pattern is a powerful general way of specifying a local protection objective (e. g. 
`this operation output must be integrity protected'); whereas ConstrainFlow is focussed on 
behaviour, a type restriction is focussed on an asset associated with a service. 
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An alternative way of viewing a type restriction is as a specification for how operations 
in an implementation are connected, thus interpreting information flow as a wiring diagram 
between operations within the scope of the service. 
The type restriction therefore has a broader application than implied by the data and file- 
handling example quoted above, it is a powerful pattern for capturing local protection 
objectives, but it is critical that the related asset concern conveys the intent of the 
protection. 
10.2.3.4. Service Constraints - pattern -by Role (Enforce Separation) 
Assets can be classified by user role, but this not usually sufficient to meet a separation 
goal. If, for example, the asset was the user space in a file system, the system would provide 
operations to read and write from that space, and these operations must connect users' 
actions to the correct asset instances. In general, security goals often result in the need for 
separate role-defined information spaces. The enforce separation constraint is a building 
block for specifying such goals; it constrains information flow between two named 
elements of the system according to their role. 
Summary 
Enforce Separation from source to destination 
This security requirement specifies that any information flow from the source to the 
destination name is separated by role. The source and destination names reference managed 
assets or operations, either in the service in which the requirement is placed, or in a remote 
service. They may not reference user roles. 
Context 
«client» «uscRole» 
cl ul 
+ op 1(param) : return 
tags erRolc* Dataseparation - al 
Enforcesep aration = from op I to el 
<ananages» 
sl 
Figure 10.17. Enforce Separati on System Context 
The system context for enforce separation is shown in figure 10.4. The source (opl) and 
destination (al) must both be classified by role. In this case the source is classified as a 
result of being a user accessible operation, and a DataSeparation requirement specifies that 
instances of al are classified by ownership. 
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Definition 
Note: Classification of al 
by role also prevents direct 
flows between these vertices. 
See Classification ofAssets, 
section 102.2.1. 
Figure 10.18. Enforce Separation Information Model 
Figure 10.18 shows the information constraints that result from an EnforceSeparation 
requirement, resulting in information flow that is maintained in role-specified channels. 
Different instances of opl are identified for different users, so the input to operations that 
are user-accessible can be distinguished by role. The constraint specifies what information 
flow is forbidden: the source input of a given role to the destination output in any other role. 
Consequences 
This requirement is effective only if the source and destination are classified by role. 
The context above shows two ways in which that is achieved: by a DataSeparation 
requirement or by referencing an operation that is directly accessed by a user. The third 
option is to ensure that the message invoking an operation from a remote service is 
authenticated by user role. This requires a message authentication claim/require pair, as 
described below. 
10.2.4. Message Requirements 
Access controls specify the connectivity of the system at a basic level, and are closely 
related to the UML system design; message requirements, or message policies as they are 
known in web-services literature, place constraints on the content of messages carried by 
the communications infrastructure. These constraints are used to establish end-to-end 
security properties, which are free from the interference of intermediate components. They 
were described in section 5.1.6, and their application is discussed in section 5.2. There are 
essentially two types of requirement: authentication, which establishes both the integrity of 
a data item and its originator, and confidentiality. Message requirements occur in pairs, 
since they are needed at both ends of an end-to-end communication. 
bkký 
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10.2.4.1. Message Requirements - Integrity (Authentication) 
Message authentication enables a claim, which is simply an arbitrary data item, to be 
authenticated by a user or a service, and reliably interpreted by a destination service. The 
effect at the destination is to introduce a layer of access control between the point-to-point, 
or direct, access and the application, since only appropriately authenticated data is able to 
access the service. 
The pair of requirements that support message authentication are the claim assertion at 
the sending end, and the receiving end requirement that specifies what claims are 
acceptable. 
Summary 
ClaimAuthentication 
«assetType» sent from localSource to localDestination 
is authenticated by signatureType 
RequireAuthentication 
«assetType» received from localSource to localDestination 
requires signature 
Message policies protect assets that are sent within messages to remote operations or 
services. The standard component in all the message policies is a specification of which 
point-to-point communication is used to send or receive the message (localSource to 
localDestination), and the «assetType» that is protected. 
The ClaimAuthentication requirement also specifies a signatureType, which is either 
`service' or `role at service'. The first specifies that the data is authenticated by the service, 
the second by a combination of the user role and the service. The RequireAuthentication 
specifies the required source of authentication; this is the name of a particular 
<<service», or a particular «userRole». 
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Context 
«se vice» 
sl 
tags 
ClaimAutbentication = of type al in message to opl by userRole 
«swice» 
s2 
+ op1(al): String 
«service» 
s3 
+ op2(al) : void 
tags 
RequireAuthentication - data received from s2 for opt requires role ul 
«osaRo1e» 
ul 
«use Role» 
u2 
Figure 10.19. Message Authentication System Context 
A typical system context for message authentication is shown in figure 10.19. The 
sending and receiving services may communicate directly, but more generally there are 
interposing services, such as s2. The authentication claim in sl specifies the path on which 
the message is sent (sl to opl ), the asset type that is protected (al) and how the message is 
authenticated (by user at service). The receiving service (s3) specifies an authentication 
requirement for messages received from service s2, for operation opt, with message type 
al. The requirement also specifies that a signature is required from user role ul. 
Definition 
service sl 
Authentication of type al in message to op] 
by userRole 
s1. op13' sl. opla virtual vertex 
arising from the 
service s2 
pair of requirements 
s1. op2. u1 sl. op2. u2 
inte ry 
s2 op2ä s2 op2 r . . . vertex 
s3 accepts only ul 
Require Authentication of data received from 
s2 for operation opt, requires userRole ul 
service s3 
Figure 10.20. Message Authentication Information Model 
The information flow model that corresponds to this system is shown in figure 10.20, 
the shaded information carriers are those that match the specified asset type. 
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On its own, the authentication claim at service sl has no effect; since the information 
available to s2 is unchanged. 
On its own, the RequireAuthentication specification in service s3 constrains the 
incoming vertex by Integrity (see chapter 9); as a result only traffic flow is received from 
this vertex: messages may be received, but their content cannot be modulated from the 
perspective of s3. This incoming constraint applies only if the named asset type is the sole 
content of the message; if there are other elements in the message signature then 
information flow is carried via these, so the vertex type is unchanged. 
A pair of matching policies (same data type and acceptable signature) result in the 
creation of a new end-to-end path, represented by the vertices sl. op2. u1 and sl. op2. u2. 
Because the requirement in s3 specifies that inputs from only ul are acceptable, paths from 
other user roles on the same end-to-end communication are blocked. 
Vertices that are classified by role (as here) are only generated if the authentication 
service specifies that the claim is authenticated by role, otherwise they are not 
distinguished. Furthermore, role classified vertices are only generated for roles that the 
authenticating service can legitimately assert, which are the roles associated with 
organisations to which it may be deployed. In other words, a service is unable to sign for an 
organisation to which it is not deployed. 
End-to-end paths are possible between all matching pairs of policies, in this case 
wherever a valid user signature is generated and the asset types of the policies match. 
These requirements are additive in information terms: specifying that a message is 
authenticated from two sources results in information paths from both. 
Consequences 
The message requirement can specify either a user role or a service as the required 
authenticator, but some systems need both. It is possible to specify these more complex 
policies by authenticating the claim with `role at service', specifying the source service in 
the message requirement, and placing further constraints by role using ConstrainFlow. 
Since these requirements specify the interface over which messages are sent or received, 
different local communication paths can be given different policies; for example, if two 
different remote services use the same operation, one could be allowed unrestricted access, 
whereas the other could be required to authenticate. 
Point-to-point communications that support an end-to-end message path may also 
include data types that are not part of the end-to-end communication. Any security 
requirements that constrain the direct messages (e. g. sl. opl. i) also constrain the related 
virtual information path (e. g. sl. op2. u1), because the virtual path is contained within the 
actual messages. The user therefore has the option to place security requirements on either 
the authenticated (end-to-end) message, or the direct message, or both. However, if a 
constraint is placed on the actual message it also constrains the authenticated message. 
258 The SeDAn Requirements Catalogue . '° 
10.2.4.2. Message Requirements - Confidentiality 
Message confidentiality protects the confidentiality of a data item while it is in transit to 
a remote service. The two components of message confidentiality are the protection of the 
message at the sending end, and setting a requirement at the receiving end that specifies that 
confidentiality is required. 
Summary 
AssertConfidential ity 
«assetType>> sent from localSource to localDestination 
is confidential to <<service>> 
RequireConfidentiality: 
for «assetType» received from localSource to localDestination 
The structure of these requirements is identical to those for authentication, they include 
a specification of which direct (point-to-point) communication is used (localSource to 
localDestination), and the «assetType» that is protected. The AssertConfidentiality 
requirement also specifies the destination service for which the confidential message is 
intended. 
Context 
4(savice» 
$1 
tags 
AssertConfidentiality - of type a1 in message to op 1 for service s3 
«s irice» 
a2 
+ op I (a' String 
«s Ace* 
a3 
+ op2(al) : void 
tags 
RequireConfidentiality = for type al received from service s2 for operation opt 
Figure 10.21. Message Confidentiality System Context 
A typical system context for message confidentiality is shown in figure 10.21. The 
arrangement is similar to the end-to-end context described for message authentication. The 
confidentiality assertion in sl specifies the path on which the message is sent (sl to opl), 
the asset type that is protected (al) and the destination service (s3). The receiving service 
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(s3) specifies a confidentiality requirement for messages received from service s2, for 
operation opt, with message type al. 
Definition 
service sl 
Confidentiality of type al in message to op] 
endpoint destination service s3 
Confidenti2dityw 
sl. opla vertex sl, oplä 
Virtual Vertex 
t Service s2 s l. op2 . Wising from m the 
Integrity 
pair of requirements 
Vertex 
Require Confidentiality of type al received frone 
service s2 for operation opt 
service s3 
Figure 10.22. Message Confidentiality Information Model 
The information flow model that corresponds to this system is shown in figure 10.22, 
the shaded information carriers are those that match the specified asset type. 
On its own, the confidentiality assertion has the effect of constraining the outgoing 
vertex to Confidentiality, this results in only traffic flow to the vertex, and transitively to the 
rest of the system. This applies only if the named asset type is the sole content of the 
message; if there are other types in the message then information is carried via these and the 
vertex is unchanged. 
On its own, the RequireConfidentiality specification has the same effect on the 
incoming vertex as requireAuthentication: it is constrained by Integrity. As a result only 
traffic flow is received from this vertex: messages may be received, but their content cannot 
be modulated from the perspective of s3. Again, this applies only if the named asset type is 
the sole message content. 
A pair of matching requirements (same data type and confidential to the correct 
destination) result in the creation of a new end-to-end path, represented by the vertex 
sl. op2. End-to-end paths of this type are created for all matching pairs of policies, in this 
case for every service that asserts a matching data type as confidential for s3. In the same 
way as authentication policies, these requirements are additive in information terms: if two 
sources make assets confidential to the same destination, information paths are created from 
both sources. 
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Consequences 
Message confidentiality requirements specify the direct, or point-to-point, path over 
which messages are sent or received, so different local paths can be given different 
requirements. 
Despite their similar configuration, authentication and confidentiality message 
requirements are different, and can be used meaningfully in combination. Consider the 
confidentiality example above: s2 could also assert the confidentiality of messages for s3, 
and these would meet the confidentiality requirement of s3 as well as the messages from sl. 
If s3 needs to ensure that the message originated from sl it must specify that as an 
authentication requirement. 
When confidentiality and integrity requirements constrain the same message flow, they 
are interpreted as if confidentiality was applied last, before a message is sent, and removed 
first as the message is received. 
Finally, security requirements are described as constraints, but this is true only if 
message requirements are considered in pairs. The requirement at the receiving end of a 
confidential message flow allows access to the confidential data, so taken on its own this 
increases the behaviour in the system rather than constraining it. In other words, the system 
would be more constrained if data was encrypted and never decrypted. The practical 
consequence of this is that message policies added during risk management add behaviour 
to the system, and may inadvertently add threat paths. 
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10.3. Summary 
Many different security requirements are described in the preceding chapters, ranging 
from user access controls to information constraints on the behaviour of services. This 
chapter consolidates these requirements into a single coherent catalogue, resulting in a 
unique perspective on what constitutes a security requirement, as well as providing a 
specification for each type of requirement. 
The chapter begins by reviewing the various types of security requirement, and 
consolidating the resulting classification in a requirements taxonomy. The root distinction 
in the taxonomy is between requirements that are expressed directly in terms of a system 
model, such as access control, and the deferred requirements described in chapter 9, that are 
modelled in information terms, but can be interpreted only in the light of a subsequent 
implementation. (10.1) 
SeDAn supports at least one security requirement for each category in the taxonomy, 
using the simplest specification for each that is useful in practice. The requirements are 
defined in a catalogue (10.2) in which each is set in its system context, and defined with 
reference to its effect on information flow. 
This chapter specifies the SeDAn security requirements, but does not show how they are 
used in practice. This is the subject of the next chapter, which progressively develops a 
more complex system scenario than has been considered previously. This illustrates how the 
requirements are used, and also serves as the focus for the following chapter on risk 
analysis. 
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Chapter 11. Solving Problems with Security 
Requirements 
The previous chapter catalogued and specified the SeDAn security requirements. The 
catalogue aims to accommodate the widest possible set of systems and security goals, 
although the trade-off between breadth and detail may not allow fine-tuning of security 
requirements in some circumstances. 
The objective of this chapter is to show how these requirements can be used in practice. 
The chapter presents a series of scenarios that grow in complexity as more requirements are 
demonstrated. The final system shows the use of message-based security to protect a system 
that communicates via an untrusted and potentially malicious sub-system, and this is 
sufficiently complex to highlight issues of organisation and management in design analysis, 
which are discussed further in chapter 12. 
As far as possible the requirements are presented in the same order as the previous 
chapter, working from access control to messaging. The same security environment is used 
in each example, and this is presented first in section 11.1. 
In detail, this chapter is organised as follows: 
9 section 11.1 describes a security environment which is used for all the system scenarios 
in this chapter, 
" section 11.2 describes a system scenario which requires point-to-point access control 
constraints; 
" section 11.3 shows how two similar sub-systems with different deployment profiles 
need to use different classification constraints to separate their users' data; 
" section 11.4 uses a variant of the system from section 11.2 to show how, as the number 
and type of operations in a service grow, it is necessary to constrain service behaviour 
as well as manage access to individual operations; 
" section 11.5 presents a further elaboration of the scenario from section 11.2. In this 
example the system communicates through untrusted and potentially malicious services. 
This introduces security problems that can only be resolved using message-based 
security requirements, and is sufficiently complex to introduce problems of analysis 
management; and 
" section 11.6 summarises the chapter. 
Supplementary material can be found in chapter 10, which specifies the security 
requirements. Further analysis of the fmal example in this chapter (11.5) is given in chapter 
12, which describes risk analysis. The tool-generated traces used to document threat paths 
were introduced in section 7.5.1. 
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Note 
Access controls can be formulated as either permissions, or exceptions to the UML 
design (see section 10.2.1); in the analysis process the latter is more convenient, whereas in 
the UML design the access controls are recorded as permissions. Both forms are used in this 
section in the appropriate context. 
11.1. The Security Environment Scenario 
The examples in this chapter use the security environment in figure 11.1. 
«usaRo1c» uusaRold «us Rolaº 
Attadca User Manapr 
«usaAttacIo 
-organisation» «orpnisation» NamelistT6eft 
OthaOrg HomeOrg 
tag 
frequaxy -1 
«adminAttack» 
RemoveData 
II 
«secuntyGoal» «sxurityGoal» 
«userAttacbº BusmessIntegrity BuB Confidentiality 
FakeData tags 
frequency 
tags tags 
tam impact =1 impact =1 
frequency -2 
«e)demalAttack* 
Hack 
ItassetConcc * ltassetConccn» 
tags Datalntegity DataConSdentiality 
frequency =3 
tags tags 
assetType-managx assetType- manag 
dhwion - toward direction - from 
flowType = data flowType = data 
impf=1 impaact=1 
Figure 11.1. Security Environment for Worked Examples 
This environment specifies two organisations, HomeOrg and OtherOrg, who share a 
single security goal, Businesslntegrity, with a related asset concern, Datalntegrity. The 
HomeOrg organisation has a second goal, BulkConfidentiality, which has a related asset 
concern, DataConfidentiality. Most of the examples below use just the integrity concern, 
but the messaging example uses both. Both concerns apply to managed data only, and 
exclude traffic analysis by specifying data-only paths. The direction of the confidentiality 
concern is away from the asset, and the integrity concern is toward the asset. The HomeOrg 
organisation has two users, Manager and User, and OtherOrg has a single user, Attacker. 
Solving Problems with Security Requirements 265 
Both organisations may attack the Businesslntegrity goal via the RemoveData attack; 
however, both organisations also own the goal of this attack. This is interpreted by 
assuming that organisations do not attack their own data (see section 12.2.1.3), so the threat 
paths evaluated in this environment are from HomeOrg's assets to OtherOrg as an attacker, 
and vice-versa. 
Two of the users, Attacker and User, may also attack the integrity goal via the FakeData 
attack, and there is a possible external attack, Hack. The external attack does not feature in 
this chapter, but is used in chapter 12, which revisits the final example (11.5) to describe 
further types of analysis. The impact and frequency metrics given in this environment are 
not significant in the examples that follow. 
11.2. Access Constraints 
Figure 11.2 presents a system scenario that requires basic (point-to-point) access 
controls. 
«client» 
Guest 
+ refresh(String) : String 
«service» 
FreeSoftware 
+ getSoftware(Strmg) Dodgy Software 
«manages» 
DodpSoftware 
«client» 
Home 
+ refresh(String) : String 
«service» 
OfficeServer 
+ updateData(BusinessData) : boolean 
«managte» 
BusinessData 
F 
aassetConcem» 
vvonment:: Datalntegrity En 
Figure 11.2. Access Control System Scenario 
In this system the HomeOrg organisation has a BusinessData database, managed by the 
OfficeServer service; a client (Home) provides facilities to manage the business data. An 
external system is represented by a FreeSoftware service, which has access to 
DodgySoftware16. The external environment also supports user interfaces via the Guest 
client. 
16 This example is not intended to imply that free (as in speech) software is in any way dodgy; the risk-aware will 
already be cautious about anything that is free (as in beer). 
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This system allows external users to access the office system, and vice-versa, perhaps 
because there are other systems sharing the infrastructure on which this will be 
implemented. The only asset concern is for the integrity of the BusinessData asset. 
The threats present in this system are therefore: 
" from OtherOrg to BusinessData; 
" from Guest to BusinessData; and 
" from User to Business Data. 
The first two are threats from outside the HomeOrg organisation; the last is from an - 
internal user. 
The access controls needed to protect this system are straightforward, and they 
demonstrate each type of access requirement. Taking each threat in turn: 
OtherOrg to BusinessData. There are two types of threat path from OtherOrg to 
Business Data-, the first is direct deployment and the second is via the access from Home to 
FreeSoftware. An organisation to which a system is deployed has direct access to the assets 
of the system, and even simple systems such as this can be (inappropriately) outsourced. 
Deployment constraints are needed to specify that Home and OfficeServer is not deployable 
to OtherOrg. 
The other threat is that the Home client uses the FreeSoftware service, perhaps to obtain 
DodgySoftware. This would potentially allow imported software to have access to 
BusinessData via the OfficeServer, allowing the OtherOrg to attack the integrity of the data 
by distributing malicious software. An access constraint is therefore needed between Home 
and FreeSoftware, but this control is unlikely to be enforced by FreeSoftware, so the 
requirement is located at the Home end of the potential access: a RefuseToAccess 
requirement. 
Guest to BusinessData, and User to BusinessData. Some of the users with access to 
the system are potential attackers, either directly or via an external client. Security 
requirements are needed to prevent access from the Guest client to the OfficeServer, and the 
User role to the Home client. 
In this example, these controls result in the associations between Home and 
FreeSoftware, and Guest and OfficeServer having no valid accesses, despite that they are 
navigable associations between services. In a real system this might indicate a liveness 
conflict between security and functionality. 
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The requirements specification for this system is: 
No Requirements set at FreeSoftware 
No Requirements set at Guest 
Requirements at Home 
Deny Access (User »> Home. update) 
NoDeploy to OtherOrg 
RefuseToAccess, operation=FreeSoftware. donateSoftware 
Requirements at OfficeServer 
Deny Access (Guest »> OfficeServer. updateData) 
NoDeploy to OtherOrg 
As noted in the introduction, the DenyAccess form of access control is used in analysis 
reports, because it is more succinct to specify the exceptions to the UML model. 
11.3. Classification Problems 
Figure 11.3 shows two similar sub-systems, both of which are clients with a managed 
asset, and both assets have the same integrity concern. There is no connection between 
these sub-systems, but different operational needs place different security requirements on 
their use. 
«client» «client» 
AnyOrgSe vice ORceServa 
+ update(AnyOrgData) : boolean I+ updateData(HomeOrgData) : boolean 
manages* amen s» 
AnyOrgData HomeOrgData 
aassetConcan» 
Envimnment:: DataIntegrity 
Figure 11.3. Classification System Scenario 
The objective of each sub-system is similar: their assets are data with multiple owners 
who need to manage (update, in this example) their own data. The difference is that the 
owners of instances of the AnyOrgData asset are organisations, while the owners of 
instances of HomeOrgData are users in the HomeOrg organisation. The two halves of the 
system are considered separately. 
The AnyOrg system. There are two organisations in the security environment, and they 
both potentially attack the other's Businesslntegrity. There is therefore no possibility of a 
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solution that results in one organisation's data being deployed to the other. Complete 
instances of the sub-system - both service and related data - must be deployed 
independently to each organisation. This is specified by a DeploySeparation requirement on 
AnyOrgService. The effect of this requirement is to specify that the service and any directly 
related information, which includes the AnyOrgData, is classified by role and separated by 
organisation. 
A threat path analysis at this stage reveals that this requirement is not quite sufficient on 
its own: 
User Path Analysis requested 
Concern : Datalntegrity Searching from: Manager' Path length=1 ; risk=3: 
.. Operation............ AnyOrgService. update(in) in role: 
User called from: User 
.. Managed Data.... AnyOrgService/AnyOrgData 
in role: Manager 
The User role is able to attack Manager data (i. e. instances of the HomeOrg asset that 
are owned by the Manager). This is because the security environment specifies that the 
User role is a possible attacker of this integrity goal, and while DeploySeparation maintains 
separation between organisations, it says nothing about users of the same organisation. It is 
necessary to add an access control to deny access to the User role. 
The HomeOrg system. The intention is to store data for HomeOrg users, so since the 
AnyOrg organisation is a potential attacker, a deployment constraint is required to prevent 
deployment of the service to this organisation, as in the access control example. 
Since legitimate users are also potential attackers it is necessary to ensure that users are 
only able to access their own instances of the asset, and this requires the separation of the 
whole path from users to the asset. This has two aspects: 
" instances of the asset must be identified with particular users; and 
" the chain of operations between the users and the asset must respect the separation. 
The first requirement is specified by a DataSeparation requirement for the 
HomeOrgData asset. The second uses an EnforceSeparation requirement to constrain 
access from the updateData operation to the HomeOrgData asset. 
In summary, the requirements specification for this complete system is: 
Requirements at AnyOrgService 
Deny Access (User »> AnyOrgService. update) 
Deployment Separation 
Requirements at OfficeServer 
NoDeploy to OtherOrg 
DataSeparation assetType: HomeOrgData 
EnforceSeparation (OfficeServer. updateData »> HomeOrgData) 
Ibl. 
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The deployment assumptions are clearly specified in these requirements, as is the nature 
of the two different types of separation. In most real systems, separation of the path between 
the user and data also needs to use message authentication to identify the ownership of 
messages sent between services. 
11.4. Managing Service Behaviour 
To limit the example in section 11.2 to access control, only single operations were 
included in each service; if there are several operations in each service then it is often 
necessary to constrain the service behaviour, as well as the access. The system in figure 
11.4 is part of the same access control example system, but with an extra operation in the 
OfficeServer, to show how this introduces the need for service-based constraints. 
«client» 
Guest 
«client» 
Home 
+ refresh(String) : String II+ refresh(String) : String 
tags tag; 
PamitAccess - ALL USERS, ALL OPERATIONS PermitAccess - Manger ALL OPERATIONS 
«Service» 
Oficeserver 
+ updateData(BusinessData) : boolcan 
+ select(mt) : Bus messData 
tags 
PermitAccess - Guest, OfTiceScrva. sclcct 
PamitAccess - Home, ALL OPERATION 
«assetConcem» 
Environmwt: Datalntegity <anazragtx» 
tags BusinessData 
assetType - managed 
direction d toward 
flowType = data 
impact -I 
Figure 11.4. Service Behaviour System Scenario 
The difference between the OfficeServer in this example, and that in figure 11.2, is the 
selectO operation, which is used to query the BusinessData asset. The system design is 
shown complete with access controls. These do not need further discussion, except to note 
that, unlike the access control example, there is a possible access from the Guest client to 
OfficeServer, since the new selectO operation is intended for public use. This is the source 
of the problem; because the Guest client has legitimate access to selectO, and selectO has 
access to BusinessData it is not possible to protect the threat path from Guest to 
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BusinessData by access control. The behaviour of the service itself must be constrained in 
some way". 
This example does not consider organisational attacks, since they need the same 
deployment constraints as were shown in the previous example. 
The simplest threat path in this system is between a user of the Guest client, via the 
select0 operation to the BusinessData: 
Concern : Dataintegrity Searching from: Manager "'" Path length=2 ; risk=3: 
.. Operation............ Guest. refresh(in) 
in role: User called from: User 
.. Operation............ OfficeServer. select(in) called 
from: Guest 
.. Managed Data.... OfficeServerlBusinessData 
This is because there is nothing to specify that the select operation is intended to retrieve 
BusinessData, not update it. A ConstrainFlow requirement is therefore needed to specify 
that select() protects the specified concern: the integrity of BusinessData 
Stateless 
Although this is the direct route of attack, there still remain indirect paths available to 
the attacker, for example: 
User Path Analysis requested 
Concern : Datalntegrity Searching from: Manager *** Path length=4 ; risk=3: 
.. Operation............ Guest. refresh(in) in role: Attacker called from: 
Attacker 
.. Operation............ OfficeServer. select(in) called from: Guest 
.. Operation............ OfficeServer. select(retum) called from: Home 
.. Operation............ OfficeServer. updateData(in) called from: 
Home 
.. Managed Data.... OfficeServer/BusinessData 
In this path the Attacker legitimately invokes select() via the Guest client. The problem 
is that this input modifies a result returned to the Home client (arrowed), which is then used 
as part of a legitimate update of BusinessData. These long paths were discussed in section 
7.5.2, and cannot be immediately discounted. A similar indirect path is described in the 
access control example, where a legitimate user imports suspect data (DodgySoftware) 
which influences a subsequent BusinessData update. 
In this case, the result returned from a select operation is a BusinessData type, if an 
attacker found a way of misusing the select() operation to return a corrupt BusinessData 
instance to the Home client, the client may inadvertently use that instance in a subsequent 
update. For example, cross-site scripting attacks use a range of mechanisms to persuade 
legitimate users to use prepared data. 
17 In this case the required service constraint may be as simple as an operating system protection policy that prevents 
write access to BusinessData; however, the required constraint is often more complex and can only be guaranteed 
within the application. 
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A similar but less likely path of attack uses a return from the update() operation in place 
of the select() operation. It is possible to use ConstrainFlow to specify that the service 
should not have this behaviour, but the problem with this approach is that the numbers of 
constraints grow rapidly with increasing numbers of operations in a service. This is a 
significant practical difficulty, less because of the number of requirements that are needed 
(access controls also result in many requirements), but because the implementation 
objective may be lost in the detail. 
A better solution to individual ConstrainFlow requirements is to use a Stateless 
constraint pattern, which specifies that an operation shall not inadvertently influence the 
results of other operations, or other instances of the same operation. 
The requirements specification for this system is: 
No Requirements set at Guest 
Requirements at Home 
Deny Access (Attacker »> Home. refresh) 
Deny Access (User »> Home. refresh) 
Requirements at OfficeServer 
Deny Access (Guest »> OfficeServer. updateData) 
ConstrainFlow for Datalntegrity (OfficeServer. select »> BusinessData) 
Stateless operation: OfficeServer. select 
The DenyAccess rules reported here are equivalent to the PermitAccess requirements in 
figure 11.4. 
Type Restricted Flow 
This example could have made use of the TypeRestrictedFlow requirement, in place of 
ConstrainFlow, but the need for this approach is more obvious as the number of services in 
OfficeServer increase. Figure 11.5 shows a similar system with four operations in 
OfficeServer. 
The previous analysis resulted in two constraints on the behaviour of the OfficeServer: 
the ConstraintFlow and Stateless requirements, the new operations introduce threats similar 
to those that resulted in these requirements. 
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Kclient* 
Guest 
+ refresb(Strmg) : String 
tags 
ParnitAoass - AIL USERS, AIL OPERATIONS 
aassetConarn» 
Envffonment: DataIntegity 
*client* 
Home 
+ refresh(String) : String 
tags IPamitAccess 
-M anag=, ALL OPERATIONS 
4(Servioo» 
OfficcSaver 
+ up dateData(BusmessData) : boolean 
+ search(String : BusinessData 
+ count(String) : mt 
+ select(mt) : BusinessData 
tags 
PamitAcass - Guest, OffiaServasearcb 
PamitAccess - Guest, OfficcS 'vaselect 
PamitAccess - HomekM OPERATION' 
tags 
assetType= manadd 
direction - toward 
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Figure 11.5. Extended Service Behaviour System Scenario 
The new search() operation is accessible to the Guest client, resulting in same two 
threats outlined above: that it could directly modify the BusinessData asset, or that it could 
inject information into the OfficeServer that subsequently modifies the asset. A Stateless 
requirement was used to defend against the latter, indirect, attack, and the new searchO 
operation must be Stateless for the same reason. 
The direct attack (from Guest via search() to Business Data) could be defended by 
another ConstraintFlow in exactly the same way as selectO. However, a more succinct 
approach is to use a constraint pattern that matches the asset types in the service; a Type 
Restriction towards a particular named component prohibits information flow to that 
component, except from components of the same type. This constraint would therefore 
allow only updateDataO to modify BusinessData. 
The requirements specification for this extended system is: 
No Requirements set at Guest 
Requirements at Home 
Deny Access (Attacker »> Home. refresh) 
Deny Access (User »> Home. refresh) 
Requirements at OfficeServer 
Deny Access (Guest »> OfficeServer. count) 
Deny Access (Guest »> OfficeServer. updateData) 
TypeRestrictedFlow for Dataintegrity, dataType=BusinessData 
Stateless operation: OfficeServer. search 
Stateless operation: OfficeServer. select 
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Summary 
There are circumstances where it is impossible to protect a threat path by access 
controls, and instead constraints are required on the behaviour of services. A common 
practical example of this problem is found in publicly accessible database queries (i. e. most 
active web pages). It is well understood that the types of queries passed through such 
systems must be filtered by the interface or database application, to prevent `scripting' 
attacks, where an attacker passes an arbitrary, but malicious query directly to the database. 
The use of constraint patterns allows the side-constraints on services to be fully 
specified, while managing the growth in the number of security requirements that are 
needed; the TypeRestrictedFlow requirement in this strategy deals with the new threat and 
also incorporates the original ConstrainFlow requirement. 
In this example the use of TypeRestrictedFlow is helpful but not critical. However, 
systems of this sort often need to preserve confidentiality or integrity across a wider range 
of service operations; type matching is one way of preventing a combinatorial increase in 
the number of security requirements needed, and perhaps more importantly providing a 
coherent implementation requirement. 
Two of the three constraint patterns are used in this example (Stateless and 
TypeRestrictedFlow), the other is EnforceSeparation, which is used in section 11.3. 
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. 
11.5. End-to-End Security: Embedded Untrusted Services 
The final example in this chapter sets a more complex security problem, and one that 
can be resolved only by using end-to-end security requirements. The significant change to 
the previous examples is that user access to the OfficerServer is remote, and the path of 
access is via an intermediary that is suspect in security terms: the FreeSoftwore service 
from section 11.2. The system design is shown in figure 11.6. 
Destination 
KcUcnt» «cli®t» 
Guest Home 
+ refresh(String) : String + updateBusinessData(BusinessData) : String 
+ updatePresentation(BusinessData) : void 
+ searchData(String) : void 
+ rcfreshO : BusinessData 
asavicaº *Service* 
FreeSoßware OfficeSava 
+ gtSoftware(String) : Dodgy Software 
+ relay (Destination, M essaw) : boo1can 
4(manages» 
M essarm 
DodgySoftware 
-ý + updateData(BusroessData) : boolean 
I+ searchData(Suing : void 
«managen» 
mayEncapsulate 
»" 
BusinessData 0 
«(assctConcan» «assetConc&n» 
Environment: Environment:: 
DataInteg ty DataConfidentiality 
Figure 11.6. Message-Oriented System Scenario 
As in the previous section, the FreeSoftware service supports assets about which little is 
known (DodgySoftware) and public access clients (Guest); it also provides a relay service 
that routes arbitrary messages to a specified destination. In this system the possible 
destinations are the OfficeServer and the Home client, and the messages may carry 
BusinessData, or other information. The interaction diagram in figure 11.7 describes the 
intended use of this system. This type of diagram shows the sequence of operations used to 
achieve particular tasks. 
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Mä 
There are two types of process: reading and writing. The searchData( facility allows a 
user to query BusinessData, and the updateBusinessData( feature allows a data item to be 
created, modified or deleted. To carry out a search, the user invokes a searchData( 
operation in the Home client, which encapsulates the search query in a message which is 
routed to a searchData( operation in the OfficeServer via the relayO operation in the 
FreeSoftware service. This system uses asynchronous messages, so the relay() operation is 
one way (although it may return exceptions); results are returned via relay() to the 
updatePresentation( function in the Home client. The actual user display is periodically 
refreshed by the user using refreshO, allowing the user to view any returned data. 
The update feature is similar, the user invokes updateBusinessDataO, which in turn 
invokes updateData() via the relayO. 
Protection Modules 
Two asset concerns are associated with BusinessData. The DalaConfidentiality concern 
supports the BulkConfidentiality goal, with the intent that an attacker should not be able to 
obtain large sections of the BusinessData database. The integrity requirement is the same as 
in previous examples. The security environment (see section 11.1) makes it clear that the 
User is not a potential attacker of the confidentiality goal, but is for the integrity goal. 
This security problem is more complex than previous examples, because the system has 
embedded untrusted components, rather than simply interfacing to such components. There 
are also two security goals, so it is necessary to break down the protection problem into 
manageable elements. The motivations for security requirements are goals, concerns and 
levels of risk, and in a large system it is often convenient to analyse vulnerable goals at each 
level of risk in turn. 
This problem is approached in three stages: basic protection, confidentiality and 
integrity; each stage groups requirements under a natural language protection strategy that 
explains their intent. The second two modules depend on the first, but are otherwise treated 
separately (some of the consequences and rationale for this process are described in the next 
chapter). This modular approach is developed more fully in the case study in chapter 14. 
Figure 11.7. Message-Oriented System Interaction Diagram 
276 End-to-End Security: Embedded Untrusted Services 
Basic Protection 
Basic protection involves ensuring least privilege, to the extent that it is possible using 
direct access controls. In other words, the only accesses that should be permitted are those 
that are essential for functional purposes. This results in access controls similar to those 
needed in section 11.2, but with some additions in the Home client. Users have no need to 
access the call-back operation that provides business data (updatePresentationO), and 
similarly the FreeSoftware service has no need to access user invoked operations (refreshO, 
searchData( and updateBusinessData( ). This pattern of access control is quite common 
in clients: dividing access between system and user operations. 
At this stage it is not known if these access constraints actually matter, some may prove 
unnecessary, but the practical ease and effectiveness of implementing security through 
access management is such that a protection approach that starts with minimum-privilege 
access is more robust, since it enforces a preference for control via access rather than by 
more complex behavioural constraints. 
The basic protection strategy is: 
In support of the security principle of least privilege, the system shall minimise access 
to its operations, consistent with its required functional behaviour. 
The security requirements that support this strategy are: 
No Requirements set at FreeSoftware 
No Requirements set at Guest 
Requirements at Home 
Deny Access (FreeSoftware »> Home. refresh) 
Deny Access (FreeSoftware »> Home. searchData) 
Deny Access (FreeSoftware »> Home. updateBusinessData) 
Deny Access (Manager »> Home. updatePresentation) 
Deny Access (User »> Home. updatePresentation) 
RefuseToAccess, operation=FreeSoftware. getSoftware 
NoDeploy to OtherOrg 
Requirements at OfficeServer 
RefuseToAccess, operation=FreeSoftware. getSoftware 
NoDeploy to OtherOrg 
Confidentiality 
The threat to the confidentiality goal is from the user Attacker, the aim of confidentiality 
protection is therefore to ensure that confidential data is not publicly accessible, rather than 
make distinctions between roles in the Home organisation. The need to use relayO in 
FreeSoftware is an obvious vulnerability, so message confidentiality is required to protect 
messages flowing from OfficeServer to Home. A pair of security requirements (one in 
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OfficeServer and one in Home) creates a confidential `pipe' between the source of the data 
and the client, but this is not quite sufficient to protect the asset of concern; for example: 
User Path Analysis requested 
Concern : DataConfidentiality Searching from: all-roles *** Path length=3 ; risk=2: 
.. Managed Data.... OfficeServer/BusinessData 
.. Operation............ OfficeServer. updateData(return) called from: FreeSoftware t 
.. Operation............ FreeSoftware. getSoftware(return) called from: Guest 
.. Operation............ Guest. refresh(return) in role: Attacker called from: Attacker 
It is also necessary to specify that the OfficeServer and the Home client do not 
inadvertently leak confidential data through other legitimately called services. In this case 
the updateDataO operation that is legitimately invoked as part of the relay may return data 
(arrowed above) and provide a path to the wider system. Similar paths are present within 
the Home client. The most succinct form of constraint is to specify TypeRestricted 
requirements for the BusinessData managed asset, and the BusinessData parameter input to 
the updatePresentation( service. This specifies how operations within the service are 
expected to interact, and identifies BusinessData and updatePresentationO as the focus of 
protection within the service. 
The confidentiality protection strategy is: 
In support of the BulkConfidentiality goal, BusinessData relayed through 
intermediate systems that are not deployed to OfceOrg shall be protected by 
message confidentiality, and OfficeOrg services shall restrict the availability of 
confidential information to operations that need to process confidential data. 
The additional requirements needed to support this confidentiality strategy are: 
Requirements at Home 
RequireConfidentiality of BusinessData 
on (FreeSoftware »> Home. updatePresentation. in) 
TypeRestrictedFlow for DataConfidentiality, 
assetType=Home. updatePresentation 
Requirements at OfficeServer 
Assert Confidentiality of BusinessData 
on (OfficeServer »> FreeSoftware. relay. in) for Home 
TypeRestrictedFlow for DataConfidentiality, assetType=BusinessData 
As noted in section 11.4, a type restriction constraint imposes a local protection 
objective, which in some implementations is as straightforward as determining how data is 
passed between operations. One effect of the type restriction in OfficeServer is to constrain 
information flow to messageRelayO, since its parameters do not match the type of 
BusinessData. At first sight this seems counter-intuitive: why is it necessary to prevent 
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information flow to a communications path that already is already protected by 
communications confidentiality? The answer is that Message is not the same type as 
BusinessData, so it is not possible to determine if a Message is just encrypted 
BusinessData, or if it contains other information; in this case, relay() parameters include 
other types (Destination). In some systems the typing of the operation makes it clear that 
the only data exported is protected for confidentiality; however, in this design it is not 
possible to determine if message level confidentiality protects information flow to relay(). 
Message confidentiality also adds behaviour to the system: it ensures that BusinessData 
is available at the Home client. Removing the message confidentiality requirement would 
not prejudice confidentiality (because of the type restriction) but would prevent access to 
BusinessData by its intended users. 
Integrity 
Unlike the confidentiality goal, the integrity goal requires that BusinessData is protected 
from legitimate O ficeOrg users. This requires a chain of authentication from users to a 
decision point that is able to determine which roles are allowed to update the business data. 
There are two possible places for the decision point: either in the OfficeServer, or in the 
Home client, and a choice is usually made to minimise the number of security requirements 
in the overall system; in this example the decision point is at the server". 
Working backwards from the server, this requires: 
" message-level access control at OfficeServer to limit access to updateData( to a 
Manager, 
"a requirement at the server that requires messages to updateData( to be authenticated; 
"a claim at the Home client of the identity of the user making requests updateDataO; and 
" the correct mapping between actual authenticated users and the message claim. 
Because there are several other operations at both Home and OfficeServer that could 
modify BusinessData, either in the message or directly in the managed asset, it is necessary 
to place local restrictions on the integrity of these items: 
" the OfficeServer must protect the integrity of the BusinessData asset from operations 
other than updateDataO; and 
" the Home client must protect the integrity of the message sent to updateData( from 
operations other than updateBusinessDataO. 
18 This is not the most compact solution for this system, by a small margin, but it does provide a more 
comprehensive example of the use of security requirements. 
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The last two are formulated using type restrictions, similar to the confidential case. All 
these requirements together provide a draft protection strategy, but risk analysis reveals that 
there are still threat paths in the system: 
User Path Analysis requested 
Concern : Datalntegrity Searching from: Manager *** Path=5 ; risk=3: 
.. Operation............ Guest. refresh(in) 
in role: Attacker called from: Attacker 
.. Operation............ FreeSoftware. relay(in) called 
from: Guest 
.. Operation............ FreeSoftware. relay(return) called 
from: OfficeServer 
.. Operation............ Home. updatePresentation(in). msg called 
from: OfficeServer t 
.. Operation............ OfficeServer. updateData(in). msg in role: Manager 
called from: Home 4 
.. Managed Data.... OfficeServer/BusinessData 
There are a number of paths of attack from both the Guest and Home clients; the critical 
link in these paths is between the updatePresentationO service, and the message sent by the 
Home client to updateDataO (arrowed). Because updatePresentationQ delivers the same 
asset type (BusinessData) that is sent to updateDataO, the TypeRestrictedFlow requirement, 
which protects the message to updateDataü, does not constrain information from this 
source. 
This threat is a version of a common attack tactic, in which a user is provided with a 
malicious object of the correct type, and inadvertently uses it, subverting the integrity of the 
asset of concern. 
However, this threat cannot be simply dismissed with an information flow constraint 
from updatePresentationO to updateDataO, since it poses an important design question: are 
BusinessData objects returned from a search via updatePresentationO used to update the 
database? This is probably the case: the Manager may be presented with query results and 
be able to update the database after editing the result data. The correct protection strategy is 
therefore to require the OfficeServer to protect the integrity of the results returned to the 
Home client; this requires a type constraint to specify that the data sent to relay() is integrity 
protected within OfficeServer, and the integrity protection of messages from OfficeServer to 
the updatePresentation( operation in Home. 
The complete integrity protection strategy is therefore: 
In support of the Businesslntegrity goal, only messages that originate from a 
Manager may be used to update the BusinessData asset; the system must ensure the 
authenticity of these messages, and the integrity of any data contained within them. 
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The requirements that support this integrity module are: 
Requirements at Home 
Claim Authentication of BusinessData 
on (Home »> FreeSoftware. getSoftware. in) from role_at service 
RequireAuthentication of BusinessData 
on (FreeSoftware »> Home. updatePresentation. in) from OfficeServer 
TypeRestrictedFlow for Datalntegrity, assetType=OfficeServer. updateData 
EnforceSeparation (Home. updateBusinessData »> OfficeServer. updateData) 
Requirements at OfficeServer 
RequireAuthentication of BusinessData 
on (FreeSoftware »> OfficeServer. updateData. in) from Manager 
Claim Authentication of BusinessData 
on (OfficeServer »> FreeSoftware. relay. in) from service 
TypeRestrictedFlow for Dataintegrity, assetType=BusinessData 
TypeRestrictedFlow for Datalntegrity, assetType=Home. updatePresentation 
This completes the example; further analysis is possible, including improved attack 
modelling and liveness evaluation, but these subjects for the next chapter. 
11.6. Summary 
Chapter 10 consolidated the security requirements identified in previous chapters into a 
working catalogue; this chapter shows how each of these requirements are used, and that 
they are all needed in typical system scenarios. 
The scenarios presented in this chapter are all complete systems, 'and progress from 
using basic protection mechanisms to needing more complex security requirements. All the 
examples use a common security environment (11.1), and the first scenario is a system that 
communicates with an untrusted service, and can be protected using point-to-point access 
control requirements (11.2). 
The second scenario uses two simple, identical, sub-systems to contrast different types 
of separation. In one case data assets are separated by role, and in the other they are 
separated by organisation. To express the security requirements of such systems it is 
necessary to specify asset classification by role and service classification by organisation, 
respectively. (11.3) 
The example in section 11.2 needed only access control requirements because its 
services were very simple; a similar scenario, but with several operations per service, shows 
that it is also necessary to place security requirements on service behaviour. In order for 
these requirements to be meaningful to a system practitioner, and scalable, it is necessary to 
use constraint patterns. (11.4) 
The final scenario elaborates this system further by introducing communication through 
untrusted and potentially malicious services. This security problem can only be resolved 
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using message-based security requirements, and is sufficiently complex to introduce 
problems of analysis management. (11.5) 
Two security analysis management practices are demonstrated: working from a default 
or existing protection regime, and modular security analysis. 
A risk management activity often inherits, or postulates, a protection regime, rather than 
starting from scratch each time. In default this amounts to ensuring that the access controls 
in the system limit the system behaviour to the essential operation calls. 
Modular analysis divides the system security problem into protection modules, 
motivated by one or more concerns, and supported by a set of security requirements and a 
natural-language protection strategy. 
Clustering requirements into modules conveys a better understanding of the motivation 
of individual requirements, but such requirements are not completely independent and the 
resulting protection modules cannot be added or subtracted without a full system analysis, 
which is the subject of the next chapter. 

283 
Chapter 12. The Process of Security Design Analysis 
The context for security risk analysis is described in chapter 6, including established IT 
governance and risk management processes; the basic method of fording threat paths 
required for risk analysis, and blocking them using security requirements, is introduced in 
chapter 7. Threat path analysis is the lens through which security requirements are judged, 
but there is rather more to security design analysis than individual threats. The analysis of 
large systems needs to be managed progressively, working from the most critical, or highest 
risk, issues to those of less importance, and this needs the support of a range of analysis 
techniques. 
The worked example in section 11.5, and the case study in chapter 15, both divide the 
security design problem into manageable pieces, or protection modules, to control the 
complexity of the analysis process. Viewing security analysis as a large-scale process also 
results in the need to evaluate the quality of the protection strategies derived for protection 
modules, or even complete systems, and exposes other questions about the potential 
benefits and problems of the supporting analysis, including: 
" is it possible to measure the quality of a protection strategy, after individual threat paths 
have been eliminated? and 
" are there special conditions or constraints needed to ensure that the analysis is effective? 
There are two process viewpoints: how a complete security design analysis is managed, 
and how particular types of threat analysis support this process. The purpose of this chapter 
is to clarify both the overall management process, and the detailed threat analysis methods, 
and then explore how well the threat analysis methods support the overall process. 
The organisation of this chapter follows these objectives directly, the first section 
clarifies the overall analysis processes used in this thesis, and this is followed by a detailed 
discussion of how threat paths are determined; the third section describes how analysis 
methods are used to assess whole systems or protection modules, and the final section 
discusses problems that require special modelling precautions if the analysis is to be fully 
effective. In detail: 
" section 12.1 describes the overall process of managing a security design analysis, 
including establishing a protection baseline, dividing security objectives into protection 
modules, and progressively evaluating and treating different levels of risk; 
" section 12.2 clarifies the detailed threat-path analysis methods, including threat path 
discovery, how organisational threats are introduced, and the rather different nature of 
external threats; 
" section 12.3 describes the creative use of threat-path analysis for system assessment, 
including the valuation of individual security requirements in terms of risk, the 
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identification of trusted, or untrusted, components in a system, and evaluating if security 
requirements have rendered the system unusable (liveness); 
" section 12.4 reviews modelling limitations that require modifications to a system design 
to ensure that an analysis is effective. A major issue is how to ensure that the analysis of 
systems that use message-based security remains systematic in the face of spoof 
messages attacks (e. g. messages authenticated by a malicious service); and 
" section 12.5 summarises the chapter. 
Supplementary material can be found in chapter 7, which provides an informal 
description of a complete analysis process, and chapter 15, the case study. This chapter 
revisits the worked example in section 11.5 to demonstrate different types of system 
security analysis. The syntax of the information-flow diagrams used in this chapter is 
explained in Appendix A. 
12.1. The Management of Security Design Analysis 
SeDAn is described as a framework to facilitate security design analysis, rather than a 
process, because it defines the whole range of components (system model, environment, 
security requirements etc) needed to support systematic analysis, and because it operates 
within established IT governance and corporate risk management methods, such as BS7799. 
However, although SeDAn is primarily concerned with the analysis and security design 
element of risk management, this activity is itself complex enough to need to be structured 
and organised. 
The example in section 11.5 and the case study in chapter 15 approach the problem of 
risk assessment and management in the same structured way; this approach is conditioned 
by the nature of risk and security requirements, and works within the IT governance 
framework in which SeDAn is used. This section describes the generic approach used in 
these chapters, and bow different analysis methods support this process; an overview of the 
process is given as a flowchart in figure 12.1. 
The starting point for security design analysis is a system model, which identifies: 
" the system context: the goals, organisations, user roles, and external connections; 
" attackers, and the system goals they target; 
" the system design, including services and security relevant assets; 
" asset concerns, which identify protection objectives for particular assets; and 
" any pre-existing or postulated security requirements, such as access controls. 
These artefacts are created in different ways, depending upon the social, organisational, 
and engineering context of the security analysis; they may be part of a top-down 
engineering process, represent proposed changes to an iteratively developed system, or have 
been elicited from an existing system or organisation. To some extent these differences 
characterise the different risk management frameworks described in chapter 6. 
The Process of Security Design Analysis 
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Figure 12.1. The Management Process for Security Design Analysis 
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Security Design Analysis reviews a system from the security risk perspective, 
determines threats, evaluates the effectiveness of security requirements, and results in a 
protection strategy for the complete system. The framework described in this thesis solves 
the problem of deriving requirements and risk factors for individual services from 
systematic security objectives (see chapter 9). In this definition `reviews' is important; this 
286 The Management of Security Design Analysis 
process does not replace the normal processes of establishing and refining business goals or 
establishing user roles and process responsibilities, it supplements it in three ways: 
" it provides a risk-based evaluation of a proposed or existing system; 
" it ensures that all necessary security requirements are identified, for example, it 
identifies constraints on service behaviour as well as the need for access controls; and 
9 it provides implementation risk profiles for individual components in the system, in 
additional to conventional security requirements. 
Given a system model which embodies the main risk management artefacts, the first 
step is to review the functional design for completeness; security analysis is valid only if it 
is carried out on a complete model of the system (see section 9.2.3). This was reflected in 
the relationship between security goals and concerns, and the need for a functionality first 
approach to goal decomposition (see section 9.33.1). This is particularly the case for 
security goals: there is no point in conducting an intricate threat analysis if major items of 
security functionality (e. g. an audit system, or provenance database) have been overlooked 
in the design. 
The bulk of the security analysis process involves exploring the system for paths of 
attack (threat paths) then deciding how, or if, these should be treated. Most realistic systems 
are too large to allow all the security requirements and risks to be analysed at once; 
however, the problem can be broken down by: 
" level of risk; 
" asset concern; 
" goal; and 
" type of attacker. 
The detail depends upon the system, but a logical approach is to make risk the primary 
focus, and to work progressively down through the risk levels. (See section 6.2 for a 
discussion of risk levels. ) This is the primary aim of risk management: to focus on the most 
critical items first, and reflect the degree of risk in any conclusions. 
12.1.1. The Overall Analysis Process in Detail 
The system will probably include pre-existing security requirements; if not, it is often 
useful to establish a default baseline. The baseline protection policy in section 11.5 is the set 
of access controls that minimise access, consistent with system operation; the case study in 
chapter 14 takes a similar approach, but introduces the baseline after first exploring the 
most significant risks. In default of a pre-existing or proposed protection scheme, 
establishing access controls in support of least privilege is a good starting point, for the 
reasons discussed in section 11.5. 
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Within each risk level it is usually necessary to divide the analysis into modules, which 
are initially treated separately. The security objectives for modules are concerns, groups of 
concerns, or all the concerns associated with a particular security goal. 
The objective is to establish a coherent protection strategy for each module 
independently. A coherent protection strategy should have a relatively simple protection 
strategy statement, supported by a set of security requirements. If this is not possible, the 
module may include too many security objectives, or there may be an underlying design 
problem. If it is not realistic to build a protection strategy for a module, or if the strategy is 
proving too complex, the best plan is to abandon the current module, complete the 
remaining modules at this risk level as far as possible, then review the whole process before 
continuing. 
Another possibility is that although it is possible to protect a risk inside the system, it 
may be more desirable to mitigate the risk outside the system. Different risk management 
methods differ in their approach to this problem; essentially there are two options: 
" to decide when the module is analysed if the risk should be mitigated inside or outside 
the system; or 
" to propose technical protection strategies wherever possible, but review them at the end 
of the analysis process to decide which should be accepted as security requirements, and 
which are better mitigated outside the system. 
The second option is usually preferable, since it clarifies what mitigation is possible, or 
not, within the system, even if the resulting security requirements are eventually rejected in 
favour of external mitigation. 
The security requirements for each module are reviewed in conjunction with those in the 
current protection baseline, which is the initial protection baseline together with any 
security requirements or changes established for protection modules at a higher level of 
risk. Within each risk level it is advisable to independently assess the requirements for each 
module. (See section 12.4, below. ) The basic threat path analysis discovery method is 
described in chapter 7 and section 12.2, below. 
When each module is complete it is reviewed to ensure that it is coherent and 
economical, or in other words, that good choices have been made about the placement and 
type of security requirements. This may be an informal evaluation, or use some of the 
quality review techniques described in section 12.3, below. 
When all modules at a given risk level are complete they are assembled into a single 
protection strategy for that risk level, and reviewed together. Quality review mechanisms 
are also useful at this stage, since there will probably be overlapping security requirements 
between modules, which may, or may not, be desirable. (See section 12.3.1, below. ) Often, 
the quantification of external risks is left to the end of the process. 
The process stops when all the risk levels have been completed, because there is no need 
to evaluate the lowest risks, or because it is impossible to proceed without a stakeholder 
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review of partially completed modules. At this stage the results need to be considered in the 
light of the system design activity, management risk assessment or other process which the 
security analysis is supporting. An important activity at this stage is to decide the balance 
between externally mitigated risks and technical security measures. If it is decided to 
mitigate some risks outside the system, this results in a change to the security environment, 
necessitating re-analysis, in the same way that a change to the design forces a review of the 
security. 
The purpose of this section is to summarise the overall security design analysis process 
used in this thesis, and to show where it is necessary to carry out quality reviews of 
complete, or partial, protection strategies. Section 123, below, describes analysis methods 
that provide metrics for these quality reviews, but before these can be described it is 
necessary to clarify the detail of how threat paths are evaluated. 
12.2. How Threat Paths are Evaluated 
The basic method of finding threat paths and blocking them using security requirements 
was introduced in chapter 7; this section clarifies the detail by describing exactly how threat 
paths are found in the information model. 
In order to discover threat paths it is necessary to identify the origin of each threat (the 
attacker) a target (the asset of concern) and determine if there are exploitable paths in the 
system that link the two. Assets, concerns, and attackers are readily associated in the system 
model, because their relationships can be traced through system goals, but the available 
paths are not as straightforward because they must take security requirements into account. 
As noted in chapter 9, some security requirements are defined in terms of the system 
model, but others are deferred: they are defined in terms of a generic model for information 
flow in services, and do not simply constrain relations or components in the system design. 
The information model combines what is known about the system in information terms with 
a framework in which it is also possible to express deferred security requirements; this 
model therefore provides the basis for threat path analysis. 
This section clarifies how threat path analysis is carried out, it begins by describing the 
basic method, how that accommodates multiple users and concerns, and its relation to risk. 
It then describes how organisational attackers are related to the system, and the slightly 
different evaluation method for external attacks. 
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12.2.1. Threat Path Discovery 
The method of finding a threat path, given an information model, is essentially 
straightforward: 
" select a concern; 
" identify the assets to which the concern applies; 
" map the assets of concern to their vertices in the information model; 
" find potential attackers of the goal to which the concern is associated; 
" map the attackers to their vertices in the information model; 
" use standard graph traversal techniques to discover paths between attacker and asset 
vertices; then 
9 map any paths discovered back to the system model to provide meaningful feedback. 
Any complexity is not in this method, but in the formulation of the information model, 
which was described in chapter 9, and the definition of security requirements in chapter 10. 
Although `threat analysis' often implies a search from attacker to target (as opposed to 
`vulnerability analysis', which implies the opposite) the direction of path traversal in the 
information model is immaterial to an analyst; the threat paths in this thesis are presented in 
the direction of information flow (e. g. integrity paths are presented attacker-to-target, and 
confidentiality paths are presented target-to-attacker). 
Other aspects of the threat path discovery method, however, are important to the analyst 
and give rise to choices about how to manage requirements and searches. These include 
path length, multiple attackers, multiple concerns and risk; these will be described in the 
following sections. 
12.2.1.1. The information model and simple threat paths 
This chapter uses examples of information models to illustrate different types of threat 
path, the first is given in figure 12.2, and subsequent examples are variations on the same 
model. 
Figure 12.2 is similar to figure 9.4, which is used to explain the information model in 
chapter 9, with some minor additions. The information model is a graph where the edges 
have been partitioned between services (sl, s2, s3), which represent the behaviour in 
information terms of the services in the real system. The vertices in the graph correspond to 
information carriers in the system, which include messages (e. g. vc) between services, call- 
return pairs for operations (e. g. va, vb) items of service state (e. g. vful) and communication 
to user roles (e. g. vh, vg, for ul). The direction of information flow between a vertex and an 
associated service or user is shown arrowed. The difference between this example and 
figure 9.4 is that in figure 12.2 the managed asset represented by of is classified by role, 
resulting in two vertices, vful and vfu2. 
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In this chapter information flow is also shown within services, to clarify the routes taken 
by threat paths. 
In figure 12.2 vful is the target (the vertex that represents the asset of concern), the 
direction of the concern is away from the asset, so the figure shows all possible threat paths 
from vf ul to the attacker, u2. 
er 
I 
Figure 12.2. Finding Threat Paths 
This chapter is not concerned with the meaning of these paths; the `real threat' takes 
place in the system so no attempt is made to justify the importance, or otherwise, of the 
threat paths in these models. In general, short paths allow attackers to directly exploit 
system operations, long paths result from indirect threats, such as injecting malicious data 
which is then used by a legitimate user (for example, see section 11.4). 
The threat paths between vf ul and u2, are" m: 
" vful-vd-vj-u2 
o vful-vc-vb-vj-u2 
" vful -vd-va-vb-vj-u2 
" vful-vd-ve-vc-vb-vj-u2 
" vful -vd-ve-vfu2-vc-vb-vj-u2 
This mixture of paths, of varying length and complexity, is typical. It is also clear from 
figure 12.2 that a single well-placed security requirement would eliminate many of the 
threats: a constraint in s3 that eliminates paths via vc or va to vb, would remove all threat 
paths, except the most direct. In theory it is possible to use the information model to 
enumerate all possible paths, but in practice the analyst usually focuses on the shorter paths 
first, so the search strategy used is to find the shortest threat path; this often motivates 
requirements that block the longer and more indirect paths, if not it may indicate that 
security requirements to treat the shorter paths were misplaced. 
19 Paths that traverse the same vertex twice are not included, because if such paths exist there is always a shorter path 
that exludes the cycle. For example of ul-vd-ve-vd-vf-u2 implies the existance of the shorter path of ul-vd-vf-u2. 
20 The reader might be concerned that there should also be an information flow from viul to vfu2, resulting in a 
further set of paths that all start in this way. If these were different assets this would be the case, but recall that the 
definition of classification by role (section 10.2.2) requires the service to maintain separation between role- 
classified assets, so there is no direct information flow between vl ul and vf. u2. 
Target "ul . u2 
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12.2.1.2. Threat paths for different concerns 
Threat paths are specific to a given concern, because some security requirements apply 
only to particular concerns, for example, the system in figure 12.3 adds an integrity concern 
to the previous example, so there are additional paths (shown dotted within services) from 
u2 to W. ul. 
The previous discussion observed that a suitably placed security requirement in s3 
would eliminate many of the threats to the confidentiality of vf, this requirement has been 
added in figure 12.3, with the result that the only confidentiality threat to of is the direct 
path (vf. ul - vd - vj - u2). 
I 
Attacker 
y Requirement 
Confidentiality 
Figure 12.3. Concern-specific Security Requirements 
The integrity concern on asset vl, with u2 as a possible attacker, results in two threat 
paths from u2 to vf ul: 
" u2-vi-ve-vful 
" u2-vi-va-vb-ve-vful 
Because the meaning of the security requirement within s3 is linked to the 
confidentiality concern, it does not eliminate the longer threat path for the integrity concern. 
12.2.1.3. Attackers who also own security goals 
Multiple attackers simply result in more goals for the search, but if an organisation or 
user is the owner of a goal, and also an attacker of the same goal, then this needs special 
treatment; for example, the environmental model in section 11.1 includes goal owners that 
are also attackers, and this motivates the separation requirements described in section 11.3. 
SeDAn uses the following interpretation in this situation: 
If a user or organisation has a concernfor a particular asset, and is also a potential 
attacker of the related security goal, then that user or organisation will not attack 
their own data 
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This interpretation is given because separation objectives are both common and 
important. It is not impossible to construct scenarios where users might attack their own 
data21, so an analyst must be aware that the framework will reflect this interpretation. 
This situation is shown in figure 12.4, which extends the example in figure 12.2 by, 
adding a second attacker to the same asset. The two users (u], O) both have integrity 
concerns for the asset vl, and both are attackers. The asset vl is classified by user role 
resulting in two vertices (vful and vfu2), so following the interpretation that attackers do 
not target their own assets, the threat paths required are vful - u2 and vfu2 - ul. 
Targets 
Figure 12.4. Paths between Multiple Attackers and their Own Assets 
The set of paths from vf ul to u2 are identical to those in figure 12.2, the set of paths 
between vfu2 and ul (shown dotted within services in the figure) are: 
" vfu2-vh-ul 
" vfu2-vd-ve-vh-ul 
" vfu2-vd-ve-vful -vh-ul 
" vfu2-vc-vb-ve-vh-ul 
" vfu2-vc-vb-ve-vful -vh-ul 
" vfu2-vd-va-vb-ve-vh-ul 
" vfu2-vd-va-vb-ve-vful -vh-ul 
The two sets of paths are independent there is no reason why any section of a path in 
one of these sets is contained within the other, so the discovery of paths of this sort requires 
separate searches. 
This extends the basic threat path discovery method described above. The first step is to 
determine from the system model if any attacker is also a goal-owner, if this is the case then 
each attacker has a different set of threat paths, so a separate threat search is conducted for 
21 An example of users that attack their own data is given in the case study. Even in this situation, where a user 
wishes to retract or falsify a previous action, we conjecture that goals of this form are mistakes in either modeling 
or system design. For example, repudiation always involves a second party, so the target of the user's attack is 
strictly the accuracy of the other party's data, not of their own. 
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each user role or organisation. Searching by role or organisation modifies the threat path 
discovery method by: 
" narrowing the target set to those that match the role or organisation (i. e. vertices that are 
not classified by role, or are classified and have the correct role); and 
9 narrowing the set of attackers by removing the specified role or organisation. 
12.2.1.4. Risk 
The final analysis issue, and perhaps the most significant for an analyst, is the level of 
risk. Risk has no effect on the navigation of threat paths, it is simply a calculation that is 
possible when a path has been established; the impact and frequency of the threat are 
attributes of the asset concern and attack, respectively, and they are combined to produce a 
risk level. A suitable method of combination is described in section 6.2. 
However, the purpose of risk-based reasoning is to focus on the most significant threats 
first, so it must be possible to evaluate threats in descending order of risk. This is achieved 
by narrowing the set of attackers for any particular path search to those that would result in 
the desired risk score, given the impact of the asset concern. 
12.2.1.5. Summary 
In summary, given an information model which is mapped to the system and security 
requirements that are specified in terms of this model, the discovery of threat paths is 
reduced to the well-understood problem of fording paths in a graph. However, a system is 
not a single graph; some requirements are concern-specific resulting in a different 
information graph for each concern, with the same vertices but different edges (see section 
9.2.2). If any concern has a user or organisation as both goal owner and attacker, the threat 
paths are navigated separately, producing one threat sub-graph for each target role. Searches 
are scoped by risk, by narrowing the set of attackers considered for any particular concern 
to those that result in a given risk level. 
The following sections extend the threat path evaluation method described above to 
organisational and external attackers. 
12.2.2. Organisational Attackers 
An organisation has direct access to any services or data which are deployed to that 
organisation. From the threat perspective, an organisation can mount an attack on a system 
via any components to which it has access. To determine paths of attack from organisations, 
therefore, it is necessary to establish what elements of the system may be deployed to which 
organisation. 
12.2.2.1. Deployment groups 
Deployment Groups were introduced in section 7.4.2. The rationale behind a group is 
that a service is an atomic element of deployment, each service has access to the assets that 
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are its inputs and outputs, and these information carriers are made available to an 
organisation with each deployment decision. Figure 12.5 shows how the elements of the 
example in figure 12.2 are clustered into deployment groups. 
sl Deployment Group 
S1 
W Deployment Group vd - ------------ 
------------ 
s3 
iiý. 
_ 
i s3 Dealovment Group 
Figure 12.5. Deployment Groups 
The deployment groups in the graph relate directly to those in the system, because of the 
direct correspondence between information carriers in the system and graph vertices. Each 
vertex has both an input and an output relation to a service, so each vertex appears in the 
deployment groups of both its input and output services, which may be different (e. g. ve) or 
the same (e. g. vf ul). 
The relation between deployment groups and organisations is constrained by the 
deployment of the related service: a service may be deployed to any organisation declared 
in the system model, unless that deployment is restricted by a deployment constraint. 
12.2.2.2. Threat paths from organisations 
A system that includes a deployment constraint, and a threat path from an organisation, 
is shown in figure 12.6. This is the same system as before (figure 12.2) but the attackers are 
the two organisations orgl, and org2; the concern is still the confidentiality of the asset vf. 
In the system model (not shown) user role ul is associated with organisation orgl, and user 
role u2 is associated with organisation org2. The service s3 has a deployment constraint to 
organisation orgl, and only attacks via this service are shown. 
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-º org 1 
Attackers 
s3 Deployment Group 
---------------- 
The resulting threat paths via the s3 deployment group are: 
" vf ul - vc - org2 
" vful -vd-va-org2 
" vful -vd-ve-vc-org2 
" vful -vd-ve-vfu2-vc-org2 
org2 
Organisation orgl is denied access to service s3 by the deployment constraint, so there 
are no threats from this organisation via s3. Since organisation org2 is associated with user 
role u2, only other role-classified instances of the asset of are targets for this attacker, in this 
case the vertex vful; the vertex vfu2 is not therefore a target of this attacker. 
Given deployment groups that link organisational attackers to graph vertices, threat 
paths from organisations are discovered in the same way as user threats. 
There are two further issues related to organisational attackers: users and deployment 
separation. User roles do not feature in deployment groups, because they are not needed in a 
search for organisational threats. Users access the system via distinguished services, known 
as clients; for a user to access a client, the client must be deployable to the organisation to 
which the user is associated. There is therefore no case where an organisation's users have 
direct access to a service which is not also accessible to that organisation. There is no need, 
therefore, for a deployment group to include user roles, since the organisation already has 
direct access to any information that its users may access. 
12.2.2.3. Deployment separation 
A deployment separation requirement specifies that several instances of a service may 
be deployed to different organisations, but each has direct access to only its own 
information carriers. This requirement causes the system model to be interpreted differently 
in information terms; for example, figure 12.7 represents the same system modelled in the 
previous examples, but with service s2 separated by deployment. 
Figure 12.6. Threat Paths from Organisations 
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Figure 12.7. Deployment Separation 
Deployment separation specifies addition vertices (vd, ve and vc are role classified) 
where the ownership of a vertex is unclear, then separates instances of the whole 
deployment group by organisation. For example, the of vertices are assigned to the correct 
service instance, and vh and vg are unambiguously identified with organisation orgl, 
because user role ul is associated with just that organisation. The threat paths between 
organisations and deployment-separated services are also restricted, as shown. 
Deployment separation is described here to clarify its effect on organisational attacks, a 
worked system example is given in section 11.3. 
12.2.3. External Attackers 
External attacks were described in section 7.4.3; they are different in kind from attacks 
by users or organisations, since the attacker may access the system via an undefined 
mechanism. The practical implications of this are discussed further in the next chapter, but 
the evaluation of threats from external attackers is an important bridge to the context of a 
deployed system, including business processes, user behaviour conditioning, infrastructure 
requirements, and physical protection. Each of these may inadvertently allow access to a 
system using mechanisms that are not specified in the system design. 
The primary purpose of external threat analysis is to indicate the degree of 
environmental protection that is required for different components of a system 
implementation. External threat analysis does not, therefore, determine a set of threat paths 
for each concern, but evaluates if assets of concern are reachable from each vertex; this 
measures the extent that an external attacker could utilise unspecified mechanisms to attack 
the system via each vertex. 
Figure 12.8 shows how external attacks are evaluated. This is the same as the system in 
figure 12.2; the focus of concern is still the confidentiality of the asset modelled as vful, 
but all possible paths from this vertex are evaluated. It is assumed that services s2 and sl 
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have established security requirements that prevent information flow to vc and va, 
respectively, for this concern. 
Of 
F-fA 
r u1 
ia 
Target 
Figure 12.8. Reachable Vertices from an External Attack 
The model elements that are shown shaded, including the users, are those that are 
reachable from this target (asset and concern). Unlike the other types of analysis, no 
account is taken of ownership; legitimate owners of data are equally likely to be the subject 
of an external attack, for example by social engineering. 
12.2.3.1. Mapping external threats back to the system: risk profiles 
The results of an external threat evaluation must be made accessible in system terms, so 
the mapping of the threat evaluation back to the system is carried out by summarising 
collections of vertices that are associated with particular implementation features. These 
implementation features are: 
9 users and the paths to users; 
" services; and 
" communication paths. 
Figure 12.9 shows how the model elements in figure 12.8 are grouped in system terms. 
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Figure 12.9. Reporting External Attacks in Implementation-relevant Groups 
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Any reachable vertex within a group means that there is a possible threat path between 
the implementation component represented by the group and the asset and concern that is 
analysed. 
Services are represented by deployment groups, which are identical to the deployment 
groups described earlier. 
User packages include both the user and the vertices between the user and a service. In 
implementation terms the external risk to a user applies equally to the individual in the user 
role, and to the path between the client and the user. The latter may be a visual path or a 
more complex communication, such as the connection between a browser and the web- 
server (see section 5.1.1). Even visual paths cannot be discounted as a possible access for 
an attacker, for example, a significant attack on ATMs is overlooking the entry of a PIN, 
and this attack has been automated with miniature cameras. 
Vertices that model associations between services are grouped into `communications' 
packages. Not all these will be implemented as communications links, but some of them 
will be, and for these the external risk evaluation provides an assessment of the need for 
communications security. 
This completes the description of how threats are discovered, the next section deals with 
how these analysis methods are used to review the quality of protection strategies that are 
complete, in the sense that security requirements have eliminated the threat paths in a 
system. 
12.3. Evaluating the Quality of a Complete Protection Strategy 
Section 12.1 indicated that in a large or complex security design analysis it is necessary 
to review the quality of the emerging protection strategy: 
" when individual protection modules are complete; 
" after completing all modules at a given level of risk; and 
" for the system as a whole. 
The aim of a quality review is to determine that the protection strategy is well 
structured, and this is a matter of judgement which is unlikely to be automated. However, it 
is possible to use the threat path discovery methods described above to advise these 
judgements, and one of the techniques by which that can be achieved has already been 
described in chapter 7: requirements valuation. 
The process of checking a baseline protection strategy for threats, then treating any 
threats that are discovered by adding or changing security requirements, terminates when no 
more threats are found. This applies to individual protection models or the system as a 
whole. At this point it is clear that the security requirements are sufficient, but it is also 
possible that the system has been over-constrained. Requirements may: 
" overlap or duplicate each other's function; or 
" constrain the functionality of system more than is necessary. 
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Both these problems are indicated by security requirements that do not protect threat 
paths; requirements valuation identifies the risk level associated with each requirement, and 
therefore identifies potential cases of overlap or over-constraint. The possibility that system 
functionality is over-constrained can be separately investigated using liveness analysis. 
Another possible design concern is the extent that services need to be trusted; systems 
may be designed with the intention that some of their services could be deployed anywhere 
(e. g. to a Grid or on the Internet), so analysis of a system's services from a trust perspective 
is a useful check that security requirements are consistent with the design aim. 
These three types of analysis (requirements valuation, trust, and liveness) are not new 
techniques, but applications of the threat analysis methods described above; they are 
described in detail in the sections that follow. 
12.3.1. Valuation of Requirements in Terms of Risk 
Section 7.5.5 described how SeDAn makes it possible to review a set of requirements to 
determine if they were all necessary. No new analysis methods are necessary, the process is 
simply to remove each requirement in turn, then use the standard threat path analysis to 
determine if this has resulted in any threats. If a threat path is found, this is evidence that the 
security requirement protects that threat, and it provides information about the level of risk 
and the concerns that are actually protected by the requirement. 
This is feasible in a realistic processing time because the underlying threat discovery 
algorithm (graph traversal) is inherently efficient, and because the modelling choices, 
described in chapter 9 constrain the size of the information graph in the interests of 
scalability. 
If a requirement does not protect a concern then it may be unnecessary, it may be 
desirably duplicated, or the security requirement may be adding behaviour to the system, 
rather than a constraint. Since the use of requirements valuation to detect superfluous 
requirements was described in section 7.5, this section reviews the exceptions: cases where 
overlapping security requirements are detected, but are still desirable. 
12.3.1.1. The need for coherent protection modules, and defence-in-depth 
The worked example in section 11.5 divided its protection strategy into three modules: 
9 an access control baseline; 
" requirements needed to protect the BulkConfidentiality goal; and 
" requirements needed to protect the Businesslntegrity goal. 
The modules into which the protection strategy of a large system is divided are not 
usually independent; in this example both the goal-based modules make use of the access 
control baseline. This baseline was derived from least-privilege considerations, rather than 
from risk evaluation, so a requirements valuation of the complete protection strategy (i. e. all 
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modules) is likely to reveal requirements in the access control module that are unnecessary 
in risk terms: 
Requirements at class: Home 
DenyAccess (FreeSoftware »> Home. refresh) ... Risk 
Level =2 to User 
DenyAccess (FreeSoftware »> Home. searchData) No Path 
Deny Access (FreeSoftware »> Home. updateBusinessData) 
... Risk 
Level =3 to User 
DenyAccess (Manager »> Home. updatePresentation) "**" No Path 
Deny Access (User »> Home. updatePresentation) ... Risk Level =3 
to User 
RefuseToAccess, operation=FreeSoftware. getSoftware No Path 
NoDeploy at Home to OtherOrg ... Risk Level =3 to 
User 
Requirements at class: OfficeServer 
RefuseToAccess, operation=FreeSoftware. getSoftware No Path 
NoDeploy at OfficeServer to OtherOrg ... Risk Level =2 to 
Admin 
This valuation report lists each security requirement in turn, and either reports the level 
of the highest risk path defended by the requirement, or warns that no path is present. If no 
path is found, it indicates that the requirement may be unnecessary. Four potential problems 
are identified, and their origin can be determined by reference to the original example 
(section 11.5): 
" both operations with RefuseToAccess requirements are also constrained by type 
restrictions, which also protect other interactions between the same services; 
" the access control from FreeSoftware to the searchData( operation is not needed, 
because there is no threat path from that operation to an asset of concern. 
" the access control from Manager to updatePresentationO is not needed, because 
Manager is not a potential attacker for any of the system goals. 
The activity of determining if requirements are unnecessary, and understanding how that 
came about, may identify unnecessary requirements, or may lead to a simplification of the 
protection strategy. However, overlapping requirements should not be automatically 
removed. In this case the access restrictions implement a coherent access protection 
strategy, which ensures that: 
" services do not have access to any operations that are unnecessary for the function of 
the system; 
" services do not have access to user operations; and 
" users do not have access to operations intended for services. 
These restrictions are in accordance with good security design practice, and bearing in 
mind the relative simplicity of access control, compared to establishing the correct 
behaviour of a service, it is consistent with good practice to leave these in place as a first- 
line defence. 
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This practice is often described as `defence in depth'; more complex in-depth defence 
strategies can be constructed by building protection modules with deliberately overlapping 
security functions. They could be analysed in exactly the same way (i. e. remove each 
module in turn and evaluate the system) although the present tool support does not automate 
this process. 
Another perspective on this problem is that allowing security requirements in different 
modules to overlap, provided this does not prejudice important system functionality, allows 
a greater degree of independence between modules, which aids the understanding of the 
overall protection strategy for a system. 
12.3.1.2. Message security that overlaps with other requirements 
A different type of overlapping constraint occurs in the confidentiality module of the 
same example, the requirements valuation for this module is: 
Requirements at class: Home 
TypeRestrictedFlow for DataConfidentiality, 
assetType=Home. updatePresentation ... Risk Level =2 to User 
Requirements at class: OfficeServer 
Assert Confidentiality of BusinessData 
on (OfficeServer »> FreeSoftware. relay. in) for Home ********** No Path 
TypeRestricte1Flow for DataConfidentiality, 
assetType=BusinessData ... Risk Level =2 to User 
There are two significant issues in this requirements valuation, the first is that not all the 
requirements have been valued (contrast this with the requirements list in 11.5), and the 
second is the absence of a threat path defended by the confidentiality assertion. 
The requirements list in section 11.5 includes RequireConfidentiality on the Home 
client, which is not reported in the valuation. RequireConfidentiality builds an end-to-end 
information path (see section 10.2.4.2) so it is not primarily a constraint. For example, in 
terms of encryption, a system is more secure if data are encrypted (AssertConfidentiality) 
and never decrypted (RequireConfidentiality). The process of valuation removes constraints 
and determines what threat paths emerge; this process will not find new threats if the 
security requirement is not a constraint, so RequireConfidentiality cannot be evaluated in 
this way. A similar situation applies to authentication claims (e. g. signing a message); taken 
separately they do not constrain the system, so they cannot be valued. 
The second issue is that the valuation indicates that the sending end of the end-to-end 
confidential message path (the AssertConfidentiality requirement) is superfluous, and this is 
certainly counter-intuitive. 
This problem was described briefly in section 11.5. Because there is more information 
transmitted to relay() than just the confidential BusinessData, this operation is constrained 
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with a TypeRestrictedFlow requirement. The type restriction is the stronger constraint, since 
it includes all the parameters of relayO. 
An implementer is faced with two security requirements: 
" to ensure communications confidentiality for BusinessData contained in the message; 
and 
" to ensure that Message and Destination data sent to relayO maintain the confidentiality 
of BusinessData (strictly, to comply with the requirements of the related confidentiality 
concern). 
The first requirement can be met by encryption. The second requirement is met by that 
encryption only if no other confidential information is transmitted to the relayO operation, 
so the overlap in the security requirements faithfully reflects the practical security problem 
and conveys important information to an implementer. 
The options for the system designer are: 
to accept the overlapping requirements; 
to remove the confidentiality requirements pair, in which case the degree of protection 
of the system will not change, but this will introduce a liveness problem; or 
to re-design relayO to make it clear that the only asset type sent to this operation is 
BusinessData, in which case the communications confidentiality assertion will suffice. 
The correct choice depends upon circumstances, in this case the relay() needs to forward 
generic messages, and removing the confidentiality requirements would result in a liveness 
problem; these overlapping constraints are therefore acceptable. 
In summary, requirements valuation provides a powerful mechanism for reviewing a 
protection strategy; it: 
" provides a risk value that indicates the criticality of each requirement; and 
" identifies requirements that may be superfluous, because they over-constrain the 
system. 
However, there may be sound reasons to retain security requirements that do not 
immediately defend threat paths; they may be part of a defence-in-depth strategy, or they 
may add essential system behaviour. 
12.3.2. Trust 
A service that must enforce security requirements to contribute to a system's security 
goals is trusted. However, attackers may use mechanisms outside the scope of the system 
design in order to exploit the access that a service provides to an asset; these are external 
attacks, and implementers defend such risks using mechanisms that are not necessarily 
specified as security requirements during system analysis (see chapter 13). Further security 
requirements are therefore added to a service during its implementation, and so system level 
requirements, on their own, are not a sufficient indicator that a service is security-critical. 
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The risk profile of a service is quantified by an external attack assessment, as described 
in section 12.2.3. This determines if there is a potential path between the service and an 
asset of concern, and this is a better measure of the extent that a service needs to be trusted 
than the presence of system-level security requirements. 
Returning to the example in section 11.5, an external threat assessment against the 
services in this system reports only the following risks: 
External Risks at class: Home 
4 DataConfidentiality 
4 Dataintegrity 
External Risks at class: OfficeServer 
4 DataConfidentiality 
4 Datalntegrity 
This is a risk profile for services; it lists each service, the risk level and corresponding 
concern. The risk levels are different to those in the user threat paths, because the external 
attack (Hack) has a different frequency. 
This report is complete, so there are no results reported for the FreeSoftware service or 
the Guest client. This is an important confumation of the security objectives of this system: 
there is no path of attack from either of these services to an asset of concern, so these 
services are untrusted. 
In summary, trust in a service is defined as follows: 
A service is trusted if there is any exploitable path between that service and an asset 
of concern. 
An external attack evaluation, as well as providing information to an implementer about 
environmental risk, evaluates if services are trusted, or not. This allows the systematic 
review of a system design that is intended to partition its services into trusted and untrusted 
components. 
12.3.3. Liveness 
The problem of liveness is mentioned at several points in this thesis. The difficulty is 
not making a system secure in isolation, but balancing security with operational 
functionality. Security analysis is not carried out on a complete functional model of the 
system, so it is not possible to guarantee liveness. However, it is possible to systematically 
check if security requirements prevent information flow between legitimate users and their 
assets. 
A normal threat path analysis does not find paths from legitimate users to assets of 
concern, only from attackers; however, an external threat analysis determines the 
vulnerability of all users to external attack, because social engineering attacks against 
legitimate users are common (see sections 7.4.3 and 12.2.3). This form of evaluation allows 
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the analyst to determine if assets are reachable from legitimate user roles, and can therefore 
be used to evaluate liveness, as well as the vulnerability of users or their communications. 
Returning to the example in section 11.5, an external threat assessment against the users 
in this system reports the following risk profile: 
External Risks on User Communication from: Manager to client Home 
4 DataConfidentiality 
4 Datalntegrity 
External Risks on User Communication from: User to client Home 
4 DataConfidentiality 
The protection strategy for this system has not prevented access between the intended 
users and the assets of concern: the Manager role can update business data and both the 
Manager and the User roles can read the data. 
This is the extent that security analysis can contribute to the liveness problem, and is 
rather similar to the relationship between availability and denial-of-service; it is possible to 
show that user access has not been denied by security requirements, but not quantify the 
resulting performance. However, because security requirements are defined in information 
terms, this limited review of liveness is relevant to security design. 
For example, the requirements valuation in section 123.1, exposed an overlap between 
the AssertConfidentiality requirement at OfficeServer, and a type restriction. If the 
confidentiality assertion is mistakenly removed, then the comparable risk profile is: 
External Risks on User Communication from: Manager to client Home 
4 Datalntegrity 
The removal of the confidentiality assertion in the OfficeServer service prevents a flow 
of messages between OfficeServer and Home; the result is that the system is secure, in the 
sense that there are no paths of attack, but the legitimate users of confidential data 
(Manager and User) no longer have access to the information. This is exposed by the risk 
profile. 
In summary, it is possible to use an external threat assessment to determine if legitimate 
user roles have information paths to assets of concern. The absence of such a path indicates 
that liveness is compromised by security, assuming that there were such paths in the system 
before the security requirements were added. 
12.4. Analysis Limitations 
The main limitations in the SeDAn framework are not the threat analysis method itself, 
but the models used: the system metamodel, the model of information and the definition of 
security requirements. Each of these accommodates the widest possible set of systems and 
circumstances, but inevitably limit what can be expressed. However, considerations of 
analysis, rather than representation, do raise one important question, which is the extent to 
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which a `standard' system model can be employed, or alternatively, the extent that a system 
model needs to be adapted for the needs of analysis. Varying a system model just to 
facilitate analysis is not desirable, so the cases where this is necessary need to be explored 
carefully. 
The examples of system models in previous chapters include elements (users, services, 
clients, assets) that are not part of the system to be implemented. For example, the worked 
example in section 11.5 includes a FreeSoftware service, a GuestClient, a DodgySoftware 
asset, the OtherOrg organisation, and an associated user role, the Attacker. None of these 
are part of the target implementation, and only the FreeSoftware service interfaces to the 
system under design. 
Changes or additions could be made to any part of the system to facilitate analysis, so 
the security environment, the functional design, and security requirements could all be 
tailored in some way; these are discussed separately in the following sections. 
12.4.1. The Security Environment 
The security environment is a straightforward representation of the system context, 
including users, organisations, security goals, and potential attacks. It is determined by 
structured elicitation from stakeholders, or from the documentation of the IT governance or 
risk management process in which the analysis is used. 
The environment must anticipate other users with access to the system, and 
organisations to which parts of the system may be deployed; for example, few systems are 
so self-contained that they are hosted on infrastructure without other users. It is therefore 
usual for a system model to include a representative `other user' and `other organisation'. 
(See the discussion in Section 7.4.2, which warns that external attacks model non-standard 
access to the system, not unanticipated user roles, which are better included explicitly in the 
security environment. ) 
One possible issue is multiplicity: can user roles be combined into a single 
representative role, or conversely are there situations where a class of users must be 
represented as several different roles. The question applies to equally to organisations. 
User roles or organisations are combined if there is no security distinction between 
them. For example in a particular system `Investigative Journalist' and `Hacker', target 
quite different security goals with different frequencies, so although they have similar types 
of access, they are distinct; on the other hand `Hacker' and `Disgruntled Employee' target 
the same system goals (e. g. availability) and could be combined into a single `Malicious 
User' role. 
Conversely, user roles and organisations need to be represented by several examples, or 
role subsets, if security objectives distinguish between them as individuals. This is usually 
the case when some form of separation goal is needed. For example, a common separation 
goal is to ensure that access to user accounts is restricted to their owners; this results in the 
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need to model representative user roles such as `user 1', and `user n'. Given the 
requirements used in SeDAn it is conjectured that two representative roles are sufficient to 
demonstrate separation12; this is the approach used in the case study in chapter 14. 
In summary, if it is necessary to distinguish between users or organisations in security 
terms, they must be distinguished in the model, and this is compatible with the normal 
process of modelling a security environment. It is also advisable to include one `other user' 
and one `other organisation' in an analysis. 
12.4.2. The Functional System 
The system or application is the subject of analysis and will therefore be represented at a 
suitable level of detail (see chapter 4), the problem is deciding in how much detail external 
systems are represented. In general it is necessary to represent external systems in enough 
detail to include any interfaces to the application or system under design, and to provide 
generic access to external systems for their users. The example in section 11.5 illustrates 
this process: the FreeSoftware service is needed to characterise the interfaces between the 
system that is to be implemented and the external environment, and the Guest client 
introduces the users from the external context. Nothing more is needed; the DodgySoftware 
asset was only included to motivate the discussion, the security analysis would not change if 
it was not present. 
Although these items are not to be implemented, they would often be part of a 
functional design: the interfaces to external systems, and legitimate external users, would 
certainly feature in functional scenarios. The need to consider security analysis therefore 
adds little to what should be present in a normal functional design. 
In summary, external systems need to be modelled to facilitate analysis; it is only 
necessary to include sufficient detail to represent interfaces to the system under analysis, 
and user access via external systems; this is consistent with the external detail that is usually 
included in a functional design. 
12.4.3. Security Requirements 
None of the examples in this thesis include security requirements that are added just to 
facilitate analysis. Adding a feature to facilitate analysis supposes that some behaviour in 
the real system is being modelled that might facilitate an attack; security requirements are 
predominantly constraints, and adding a constraint will not enable a threat path where one 
did not previously exist. There is therefore little opportunity to use security requirements to 
improve the behavioural modelling of attack, but security requirements that are not pure 
constraints are important exceptions to this rule. 
22 Note that this conjecture applies to only separation objectives, not to arbitrary multi-role security scenarios. 
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Message-based security requirements are a mixture of constraint and behaviour, and 
there are two ways that inappropriate message requirements give rise to threat paths: 
"a malicious service creates a confidential message, which is accepted by a remote 
service; or 
"a malicious service authenticates a claim, which is accepted by a remote service. 
12.43.1. Malicious Confidential Messages 
The confidential case arises only if a system inappropriately relies on confidentiality for 
integrity protection. For example, the integrity protection module in section 11.5 includes 
requirements that preserve the integrity of messages between OfficeServer and 
updatePresentation( in Home. However, if all the modules in this example are combined 
and the requirements valued, these message integrity requirements are identified as over- 
constrained, because the confidentiality requirements on the same message flow also limits 
the access from attackers to updatePresentationO. If the message integrity requirements are 
removed, because they are apparently over-constrained, a potentially malicious system, 
such as FreeSoftware could encrypt a data item for the Home client, resulting in a new 
threat path. Adding a confidentiality assertion at FreeSoftware to mimic the creation of a 
spoof message, then testing the integrity concern, demonstrates the problem: 
Requirements at class: FreeSoftware 
Assert Confidentiality of BusinessData 
on (FreeSoftware »> -Home. updatePresentation. in) for Home 
Concern : Datalntegrity Searching from: User *** Path length=4 ; risk=3: 
.. Operation............ Guest. refresh(in) 
in role: Attacker called from: Attacker 
.. Operation............ FreeSoftware. relay(in) called 
from: Guest 
.. Operation............ 
Home. updatePresentation(in). msg called from: FreeSoftware 4 
.. Operation............ OfficeServer. updateData(in). msg 
in role: Manager 
called from: Home 
.. Managed Data.... OfficeServer/BusinessData 
The only message requirement in Home is that the input to updatePresentationO is 
confidential, the attacker provides a suitable confidential message that is then injected in the 
update path for BusinessData. In concrete terms, the malicious server has encrypted a spoof 
message using the public key of its victim, the victim's communication requirements 
include confidentiality, but not authentication, so the victim mistakenly trusts the spoof 
message. 
There are two ways of dealing with this problem: structuring the security design so that 
the problem cannot occur or adding security requirements to the analysis to ensure that it is 
detected. It is straightforward to structure the design analysis to consider integrity and 
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confidentiality modules separately, avoiding possible confusion between requirements that 
are intended to protect confidentiality or integrity concerns. This was the approach taken in 
section 11.5. 
The second option is to add security requirements to services that may be part of an 
threat path, in order to mimic malicious confidentiality messages. For example, an 
AssertConfidentiality requirement could be added to the FreeSoftware service, ensuring that 
if an threat path was otherwise present, then it would be detected. This process can be 
carried out systematically, as described at the end of this section. 
12.43.2. Malicious Authenticated Claims 
The integrity case is similar to the confidential problem. In the example system from 
section 11.5, OfficeServer requires updateData( to be authenticated by a Manager. The 
attack is for FreeSoftware to authenticate a suitable message by role. At present the worked 
example is vulnerable to this attack, which can be detected if FreeSoftware is given a 
ClaimAuthentication message security requirement that establishes an unplanned message 
flow to the OfficeServer. 
The system can defend this attack at either end of the end-to-end flow of malicious 
messages: 
" access to the updateData( operation can be restricted to a particular server as well as a 
role (see the discussion in 10.2.4.1); or 
" FreeSoftware can be prevented from authenticating a message as Manager by 
specifying a deployment constraint that prevents FreeSoftware being deployed to the 
Home organisation. 
The first option is a design question: the system may need to work with roaming users, 
or it may be able to use a single client. The second is good practice anyway, since although 
it places a security requirement on a service over which it has no implementation control, it 
states an important system-level implementation assumption: that FreeSoftware should not 
able to represent itself as an agent of the Home organisation. 
As well as avoiding the problem with a suitably structured system design, the analyst 
has the option to add security requirements to services that may carry out this type of attack, 
to ensure that it will be exposed by the analysis; in this example this would involve adding a 
ClaimAuthentication requirement to FreeSoftware. The next section describes how such 
requirements can be added systematically. 
12.433. Summary 
In systems that use message based security, attackers may increase the behaviour of the 
system above that which was analysed by constructing spoof messages. If the security 
requirements that specify such messages are not included in the analysis process there is a 
danger that these threat paths will be missed. The problem can either be avoided by a 
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structured approach to design, or systematically analysed by adding security requirements 
that simulate the information paths facilitated by such messages. 
The structured design approach: 
" separates confidentiality and integrity message requirements into separate protection 
modules; and 
" uses deployment constraints to constrain the ability of services to authenticate critical 
messages. 
It is also possible to ensure the systematic coverage of path and valuation analysis by 
adding security requirements that extend the behaviour of the system model. Essentially, 
what is required is a path between every possible attacker and every distinct confidentiality, 
or authentication by role security requirement. This enumeration can be constructed 
systematically: 
" select a subset of services such that at least one service in the subset is accessible by 
every possible attacker (organisation and user). 
" in each selected service, add an authentication claim by role with a matching asset type, 
for every distinct RequireAuthentication security requirement by role in the system. 
" in each selected service, add a confidentiality assertion with a matching asset type, 
confidential to every distinct RequireConfidentiality security requirement. 
This guarantees that there is a potential path from every attacker to every operation that 
accepts confidential, or role-authenticated, messages. Each of these is not a threat path in 
their own right, but they may facilitate paths which are identified by threat analysis. 
If the service subset is small then this enumeration will not result in the addition of a 
disproportionate number of security requirements; in the example there is a single 
representative external service, FreeSoftware, which would suffice. 
This section has highlighted problems with message-based security, which accrue 
because these security requirements are not pure constraints. Dealing with requirements that 
are a mixture of constraints and functions is inherently difficult; the analyst has the choice 
to structure the system and its analysis to avoid these problems, or 'to add security 
requirements to the design to ensure that related threats are detected. 
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12.5. Summary 
To manage the size and complexity of system design analysis it is necessary to divide 
the problem into manageable pieces, or protection modules; each of which represents one or 
more security concerns at a particular level of risk. The aim is for each module to be 
described by a concise protection strategy statement, and supported by security 
requirements that are sufficient to protect the related concerns. Each level of risk is 
considered in turn, and this ensures that the most critical risks are considered first. Within 
each risk level, protection modules are independently assessed and their supporting security 
requirements established; they are then brought together in a consolidated protection 
baseline for the system. (12.1) 
Different types of attacker (user, organisation, external) require different methods of 
analysis, although the underlying threat discovery method is straightforward given the 
framework components described in the previous three chapters: the system model, the 
information model and security requirements. (12.2) 
As well as the discovery of threat paths in a partially protected system, threat discovery 
methods can be used to support the quality assessment of protection strategies that are 
complete, in the sense that all threat paths have been resolved with security requirements. 
(12.3) Three forms of analysis are particularly valuable: 
9 requirements valuation, which determines the level of risk carried by each security 
requirement; 
" trust, which determines if services are trusted, in the sense that there is an exploitable 
path between the service and an asset of concern; and 
" liveness, which determines if a protection strategy has removed information paths 
between legitimate users and assets of concern. 
Finally, it is often necessary to add elements to a system model, such as other User role, 
or Guest client, to facilitate a comprehensive analysis. Most of these features are determined 
naturally by security distinctions that need to be made in the security environment, but the 
possibility of spoof message attacks (messages that are encrypted or signed by the wrong 
service) is such that it is necessary to carefully structure the analysis of systems that use 
these message requirements. (12.4) 
A security design is not just a set of security requirements attached to a system model; it 
is also a measure of the risk protected by those requirements, and the risk profile of external 
attacks via system components. All these features have implications for the implementation 
of a system, and this is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 13. Implementation Obligations that follow 
from a Security Design 
This thesis describes a systematic approach to security design analysis, but when the 
analysis is complete, and a set of security requirements have been specified that satisfy the 
designer, these requirements must be accurately reflected in the implementation. The 
detailed design and implementation of a system includes binding services to concrete 
locations or organisations, the development of individual services, and the choice of 
supporting infrastructure. These are all subject to security obligations established by the 
security design; security requirements are the most obvious form of implementation 
constraint, but there are others: 
" the management of vulnerabilities introduced during implementation; and 
" residual system level constraints. 
These are both important implementation issues. SeDAn provides component risk 
profiles, which indicate the sensitivity of the system to implementation vulnerabilities in 
individual components. Security design satisfies systematic security goals and objectives 
with component security requirements, but is not able to remove all security obligations at 
the system level; some residual system-level constraints remain, essentially to ensure that 
the implementation is faithful to the system design that was analysed. 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise how a SeDAn security design constrains an 
implementation. Most of this material has been introduced in previous chapters; this chapter 
summarises and references that material to provide an overview of the essential 
implementation obligations. 
In detail, the chapter is organised as follows: 
" section 13.1 is an overview of the relationship between analysis and implementation; it 
summarises the fundamental assumptions behind the analysis framework, and how they 
constrain an implementation. 
" section 13.2 describes what is necessary to maintain the integrity of the security design 
at the system level. There are three issues: the overall system structure, the need for 
security infrastructure, and service deployment. 
" section 13.3 describes implementation obligations that apply to individual services. 
These fall into two main categories: security requirements, and component risk profiles. 
The former are protection requirements that were derived during analysis, the latter 
provide the focus for reviewing implementation-level risks, such as physical, procedural 
or software vulnerabilities. The section also discusses the issue of trust in system 
components, since many systems include embedded untrusted components. 
9 section 13.4 summarises the chapter. 
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Supplementary material can be found in previous chapters and is referenced in the text. 
This chapter is not a guide to implementing secure systems; information on this subject can 
be found in standard security texts (e. g. [199,250]). 
13.1. Fundamental Assumptions 
The aim of security design analysis is to solve the systematic security problem: to show 
how goals and concerns that apply to the system as a whole are satisfied by security 
requirements that are placed on individual system components, predominantly services. In 
order to make the connection between systematic goals and local requirements, it is 
necessary to have a model of the system which incorporates security-relevant aspects of risk 
analysis: the organisations, users, goals, concerns and attackers, as well as the system 
design. In SeDAn this is known as the information model (see section 9.2), and the 
characteristics of this model determine important implementation obligations. A typical 
information model is shown in figure 13.1, reproduced from section 9.2. 
The underlying model of the system is a set of services that exchange information via 
information carriers (messages, other assets and communication to and from users). This is 
represented in the information model in figure 13.1 by services, (sl, s2, s3) with unspecified 
internal information flow, that transfer information between vertices (va ... vg), which map 
directly to the information carriers in the system. For example, va and vb represent the call 
and return of an operation in s3 by sl; of is part of the state of service s2 which is identified 
because it is security-significant, and vg and vh represent communication to and from a 
particular user role. 
LJ. 
Figure 13.1. A Typical Information Model Corresponding to a Small System 
During security analysis, security requirements are interpreted in terms of this 
information model. Some requirements, such as access controls, can be related directly to 
the system and its implementation; an access control prevents a particular flow of messages, 
and these correspond to particular vertices in the information model. However, services are 
functionally undefined; the information model provides a generic framework to allow the 
analysis of security requirements placed on services, but says nothing about their 
functionality. This is consistent with a system-level design; the specification of service 
Implementation Obligations that follow from a Security Design 313 
operations in such a design does not provide any information about what a service does, it 
simply specifies the interfaces it supports. 
In essence, security design analysis factors the system into islands of generic, but 
unspecified, functionality (the services) using the information that is present in the 
functional design (the flow of messages and interface specifications). This allows the 
decomposition of system properties to requirements on individual services, and remains 
valid provided that the implementation reflects the same structure. Section 9.2.3 identifies 
the three critical assumptions that underpin this approach to security design: 
"a system can be decomposed into services; 
" the only information flow between services is via identifiable information carriers; and 
" the structure of the services and information carriers is consistent between a system 
design and its implementation (see below). 
The System 
The contract between analysis and implementation is specified in the third bullet: that 
the actual messages and the structure of the system in the implementation is identical to that 
which was analysed. If this contract is met, then the implementer is able to use the 
requirements and risk profiles that are produced during security analysis to focus on service 
level implementation, and not system level security. From the security perspective, 
therefore, the implementer has two obligations: 
" to maintain the integrity of the system design; and 
" to comply with security requirements, and protect against implementation risks for 
individual services. 
Maintaining the integrity of the security design is mostly concerned with complying 
with the interfaces specified in the system model, including ensuring that there are no other 
means of communication between services. However, it is also necessary to ensure that 
certain parameters used in security requirements are universally available and consistent 
across the system; these include user roles, organisations and services. For example, access 
control requirements need to reliably distinguish the identity of different services or users. It 
is therefore necessary to ensure that these system level identities are provided by the 
implementation, for example, by the use of a security infrastructure. 
The final system property of importance to an implementer is deployment. Deployment 
constraints are prohibitions about the concrete bindings that are made between services and 
organisations, or administrations. In this sense deployment is a local constraint on a service; 
however, it can be enforced only at the system level, not by the service or the immediate 
environment of the service. There are also related system obligations: deployment 
constraints limit the user roles that a service may authenticate, and the assets deployed with 
the service. 
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In summary, the system level implementation obligations are to: 
" maintain the separation between services, and the interfaces between them; 
" consistently identify user roles, organisations, and services; and 
" observe deployment constraints. 
Services 
There are two products of security analysis that place obligations on individual services: 
security requirements and risk profiles. 
Security requirements record the security design, and are defined in chapter 10. Risk 
profiles are the product of external risk assessments for system components (see sections 
7.4.3and 12.2.3), and provide the starting point for risk-based evaluation of implementation 
vulnerabilities in individual components. The physical implementation may allow access to 
the system in ways that are not modelled in the system design, allowing attacks such as theft 
or wiretapping. The external risk profile provides a risk metric that indicates how 
vulnerable the system is to attacks via each of its components. This allows the risk-based 
review of implementation components, without needing a re-evaluation of the overall 
system. 
The component, or service level, obligations are therefore to: 
" comply with the specified security requirements; and 
" defend against the risk of attacks that access the system via mechanisms outside the 
system design, in particular via implementation defects (vulnerabilities), or via 
implementation features, including the physical or organisational context of the system. 
Other Implementation Issues - Problem Requirements 
Although not an implementation obligation, there is another fundamental aspect of the 
framework of importance to an implementer, and that is the possibility that security 
requirements are specified that cannot be implemented. 
The problem arises because deferred requirements are not fully modelled in the 
information model used for analysis; their interpretation also depends on the informal 
semantics of related asset concerns. When a threat path is protected by a deferred 
requirement, the only formal information available to the analysis is the position of the 
requirement on the threat path. It is therefore possible for the security designer to assign a 
requirement to a component which is on the threat path, but is unable to support the 
informally specified security objective. 
A concrete example is discussed in section 933.4. Essentially, a requirement is 
specified to block a denial-of-service path from an attacker to a query presentation, which is 
the asset of concern. However, not all components in the threat path are able to defend the 
denial of service, since some are functionally dependent on inputs that may themselves be 
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attacked. As a result, the protection of this threat is possible in some places in the threat 
path, and not in others. 
This problem should be avoided by correct security design, but it is useful for 
implementers to understand its symptoms and origin. 
Security requirements may also not be implementable because they disable the system 
functionally. These may be detected during the design process by liveness checks, but 
remain a possibility, as they do in most types of security design. Of course, both these 
problems indicate that a system's protection strategy should be re-designed. 
The following sections describe each of the implementation obligations in turn. 
13.2. System-level Obligations 
System-level security obligations are those that are necessary to preserve the 
assumptions that were made during security analysis, and which apply to the whole system, 
as opposed to individual components. The previous section introduced three types of system 
obligation, service structure, system identities, and deployment, which are discussed in turn 
below. 
13.2.1. The Service Structure: Separation and Communication 
The requirements on an implementer to maintain the integrity of the system structure 
amount to ensuring that the system model is correctly interpreted, and the separation model 
of services is upheld. 
The detail of how the system model should be interpreted is described in section 8.2.2. 
This provides the designer with much modelling freedom, but it is important because the 
interpretation of the system design by the implementer must be consistent with its meaning 
in the analysis framework. 
The essence of a system from a security perspective is its division into services, and the 
identification of information carriers between these services. This is described in section 
9.2, and summarised above (13.1). The operations, or messages, of a service define its 
interface: both the messages that are possible and the types of data they contain. The 
primary security obligations are therefore to: 
" maintain the same overall structure of sub-systems, or services; 
" provide only operations (or allow messages) as specified in the system design; and 
" not allow any other means of communication between services. 
The association relations between services in the UML design are not important, since 
in a complete security design, access control requirements specify all the permitted 
accesses. This provides a record, in the security requirements for the system, of the service 
connectivity that was analysed. However, operation names are used in SeDAn to 
consistently identify messages between different services. If there is an implementation 
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failure to maintain consistency between services, then the type of problem shown in figure 
13.2 can arise. 
I 
user manger 
cl 
confused implementation 
Il s2 getNewsO getConfidentialDataO 
Figure 13.2. Confused Implementation Messages 
In this scenario there are two services: a client, cl, that services two different user roles, 
and a service, s2, that manages two different types of data. In the security design, a flow 
constraint was specified in the client, cl, to prevent confidential data leaking into the output 
of getNewsO, and this constraint identified messages from getConfidentialData( by using 
that operation name. However, if the continuity of message naming is confused in the 
implementation, resulting in the message flow shown in the figure, this constraint is 
ineffective, since cl no longer correctly identifies the confidential messages. 
The implementation must therefore maintain consistency between the messages 
identified in the design, and in the implementation. This may be as simple as maintaining a 
set of known message types, or it may require additional levels of message authentication. 
13.2.2. The Need for Security Infrastructure 
Parameters used in SeDAn security requirements, and which refer to remote entities, 
must have a consistent meaning wherever they are used in the system. The most significant 
are: 
" user roles; 
" organisations; 
" services; and 
" operations. 
User roles are important primitive security types, their reliability and consistency across 
an implementation is critically important. Organisations are also globally significant; for 
example, a deployment constraint specifies that a service should not be deployed to a 
specific organisation. 
Services are referenced in three different ways, which may be supported by the same, or 
different, security infrastructures. The three types of reference are: 
" an identity (e. g. as in an access control requirement); 
"a source of message authentication; and 
"a destination of message confidentiality. 
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The two other parameters used in security requirements are operation names and asset 
types; the significance of operation names was described in the previous section, the names 
of asset types are only of local significance to each service. 
The obligation to identify user roles, organisations, and services could be implemented 
by a basic public key system; all that is required is that these identities are consistent, and 
available to any service that needs them. Nothing more is assumed about the exact details of 
the security infrastructure, or even if it makes use of public key technology - this is a 
convenient and well-understood mechanism, but other types of infrastructure can achieve 
the same effect. 
The best way to treat more elaborate types of security infrastructure remains an open 
question. For example, an identity system, such as that described in section 5.2.3, could 
either be modelled as part of a system design, or could be regarded as the infrastructure 
solution to system-wide user roles. There are pros and cons; the former would produce a 
more complicated system design, but make fewer assumptions about system-level 
infrastructure; the latter would focus the system design on the business and application, but 
the complexity of the identity system would introduce new interfaces during 
implementation. The resolution of this requires more study of the lifecycle of a system 
following security design analysis. 
13.2.3. Constraining Service Deployment 
Deployment constraints in SeDAn place three different security obligations on an 
implementation: 
9 where services can be deployed (i. e. to which organisations); 
" what is deployed with each service; and 
" which services are able to authenticate which user roles. 
Deployment is specified in section 10.2.1.2, and the issue of what should be deployed 
with each service is specified in sections 10.2.2.2 and 12.2.2. In brief, a deployment 
constraint is a security requirement that specifies that a service should not be deployed to a 
particular organisation, and should not be able to authenticate messages as originating from 
roles in that organisation. 
Deployment may be a static binding made during the design process, or a dynamic 
binding made at run-time, as in some grid applications. In the former the development 
process must satisfy the security obligation; the latter requires an implementation 
mechanism, similar to access control. 
Services may only authenticate messages as originating from user roles that are 
associated with an organisation to which the service may be deployed; this places a further 
requirement on the supporting security infrastructure described in the previous section. 
--Deployment separation is a different requirement (see section 10.2.2.2); it specifies that 
if any assets within the deployment group of a service are classified by user role, then only 
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those associated with user roles of the organisation to which the service is deployed may be 
deployed with the service. In other words, deployment separation requires the implementer 
to ensure that only the data belonging to the destination organisation be deployed with the 
service. This is particularly relevant to systems with dynamic or late binding of services to 
organisations. 
13.3. Component-level Obligations 
Definitions 
Implementation components are not identical to services, but services in the system 
design are carriers for security requirements and other constraints that apply to the 
components that implement, or host these services'. This section will use `component' to 
mean `the component that implements or hosts a service', and `service' to mean either the 
abstract service, or the actual service offered by a component, depending upon context. 
Introduction 
Security requirements for system components fall into two categories: 
" requirements that are specified during system-level security analysis; and 
" controls that need to be added during implementation, in order to protect the system 
from attacks via unorthodox access mechanisms. 
Requirements specified during security analysis are local to services. Of these, 
deployment requirements constrain either the design process, or the supporting system (see 
13.2.3); all the others can be enforced by the implementation component itself, or the 
infrastructure directly associated with the component. 
New security requirements are introduced during implementation, because each level of 
design introduces its own vulnerabilities. System-level security analysis is unable to 
specify implementation-specific requirements, but it does provide a risk profile for each 
component, which can be used in an implementation risk assessment. In the case of 
implementation-level risks the primary components are those that implement services, but it 
is also necessary to consider risks to communications, users, and the direct communications 
between user clients and users. 
13.3.1. Security Requirements on Components 
The intent of each security requirement is described in detail in chapter 10, and the 
implementation obligation is to ensure that these constraints are met. This section does not 
repeat that material, but summarises the requirements for each of the four main classes in 
the requirements taxonomy: access, classification, service behaviour, and message security. 
23 The relationship between the system design and implementation is discussed in section 8.22 for security 
requirements, and 121.3.1 for risk profiles. 
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Point-to-point access controls are the most common type of security requirement; they 
are usually implemented in infrastructure outside application software, using mechanisms 
that range from simple firewalls to specialist trust management systems. 
Classification requirements apply to either services or assets, the former are deployment 
separation constraints and have been discussed in section 13.2.3. An asset classification 
requirement specifies that a service is able to identify the ownership of an instance of an 
asset. This may be enforced by system infrastructure (e. g. user accounts, database logins) or 
application software. 
Constraints on service behaviour are generally the hardest to interpret; they are specified 
in terms of information flow, and by reference to the concerns that they defend (see section 
9.1). Unlike access controls, which can be implemented in security infrastructure, service 
requirements often constrain the functionality of applications that implement services, as 
well as their host infrastructure. Some SeDAn constraint patterns correspond to common 
infrastructure mechanisms (i. e. stateless, enforce separation), but care still needs to be taken 
to ensure that any proposed mechanisms are strong enough for the particular application. 
For example, web-servers and application servers support stateless operations by providing 
notional separation between different instances of the same application, but the strength of 
separation varies significantly between different software technologies. 
Message Requirements, on the other hand, are implemented with well-understood 
communications mechanisms; in most cases the underlying strength of mechanism is well 
established (e. g. the type of cryptography), as is the trust base for cryptographic keys. The 
access controls implied by message requirements can be implemented in infrastructure, 
often as part of a systematic approach to access management. One implementation difficulty 
is resolving what is intended by a client service that authenticates a message by role. This 
usually means that the actual user is prepared to sign the message, so the implementer must 
take care that the information presented to the user, and the method of presentation, ensures 
that the user understands the nature of the commitment. 
Most of these issues will be found in standard texts on security implementation, the 
service behaviour constraints are less common, but even these will be familiar in concept to 
those involved in component evaluation. However, a new factor that SeDAn brings to all 
these requirements is their value in terms of risk. A requirements valuation provides a guide 
to the level of risk supported by each security requirement, and this is helpful in deciding if 
the strength of mechanism, or the degree of assurance in the design process, is 
commensurate with the risk defended by the particular requirement. 
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13.3.2. Implementation Risk 
Implementation introduces security vulnerabilities that are not predictable at the system 
level; however, the security analysis is able to measure the vulnerability of a system to 
subverted components, and this provides a risk profile that guides the implementation-level 
risk assessment of individual components. 
SeDAn uses a concept of external attacks (see sections 7.43,7.5.6, and 12.2.3); an 
external attack is one that uses a non-standard mechanism to access or subvert a system 
component, which then becomes an attack agent. For example, consider an attacker who 
physically accesses a corporate local area network socket, which is logically behind a 
corporate firewall, and then uses services on the corporate network to destroy valuable 
company data. The system design identified the need for access control to these services, 
which is implemented by the firewall. 
In this case the `non-standard' part of the attack is physical access to a communications 
path; the services used to destroy the data are a legitimate part of the system, perhaps used 
for data management. 
How do risk profiles help this situation? An external risk assessment would indicate that 
there is an external risk to both the services that update this data, and their communications. 
The implementer does not need to carry out a risk assessment on the whole system to 
determine the exposure of these individual components, but as part of the implementation 
must consider the risk profiles of individual parts of the system and ensure that they are 
appropriately protected. In this case the need for physical access control to the 
communications may seem obvious, but the attack is on a LAN between the services and 
the firewall, and without a risk profile the implementer responsible for this network may 
have little idea of the level of risk to remote corporate assets. 
External risk assessments are reported in three categories: services, communications and 
users. 
Components that implement services may be physically vulnerable (dynamite, flood, 
fire, theft, direct connection), but software vulnerabilities that afford remote access are also 
a problem. These include operational matters (software integrity, configuration, 
management, control of available services) as well as non-standard electronic access (e. g. 
buffer overflows, exploiting unintentionally offered services). The set of possible 
vulnerabilities is very wide, but the security analysis can characterise the threats from 
external attackers, to provide a local risk profile for each part of the system. This does 
require the elicitation and modelling of attackers to include lifecycle and implementation 
issues; for example: are software developers, or commercial suppliers of software 
infrastructure, potential attackers? 
Communications vulnerability is often easier to manage than that of services, but an 
implementer must not assume that internal communications are necessarily free from 
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physical or electronic interference. A favourite trick of penetration testers is to install a 
wireless network spur using an internal network outlet (e. g. see chapter 6 of [291]), and a 
well-known system attack is to install a network `sniffer' on a relatively unimportant and 
unprotected machine, providing access to an internal network with much more sensitive 
information, such as unencrypted passwords. The risk profile for communications 
components provides a starting point for a review of the implementation. 
User roles and the communications to users also have risk profiles, and the 
interpretation of these risks is system specific. Users themselves are not immune from 
attack: blackmail, bribery and extortion may be relatively rare, but social engineering is 
very common (e. g. phishing attacks via email). These profiles provide an objective basis to 
consider the number of people in each user role, business process issues, such as the need 
for authorisation procedures, or even the need for staff vetting. They may also provide an 
objective input to acceptable usage policies, and other forms of social user conditioning. 
However, in a well-designed system, the risk profile to user roles should not contain any 
surprises, since the privilege given to each role should faithfully mirror its part in the 
business process supported by the system. 
The interpretation of the communication to a user depends upon the system. If the client 
is a web-server and user communication is via a remote browser (see section 5.1.1), then 
only low risks may be acceptable. On the other hand, even a direct visual link may need 
some degree of protection if it carries a high level of risk. 
In summary, component risk profiles are an important output of security analysis, since 
they facilitate implementation-level risk-analysis of individual system components. This 
section has provided examples to stress the importance of this linkage, not to provide a 
guide to implementing secure systems. The security environment used as the basis of 
analysis must include implementation-level attacks to ensure that suitably fine grain 
component risk profiles are generated. 
13.3.3. Trust in System Components 
Trust is broadly regarded as an expectation that a component will behave in a certain 
way. If a security infrastructure component is trusted in some sense, it is not contained in 
that sense. In other words if a system is dependent on a behaviour of a component, by 
definition, it has no independent way of guaranteeing that behaviour. 
The question of whether a component is trusted is therefore important, and is often an 
issue in the negative sense: it may be desirable to show that the security of the system does 
not depend on certain components, because their behaviour is unpredictable (e. g. services 
on the Internet). 
This problem was discussed in section 12.3.2. In brief, services that must uphold 
security requirements are clearly trusted, but this criterion is not sufficient to identify the 
need for trust. The definition of trust needs to reflect the extent that a component could 
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attack the system, if subverted, since this includes the possibility of implementation defects 
and non-standard access paths. Section 123.2 provides the following definition: 
A service is trusted if there is any exploitable path between that service and an asset 
of concern. 
This is a binary definition, but of course a particular component may be able to mount 
certain attacks and not others. This is exactly the information contained in a risk profile, as 
discussed in the previous section. Risk profiles can therefore be regarded as measures of 
trust, since they characterise the reliance placed on system components. They can be used to 
answer the binary trust question, and also provide finer grain information about the 
exposure of the system to particular components. For example, an organisation may be 
prepared to accept low risk threats in return for the benefit of grid deployment, and the risk 
profile could be used to check that services deployed to the grid were only capable of 
mounting low-risk attacks against the remainder of the system. 
13.4. Summary 
Security design decomposes security objectives, which are systematic properties of a 
system, into requirements on individual services. The primary job of an implementer is to 
ensure that system components meet these requirements. However, there are other' 
obligations that must be met by a system if the security design is to remain valid, these are 
that: 
" the system topology is maintained, in particular that the flow of messages between 
services is the same as that in the design; 
" that users, organisations and services, can be consistently and reliably identified. An 
implementation may need a basic security infrastructure to ensure that this is the case; 
and 
9 that deployment constraints are honoured. 
New security problems are also introduced during implementation. The physical 
location of a system may make it vulnerable to theft, or the administration of the system 
may allow the substitution or corruption of software. SeDAn provides risk profiles, which 
specify the extent that each part of the system (services, communications, users) could be 
used to attack assets of concern. Risk profiles provide metrics that facilitate component- 
level risk evaluation of the implementation, and they also connect the system-level security 
analysis to the social, physical and infrastructural context of a system. 
In summary, the bulk of the security obligations on an implementer are specific to 
services; these are security requirements, and the need to take account of implementation 
risk. There are some residual system-level obligations: to maintain the same topology that 
was analysed, to ensure the reliability of certain global information, such as user roles, and 
to comply with deployment constraints. There are no goal-specific or concern-specific 
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requirements remaining at the system level, so SeDAn is effective in its primary objective 
of moving from systematic security objectives to local security requirements. 
This chapter has not discussed development methodologies, but understanding the 
security obligations of an implementation is the same as understanding when a 
implementation has moved outside the scope of a security analysis, and it is necessary to 
rework the system level analysis. For example, changing the design of a service has no 
effect at the system level, but changing the interface to a service requires a new security 
analysis. For the same reason, chapter 9 discusses the need for a functionality first approach 
to security goals; functionality in support of security goals (e. g. audit functions in support of 
availability goals) should be included in the design before analysis, not later in the 
development cycle. Of course, a change to the security environment of a system, such as the 
addition of new user roles, or an updated attack appraisal, also requires the system to be 
considered as a whole. 
This chapter concludes part 2 of the thesis, which describes the SeDAn framework in 
detail; it shows how the framework meets the requirements established in part 1, and 
provides worked examples and explanations that clarify the applicability of each framework 
component. 
Part three of this thesis moves from examples to real problems. Chapter 15 describes the 
security analysis of a multi-organisational service-oriented distributed system. Before that 
case study, chapter 14 describes the tooling that is necessary to allow SeDAn to be applied 
in practice. 
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PART 3: SEDAN IN PRACTICE: EXPERIENCE AND EVALUATION 
Part three presents the practical evaluation of SeDAn. The Security Analyst Workbench is 
described first, which is a proof-of-concept requirements management and analysis tool. 
The core material is the case study in chapter 15, which describes the use of SeDAn in the 
analysis and design of an industrial-scale system. This part also concludes the thesis by 
evaluating the extent that the thesis proposition has been demonstrated, summarising 
important and novel aspects of SeDAn that are of wider significance, and recording open 
questions that arise from the work. 
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Chapter 14. Tool Support: The Security Analyst 
Workbench 
The previous part of this thesis describes the SeDAn framework; this third part 
demonstrates that it can be used in practice. The most substantial part of this demonstration 
is the case study in chapter 15, which describes how SeDAn was used to evaluate a real 
system. However, the analysis of an industrial-scale system is feasible only if it is tool- 
supported, so this chapter first describes the tool used to support the case study, the Security 
Analyst Workbench (SAW). SAW is a proof-of-concept tool, which: 
9 demonstrates that the SeDAn framework can be tooled; 
" provides the capability to analyse realistic-sized systems; and 
" explores the user functionality necessary to support design analysis. 
Chapter 1 discussed requirements that must be met for a framework to be 'practical', 
and all these must be reflected in supporting tools. To be effective, a tool must: 
" automate the underlying analysis process; 
" integrate with standard, UML, engineering practice and development tools; and 
" be scalable, to support the security design of realistic-sized systems. 
Without an analytic tool it would not be practical to carry out the study described in the 
next chapter in any way that could be described as systematic. However, Security Design 
Analysis is a design activity: the process of establishing a protection strategy involves 
choices about the placement and type of security requirements; the SeDAn framework 
informs that choice, it does not automate it. As a result, the tool requires a richer and more 
interactive set of user functions that are suggested by `analysis', and most of these functions 
are concerned with supporting the management of a set of security requirements. 
This chapter reviews the requirements for a SeDAn tool, describes the architecture of 
the Security Analyst Workbench, and evaluates the performance and scalability of the tool. 
In detail, this chapter is organised as follows: 
" section 14.1 describes the primary requirements for a SeDAn support tool: design 
analysis, and managing a set of security requirements. The latter requires an interactive 
interface, with consequences for performance, design, and UML integration; 
" section 14.2 is an outline description of the Security Analyst Workbench. It introduces 
the architecture of the tool and briefly describes each part of the system; 
" section 14.3 evaluates the performance and scalability of the present tool. This indicates 
the size of system that can be analysed using proof-of-concept tooling, and the point at 
which a performance-oriented implementation is necessary; and 
" section 14.4 summarises the chapter. 
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Supplementary material can be found in section 7.5.1, which describes the analysis 
traces produced by the tool, and provides examples. Examples of other analysis reports 
(valuation and requirements listing) can be found in section 7.5.5. 
14.1. Tool Requirements 
A SeDAn tool must support systematic threat path analysis; it should be able to evaluate 
paths in a UML model between different types of attacker (user, organisation, external) and 
assets of concern. A tool should also automate the analysis methods used to evaluate the 
quality of protection strategies, such as requirements valuation (see section 12.3). These 
tool requirements are outlined in the next section (14.1.1), including the features needed to 
manage the analysis process. 
The process of Security Design establishes a set of security requirements, which could 
either be managed in the UML design environment, or within the analysis tooling. This 
choice is explored in section 14.1.2, below, which concludes that security analysis will be 
used to explore protection problems, as well as check fully defined protection strategies. As 
a result the tool must be interactive, with consequences for performance and functionality. 
14.1.1. Supporting Analysis 
Threat path analysis is described in detail in chapter 12. In summary, the system model, 
which includes both the functional design and details of the security environment, is 
mapped to an information model (see chapter 9), which is a graph in which the vertices 
correspond to information carriers in the real system (e. g. messages) and the edges are 
partitioned between the services in the system, providing a generic model for the behaviour 
of each service. Security requirements either constrain the system model, in which case they 
change the topology of the system (i. e. the information model vertices) or they constrain the 
behaviour of services, in which case they place constraints on the information paths that are 
possible within services (i. e. graph edges). The underlying analysis process finds paths in 
the information model; the assets of concern and attackers in the system model determine 
the origin and goal vertices of these paths. 
The main functions in this analysis process are shown in figure 14.1. Arrowed lines 
show the data input or output by each function, and data items are distinguished by 
document symbols. The diagram also shows which parts of the system model are used by 
which function. 
The following description is a functional outline of the detailed analysis process 
described in chapter 12. 
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System Model 
(Functional Modej/ I (Deferred I (Security 
Security Requirements) Requirements) Environment) 
Build Generic Specify Constraints Analysis Type 
Model (Vertexes) on Services 
Information Model Specify Analysis 
Path Origins and Goals 
Path Checking 
Figure 14.1. Main Functions in the Analysis Process 
The Build Generic Model function specifies the vertices in the information model; these 
are obtained directly from the system model: the functional model defines the topology, and 
this may be constrained by security requirements. The edges in the information model may 
also be constrained, by Deferred Requirements, to specify the behaviour of services. The 
Speck Constraints on Services function uses deferred requirements in the system model to 
place constraints on what edges are allowed in the information model; however, some types 
of constraint are specific to particular concerns, so the information model is a set of 
information graphs, one for each possible concern. 
The Path Checking function uses the information model as input, together with a 
specification of which vertices are the search origins and goals. This function determines if 
there are paths in the information model between the origin and goal vertices. 
The goals and origins are generated by the Specify Analysis function, which varies 
depending on the type of analysis required (e. g. user or organisational). The analysis type 
may limit the search to particular risk ranges, the asset concern to be analysed, or by role or 
organisation. Limiting a search by role or organisation specifies that a particular user's or 
organisation's assets are the target of attack. The Security Environment is navigated to 
identify attackers that target the security goals to which each concern is traced. 
The underlying processes determine the parameters that can be used to control or tailor a 
particular threat path analysis, they are: 
" the type of analysis (user, organisation, or external); 
" the level of risk; 
" the particular asset concern; and 
" the asset owner (organisation or user role). 
Some of the analysis methods described in chapter 12 require automated management of 
these parameters, or of the system model. For example, in requirements valuation each 
requirement is removed from the system model in turn, and then path analysis carried out 
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for each resulting protection strategy. A SeDAn analysis tool must support these types of 
automation, as well as the basic analysis process described above. 
Finally, it is necessary to map the results of an analysis back to the system model: the 
paths discovered in information model terms must be presented to the user in system terms. 
14.1.2. Managing a Protection Strategy 
A SeDAn tool must also integrate with standard UML engineering environments, to 
ensure that security analysis is carried out on the actual system design, and that resulting 
security requirements are recorded with the primary system engineering documentation. 
The foundations for UML integration were established in chapter 8, which gave UMIL 
profiles that define how a system model is recorded; this allows a standard functional 
design to be extended with a security environment, thus providing sufficient contextual 
information for analysis. The simplest integrated tool would provide an off-line analysis 
function capable of importing the UML model from an existing design tool. However, 
practical considerations suggest the need for a more sophisticated capability. 
The fundamental problem is that security design analysis is a design activity (see section 
9.1); most protection problems have no unique solution to the type and placement of 
security requirements. It is therefore necessary to choose between different protection 
strategies. In consequence, the analysis tool will be used to explore design alternatives, so 
its performance as an investigative tool is as significant as its ability to carry out bulk 
analysis. The interactive performance of a SeDAn tool is dominated by its two main 
functions: 
" path analysis; and 
" managing a protection strategy. 
The analysis process was summarised in the previous section. The parameters that can 
be used to manage or limit the scope of analysis (see above) are particularly significant in 
an interactive environment, since they allow each threat path analysis to be well focused. 
The set of security requirements that comprise a protection strategy could be recorded in 
UML then imported into an analysis tool, but there are a number of factors that suggest that 
the analysis tool should directly support the management of protection strategies. They 
include: 
" the time to export models from UML design tools (e. g. into XMl) is generally too slow 
for interactive use (it depends on the UML tool, but may be several minutes for designs 
of any size, even using well-specified PCs); and 
" many security requirements have context-sensitive parameters. The scope for error and 
rework is greatly reduced by context and type-correct input management, as opposed to 
after-the-fact type checking. 
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In consequence, an important requirement for an analysis tool is to provide a 
management capability for protection strategies, consistent with interactive operation. 
14.1.3. Summary 
A tool to support SeDAn must support security design, not just analysis, and this 
implies that the tool will be used in an exploratory and interactive way. Its main functions 
are: 
" threat path analysis; and 
" managing the security requirements that comprise a protection strategy. 
In order to focus the threat path analysis, it must be possible to specify parameters that 
narrow the scope of analysis (type, risk, concern and owner). More complex types of 
analysis (e. g. requirements valuation) must also be supported using the core analysis 
process. 
The facilities to manage a protection strategy must ensure that only type-correct security 
requirements can be input, and provide as much context-sensitive help as possible. The need 
to record the security design in the UML system' documentation is also important, so if 
security requirements are specified outside a UML design tool, it must be possible to update 
the UML system model with a revised protection strategy, in other words to round trip the 
system model. 
14.2. The Security Analyst Workbench (SANN) Architecture 
The SAW architecture is shown in figure 14.2, and directly reflects its main 
requirements. Functions and data items are shown using the same diagram conventions as 
figure 14.1; control paths from the interface to the functions are shown in grey, and 
boundaries of the main subsystems are shown as broken lines. This model shows only the 
main functional units; SAW has other supporting functions that are normal for tools of this 
type, such as analysis logging and tool options management. 
There are four main subsystems in the Security Analyst Workbench: 
" the User Interface; 
" the XIVII Interface; 
" the Requirements Management Tool; and 
" the Analysis Tool. 
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Figure 14.2. Security Analyst Workbench Architecture 
The interface between SAW and the UML design environment is an XNU file: SAW 
loads models in XMl format, and saves models that have been modified internally (e. g. by 
adding new security requirements) into XMI, allowing the requirements specified within the 
tool to be transferred to a proprietary UML development environment. 
There are three different formats for the System Model: 
" the proprietary UML model held within a UML development environment; 
" the XMI form of the propriety model that is used for model exchange; and 
" the internal model that is held within SAW and managed interactively. 
From the user perspective, SAW edits the XML file, and the user then needs to re-import 
that file into the UNIL development environment; all information exported from the UML 
development environment into XMl (e. g. diagram layouts) is maintained during the edit. 
The following sections provide an overview of each of the four SAW subsystems in 
turn. 
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14.2.1. The User Interface 
A screenshot of the user interface is presented in figure 14.3. The system Windel 
displayed in this view is part of the case study, described in chapter 15. 
Grid SBMCe_ Provider 
RollsRoyce 
constrain »> 
I. 
New Working Focus selected EngineGUi 
New Analysis concern selected IV-Decision-Basis 
New Role selected All Roles 
New Working Organisation selected All organisations 
New Role selected Engineer 
User Path Analysis requested 
Concern IV_Decision Basis Searching by Engineer - No paths found, search from risk level 3 terminated with boundary at 1 
Total Processing Time 0 seconds 
Figure 14.3. Security Analyst Workbench User lntcrface 
The user interface is designed to provide easy access to the functions described 
previously. It is divided into three areas, the main tabbed area, which is used to manage 
security requirements (top right), the context panel (the area on the left) and the journal 
viewer (the bottom text panel). 
The context panel sets and displays the current working context: the level of'risk ( 1), file 
current concern (IV Decision_Basis) and the current service (Engine(; (' /). File tabbed area 
displays and manages security requirements on the current service. 
The context panel also provides quick access to often-used analysis functions: user 
analysis, admin analysis and the valuation of requirements at a particular service (the t(,. %t 
requirements panel). The scope of these functions is constrained by the current context, so 
the performance of the most used functions are acceptably fast. The user anal) sis and admin 
analysis may be constrained to a particular user role (Engineer) or organisation. as 
described above (see section 14.1.1). 
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Each panel in the tabbed area displays and manages one type of security requirement; 
the panel shown in figure 14.3 is used to specify deployment constraints. The deployment 
of the EngineGUI service is unconstrained to four organisations, but it may not be deployed 
to Organisation, or Organisation n. The panel also allows the specification of deployment 
separation, by the check box (see section 10.2.2.2). 
The journal viewer displays analysis results and other information, which includes user 
actions and error reports. The journal may also be also logged to file for future reference. 
The main window menu provides four groups of functions: 
" File functions include file loading and saving; saving a file automatically merges any 
modified security requirements with the input XMl file; 
" Tools provide analysis functions with a wider scope than those in the context panel, 
such as checking all requirements. These are typically used when an analyst needs to 
decide which requirement to work next. The performance of these functions is not 
necessarily interactive, but acceptable for once-a-session functions (10s of seconds to 
minutes). This menu also includes SAW configuration options; 
" Info queries allow the analyst to search the UML model, rather than looking information 
up in a UML diagram. These provide quick access to information that would otherwise 
need to be deduced by navigating associations in the model, such as the data items 
managed by a service; and 
" Reports are batch analysis functions that provide very comprehensive offline analysis. 
They include requirements valuation, testing external attackers by user, service or 
communications, and printing a system requirements strategy. 
The user interface integrates all the functions needed for security design analysis - there 
are no off-line processes, other than the need to export and import XMl files from the UML 
design tool. The user interface is designed to support a user who understands the 
implications of the various security requirements, and needs to test their effectiveness. 
14.2.2. The XMI Interface and UML integration 
The purpose of the XMl interface is to import UML system models from a UML 
development environment, and merge updated security requirements back into the original 
UML source. This is known as `round-tripping' the model, and it allows a UML system 
model to be shared between a UML development environment and SAW. 
The persistent representation of a system model used by SAW is an XMI file [292], 
which can be read and written by SAW, and also by UML development environments. This 
exchange format naturally supports round-tripping of models, since they can be freely 
imported or exported from either tool. 
However, there is a problem with this approach: the format of XMl data varies between 
different UML development environments, because of differences in their internal 
metamodels. The SAW XMI interface avoids this problem by interpreting a novel bi- 
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directional template language, in which a single template specifies both the extraction of the 
system description from the XMJ, and also round trips an updated SAW model back into 
XMl. The result is that SAW can be interfaced to different UML development 
environments by replacing a single template description, and the format of the XMl file 
used as input and output by SAW is the native format of the current UML development 
environment. 
The details of this approach to round-tripping models is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
and is described in a separate paper [7]. 
14.2.3. The Requirements Management Tool 
This tool maintains an internal version of the system model, and provides facilities for 
the user to manage that model. The Model Manager carries out the latter function, 
providing queries that are used by the user interface to populate its display, and the facilities 
to add or remove security requirements. The requirements management tool also maintains 
context data known as the Interactive Focus, the most important elements of which are 
those that are set in the user interface context panel (risk level, concern, service, role and 
organisation). The focus data modify the behaviour of model queries and analysis requests. 
The requirements management tool also includes a Type Checker. The primary function 
of the type checker is to ensure that imported models are valid, in particular that: 
" they comply with the constraints specified in the UML profiles in chapter 8; and 
" that security requirements reference valid model types. 
The SAW user will normally be aware of the type checker only if there are type errors 
when a UML file is imported for the first time. However, the type-checker runs 
continuously in the background, since the model manager and user interface are relatively 
complex, and continuous type checking increases the likelihood that any software errors 
will be detected 
14.2.4. The Analysis Tool 
The main functions that comprise the analysis process are described above (see section 
14.1.1), and the analysis tool implements these almost directly. The main difference 
between the functions described in section 14.1.1, and their implementation, is that in the 
implementation the information model is partitioned into a (single) set of vertices and 
several sets of constraints, as opposed to being compiled into several complete models, one 
for each concern. The constraints are more primitive that those available to an analyst as 
security requirements (see appendix B for their specification). The benefit in this approach 
is that the information model is relatively compact; the disadvantage is that the path checker 
is more complex, since it must ensure that constraints are met, as well as simply tracing 
paths in the graph. 
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This is a departure from a standard model-checking design, which would usually expand 
the problem into a single graph, then use a graph-traversal algorithm to find examples of 
paths. Which method is the more efficient in this case is an open question, the method 
implemented here avoids building sections of the graph that are never visited, and is 
compact in memory, but the traversal is inevitably slower. 
This design approach allowed the tool to be readily prototyped, with sufficient 
performance to be used in practice, which was the primary aim of the proof-of-concept tool. 
14.3. Performance and Scalability 
The current Security Analyst Workbench is a proof of concept tool, which has not been 
designed, or tuned, for performance. However, the SeDAn framework is intended to support 
the analysis of real systems, so even an unoptimised tool should be useful to demonstrate 
the practical value of the framework. This section is a brief review of the performance and 
scalability of SAW, to determine the extent that this expectation has been met. 
All the measurements in this section were made on a 2.81GHz Intel Pentium 4 based 
personal computer, with 1GB of RAM. 
14.3.1. Performance 
The most demanding performance requirement is the need to interactively evaluate 
protection strategies. The SAW interface allows the user to narrow the context of threat path 
analysis to a particular risk level, concern, and role, and this is the main performance 
management feature: interactive analysis is carried out in as narrow a context as possible. 
Although this is a proof-of-concept tool, its performance is adequate in practice. For 
example, the following performance was reported for the evaluation of all concerns at risk 
level 3 and above in the chapter 15 case study, using the protection baseline after all 
medium risks have been treated: 
Total Running Time = 7094 ms 
Transfer Time = 47 ms 
Compile Time = 47 ms 
Analysis Time = 7000 ms 
Number of initial facts = 730 
Functional classes = 94 
Operations = 57 
Access permits = 98 
Number of compiled constraints = 204 
Number of compiled vertices = 216 
Number of searches = 23 
Number of edges/search =112 
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The performance report is grouped into three sections. The first reports time taken, 
which is subdivided into: 
" transfer time, the time taken to copy the internal system model into the analysis 
environment; 
" compile time, the time taken to create the information model, which is the execution 
time of the Model Builder and Requirement Compiler functions (see section 14.2.4); 
and 
" analysis time, the total time taken to carry out the path analysis. 
The tool is able to carry out many different searches over a compiled model, so the 
initialisation cost of the transfer and compilation are not usually dominant performance 
factors. Values this small are not accurate, since they are quantised by operating system 
timeslots. 
The second section describes the size of the search problem. The initial facts are the 
SAW predicates that specify the system model; these include the declarations of classes, 
operations and access constraints, and also other features of the UML model, such as 
operation parameters, and security requirements. The number of vertices in the information 
model determines the size of the graph to be searched, and this depends on21: 
" the number of access controls (2 vertices per access); 
" the number of assets with a managed relation to a service. Each asset gives rise to either 
2 vertices, or 2r vertices (where r is the number of user roles) if the asset is classified by 
user role; and 
9 the number of end-to-end message paths (i. e. assert/require authentication pairs). Again, 
each gives rise to either 2 vertices, or 2r vertices if the authentication is by role. 
In most systems the total number of access permissions will be large compared to either 
the number of managed assets or the number of authenticated links. As a consequence the 
dominant factor in the size of the information model is likely to be: 
2x number of access permissions. 
The fmal section in the report documents the job size. In this case 23 searches were 
carried out. This means that 23 distinct combinations of concern and role (see section 
12.2.1.3) were tested, and the average number of edges traversed in each search was 112. 
Most interactive testing is on a single concern/role combination, so based on these results a 
24 These are the main influences; there are others that are probably less significant For example, a confidentiality 
requirement pair will introduce new vertices if there is no authentication pair on the same end-to-end path, and 
deployment separation may introduce new classifications, which in turn result in new vertices. See the definitions 
of security requirements in chapter 10. 
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single test would be expected to take 398ms. 5 The average cost of a traversing a single 
graph edge in the search is 2.7ms 26 
Changing a protection strategy requires thought, and usually the modification of several 
security requirements; this process is likely to take minutes or tens of minutes, so an 
evaluation time up to a minute would not interfere significantly with the analyst's work 
cycle. The analysis times achieved in practice on this system, less than a second, are clearly 
adequate for interactive use. 
Since the search process finds only the shortest path to each information vertex, the total 
number of vertices in the information model limits the total number of graph edges 
traversed in a search". In this case the average size of the searches (112) is over half the 
number of vertices (216), indicating that these performance figures are not optimistically 
based on trivial searches of a highly constrained graph. 
In summary, the performance of the proof-of-concept tool is ample for interactive use 
on systems of a similar size to the case study (around 100 UML classes). Scalability is 
addressed in the next section. 
14.3.2. Scalability 
Because the performance of the proof-of-concept tool is relatively good, it is difficult to 
predict how that performance varies using just the system models described elsewhere in 
this thesis: the worked examples are not large enough and the case study provides too few 
distinct measurements. The results in this section were therefore obtained using a system 
model that is designed to provide a controlled measure of scalability. 
The present tool is implemented using Jess [293], which is a forward-chaining 
production system. Each edge in a search is represented as a new fact; and the performance 
of such a system is dominated by the time taken to match vertex-fording predicates, which 
fire rules to generate the edges. In other words, the performance is related to the cost of 
searching for each new valid edge. Jess uses the RETE algorithm [294], which records 
partial predicate matches (at the expense of memory), resulting in a pattern matching cost 
that is related to the number of facts that change in each iteration of the search, rather than a 
function of the total number of facts in the system. The facts that change during a search are 
the graph edges in the information model that record the search path, and these are matched 
against the vertices in the graph in order to find new edges. These two factors can therefore 
be expected to be important performance drivers. In other words, performance is expected 
to vary depending on the model size, as measured in number of vertices, and search size, as 
measured in number of edges traversed. 
25 398ms = 47 + 47 + 7000/23 (The transfer and compile times are independent of the number of tests. ) 
26 2.7ms = 7000 / (23 x 112) 
27 Strictly, the total number of edges that can be traversed is the total number of vertices, minus the number of 
vertices that are search origins. 
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The following sections describe the test configuration used to investigate scalability 
with respect to model size and search size, and the test results. 
14.3.2.1. The Test Model 
Two parameters are to be investigated, the model size in vertices and the number of 
edges traversed in a search, so the test model is designed to allow each to be held constant 
while the other varies. A large system model is needed to allow meaningful results; as noted 
above, the controlling factor in the number of vertices in the information model is the 
number of access permissions. An outline view of the UML system model used for testing 
is given in figure 14.4. 
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Figure 14.4. System Model for Scalability Test 
This model includes five identical clusters of services, one of which is shown in detail in 
the diagram. Recall that a vertex is generated for each direction of each distinct operation 
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access, so the cluster shown in figure 14.4 results in 2 (direction) * 10 (operations) *4 
(accesses) = 80 vertices, in addition to those generated between the services classl2, 
classl0 and class 26. 
The security environment (not shown) has a single user, who is an attacker for the Data 
class, and who may access the system via the Class3 client. 
This system is used in three different ways: 
" Test 1: Class3 is associated with the our class, and the number of operations in every 
test cluster changed. This results in a constant search size, but a variable number of 
vertices. 
" Test 2: Class 3 is associated with the aux class, as in test 1. Services Class 10 and Class 
12 are populated with 20 operations each, and the three extra test clusters deleted. The 
operations in services Class 10 and Class 12 are varied to produce a similar variation in 
number of vertices to test 1, but with a different architecture; and 
" Test 3: Class3 is associated to each test cluster in turn. This results in a constant number 
of vertices, but a variable number of edges traversed before a path is found between 
Data and Class3. 
This test model has up to 551 vertices, allowing the test range to exceed the range of 
vertices found in the case study. The number of search edges in tests 1 and 2 (52) are large 
enough to ensure that start-up overheads (which are present in RETE, as well as the SAW 
compiler) are negligible. 
The modular structure of this model is deliberate. An efficient implementation of 
SeDAn analysis would take advantage of the fact that only vertices associated with 
particular services are candidates for information flow from any particular input, resulting 
in a performance that scales much more slowly than the number of vertices in the system. 
However, the proof-of-concept tool will not be able to exploit this feature 2`, and so these 
tests are designed to explore the scalability range that results from different system 
architectures. 
28 This is not simply conjectural. The stable release of JESS (V6.1) used for this implementation is unable to use free 
variables in the head position of predicates; in effect it is not possible to create distinct sub-sets of vertices (e. g. by 
service) that exploit head indexing to avoid the need to unify a new path with every possible vertex. 
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The result of measuring overall analysis time, for variable model size and search size is 
presented in figure 14.5. The vertical scale is the average time taken to create each search 
edge; the horizontal scale depends on the test. In the constant search but variable model 
tests (1 and 2), the horizontal scale is the number of graph vertices; in the constant model 
but variable search test (3) the horizontal scale is the number of search edges. These results 
are presented as indications, not a detailed study, but the linear least squares fit are justified 
by the related R2 values: test 1: 0.984; test2: 0.998; test3: 0.004 (i. e. a constant). 
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Figure 14.5. Search Times related to Search Size and Model Size. 
Under these controlled circumstances, both these parameters scale linearly. Note that the 
vertical scale is Time per Edge, so the approximately constant result for a fixed model size 
means that the total search time is proportional to the number of graph edges traversed, as 
might be expected. 
Although tests 1 and 2 show a small spread of results the difference is in the intercept 
rather than the slope of the linear regression, so the scalability for different architectures is 
identical". The results reported for the real case study (2.7ms per search edge, for 213 
vertices, see section 14.3.1) are slightly better than those predicted by these results (3.7ms), 
probably because the searches in the case study are averaged over many different concerns, 
and this is more effective at removing start-up costs than the simpler strategy used here of 
ensuring a minimum number of edges in each search. 
29 Test by analysis of covariance. The slopes are almost identical (0.0129,0.0123); it is not possible to find evidence 
in these results to reject Ho: the slopes are identical. However, Ho: the means (intercepts) are identical is rejected 
at the a=0.005 level, with a test value of 4.29 (t test, 7 degrees of freedom. t=3.499). 
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14.3.23. Scalability - Conclusions 
The linear relationship between model size and analysis time is to be expected, given a 
proof-of-concept implementation. As noted above (14.3.2.1), a performance-oriented 
implementation should be able to exploit the structure of SeDAn to achieve a below-linear 
cost function; these results neither confirm nor contradict this conjecture. 
Bearing in mind that the maximum number of search edges to be traversed is 
approximately equal to the model size in vertices, and assuming that the factors investigated 
here dominate, the analysis time of the present tool scales with the square of the model size: 
both the cost of each edge and the number of edges being proportional to the number of 
vertices. As systems grow in complexity it is likely that, due to their inherent modularity, 
the search size will not grow as quickly; this trend can be seen in the case study in the next 
chapter, which is effectively partitioned into subsystems. The trend for practical systems 
should therefore be below square law. 
If these results were extrapolated to larger systems, assuming that a search traverses half 
the vertices, as in the case study example, the time for the analysis of a single concern 
would be 2.6 seconds for a system a factor of three larger than, the case study (600 vertices), 
and 26 seconds for a system that is 10 times larger (2000 vertices). A system design 10 
times larger than the case study would have between 500 and 1000 UML classes, which is a 
very substantial system. The discussion above suggested that sub-minute analysis 
performance would be useable; these figures indicate there is plenty of scope for the present 
tool to be used in real systems, before it is necessary to redevelop its underlying structure 
with performance in mind. 
There are two options for redevelopment of the analysis tool, both of which would offer 
improved scalability as well as performance: 
" use the existing (RETE) evaluation, but restructure (tune) the production rules. 
" re-implement the path analysis section to use a dedicated graph path discovery 
algorithm, rather than a general-purpose production system. 
In summary, the Security Analyst Workbench was developed as a proof of concept; 
however, the design of the SeDAn framework is such that this tool is efficient enough to 
allow the analysis of realistic systems. The tests reported in this section do not amount to a 
comprehensive analysis of tool performance; however, the scalability results indicate that 
the present tool can be used to analyse realistically large systems. 
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14.4. Summary 
This chapter has described the Security Analyst Workbench, which is a tool that 
supports the SeDAn framework. The basic function of the tool is threat path analysis: it is 
able to import a UML system model, and determine paths of attacks between various types 
of attacker and assets of concern. The tool is also able to support comprehensive analysis 
functions, such as requirements evaluation, in support of the quality assessment of 
protection strategies. 
The tool is a proof-of-concept, and its rapid development was made possible by the use 
of a logic language (Jess) which is tightly integrated with the Java programming language; 
this proved to be a valuable combination: straightforward logic programming, together with 
access to Java for user interfaces, and other functions such as XML processing. 
Setting and testing security requirements is a design problem, which involves making 
choices about which requirements should be used, and where they should be placed. The 
consequence is that an effective tool must do more than analysis; it must also support the 
process of design. This determines the second main function of a tool to support SeDAn: 
the management of the security requirements that comprise a protection strategy. This 
includes providing facilities to modify and test security requirements, round tripping 
requirements between the security design and UNII, system documentation, and analytic 
management features that allow requirements to be tested interactively. (14.1) 
These aspects place more stringent requirements on analytic performance that would be 
necessary in an off-line, or batch, analysis tool. Although the tool has not been optimised 
from a performance perspective, its performance on a real system, the case study of the next 
chapter, is more than adequate for interactive use: a single threat path analysis can be 
performed in under half a second. (14.3.1) 
An outline investigation of the scalability of the present tool indicates that it would be 
able to support the analysis of systems of around 10 times the size of the case study, 
perhaps corresponding to systems with around 1000 UML classes. Bearing in mind that 
these are system designs, not implementation models, this suggests that SAW is able to 
analyse quite large systems. (14.3.2) 
This is a substantial achievement for a tool that is not optimised for performance, and is 
confirmation that. SeDAn can be tooled to support the analysis of large and complex 
systems. The next chapter describes the practical use of SeDAn, and this tool, on one such 
system. 
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Chapter 15. SeDAn in Practice: A Case Study 
Foreword 
This case study exposed design flaws in a pilot distributed system, which will have to 
be addressed in future iterations of that system. This does not imply criticism of the 
project or any of its partners, who were consistently helpful in providing input for the 
study, and who welcomed its conclusions. Problems are simply to be expected in the 
design of complex distributed systems. The pilot was intended to expose and resolve 
design issues, to assist the subsequent development of the system. 
Establishing a protection strategy for a system is a security design process, and SeDAn 
advises that process by providing a systematic connection between system-level risks and 
security requirements at the component level. This allows a system designer to: 
" identify design defects early in a system's development, when they can still be 
corrected; and 
" resolve systematic security objectives into requirements on individual services, allowing 
implementers to focus on the security of services, rather than of systems. 
The complete SeDAn framework is described in part two of this thesis, which includes 
worked examples (chapters 7 and 11) and a description of the overall process that is 
necessary to manage the analysis of more complex systems (see section 12.1). 
However, the security design of a real system does not necessarily follow a flawless 
path from goal to requirement, unlike worked examples that can be designed to illustrate, or 
avoid, particular analysis issues. Real systems are also objective: system stakeholders 
provide both the functional design and its security objectives, and have an independent 
interest in the outcome. A real case study is therefore an important test of the flexibility and 
usability of the framework, and this includes the SeDAn models and security requirements, 
as well as the analysis process. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the practical application of SeDAn in the 
security study of the Distributed Aircraft Maintenance Environment (DAME) pilot system. 
This chapter describes the whole study, including establishing the system model and other 
preparatory work, as well as the security design analysis. 
This chapter is organised as follows: 
" section 15.1 describes the background to the DAME project, the objectives of the 
security study, and a summary of the functional design; 
" section 15.2 summarises the processes used to manage the case study; 
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" section 15.3 describes the system environment, including security goals, concerns and 
possible attackers; 
" section 15.4 describes the goal audit, that determines if the functionality required by 
security goals was consistent with the functional design; 
" section 15.5 describes the detailed analysis of the design. It follows the process 
described in section 12.1, working from high to low risk attacks and dividing each risk 
level into several protection modules. This section also illustrates two other types of 
analysis: the evaluation of risk profiles, that characterise implementation risk, and 
requirements valuation; 
" section 15.6 summarises the study results, by quoting the findings reported in its 
management summary; 
" section 15.7 reviews the use of SeDAn in this case study; and 
" section 15.8 summarises the chapter. 
One of the problems in presenting a real case study is size: it is not feasible to present 
the complete design, or even the complete security study, in this space. An outline 
functional description of the DAME pilot system is given in the next section, and the 
security analysis is described in terms of the sub-systems introduced in that section. 
Supplementary material can be found in appendix D, which lists the public services 
available in each of the DAME pilot subsystems, and provides annotated lists of SeDAn 
requirements needed to support the protection strategies described in section 15.5. 
15.1. Introduction to the Distributed Aircraft Maintenance 
Environment Pilot System 
The Distributed Aircraft Maintenance Environment (DAME [295]) is an e-Science pilot 
project to provide a diagnostic system for aero engines, implemented as a set of 
collaborating services using the Grid computing paradigm [296]. The input to DAME is 
monitoring and sensor data obtained during flight, and the system provides a collaborative 
environment where expert users in different organisations work together to investigate 
sensor data features that may indicate particular engine conditions. The system includes a 
range of diagnostic functions, including tools to search previous patterns of behaviour and 
model expected engine performance. The collaborating users develop diagnoses and 
prognoses, and optimise the planning of remedial maintenance to minimise its operational 
impact. 
15.1.1. The DAME Project 
The operational maintenance system will span several companies and support high- 
valued contractual relationships, so it is inevitable that the stakeholders of this system have 
critical security requirements. The most significant of these relates to the provenance of a 
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maintenance diagnosis: how it was determined, what supporting evidence or data was used, 
and how it was communicated. The project has two industrial customers: 
" Rolls-Royce plc, who will use DAME as a diagnostic tool during engine testing, and 
provide expertise to advise on operational diagnoses; and 
" Data Systems and Solutions LLC, who will use DAME within their aero-engine data 
management, maintenance planning and maintenance prediction systems, and provide 
diagnosis as a service to aero-fleet operators. 
Other industrial stakeholders include aero-fleet operators, and the owners of Intellectual 
Properties used in the system. The DAME system is not a commodity-computing grid 
application, but it distributes computationally intensive data processing, and supports the 
collaborative workflow of a virtual team located in different organisations and 
administrative domains. These are important characteristics of many grid systems. 
Four development teams each contribute unique expertise to the project: 
" the University of York: pattern matching, grid services and security analysis; 
" the University of Leeds: workflow, provenance and service level agreements; 
" the University of Sheffield: engine simulation and case based reasoning; and 
" the University of Oxford: signal processing and data management. 
This project is a demanding test case for design-level security analysis because it has 
essential security requirements, and is a complex, distributed, service-based system. 
15.1.2. The Security Study 
The purpose of the study was not to `secure' the experimental DAME pilot system, but 
to contribute to the pilot project's investigation of the feasibility of such systems by 
providing early warning of security design defects. The security study was carried out on 
the pilot design, but was intended to influence the design of subsequent production 
prototypes. This iterative project approach allowed the security study to be regarded as a 
potential asset, rather than a threat, by the developers working on the pilot system. 
The study delivered four documents. The first three document the SeDAn system 
model; these provided the basis to agree the scope of the study with system stakeholders 
(see section 15.2, below). The final document reports the results of the security analysis. 
The documents are: 
9 the system context, which summarises the functional design, the top-level use-cases, the 
organisations and users roles, and identifies the concrete assets in the system; 
" the asset assessment, which records the security goals for the system and how these are 
reflected in asset concerns; 
" the attacker assessment, which summarises possible attackers, the security goals that 
they target and predicted frequencies of attack; and 
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" the final report, which documents the findings of the study and makes 
recommendations about critical security issues that need to be addressed in the next 
design iteration. 
Both space and commercial confidentiality prevent the presentation of all this material. 
This chapter describes the study in enough detail to show how the practical results were 
obtained, and how the process was managed and documented. The previous published 
account [8] is expanded by providing more detail and critique of SeDAn. The management 
summary in the final report is presented verbatim in section 15.6. 
15.1.3. The DAME Pilot System Overview 
The major subsystems in the DAME pilot system are shown in the UML package 
diagram in figure 15.1. This diagram is a simplification of the actual package design, but 
provides sufficient information to allow the security issues described later to be understood 
in their system context. 
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Figure 15.1. The Distributed Aircraft Maintenance Environment 
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The Groundlnterface is the source of raw input data; it obtains processed engine sensor 
data from an aircraft and provides it to a distributed database. It also provides an arrival 
notification to the workflow sub-system to initiate an automated review of the flight data. 
The EngineData subsystem is a distributed database which records two types of data: 
bulk data, which is directly derived from sensors mounted on aircraft engines, and 
metadata, which describes important attributes of the bulk files (e. g. engine ID, flight, file 
location) and any diagnostics reported during flight. 
The DataAnalysis subsystem is able to carry out a range of transformation, indexing and 
diagnostic functions, but its primary function is distributed pattern matching. This takes a 
short segment of sensor data, and determines if there are similar patterns in data retrieved 
from previous flights. Data from previous flights may be physically distributed over a large 
number of databases and locations, hence the relevance of Grid computing to this part of the 
project. 
The ServiceRecords subsystem includes the maintenance history of supported categories 
of aircraft engine, and a case-based reasoning system that determines the relevance of the 
maintenance history to the events that are presented by the distributed diagnostic system. 
The Workflow subsystem co-ordinates diagnostic activity. It has two main functions: to 
provide an initial automated diagnosis, and to facilitate the collaborative exchange of 
information that leads to a diagnostic decision. Maintenance decision-making may be 
subject to later scrutiny, so the workflow subsystem also records the provenance of 
maintenance decisions, in the form of a process record. 
Simulation Tools are specialist tools that are accessible to users who have particular 
expertise in engine design or performance. They allow the experts of last resort to compare 
the in-flight performance of an engine system with predictions of its designed behaviour. 
The Portal provides the main user interface to the system. Its primary function is to 
ensure that users are correctly identified and mapped to their roles in the DAME 
application. It maintains the binding between an actual user and a user role, ensures that the 
correct role is used in requests to the workflow system, and manages the confidentiality of 
workflow results. 
The operation of this system is triggered by the arrival of new flight data at the 
Groundlnterface; the data are loaded into an EngineData database at one of several 
distributed data centres, and the Groundlnterface triggers the Workflow subsystem to begin 
an automated review of the new flight data. Primary diagnostic information associated with 
the flight data may indicate that there is a potential event in the sensor information (perhaps 
by identifying the time section in which the event occurs), but events are rare, so it is 
necessary to identify previous similar occurrences. This is the function of the DataAnalysis 
subsystem, which prepares a shortlist of possible similar events. These allow the extraction 
of relevant service records by the ServiceRecords subsystem, and its case-based reasoning 
system makes a recommendation about what action, if any, is necessary. This 
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recommendation is presented to the maintenance Engineer currently responsible for the 
engine, perhaps employed by an aero-fleet operator. For example, the recommendation may 
be for a physical inspection to check the diagnosis. If the outcome of the diagnosis is 
uncertain, two stages of escalation are possible. The first is from the Engineer to a 
maintenance Analyst, who has full access to maintenance service records; the second is 
from the Analyst to an Expert in some aspect of the engine, who has access to design 
information and tools in the Simulation Tools subsystem. The collaboration between these 
three user roles leads to a maintenance diagnosis and a decision to release (or not) the 
engine for flight. 
15.2. Process Overview 
The focus of SeDAn is setting and testing a system protection strategy, and the 
management process used to achieve this is described in chapter 12. However, before 
analysis can begin it is necessary to establish a complete system model. SeDAn does not 
provide a process by which this is achieved, but it does impose some constraints on the 
form of the model, including its semantics, how it can be expressed in UML (chapter 8), 
and how security goals relate to functional requirements and asset concerns (chapter 9). 
The reason that SeDAn does not include a process to create the system model, is that 
this information will be obtained by different means, depending upon the IT governance 
framework or system design process in which SeDAn is used. For example, the system 
may already exist, and its documentation obtained by a `what exists' survey, or from pre- 
existing system documentation; on the other hand, the analysis may be of a proposed 
design, or a proposed iterative update to an existing design. In each of these cases different 
information will exist and different methods may be appropriate to fill any gaps. The 
subject of this case study is a new system design, and the pre-existing information is typical 
of this situation, it includes: 
" Functional Requirements, that define the boundary of the system and its major business 
processes; 
"A Functional Design, with a variable degree of design detail, depending upon the 
subsystem and design team; and 
" Some security requirements and functions. User roles and organisations are identified 
within the functional requirements; the design includes the authentication of these roles 
at the Portal, and a provenance-recording function. 
This provides a complete functional design model, but only part of the security 
environment: security goals, assets and attackers are not included. There are therefore two 
main parts to the security study: 
" Completing the System Model; and 
" Security Design Analysis. 
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The process used in each of these is summarised below, the detailed experience is 
reported in sections 15.3 to 15.5. 
15.2.1. Completing the System Model 
As noted above, SeDAn provides a framework in which the system model can be 
represented and understood (chapter 8), but does not define a single process by which this 
information is gathered. This has the benefit of ensuring that the system model is described 
rigorously, without limiting the governance or management processes within which SeDAn 
can be used. 
The system model includes the main artefacts of risk analysis; these are described in 
chapter 6 and redrawn in figure 15.2, below. The dependencies between these artefacts 
(arrowed lines) determine the order in which the system model can be generated. 
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Figure 15.2. Components of the System Model 
The pre-existing information corresponds to the context and scope and the system 
description in figure 15.2. All that was necessary in process terms was to consolidate this 
information in a single model (it originated from several design teams) and agree with the 
design teams and stakeholders that it properly represented the system. The main concern in 
this process is to manage the level of detail. (See section 4.1. ) Too much design information 
prevents customers from understanding the system in business terms, so the correct level of 
detail is one that exposes the internal workings of the system as a business process, ensuring 
that it is meaningful to all system stakeholders. 
Because of the dependencies between the remaining artefacts, they were documented in 
two phases: 
" Asset Assessment, which developed both asset concerns and security goals; and 
" Attacker Assessment, which used the security goals, actors and organisations previously 
identified, and developed a model of the potential attackers. 
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Since none of this information existed, it had to be elicited from stakeholders; a three- 
stage requirements elicitation and management process was used: 
" Structured Elicitation. Stakeholders were guided by input checklists derived from the 
system design and identified potential concerns or issues. The information was 
recorded, but not filtered at this stage; 
" Consolidation. The elicited information was consolidated in a draft document that 
included outstanding questions or discrepancies. This stage also allowed the analyst to 
critically review and query the input data; and 
" Confirmation. A round of discussion with stakeholders was used to confirm the 
resulting documentation and answer open questions or issues. 
This process was used to establish both asset concerns and attackers. The initial 
elicitation checklist for asset concerns was the list of data assets in the functional design; the 
checklist used for attacker elicitation included the system's organisations and users 
(potential attackers) and the security goals (potential targets). 
Security Goals 
Unlike asset concerns, security goals were developed indirectly; in other words they 
were not obtained by elicitation prompted by the system context, as might be imagined. 
The problem with developing security goals directly from the system context3° is that it 
is difficult to establish an appropriate level of detail; however, it is relatively easy to elicit 
concerns for specific business assets, because customers are comfortable thinking in 
concrete terms. The strategy used in the DAME pilot study was to consolidate the informal 
descriptions of outcomes associated with each concern into putative security goals, which 
were then revised by stakeholders. 
Given the security goals, asset concerns were reviewed to ensure that they were 
complete and pertinent. Completeness was checked by reviewing how well each security 
goal was supported by asset concerns; pertinence was established by ensuring that each 
concern was traceable to a goal. 
Documentation 
Chapter 8 defines a UML representation of the SeDAn system model, but stresses that 
this does not need to be the sole representation for SeDAn models. The UML form is well 
suited to design information, but is less convenient as a communication medium with 
business stakeholders during requirements elicitation and review. As a result the security 
environment (asset concerns, attackers etc) is maintained in two separate forms, the first is a 
tabular form (the asset and attacker registers), which is convenient for discussion and 
30 Some IT governance processes, including those described in chapter 6, require the development of organizational 
security management policies, which do provide the basis for system security goals. However, if no such policies 
exist, the danger is that goals elicited without a developed system context will not be sufficiently focused. 
Examples of suitable goals are given later in this chapter. 
SeDAn in Practice: A Case Study 353 
review, and the second is the UMIL form. Both record the same information, and examples 
of each are given in section 15.3. 
The system model is divided between three documents, which reflected this production 
process: 
" the System Context, which defines the scope of the system under consideration, and 
identifies organizations, roles, actors, system assets and boundary dependencies; 
" the Asset Assessment, which includes the main security goals and the unwanted 
outcomes (concerns) that relate to each asset; and 
" the Attacker Assessment, which identifies attacks, their frequency, and associated types 
of attacker. 
The production of the system model is described in section 15.3. 
15.2.2. Security Design Analysis 
The design analysis method in SeDAn is presented in chapter 12. It will not be 
described in detail here, but significant aspects include: 
" an initial check that the functionality of the system is complete; 
" treating threats in order of risk; 
" starting from a proposed protection baseline, and incrementing the baseline after the 
treatment of each level of risk; 
" dividing the protection problem into modules, and focussing on a coherent protection 
strategy for each module, rather than individual security requirements; and 
" continuing the analysis, even in the face of unresolved security problems, to maximise 
the information generated in each design iteration. 
The process used in the case study followed this method almost exactly; the results are 
described in sections 15.4 (Goal Audit) and 15.5 (Security Analysis). 
Goal Audit 
The goal audit is documented separately because it is an important precursor to analysis. 
Chapter 6 introduced a traceability model (see section 6.3.3), which explains the 
relationships between security goals, functional requirements and asset concerns. In brief, 
security goals give rise to both functional requirements (e. g. audit systems or intrusion 
detection) as well as non-functional objectives (e. g. a concern to protect the integrity of a 
particular asset). These relationships are explored in more detail in chapter 9, which 
identified an important process principle: functionalityfirst. 
The underlying problem is that security design depends on the analysis of a complete 
system: adding behaviour after the fact may invalidate the analysis (see section 9.2.3). 
Security goals give rise to functional requirements, so it is important to ensure that these 
have been incorporated in the design prior to analysis. 
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The process used in the Goal Audit was to consider each security goal separately, design 
functional requirements that satisfy the goal, then contrast these with the existing functional 
design. 
Security Analysis 
In an operational system it is often possible to treat, or resolve, risks outside the system, 
for example by procedure or insurance. In SeDAn this is accommodated by a change to the 
security environment; to be effective, risk mitigation outside the system (external 
mitigation) must modify the security environment in such a way that the associated risk is 
reduced (e. g. reducing the impact of an attack by insurance). The SeDAn system model 
provides a degree of clarity to this process: if a proposed external mitigation cannot be 
expressed in terms of a change to the system environment, then it has not changed the risk. 
However, in this study, the aim is to evaluate an internal design, so the object is to discover 
if it is possible, or not, to counter a risk with suitable security requirements. If it is not 
possible, then this may indicate an inherent internal design defect. External mitigation was 
not therefore considered in this study, although it can be accommodated by SeDAn. 
The process used in the case study varied the documented analysis process (see chapter 
12) slightly by including the default protection baseline after the analysis and treatment of 
the highest risks, rather than before. In this system rather few security requirements (21) are 
needed to protect against the highest risks as opposed to the number of access controls in 
the baseline (71). This avoided the need to review a large number of baseline controls for 
necessity when the high-risk protection strategy had been determined. 
SeDAn divides the analysis of a system into protection modules (see chapter 12), but 
does not determine how they should be constructed. In the case study modules are defined 
by security goal, type of attacker, and level of risk; this results in protection modules that 
focus on a single concern, and all the assets related to that concern. This is convenient for 
this system; other groupings may be more effective for different systems. For example, if 
there are several distinct groups of assets associated with a particular security goal it may be 
more effective to treat each asset group separately. 
Other issues 
The SeDAn process in chapter 12 recommends that if a satisfactory protection strategy 
cannot be drafted for a particular module, the analysis of that module should be abandoned, 
but other modules at the same level of risk should still be analysed. There are two reasons: 
" problem risks may be mitigated outside the system; and 
" the analysis of other modules will maximise the security information available at each 
design iteration. 
The latter is particularly relevant to the case study, which (unsurprisingly) needed to 
continue the analysis of the system despite unresolved design problems at several places in 
the process. 
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The next three sections present the study in detail; section 15.3 describes the 
construction of the system model, section 15.4 describes the goal audit, and section 15.5 
reports the detailed security analysis. 
15.3. Understanding the System: Building the System Model 
Before security analysis can begin it is necessary to have complete documentation of the 
functional design and its security environment, and represent that information within the 
SeDAn framework using the UML profiles described in chapter 8. The process used to 
build this model is described in section 15.2, above; essentially, the functional design was 
consolidated from existing design documentation, while security aspects of the system 
(asset concerns, attackers) were established by structured elicitation. The following sections 
describe the experience of building a system model: 
" section 15.3.1 describes the consolidation of the functional design and other contextual 
information (organisations, user roles) from existing documentation; 
" section 15.3.2 describes the asset assessment, which determined the system security 
goals and asset concerns; and 
" section 15.3.3 describes the attacker assessment, which determined the attack 
environment for the system. 
As noted above (see section 15.2.1) the asset and attacker information is in two forms: 
tables, which are used for discussion with business stakeholders; and UML, which is used 
by analysts and designers. This section includes examples of both, to illustrate all the 
artefacts produced during the study. 
15.3.1. The System Context: Functional Design, Organisations, 
Users and Assets 
The DAME system context provides a complete, but relatively concise (47 page), 
summary of the system. It serves two purposes: 
" it provides the basis for agreement with stakeholders about the system to be analysed, 
its boundary, purpose and main features; and 
" it specifies the functional design, and the organisations and user roles associated with 
the system. 
The design, organisations, and user roles, are included in the SeDAn system model. In 
addition, the system context document delivered to the customers identified stakeholders, 
boundaries, use-cases, top-level business process, and UML models for each subsystem. 
These provided additional context for agreeing the scope and design of the system under 
study. 
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15.3.1.1. The Functional Design 
An overview of the functional design was given in section 15.1.3; the UML functional 
model has 63 classes. (This excludes classes used to model the security environment, which 
in this study was relatively complex; overall the system model contained 94 UML classes. ) 
Obtaining an agreed design should have been the quickest part of the case study, but 
actually consumed the most elapsed time. There were two sources of difficulty; the first was 
that the actual design had progressed beyond the top-level business processes and services, 
meaning that some parts of the top-level view had to be reconstructed from lower-level 
detail. The second was that the DAME team was concerned that this study should, as far as 
possible, be valid for the final pilot deliverable, rather than being based on an intermediate 
snapshot of the system. However, the final deliverable was subject to ongoing debate 
amongst the development teams. The top-level use-cases and business level interaction 
diagrams remained stable, but the details of services and operations changed significantly 
during the course of the study. 
In most projects the current design should be less a subject of debate; however, designs 
are likely to iterate, so a more common problem may be how the analysis is integrated in 
the design cycle. In contrast, the problem of reconstructing a top-level design from lower- 
level information is likely to be encountered in many projects, since detailed designs may 
diverge from system-level documentation. This study managed that problem by 
documenting each service or sub-system as a separate UML diagram; the documentation 
showed the context for each service (its inputs, outputs, and the services used) and this 
provided a framework for discussion and agreement with the relevant development team. 
A minor process problem was the identification of suitable stakeholders. Because the 
system was in its pilot phase there were a number of stakeholders for the final system that 
had yet to be identified with individuals or companies. These included aero-fleet operators 
(customers for aero-engines) and grid-service providers who might host the system. In the 
absence of the actual stakeholders, it was necessary to find proxies to represent their 
viewpoint. This problem is to be expected in systems with deferred deployment, and the 
identification of suitable proxy stakeholders is likely to be critical in ensuring valid 
requirements elicitation. 
15.3.1.2. The Organisational Context 
The organisational context of the system is shown in figure 15.3. This UML model uses 
the system environment profile defined in chapter 8 to describe the organisations and roles 
in the system, and their relationships. The same profile is used throughout this section to 
document other parts of the security environment. 
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Figure 15.3. DAME Organisations and Roles 
The three primary user roles are Expert, Analyst and Engineer, as described in section 
15.1.3. They are employed or contracted to Rolls-Royce plc, Data Systems and Solutions 
LLC, and aero-fleet operators, respectively. Aero-fleet operators are modelled as two 
different organisations (Operator and Operator n) because there will be many such 
organisations, with different interests (see section 12.4.1); despite this separation the 
Engineer is modelled as a single role, because this reflects the design of the pilot system. 
One role missing from this model is the Dame Administrator, this is identified in the system 
context documentation as a possible role, but no facilities are present in the design to 
support the role, and no use-cases are present in the requirements documentation to indicate 
its function. 
Two other organisations are modelled: a Grid Service Provider, because part of the 
system may be deployed to such a third party, and Cybula Ltd, that owns the pattern- 
matching technology used in the system, and will have security goals for the system, despite 
not being an operational partner. 
This model was straightforward to derive from top-level system use-cases. 
15.3.2. Asset Assessment (establishing Security Goals and Asset 
Concerns) 
The process of asset assessment was described in section 15.2.1; in brief, it establishes 
the security goals for the system, and concerns (unwanted outcomes) that apply to specific 
assets. The input to the process is the list of assets identified in the functional design, and 
this is used as the basis for a structured elicitation of security concerns. 
Security goals were developed iteratively as part of the same process (see section 
15.2.1), then used to ensure the completeness and pertinence of the resulting asset concerns. 
The following sections describe the resulting goals and concerns. 
358 Understanding the System: Building the System Model 
15.3.2.1. Security Goals 
Although the goals are described first, they were developed iteratively, as described in 
section 15.2.1. The value of explicit security goals is that they allow the completeness and 
pertinence of asset-based objectives to be established. 
The aim in drafting goals was to produce business-oriented statements with clear 
motivation and objectives. Goals consisted of four parts: title, owner, business impact, and 
descriptive clarification. Six goals were identified for DAME; table 15.1 lists the title of 
each goal, and table 15.2 shows how a typical goal is documented. 
Table 15.1. DAME Security Goals - abbreviated titles 
I To protect the confidentiality of detailed engine design and performance data. 
II To protect the confidentiality of operational data. 
III To ensure that any diagnostic advice provided by the system is reliable. 
IV To record the provenance of diagnostic decisions and identify individuals' actions 
in the diagnostic process. 
V To provide predictable availability. 
VI To protect the confidentiality of technical industrial property used in the system's 
implementation. 
The titles in table 15.1 do not define the goals because words such as `reliable' or 
`confidential' are not sufficiently precise to motivate requirements. For example, goal III 
('reliable') needs considerable clarification, which includes an explanation that the system 
is advisory, so its reliability is neither safety-critical nor security-critical, but that an 
unpredictable performance would undermine the cost-effectiveness of the system. An 
example of a complete security goal is given in table 15.2. 
Table 15.2. A Typical DAME Security Goal 
Goal Number N 
Title To record the provenance of diagnostic decisions and identify 
individuals' actions in the diagnostic process. 
Owner(s) Rolls-Royce plc; Data Systems and Solutions LLC 
Impact Medium 
Description The process by which diagnostic decisions are made must be recorded 
with sufficient quality to allow the investigation of problems or marginal 
decisions after the fact. Individuals that contribute to the diagnostic 
workflow must be accountable for their contribution to the process. 
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The DAME security goals define threats, objects of protection, and motivation, and 
these features are important when the goal is used to motivate functional requirements or 
asset concerns. 
It was to achieve this clarity of goal that the iterative goal-development process was 
used (see section 15.2.1); goals were consolidated from specific protection requirements 
elicited for the assets of the system. However, this was not a one-way process; after the 
goals were reviewed and agreed with stakeholders, they were used to ensure the 
completeness and pertinence of asset concerns. 
As described in section 15.2.1, goals, assets, and attackers were documented in tabular 
form, to facilitate discussion with business stakeholders, and also using UML to provide the 
formal context for analysis. The UML model of DAME goals is given in figure 15.4; this 
model identifies security goals and organisations; the associations between goals and 
organisations denote ownership. In general the associations between classes in the security 
environment do not need to be stereotyped since their meaning (in this case, goal 
ownership) is evident from context. The profiles used in this, and subsequent UML 
diagrams, are given in chapter 8. 
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Figure 15.4. DAME Goals in UML 
In this model goals II and V have been merged for analysis purposes, since their 
concerns proved identical (see the next section). Each goal is identified together with an 
impact and an owner. The owner relationships on this diagram illustrate both a strength and 
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a weakness of this type of IJML modelling: they allow shared goals to be represented in a 
compact way, but do not always result in diagrams that are visually easy to follow. In this 
study it is inevitable that all the organisations with an operational interest in the system 
would share goals for some aspects of its operation. The UML representation is helpful for 
understanding relationships during analysis (e. g. `who owns this goal? ') as well as 
providing the formal context for analysis, but as noted above, the tabular form is needed for 
discussion with business stakeholders. 
15.3.2.2. Asset Concerns 
The process used to develop asset concerns is described in section 15.2.1. In brief, asset 
concerns were initially identified by a process of structured elicitation, using the assets (data 
classes) in the functional design to focus discussion. They were then consolidated and 
reviewed, and this process iterated with the development of system security goals. The 
assets, concerns and related information were presented in tabular form for discussion and 
agreement with business stakeholders (the asset register), and also transcribed into UML 
for use by the security analyst. 
The business-related scale of impact defined in section 6.2 was used. For the purpose of 
elicitation, the three level scale defined in chapter 6 was extended to four, to help clarify the 
meaning of `low', but only the three highest levels were recorded or used in the analysis. 
The impact definitions used were: 
" High: will prejudice part of the business, sufficient to impact the results of the business 
over a long period; 
" Medium: will have a perceptible result on the bottom line of the organisation, but no 
serious long-term effect in subsequent years; 
" Low: may carry a significant cost, but a number of incidents can be absorbed by the 
organisation in any year, and 
" Zero: may be a nuisance or carry a small cost, but is not significant enough to warrant 
analysis. 
Keywords used to prompt the elicitation were compiled from an initial brainstorming 
with customers, and extra words were added if they were suggested as a concern against 
any particular asset. The list included: confidentiality, integrity, availability, reliability, 
privacy, completeness, provenance, and non-repudiation. 
The processes of consolidation and confirmation (see section 15.2.1) rationalised these 
keywords. For example, provenance was more apt than non-repudiation at the level of an 
asset concern, so non-repudiation was dropped; in a similar way, the asset concerns 
resulting from availability and reliability goals were identical, so these goals were not 
distinguished at the asset level. 
Keywords are not sufficient on their own to specify a concern. In SeDAn, informal 
descriptions of outcomes are associated with each concern to provide semantics, which are 
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interpreted by an implementer. (See the discussion on deferred requirements in section 9.1 
and the System Environment metamodel in section 8.2.1). Keywords were used to prompt 
discussion during the elicitation of asset concerns, but more detailed informal outcome 
descriptions were needed for each concern. During consolidation these were also 
rationalised, because several asset concerns often shared the same description. The asset 
register therefore included a separate table of informal concerns, which were referenced 
from individual assets. Two typical informal outcome descriptions are shown in table 15.3; 
these are simply outcomes, they do not identify assets, stakeholders or goals. 
Table 15.3. Typical Asset Outcomes 
(Extracted from) Asset Register Table I 
Keyword Outcomes 
P. P. A The asset records a business decision, or an intermediate 
Provenance result or contribution to a process that results in a business 
decision. Loss of provenance in the asset results in lack of 
Lack of provenance of traceability, or accountability for the history of the asset, and 
an individual asset. hence of a critical business component. 
P. B The asset represents long-term reference data, on which the 
system depends for diagnostic effectiveness. Loss of 
provenance results in loss of traceability of the data on 
which diagnostic decisions were based, with the outcome 
that valuable business records are no longer available for 
diagnosis, or the basis of any diagnosis based on the records 
is incomplete. 
Asset concerns are intermediate security objectives; the outcomes apply to particular 
assets, not necessarily to the business as a whole (they are not system security goals). The 
range of interpretations associated with particular security keywords is discussed in section 
2.3; clarifying the nature of each outcome as shown above proved very helpful in 
developing a common understanding of the stakeholders' requirements. 
Table 15.4 shows a typical summary entry in the asset register. The only keywords that 
apply to this asset are confidentiality, integrity and provenance, and each has a different 
concern. The summary contains the following information for each concern: 
" Notes, a brief comment on the reason for the concern, and its owners; 
" Goal, the security goal which gives rise to this concern; 
" Outcome, a reference to a detailed informal description of the unwanted outcome. The 
detailed descriptions are documented in a separate table, because they are often shared 
between several concerns. For example, P. B references the second provenance outcome 
in table 15.3, above; and 
" Impact, the impact of the unwanted outcome in business terms. 
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Table 15.4. Typical Asset Concerns 
(Extracted from) Asset Table 3 Specific DAME Data Asset Concerns 
Data Asset Confidentiality Integrity Provenance 
3.2 Engine Notes RR / DS&S. RR / DS&S. RR / DS&S. 
Data Record Could divulge Need to protect Protect the 
Performance proprietary engine accuracy of reference source 
information to 3`' party. reference data. of decision data. 
Goal I Engine confidential III Reliability IV Diagnostic 
provenance 
Outcome CA Unauthorised I. A Loss or P. B Source of 
Access Corruption Reference Data 
Impact I Medium Low Medium 
The UML equivalent of table 15.4 is given in figure 15.5. 
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Figure 15.5. Asset Concerns for EngineDataRecordPerformance Asset 
This model does not show the text notes that document the outcomes for each concern, 
but includes extra information in the asset concern tags: 
assetType specifies if all instances of this class (e. g. including operation parameters) 
are assets of concern, or only those with a <<manages>> relation from a service 
(e. g. data base records). The provenance requirement is for the long-term preservation 
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of the data, so it applies to the database information; the other two concerns are more 
general, and apply everywhere this data type is used. 
direction specifies if the concern is related to information flow away from, or toward 
the asset. This asset has both a confidentiality requirement (away from the asset), and 
integrity and provenance requirements, which involve modification of the asset, or 
information flow toward the asset. 
flow Type specifies if threat paths that utilise traffic flow are exploitable for this 
concern. They are not, so the, flowType here is data. The choice of flow type was 
agreed with stakeholders; there is one asset in this system where traffic flow is a 
potential problem, since it indicates operational performance. (In this case the 
, 
flowType is all. ) 
impact is the numerical equivalent of the impact assessment in table 15.4. The impact 
scores for goals provide an upper bound to the impact of each related asset concern; 
in this case the actual impact (2) of the I Engine Proprietary_M concern is less than 
the potential impact of the related goal (3: see figure 15.4). 
In total there are 12 distinct concerns with 32 relations to 21 different data types. This 
amounts to a fairly complex security model: approximately half the data assets in the 
system have security concerns. 
Establishing a set of asset concerns, traceable to a system's security goals, is at the core 
of SeDAn, since they define concrete protection objectives. In this case study, the 
specification of asset concerns was straightforward; three relatively minor problems were 
encountered: 
" security objectives for services; 
" functional inconsistencies; and 
9 non-static requirements. 
Security objectives for services 
Security objectives for services were discussed in section 9.3.2, which argues that, at the 
system level, it is more appropriate to identify security objectives with data assets than 
services; for example `availability of result' rather than `availability of service'. However, 
during the elicitation of asset concerns, stakeholders wished to express concerns for 
services. The primary aim of the elicitation (see section 15.2.1) is to obtain stakeholder 
input. This leaves the analyst with the choice of guiding the elicitation away from 
inappropriate models, at the expense of missing valid input, or accepting the input and 
dealing with it during the consolidation and confirmation processes. In this study the latter 
approach was taken: stakeholders' concerns relating to services were documented, and they 
were later re-modelled as described in section 9.3.2. 
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Three types of concern were expressed for services: 
" algorithm confidentiality; 
" availability and reliability; and 
" inappropriate use, providing a means of attack to other assets. 
The need for algorithm confidentiality identified a class of security relevant assets that 
were not in the functional design. Two algorithms were added to the functional model as 
managed assets (security relevant components of service state), allowing concerns to be 
assigned in the usual way. 
Service objectives for availability, reliability, and inappropriate use, are all examples of 
indirect (or secondary) concerns, and indirect concerns were also identified for data assets. 
An indirect concern is assigned to an asset in order to support a concern on a different asset. 
Indirect concerns are superfluous, because the consequences of all concerns are explored by 
design analysis. They were removed from the system model, because they may remain as 
security objectives, even if design changes remove the need. 
Stakeholders naturally reason about the implications of their decisions and this can lead 
to the confusion of primary and indirect concerns in the elicitation process. The problem 
was exposed by making the traceability of each concern explicit in the asset register: the 
`goal' entry in table 15.4 may be a goal or another concern. Concerns that are traceable to 
other concerns were identified in this way, and their relevance questioned. 
Functional Inconsistencies 
The development of asset concerns also highlighted cases where security goals were not 
consistent with existing functional requirements. The most significant incompatibility was 
the definition of provenance, which stakeholders extended to persistent reference data, but 
had previously been applied only to workflow records. The elicitation of security goals and 
concerns is asset focussed, and therefore provides a different viewpoint of system 
requirements to the use-case and process-interaction methods, which were used to develop 
the behavioural requirements. 
Inconsistencies of this type require a further design iteration. It is important that the 
security design of an operational system is based on a complete functional design (see 
section 9.3.3), so the best solution is to anticipate that this will occur, and incorporate the 
security requirements capture early in the system life-cycle [290]. In this study these 
inconsistencies were reported with other security findings, all of which contribute to the 
next design cycle of the system. 
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Non-Static Risks 
Only one stakeholder requirement was difficult to accommodate in the SeDAn 
framework; this was a goal whose impact varied with the business cycle: the impact was 
greater during the negotiation of a new contract or the development of a new product. This 
issue was recorded, because it may complicate the later lifecycle of the system, but it is an 
open question if SeDAn can accommodate threats and impacts that vary with time. In 
practice this requirement can be accommodated pragmatically; typical approaches include: 
" phased delivery of the system, with the result that its availability to users, or 
organisations, is limited during a critical time-period; 
" partitioning the system, so that assets of similar type, but relating to different parts of 
the lifecycle, are distinct. (e. g. draft contracts and agreed contracts; development test 
results and production test results); 
" designing the system for the worst case: the highest impact. 
These pragmatic approaches are also used in checklist-based risk management methods. 
15.3.3. Attackers 
The final component of the SeDAn system model is the hostile part of the security 
environment: the attackers, their frequency of attack and the security goals they target. In 
the DAME study, establishing a model for attackers was carried out after the asset 
assessment, because system security goals were needed before attacker elicitation could 
begin. (See section 15.2.1. ) 
The attack register characterizes each potential attack by access type, attacker, target 
goal and frequency. The SeDAn access types (user, organisation and external) were sub- 
divided into the following categories: 
" administrators, organisations with administrative rights over parts of the system; 
" legitimate users, users with legitimate DAME roles; 
" other users, employees of companies that use DAME, but who do not have DAME 
roles; 
" external attackers with significant resources, such as journalists or competitors; and 
" external attackers with limited resources, such as hackers. 
The list of possible attackers in the first three categories is specified in the system 
environment (see section 15.3.1), so the elicitation of attackers used these, and the security 
goals, as a focus for discussion. 
The frequency of attack was qualified on the four-point SeDAn scale (see section 6.2); 
this is summarised in table 15.5. 
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Table 15.5. Frequency of Attack 
Frequency Expected Significance 
per Year 
High >3 Several attacks are expected per year, this includes very 
frequent attacks that are expected every day. 
Medium 3 to 0.3 An attack is likely in any given year. 
Low 0.3 to 0.03 The attack is not likely in any given year, but one is 
expected during the lifetime of a system (typically 10 
years). 
Unlikely < 0.03 The attack is an unusual occurrence; most systems would 
not experience the attack in the course of their lifetime. 
A scale of four was used because it relates well to the business context of the system. 
High and Medium attacks are respectively equivalent to many, or at least one, attack in any 
financial year. Low and Unlikely levels relate to the lifetime of the system, they indicate 
that an attack is likely, or not, during a system's operational life of approximately 10 years. 
The attack register was compiled using the process described in section 15.2.1, using the 
security goals, organisations and user roles as the initial focus. A typical attacker record is 
shown in table 15.6. This records a potential attack on the goal shown at table 15.4. It 
relates to several possible attackers, showing how attackers and goals are clustered, where 
possible, to produce a compact representation. 
Table 15.6. Typical Attacker Record 
(Extracted from) Attack Register 
Access Type: Legitimate User 
Name Attacker(s) Goal(s) Frequency Notes 
Remove_ Domain expert, IV Low Users may seek to 
Records Maintenance analyst, change or remove 
Maintenance engineer. records of inappropriate 
decisions or actions. 
In this case the attackers are user roles, which are defined in the security environment 
(see section 15.3.1). The UML model is the direct equivalent of these records; the complete 
UML diagram for attacks from DAME users is given in figure 15.6. 
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auserRole» 
NonDazneUsa 
auserAttack» 
Remove Records 
tags 
frequency -1 
«nsaAttack» 
Social-Engineering 
tags 
frequency -0 
«userAttack» 
Social-Non-Dame-User 
tags 
frequency -2 
«userAttack» 
Grudge 
tags 
frequency -2 
KsecurityGJoal» 
IV Diagnostic Provenance 
tags 
impact -2 
KSOCnfltyGioal» 
II Operational_Performance Confidcntiality 
tag 
impact 2 
KsavrityGoal» 
111_ Predictable Availability 
tagt 
impact -I 
Figure 15.6. DAME User Attacks 
The attack at the top of figure 15.6, Remove Records, is the one described in table 15.6, 
and is the primary threat from legitimate users: that they may seek to change the record of 
action or advice that, in retrospect, was ill-advised. This UML model also shows how social 
engineering attacks are accommodated. Although social engineering is a means of access 
for an external attacker, such as an investigative journalist, the attack agent is a legitimate 
user, so the possibility of such an attack is considered as a threat from that user. The 
frequency of such attacks depends upon the number of users, and in this model the relative 
frequency of social engineering attacks via DAME users (unlikely) as opposed to direct 
attacks from other users (medium) reflects both the higher number of other users in the 
environment, and the better understanding that DAME users have about the significance of 
the data to which the attack relates. 
The final attack in this model is a grudge attack from non-DAME users. In organisations 
with a high population of users (recall that DAME includes aero-fleet operators as well as 
the two companies that sponsor the system) attacks from disgruntled users are relatively 
frequent, and are therefore a significant threat. 
Organisation and external attacks are not presented in full, for reasons of space; any of 
significance are described where they are encountered in section 15.5. These attacks are 
each similar in number to the user attacks in figure 15.6. The attack model was relatively 
concise: in total there are 13 types of potential attack, 5 external attacks and 8 that originate 
from users or organisations. As with other elements of the security environment, the tabular 
attack register was used for discussion with system stakeholders, and the UML form for 
analysis. 
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In the event, identifying attackers did not result in iteration of the security goals or 
concerns, although it did review those parts of the security environment from a different 
perspective. An important contribution of business stakeholders was to assess attack 
frequency based on their companies' experience, both as targets and potential attackers. For 
example, the companies concerned had strong views about the possibilities of their 
mounting an attack on their competitors (it would not be considered an option), and thus 
regarded an attack from their competitors as equally unlikely". 
15.3.4. Summary 
Before SeDAn analysis can begin it is necessary to understand the system, and record 
that understanding in a system model. SeDAn specifies the content of the system model, 
and its meaning, but how it is populated depends upon the context of analysis. In this case 
study the functional design, organisations, and user roles had already been identified, but 
asset concerns, security goals, and attackers needed to be determined as part of the study. 
(See section 15.2.1. ) 
The clarity of understanding needed to populate the SeDAn system model resulted in 
the identification of inconsistencies between security goals and the existing functional 
requirements. This was an unexpected benefit of this stage of the study. (See section 
15.3.2.2) 
Chapter 8, which defines SeDAn modelling, makes a clear distinction between the 
models and their representation in UML. This clarity was exploited by maintaining two 
different forms of the security environment: tabular (the asset register and attack register) 
and UNII.. The UML form is well suited to analysis, both as a formal input to the process 
and to allow an analyst to navigate the environment, but is not accessible to business 
stakeholders; the tabular form was used for this purpose. The conversion process between 
the two forms was manual; it is a straightforward matter to enhance the Security Analyst 
Workbench to generate tabular reports from UML, but there is a deeper outstanding 
question on how to integrate the explanatory text that surrounds these tables with the UML 
environment. 
The most time-consuming part of this process was obtaining a suitable functional 
design, at a level of abstraction at which its components were meaningful as business assets. 
(See section 15.3.1.1) In general, however, it was straightforward to populate the SeDAn 
system model, and the structure of the model was valuable in focussing the elicitation of the 
security environment. One particularly helpful feature of SeDAn was the need to develop 
informal descriptions for asset concerns; these were important in developing an 
31 Of course, if the security analyst suspected that the stakeholder's view was naive in this respect, the process of 
consolidation and confirmation would allow the analyst to present evidence to the contrary. There is relatively 
little published evidence on such subjects, but industry surveys (e. g. [12]) are often useful in clarifying the 
likelihood of the more common types of attack. 
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understanding of individual asset concerns, and by a process of consolidation, system 
security goals. 
The SeDAn models were very flexible, allowing the UML models to reflect the 
stakeholders' concerns directly. Only two issues were noted where the stakeholders' input 
potentially conflicted with SeDAn modelling: service concerns and non-static requirements. 
(see section 15.3.2.2). 
The problem of stating concerns (unwanted outcomes) for services was explored in 
section 9.3.2. This argued that concerns are better expressed in terms of data (e. g. 
availability of results) rather than services (e. g. availability of service), since the former are 
a better expression of the requirement. The final case-study model did not need to diverge 
from this position, but during requirements elicitation stakeholders did discuss services, and 
the discussion usefully identified new security-critical assets (Algorithms). 
Only one requirement was raised by stakeholders and could not be accommodated 
within SeDAn; this was goal impact that varied with the business cycle. The treatment of 
temporal risk variations is an open question for SeDAn, and probably for risk management 
generally. 
15.4. Audit of Security Goals for Functional Behaviour 
The first step in the SeDAn analysis process is to ensure that the functionality of a 
system is complete. In particular, security goals may have been developed during the course 
of building the system model, and their functional consequences need to be resolved before 
design analysis. This is the purpose of the goal audit. The process is described in section 
15.2.2; it involves specifying the functional requirements needed to support each security 
goal, then checking that they are consistent with the functional design. 
15.4.1. Audit Results 
Two security goals were found to have functional implications. One of these (Goal V: 
Availability) needs a range of supporting functions, including intrusion detection, auditing, 
backup and system recovery. (Section 2.3.3 describes why these requirements follow from 
an availability goal). These functions may not necessarily appear in a business-focused top- 
level functional design; for example, backup and recovery mechanisms may be 
implemented by an off-line management process, or they may need explicit system 
functionality and associated management features. None of these were in the design, so it 
was recommended that they should be documented as implementation requirements. 
The second omission (functions to support Goal IV: Provenance) is a more fundamental 
problem. The system is designed to record the process that gives rise to a maintenance 
diagnosis by recording the operation of the workflow system. However, the assets subject to 
provenance concerns include the results generated by data analysis tools, and these tools 
can be accessed directly by users. There are several user interfaces that do not route their 
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interactions via the workflow, and between them they are able to access much of the 
analytic functionality. (See figure 15.1. )32 
This problem is straightforward to identify. The provenance goal requires a recording 
function for each asset to which it applies, so the audit simply checked that functionality 
existed to record relevant lifecycle events for each of these assets. 
This problem has probably developed as a result of well-meaning design iterations in 
different parts of the project; however, it constitutes a major architectural flaw. As it stands 
the design is unable to meet the provenance goal. 
The SeDAn process requires problems of this sort to be corrected before analysis can 
proceed. This is because a protection strategy will be valid only if it is based on complete 
system functionality (see section 9.2.3). Adding functions to a system may provide a paths 
for any type of attack, not just attacks related to the security goal that the functions support 
However, the purpose of this study was to identify potential design problems rather than 
provide a final protection strategy. For this reason the analysis proceeded without updating 
the system design, in order to highlight any further design issues. 
15.4.2. Goal Audit - Conclusions 
User-specified security goals frequently require extra functional behaviour as well as 
security requirements. Before security analysis can begin it is important to ensure that the 
functionality of the system is complete. 
The audit of the DAME pilot system in this respect exposed two issues. The first, 
availability, requires a range of supporting functions. The second identified a coverage 
failure of one of the system's most important security goals: provenance. This has probably 
occurred because of inappropriate design iteration, and demonstrates the need to 
continuously review security in an iterative design process. 
This part of the SeDAn process is important to protect the designer from invalid 
analysis; however, it is also valuable as an aid to identifying missing functional 
requirements. In this case, although the provenance goal had been identified during standard 
requirements capture, the related assets (analysis results) had not been fully explored. 
Because the functionality was reviewed with knowledge of the associated business assets, 
additional functional requirements were exposed. 
15.5. Security Analysis 
Security analysis - determining threat paths and designing protection strategies - is at 
the core of SeDAn; the overall process is described in chapter 12, and summarised in 
section 15.2.2, above. 
32 Note that this is different to the provenance issue identified in section 15.3.2. That was related to the assets to 
which provenance applies; this relates to identifying the information upon which users based diagnostic decisions. 
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Section 6.2 described how the frequency of attack and the impact of an unwanted 
outcome are combined to produce an overall level of risk, which is meaningful in business 
terms. Deploying a system with unmitigated risks has the following business consequences: 
" high risks will probably result in significant damage to part of the business, causing 
long-term financial impact; 
" medium risks will probably result in a bottom-line financial impact in one of the years 
that the system is operational; and 
" low risks indicate that an attack is either unlikely, or can be absorbed financially. 
The DAME pilot has 26 distinct valid combinations of asset concern and attack. Of 
these 4 are high risk, 6 medium and 16 low. Attacks from legitimate users have the potential 
for high impact, so even relatively infrequent attacks are dangerous in business terms. 
External attacks are the next biggest risk, because of their likelihood rather than their 
impact. There are no high risk attacks from administrators in this system; despite their 
potential impact they are less likely than an attack from an internal user. 
The process of analysing risks, and proposing and testing protection strategies, involves 
choices about where to place requirements and which requirements are most appropriate. 
SeDAn is able to advise these choices by systematically finding threat paths, investigating 
the effectiveness of security requirements, and testing the quality of proposed strategies. 
Developing a protection strategy is often an iterative process, in which several proposed 
approaches are tried and tested. For reasons of space, the final protection strategy for each 
risk is described, but not any iteration that was necessary to discover or optimise their 
scope. 
The following sections describe the security design analysis of the DAME pilot system, 
in the order in which it was carried out: high, medium and low risks from both users and 
organisations, and then external attacks. 
Reference Information 
This section uses the sub-system (package) names introduced in the DAME system 
description (see section 15.1.3). In a small number of cases actual service names are used 
(e. g. in tool output and section 15.5.4.2); section D. 1 cross-references these service names 
to their packages. The first section below (15.5.1) includes both protection strategies and 
related security requirements; subsequent sections discuss only the strategies, the related 
security requirements are listed in appendix D. 
15.5.1. High Risk 
Potential risks can either be determined by the Security Analyst Workbench, or by 
inspection from the UML model of the goal and threat environment. In practice the analysis 
tool is used to list potential risks, and the UML visualization helps understand their 
significance. There are no potential risks from organisational attacks at this level, but there 
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are two potential user attacks against a range of assets, which are considered in the 
following sections. 
15.5.1.1. User attacks against the identity sub-system 
The potential attack is summarised in table 15.7. 
Table 15.7. High Risk 1 
Goal of attack IV Diagnostic Provenance 
Risk High 
Assets Portal assets used to determine user authentication & authorisation. 
Threat Manipulation of the authentication or authorisation system allows 
users to misrepresent the diagnostic record. 
The protection strategy for this risk requires that normal users of the system should not 
be able to modify the assets that are the basis of the authentication and authorization 
system, and that the integrity of these assets is protected inside the system. 
The protection strategy is that 
" normal users of the system must not be allowed to invoke administrative operations; 
" other services in the system must not be allowed to invoke administrative operations; 
and 
" services within the Portal package must protect the integrity of the assets that support 
user authentication and authorization, to ensure that only legitimate security 
administrators modify them, and that services are provided with authentic data. 
The SeDAn requirements that support this strategy are: 
Requirements at MyProxy 
ConstrainFlow for IV User Role Authenticity 
(MyProxy. getUser »> MyProxy. getUser) 
TypeRestrictedFlow for IV User Role Authenticity, assetType=User 
Requirements at Portal 
Deny Access (Analyst »> Portal. administerUser) 
Deny Access (Engineer »> Portal. administerUser) 
Deny Access (Expert »> Portal. administerUser) 
TypeRestrictedFlow for IV User Role_Authenticity, 
assetType = AccessPermittedPage 
TypeRestrictedFlow for IV User Role_Authenticity, 
assetType=RoleDatabase. getRole 
Access control requirements block access from a user or another service to an operation 
within a service. The underlying requirements are in the form of access permissions rather 
SeDAn in Practice: A Case Study 373 
than denials, as they would be in a system; however, this presentation of access 
requirements as exceptions to the design model is more compact and informative for use 
during analysis. 
There are other administration operations in the Portal package and users are prevented 
from access to these by the protection baseline (see section 15.5.2, below), but only the 
administerUser operation constrained here is relevant to these risks. 
TypeRestrictedFlow requirements are constraint patterns (see section 10.2.3.3) that 
specify that only data items of the correct type can influence the value of the protected 
object; these can be interpreted as constraints on how operations exchange data, or as a way 
of identifying a particular data type that must be protected. 
Two of the three type restrictions constrain the modification of managed data 
(AccessPermittedPage, User); the page access and user ID databases are the objects of 
protection. The requirement to protect getRole( from the Portal service requires that the 
service protects the integrity of the operation's input parameter, User. 
ConstrainFlow is a primitive constraint that specifies that a particular information flow 
is prohibited for a particular concern. In this case the information path is between the input 
to the operation get User( in the MyProxy service and its own return, and the concern is 
IV User Role Authenticity. This identifies the output of the operation as the object of 
protection, but it does not mean that inputs to this operation should never result in outputs; 
it means that this particular path is critical to protecting the concern. An implementer must 
ensure that the operation, and any related infrastructure, does not return a result that may 
cause the undesired outcome represented by the concern. In this case, only the correct User 
type should be selected by the operation. 
15.5.1.2. User attacks against the confidentiality of the maintenance database 
The potential attack is summarised in table 15.8. 
Table 15.8. High Risk 2 
Goal of attack II Operational Performance Confidentiality 
Risk High 
Assets Datamining results obtained from the ServiceRecords subsystem 
and used by the Work, flow and Portal subsystems. 
Threat An external attacker obtains confidential operational performance 
data by a social engineering attack against non-DAME users (i. e. 
users with access to the organisations' systems but not legitimately 
to DAME). 
The protection strategy for this is straightforward: 
" non-DAME users must not be allowed access to the system. 
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This would seem obvious, but one of the benefits of a structured approach to analysis is 
that it documents such information. The SeDAn requirements that support this protection 
strategy are: 
Requirements at EngineGUI 
Deny Access (NonDameUser »> EngineGUI. defaultUserOperation) 
Deny Access 
(NonDameUser »> EngineGU l. selectSimulationModeAnd Parameters) 
Requirements at EnginePerformanceVisualiser 
Deny Access 
(NonDameUser »> EnginePerformanceVsualiser. selectDataToVew) 
Requirements at Portal 
Deny Access (NonDameUser »> Portal. OtherOperation) 
Deny Access (NonDameUser »> Portal. administerService) 
Deny Access (NonDameUser »> Portal. administerUser) 
Deny Access (NonDameUser »> Portal. administerWorkflow) 
Deny Access (NonDameUser »> Portal. displayData) 
Deny Access (NonDameUser »> Portal. mineDatabase) 
Deny Access (NonDameUser »> Portal. runChart) 
Deny Access (NonDameUser »> Portal. runZmodViewer) 
Requirements at SignalDataExplorer 
Deny Access (NonDameUser »> SignalDataExplorer. invokeFromPortal) 
Deny Access (NonDameUser >>> Sig naiDataExplorer. selectAnd Search) 
Deny Access (NonDameUser »> SignalDataExplorer. selectTimeSeries) 
The number of access permissions, or denials, in a system is related to the number of 
operations, so it tends to grow linearly with the size of the system. 
15.5.1.3. High Risk - Conclusions 
These protection strategies demonstrate that DAME is relatively easy to protect against 
high-level risks; access controls are required at the system boundary, together with the 
protection of the assets that are the basis for user identification, role management and 
service access management. 
The Portal sub-system includes authorization and authentication functions and 
associated data types, which must be protected. A surprising omission (in section 15.5.1.1) 
is the need for security requirements to protect these components in the other GUIs (e. g. 
EngineGUI). This may be a design inconsistency, or may indicate that the same level of 
authentication is not planned for the other user interfaces. The need to defend against high- 
risk attacks requires the other GUIs to have the same degree of user protection and security 
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management as the portal. This is an important requirement, but it is not possible to 
determine if this is the design intent. 
Designers have a choice about representing security infrastructure in a system model, or 
not. At the system level it is possible to include authorisation and configuration information, 
as well as user roles to administer the information. Alternatively, security requirements can 
assume that roles can be identified, leaving the implementer to provide a suitable security 
infrastructure. (See the implementation discussion in section 13.2.2. ) A poor choice is to be 
inconsistent, since that leaves the analyst unable to decide if important security functions 
are missing, or if different design teams have made different assumptions about 
implementation infrastructure (as is probably the case here). 
The use of SeDAn to analyse high risks proved straightforward. Most security analysts 
would identify the inconsistent user authentication problem described above; however, the 
benefit of using SeDAn is that it quantifies the problem as a high-risk issue. 
15.5.2. The Protection Baseline 
The SeDAn analysis process in chapter 12 recommends that risk analysis should work 
from a protection baseline: either an existing system, or a proposed protection strategy. 
While it is useful, and informative, to analyse a small number of high-level risks without 
baseline protection, any attempt to evaluate more complex risks usually concludes that it is 
necessary to begin by eliminating unnecessary accesses between services. This both 
eliminates the analytic workload of understanding attacks via mechanisms that have no 
functional purpose, and is in accordance with the security principle of least privilege. Since 
it is possible to determine if the system is over-constrained, by means of a requirement 
valuation (see 15.5.6, below), the analyst is able to decide later if the baseline is 
unnecessarily restrictive, or useful defence-in-depth. (See section 12.3.1. ) For these reasons, 
if there is no existing baseline protection strategy for the system, a default strategy is built 
by permitting only those accesses that are necessary for the functioning of the system. 
For example, the Groundlnterface subsystem uses an arrival notification operation in 
the EngineData subsystem, but not other operations that store, manage, or retrieve the data; 
the default protection baseline therefore prohibits access from Groundfnterface to these 
other operations. 
The complete DAME protection baseline is presented in section D. 2. It enforces least- 
privilege access control, as well as including the security requirements necessary to protect 
high-level risks. This baseline results in the removal of 71 access permissions from users or 
services to operations, from those that are implied by navigable UML associations; 100 
access permissions remain in the system. 
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15.5.3. Medium Risk 
There are two medium-risk attacks that are already mitigated by the protection strategies 
for high-risk attacks. The targets of these attacks are: 
" II Operational Performance Confidentiality (From Users) 
" III/V Reliability and Availability 
Attacks on both these goals are from non-DAME users, so the protection strategy above 
(see section 15.5.1) is sufficient and does not need further development. 
There are three other medium risk attacks, one from users and two from organisations, 
and these are described in the following sections. 
15.5.3.1. User Attacks against the provenance record, or supporting assets 
The potential attack is summarised in table 15.9. 
Table 15.9. Medium Risk 1(from Users) 
Goal of attack IV Diagnostic Provenance 
Risk Medium 
Assets Assets in the Work, flow subsystem that record collaborative 
interactions and analysis actions; reference data in the EngineData 
on which a diagnosis is based. 
Threat Users remove or modify provenance records to misrepresent their 
own contribution to a decision or action. 
The protection strategy is concerned with two aspects of the system, the integrity of the 
reference data, and the records held in the workflow package. In order to protect the former 
it is necessary to ensure that the source of data (the Groundlnterface subsystem) is also 
reliable. 
The protection strategy is: 
" the Groundlnterface subsystem must guarantee the integrity of incoming data; 
" the EngineData subsystem must load reference data from only the Groundlnterface; and 
" the Workflow subsystem must protect the record of collaboration and analysis actions 
from subsequent modification. 
The first two elements of this strategy are relatively straightforward, and result in 
security requirements that ensure that other sources of data, even of the correct type, do not 
modify reference data in the EngineData databases. 
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The protection needed in the Workflow subsystem for workflow records is not complex, 
for example, an append-only strategy would suffice". This is a good example of a 
requirement that matches the goal against which it is directed, rather than an abstract notion 
of information flow: the integrity constraint against this goal requires the protection of 
previously recorded information, while allowing new workflow records to be added. 
The security requirements needed to support this strategy are listed in section D. 3.1. 
15.53.2. Organisation attacks against engine confidentiality 
The potential attack is summarised in table 15.10. 
Table 15.10. Medium Risk 2 (from Organisations) 
Goal of attack I Engine Design Confidentiality 
Risk Medium 
Assets Algorithms used to simulate engine performance 
Threat Other organisations obtain engine design information for 
commercial advantage. 
There are two options for protecting these algorithms, depending on the view taken of 
the sensitivity of their observable behaviour. Path analysis reveals two main destinations for 
information: the results stored within the SimulationTools subsystem, and the use that the 
simulator makes of data from the EngineData subsystem. The protection strategy proposed 
here is the simplest, which is based on the assumption that network and database traffic 
fetching raw engine performance data from the EngineDala subsystem does not reveal 
significant information about the algorithm, but that results are potentially sensitive. 
The protection strategy is to: 
" assert that the selection of input items from the EngineData filestore does not pose a 
threat to this goal; 
" constrain the deployment of services in the SimulationTools sub-system to prevent their 
deployment to aero-fleet operators. 
The first requirement records the assumption about the exploitability of paths for this 
asset concern. The concern specifies that traffic flow paths are not exploitable, but there are 
messages between the SimulationTools subsystem and the EngineData repositories that are 
not traffic flows, since they carry data. Security requirements are needed to specify that 
these are not (and should not become) information paths that can compromise the 
simulation algorithms. 
33 This depends on the interpretation of this goal; the detailed documentation cites 'loss or corruption' and 
'inappropriate modification'. Of course, there may be other integrity requirements on the workflow system 
flowing from provenance goals on other assets, but these would appear as the targets of different attacks. 
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Because traffic flow paths are not exploitable for this concern, one access into this sub- 
system has been ignored by the analysis; this is path between the Portal and the 
SimulationTools, which is used to invoke the SimulationTools user interface. 
The only organisation specified for this attack is the aero-fleet Operator, so the last 
requirement specifies that this part of the system must not be deployed to Operators. Simply 
constraining the deployment of the complete sub-system is rather a blunt strategy, but the 
simulator must be constrained in this way to prevent the direct deployment of the algorithm 
to an attacker, so there is little point in designing a more complex protection strategy for the 
other parts of this sub-system. Of course, there may be other organisations with an interest 
in obtaining this information, but these are not possible deployment locations for parts of 
the system, and are considered as external attackers, or via social engineering attacks to 
users. 
The security requirements needed to support this strategy are listed in section D. 3.2. 
15.533. Organisational attacks against diagnostic provenance 
The potential attack is summarised in table 15.11. 
Table 15.11. Medium Risk 3 (from Organistions) 
Goal of attack IV Diagnostic Provenance 
Risk Medium 
Assets 3 assets used to manage user identity in the Portal. 
Threat An organisation subverts these assets, allowing it to impersonate 
users from other organisations; the fake authentication is then used 
to misrepresent the attacker's contribution to a decision or action. 
Setting a viable protection strategy to defend against this attack is difficult given the 
current design. All the primary user organisations are potential attackers, and the assets of 
concern are embedded in the portal subsystem, which is the primary point of access for each 
organisation's users. 
This exposes a weakness in the design, since the Portal subsystem is clearly designed to 
support all user roles; even if it is possible to deploy multiple portals there are no design 
features that would partition the authorisation and authentication data. A deployment 
separation requirement (see section 10.2.2.2) cannot therefore be supported by the design, 
and it is also not possible to defend the assets of concern if the portal is deployed to any of 
the principal organisations. 
There are two possible solutions, the first is to constrain the deployment of services in 
the Portal subsystem to a trusted third party, the other is to redesign the system to distribute 
authentication and authorization functions between the principal organizations in such a 
way that the identity of the organization is bound to the role of its users. The trusted third 
party approach may be valid in circumstances where a `virtual organization' is tangible and 
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is capable of administering the system, but this does not apply to DAME: the system is 
likely to be either fully distributed or administered by one of the principal organisations. 
Centralized authentication is therefore inappropriate; a more effective design would make 
individual organisations responsible for the authentication of their own users, in such a way 
that a user claiming a role would also identify the authenticating organization. 
15.5.3.4. Medium Risk - Conclusions 
Strategies to defend medium risk attacks are built on a protection baseline, which denies 
access from services to any operations that are not essential, and includes the protection 
strategies for high-risk threats. 
The first two attacks are relatively straightforward to defend. The first, a user attack on 
the assets that record or support diagnostic provenance, requires the integrity of the system 
reference data to be guaranteed at source (Groundlnterface subsystem) and during their 
subsequent storage (EngineData subsystem). It also requires persistent records in the 
Workflow subsystem to be protected against subsequent modification. 
The second attack, an organisational attack against the confidentiality of algorithms in 
the Simulation Tools subsystem, is interesting from the grid perspective since it requires a 
deployment constraint. The most straightforward protection strategy is to forbid the 
deployment of the engine simulation sub-system to air-fleet operators, allowing it to be 
deployed to either Rolls-Royce plc, or Data Systems and Solutions LLC. This does not 
imply that other parts of DAME cannot be deployed to a grid, but it does illustrate that grid 
based systems may have elements that need to be more restricted. 
The final risk at this level, the possibility that organizations may attempt to modify the 
provenance record by manipulating user authentication or authorization data (in other words 
by faking user roles), is much harder to counter. There are two possible solutions. The first 
is to constrain the deployment of the Portal subsystem to a trusted third party. The other is 
to distribute authentication and authorization functions between the principal organizations 
in such a way that the identity of the organization is bound to the role of its users. 
This issue is significant for the engineering of distributed systems, including the grid. 
Usually the need to identify organizations as well as roles is assessed on the basis of access 
need: does the organization feature in the access requirement as well as the current role? 
This highlights another dimension to this problem: organisations as potential attackers and 
their ability to manipulate authentication systems deployed within their domain. 
The two organisational attacks described above are significant because they demonstrate 
the capability that SeDAn provides to reason about deployment to organisations, and attacks 
from organisations. It is possible that these design problems could be discovered at a later 
stage in the design process, when concrete bindings were made to organisations, but without 
the SeDAn model of organisations and deployments it would not have been possible to 
systematically identify these problems early in the system development. The first 
organisational problem (deployment constraint of sensitive algorithms) is a straightforward 
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use of the SeDAn constrained binding; it both identifies the problem and records the 
deployment constraint. The second is a more complex interaction between the design of the 
role-based system and threats that originate from legitimate organisations, and this 
identifies a significant design issue at medium risk. This problem was not anticipated prior 
to design analysis, by either the security analyst, or by the team responsible for designing 
the role-based access infrastructure. 
Although the third module at this level cannot be fully protected, the analysis continued 
to low-level risks, in order to maximise the information produced by the study. This 
strategy is described in the SeDAn process description in chapter 12, and in section 15.2.2, 
above. 
The protection baseline after the analysis of medium-level risks is the previous baseline, 
together with the modules that have been successfully treated at this level. It is also 
necessary to remove the unprotected risk from the security environment; otherwise 
requirement valuation will not produce meaningful results (because unprotected risks at this 
risk level will be found for every requirement). 
15.5.4. Low Risk 
Unlike the high or medium risk levels, it is much more likely that an organisation will 
accept a system with unmitigated low risks, taking the view that the operational value of the 
system outweighs the possible damage. There are five potential risks at this level, three do 
not raise major issues, but analysis of the other two raises significant design questions. 
There are two low-risk levels: 
" low impactlunlikely frequency; and 
" low impact/low frequency, or medium impact/unlikely frequency. 
Only the second (higher) level is discussed here; there is no problem in principle with 
treating the lowest level in the same way, but there are several new design issues described 
below that reduce the value of further analysis. 
There are five potential attacks at this level, which are described in turn. 
15.5.4.1. User attacks against the confidentiality of user privileges 
The potential attack is summarised in table 15.12. 
Table 15.12. Low Risk 1 (from Users) 
Goal of attack IV Diagnostic Provenance 
Risk Low 
Assets The relationship between users and roles. 
Threat Users obtain knowledge of the system privileges of other users, as a 
precursor to a social engineering attack on the provenance record. 
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This attack illustrates the depths of indirection that attack elicitation can reach, and that 
both confidentiality and integrity concerns can support the same security goal. The attack is 
straightforward to defend, since it identifies a single asset in the Portal subsystem, and this 
does not need to be presented to a user. The protection strategy is: 
" ensure that Role information about other users is not provided to system users. 
The related security requirement is a single TypeRestrictedFlow in the Portal. 
Because this attack is low risk, and its implementation is almost trivial, this has perhaps 
not received as much critical examination during the review process as it deserves". Indirect 
attacks (attacks to enable attacks), like indirect concerns, need to be carefully reviewed; 
especially by asking why a particular indirect attack is identified in preference to other ways 
of achieving the same aim. This attack was identified as part of a structured elicitation 
focussed by assets and keywords; the stakeholders were effectively asked "does the 
confidentiality of Role information matter", and reasonably replied "it might". The next 
question should have been "but this is a collaborative system, won't the users know each 
other anyway? " 
This provides no new insights into analysis, but a reminder of the inherent bias in any 
structured elicitation. Further review with system stakeholders would be likely to result in 
the removal of this concern. 
15.5.4.2. User attacks against the confidentiality of operational performance 
The potential attack is summarised in table 15.13. 
Table 15.13. Low Risk 2 (from Users) 
Goal of attack II Operational Performance 
Risk Low 
Assets Analysis results, and maintenance database query results. 
Threat A social engineering attack against DAME users results in the 
attacker obtaining commercially sensitive information about a 
company's operational performance. 
Since this a social attack, it is wrong to assume that users will not attack their own data; 
however, the system designer can minimise the total data available to any single user 
(directly and by propagation through the system), and also ensure that user behaviour and 
social vulnerability are taken into account at the business process level. The present design 
already limits the use of many of the assets of concern, and there are options for 
supplementing this with requirements that separate the data of individual user roles. 
34 The author is responsible for this omission. 
382 Security Analysis 
The protection strategy to achieve this is: 
" assert that case-based reasoning does not propagate sufficient information about its 
input data for its results to be exploitable for this concern; 
9 ensure that results produced for display by the DataAnalysis subsystem GUI are 
provided only to the users for whom they were generated; and 
" ensure that results derived from maintenance records are supplied only to authorised 
users. 
There are two case-based reasoning systems (see section 15.1); the assertion reflects a 
stakeholder decision that the output of these systems does not convey sufficient information 
to be exploitable for this concern. In one of these systems the output is assigned a similar 
concern, but at a lower level of impact, to reflect the fact that there is limited information 
conveyed in this way. The requirements that support this strategy record these design 
assumptions. 
The local results produced by the DataAnalaysis system are contained within the GUI, 
and restricted to the user for whom they were generated. 
The final requirement is straightforward in concept, but its implementation is 
complicated, since the data passes through a number of intermediate services, one of which 
processes the data into a different, but equally sensitive, type. Users at the relevant aero- 
fleet operator, and at Rolls-Royce plc, or Data Systems and Solutions LLC, may access the 
maintenance records of particular operational engines. The database mining functions in 
this system are not fully developed, so the final result may be a decision that only the two 
primary companies should be able to access this information. However, it is possible to 
implement least privilege access within the existing system design, and one possible 
approach is described below. 
The information flow between the services involved in the delivery of database results is 
shown in figure 15.7. This figure shows the services in the delivery chain (SDM-G, 
DataBaseMiner-G, Work, flowManager, Portal), relevant operations and data types. Only the 
return path is included, which shows the path of data from the database to the user. The 
services are split between three of the main subsystems: ServiceRecords (as shown), 
Workflow and Portal. 
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Figure 15.7. Information Chain in the Delivery of Data Mining Results 
The SDM-G service represents an interface to an external service database; in the 
DAME pilot design no details are given about the structure of this database service, except 
the ge: EventAircraft( operation, which returns a SDMRecord, which is the asset of concern 
in this case. 
The DataBaseMiner-G service obtains a number of records, and returns clusters of 
records in a DataBaseMinerResult, which is the return value from a getResulto operation. 
This is returned through the WorkflowManager to the Portal, and hence to a user. 
The objective is to ensure that SDM-G records that are owned by specific users are 
delivered only to those users. The conventional approach to this problem is to rely on access 
control at the database to limit the returned records to those appropriate to the caller, having 
passed the identity of the user down the chain of operations, and ensured that different 
instances of the same operation remain separate. (See the Delegated Access Management 
Problem, described in section 4.4.1. ) The present design does not allow this approach, 
because all access control is implemented in the portal, so it is necessary to label the data 
with a permitted access role, and allow the portal to enforce confidentiality. Figure 15.8 
shows the security requirements that are needed to achieve this strategy. 
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Figure 15.8. Security Requirements to Protect Maintenance Records 
It is not possible to use complete end-to-end message protection between the source of 
the data (SDM-G) and the Portal, because the data are processed in the DataBaseMiner. 
The chain is therefore split into two end-to-end message paths: between SDM-G and the 
DataBaseMiner, and between DataBaseMiner and the Portal. Each of these paths has a 
claim that authenticates the data ownership, and a matching authentication requirement that 
ensures that only authenticated data are accepted. There are two further constraints's, the 
DataBaseMiner must enforce separation between incoming SDMRecords and outgoing 
DataBaseMinerResults (i. e. must not confuse ownership), and the Portal must do the same 
from DataBaseMinerResults to the user. This design avoids the need to propagate the users 
identity with the invoke path for these data queries, and can therefore be used with access 
control at the user interface. 
This solution is not presented as the best design approach to this problem, but it 
illustrates the flexibility of message-based security to implement protection strategies that 
are not quite standard (the authentication claims are asserting ownership, not the identity of 
a caller or certifier), and that SeDAn is able to accommodate these variations. The detailed 
security requirements needed to support this protection strategy are presented in section 
D. 5. 
35 This describes the main information chain; there are also three side constraints that specify that DataBaseMiner, 
WorkflowManager and Portal should not `leak' the information to other operations. See section D. S. 
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This also highlights the role of SeDAn deferred requirements to specify constraints on 
services. The two Enforce Separation requirements form a necessary part of the chain of 
security from the database to the user. SeDAn provides the context in which side- 
constraints of this sort can be specified, and the use of requirement patterns, rather than 
individual information flow constraints, results in a compact specification. 
Returning to the assessment of this risk, there are no inherent design defects here, but 
the degree to which the system is exposed to this attack can be reduced by a user separation 
strategy. However, the likelihood is that the overall structure of the access control will be 
changed in response to the medium-risk problem (see section 15.5.3.4, above), and this risk 
will be re-assessed as part of that change. 
15.5.43. Organisation attacks against diagnostic provenance 
The potential attack is summarised in table 15.14. 
Table 15.14. Low Risk 3 (from Organisations) 
Goal of attack N Diagnostic Provenance 
Risk Low 
Assets Assets in the Workflow subsystem that record collaborative 
interactions and analysis actions; reference data in the EngineData 
on which a diagnosis is based. 
Threat Organisations directly remove or modify provenance records to 
misrepresent their own contribution to a decision or action. 
The issues are similar to those described in section 15.5.3.3, but these assets present a 
more difficult protection problem: if assets need to be protected against organisations then 
they either need to be held by a trusted third party, or divided between them in such a way 
that there is no opportunity for attack. The former is possible in this design, although it 
would hardly seem to be the intent of the stakeholders; the latter, however, is not possible. 
Consider a workflow record; if an organisation wishes to misrepresent its contribution to 
the workflow it is likely to change its own record, so simple separation of the records is not 
effective. The workflow system records a collaboration that may later be the subject of 
contractual debate, in these cases the business practice is well established - both parties 
need separate, equally valid, verifiable evidence of the execution of the contract. A 
workflow between collaborating companies with single point records will always be 
vulnerable to an attack by the organisation that holds the record, unless a trusted third party 
is employed. This is an instance of the Asymmetric Record problem described in section 
4.4.4. 
Since this is a low risk item, stakeholders may choose to ignore the problem. However, 
the restrictions imposed on the system by this workflow design are sufficient to prevent the 
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evolution of the business function of system, and that is a good reason for the next iteration 
of the system to consider an alternative design approach, as described in chapter 4. 
15.5.4.4. Organisation attacks against the confidentiality of operational 
performance 
The potential attack is summarised in table 15.15. 
Table 15.15. Low Risk 4 (from Organisations) 
Goal of attack II Operational Performance Confidentiality 
Risk Low 
Assets Analysis results, and maintenance database query results. 
Threat Aero-fleet operators obtain commercially sensitive information 
about other companies' operational performance. 
The protection strategy is a choice between constraining the deployment of these assets 
away from aero-fleet operators (e. g. hosting these elements at Data Systems and Solutions 
LLC) or, if it is acceptable to stakeholders, to reduce the impact by separating the assets by 
operator. The latter depends on choices made about the workflow integrity problem 
described in the previous section (15.5.4.3), so this problem will be reviewed when the 
design issues described in the last section are revisited. 
15-5.4-5. Organisation attacks against engine design confidentiality 
The potential attack is summarised in table 15.16. 
Table 15.16. Low Risk 5 (from Organisations) 
Goal of attack I Engine Design Confidentiality 
Risk Low 
Assets Both simulated and actual engine performance data, and associated 
engine metadata. 
Threat Organisations obtain commercially sensitive engine design 
information for competitive advantage. 
This risk is difficult to protect because EngineMetadata is used extensively throughout 
the system to reference performance data. The straightforward strategy is to further 
constrain the deployment of the system, but this would prevent the deployment of the 
DataAnalysis subsystem to aero-fleet operators. This must be regarded as a design defect in 
a system that is intended to be a grid application, although this is a low risk item so system 
stakeholders may simply decide to accept the level of risk in return for the benefit of 
distributed processing. 
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The system has several other types of indirect reference to data assets, so it is possible 
that a review of how performance data is referenced could maximise the use of less 
revealing references. This may downgrade the risk, but it is unlikely to be completely 
eliminated because some of these data types are determined by the system context, not by 
the DAME design. The relevant design pattern is Distribute by Reference in section 4.4.1.1. 
15.5.4.6. Low Risk - Conclusions 
Unlike the high or medium risk levels, it is much more likely that an organisation will 
accept a system with unmitigated low risks, taking the view that the operational value of the 
system outweighs the possible damage. There are five potential risks at this level, three do 
not raise major issues (Risks 1,2, and 4), but analysis of the other two raises significant 
design questions. 
The first design issue is exposed by another attack on diagnostic provenance, in this 
instance from one of the principal customer organisations seeking to misrepresent its own 
provenance records (Risk 3, section 15.5.4.3). Since the attack is from one of the principal 
organisations, and it targets their own data, then the only options are the deployment of the 
workflow system to an independent trusted third party, or an alternative design approach. 
The workflow system records an exchange that may become the subject of contractual 
dispute or investigation. Normal business practice for such documentation is well 
established - both parties need separate, equally valid, verifiable evidence of the nature of a 
contract and its execution. Unless a trusted third party is employed, business workflows 
between collaborating companies with single point records will always be vulnerable to an 
attack by the organisation that holds the record, and this is the situation here. This situation 
is a version of the Asymmetric Record problem described in section 4.4.4. 
Although this is a low risk item, this vulnerability is sufficient to prevent the evolution 
of the business role of the system, and that is an important reason to reconsider the 
advisability of a centralized workflow design at this stage in the system lifecycle. 
This problem also illustrates the value of SeDAn in identifying the more complex 
security problems that arise from the relationships between organisations and assets. It also 
illustrates a limitation, and the need to apply the SeDAn security requirements with care. 
The SeDAn analysis successfully identified a conflict between organisations as attackers 
and the workflow assets they own. It would be possible (in theory) to use. SeDAn 
requirements to resolve the threat with a separation strategy that ensured that each 
organisation was able to update only its own data. Because the underlying SeDAn model is 
that attackers do not target their own data (see section 12.2.1.3), a separation strategy would 
remove the threat paths from the SeDAn analysis. However, this solution would be flawed, 
because the object of the attack is the attacker's own data. It is an open question how 
SeDAn could be extended to allow problems of this sort to be fully represented; in the 
meantime designers must be careful to avoid implementing separation-based solutions 
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where it is known from the semantics of the attack that the attacker may target their own 
data". 
The second design issue also relates to an attack from an organisation, this time directed 
at obtaining confidential engine design information for commercial advantage (Risk 5, 
section 15.5.4.5). The difficult asset to protect is EngineMetadata, and the attacker is an 
aero-fleet operator. It is possible to constrain the deployment of services to operators, but 
much of the system uses EngineMetadata, so this strategy would effectively prevent the 
deployment of the system to a grid: DAME uses the grid to process high volumes of data at 
the point of collection, which is at locations managed by aero-fleet operators. 
The scope of this problem can be reduced; rationalizing the use of performance data 
references, would probably result in a reduction in the number of assets of concern. (See the 
discussion on Delegated Access Management in section 4.4.1. ) On balance, however, this 
risk can be reduced but not eliminated, and stakeholders will have to consider accepting a 
low risk of attack in return for the value of distributed processing. 
Unlike the previous threats that arise from organisational attacks, this was self-evident, 
because of the extensive use made throughout the system of EngineMetadata. However, the 
analysis was valuable, because it systematically established the risk level of the threat, 
which is fortunately low. 
It is notable that both these issues arise from attacks from participating organisations, or 
their system administrators, rather than from users. Designers are probably accustomed to 
thinking in terms of user access control, but the problem of system deployment to one or 
more administrations has received little practical exposure. 
It would be possible to review the lowest level risks, but this is not justified because the 
value of such a process reduces given increasing doubt about the design intent. By the time 
several protection modules have registered design problems, the chances of design changes 
propagating into the remaining modules is relatively high, and this progressively decreases 
the value of speculative analysis. 
There are two remaining analysis tasks: risk profiles from external attacks, and 
evaluation of the whole protection strategy. These are described in the following sections, 
using the medium risk baseline as the starting point. 
15.5.5. External Risk 
SeDAn external risk profiles are important because they link system design analysis to 
the wider implementation context. Strictly, they indicate the extent that subverted 
components can be used to attack the system; this determines the extent that services need 
to be protected against implementation defects, or environments, taking into account 
36 This problem justifies the conclusion that an analyst should be cautious about systems in which attackers may 
target their own data. However, note that Chapter 12 conjectures that this situation may always indicate an error in 
security modeling or functional design. 
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system-level security objectives, attackers and risks. External attacks were introduced in 
section 7.43, and the implementation aspects are further discussed in section 13.3.2. 
External attacks from hackers are more frequent than attacks from legitimate users or 
from organisations that host systems, so if there is a path of attack to an asset, the risk level 
is often higher. This is offset by the fact that most systems can police their boundaries fairly 
effectively. However, the idea of a `boundary' is complicated by deferred deployment, 
such as to a computing grid, so an important consideration for such systems is the extent 
that services, which are deployed to a grid, can be used to attack the remainder of the 
system. 
This analysis considered external attacks at only the high and medium levels, because of 
the outstanding system design issues at the medium and low-risk levels. The goals of high 
or medium-level risk external attacks are: 
"I Engine Design Confidentiality. The attack is from a potential engine competitor, the 
highest potential risk is medium; 
" II Operational Performance Confidentiality. There are two possible attackers: 
investigative journalism results in a high risk, while attacks from potential operational 
competitors are medium risk; and 
" III/V Reliability and Availability. Hackers are the primary threat, and without adequate 
defence these are high risk because of the very high frequency of attack; however, the 
impact of availability incidents on this system is low. 
Security requirements change the way that information flows in the system, and 
therefore the degree to which elements of the system are vulnerable; it is therefore possible 
to change risk profiles by design. 
The flow of engine design information is constrained by the protection strategies already 
proposed, and there is little that can be done to reduce the system profile to hackers (their 
target is so broad). Restricting the distribution of operational performance data in the 
system is discussed in section 15.5.4.2 (low risk 2); that strategy takes on more significance 
here because of its relation to more frequent external attacks. Applying this protection 
strategy constrains access to related assets, removing a high-risk external attack against goal 
II from the data analysis subsystem. 
The proposed protection strategy for external attacks is: 
" implement the high and medium risk protection strategies for users and operations. This 
will deny external access to normal system functions, and reduce the accessibility of 
engine design data within the system; 
" implement the protection strategy outlined for goal II in section 15.5.4.2. This reduces 
the accessibility of operational performance data within the system; and 
" implement boundary protection to ensure that the systems and software cannot be 
accessed via non-standard paths present in the implementation (management channels, 
inadvertent services, physically, etc). 
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The resulting risk profile for the system is shown in table 15.17. Profiles are given for 
each of the main subsystems, being the upper bound of risks in the services within each 
subsystem. The risks for services within each subsystem are similar. 
Table 15.17. DAME Pilot External Risk Profile (medium and high risks) 
SubSystem Attacker Goal Risk Impact 
DataAnalysis, EngineData, Competitor II Medium Medium 
Groundlnterface Hacker IIIN High Low 
Portal, Service Records, Workflow Competitor II Medium Medium 
Journalist II High Medium 
Hacker BW High Low 
Simulation Tools Competitor I Medium High 
Competitor II Medium Medium 
Hacker IHN High Low 
The first group of services in table 15.17 is associated with data searching and reporting, 
the second with workflow, and the third is concerned with engine simulation and analysis. 
Restricting the exposure of the first group to external attacks is a positive result for 
distributed computing, since these services are most likely those that will be deployed to a 
grid. This means that if this processing is outsourced, the only high risks that the service 
providers need be concerned about are standard external hackers, and not application 
specific issues. The second group is where many of the outstanding design issues are 
centred, and the third group will, in any case, have restricted deployment (see section 
15.5.3.3). 
This form of analysis is a unique feature of SeDAn; implementation studies are needed 
to show its true value, but this case study demonstrates that it can be used to influence a 
protection strategy. It is evident that this system has three major zones with different 
environmental risks, and the proposed protection strategy allows one of these to be better 
suited to grid deployment. This is similar to the analysis described in section 123.2 to 
determine if a service is trusted, although in this case it is possible only to minimise, rather 
than completely remove, risk. 
15.5.6. Requirements Valuation 
SeDAn provides the capability to Value each security requirement, which is to 
determine the risk level that would result if a security requirement was removed. This 
provides the starting point for a review of the necessity of security requirements. This 
analysis was introduced in section 7.5.5, and is discussed in depth in section 123.1. 
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The protection regime used to evaluate external risks (the medium risk baseline, plus the 
requirements for low risk 2) has a total of 112 security requirements; their distribution 
between the different requirement types is shown in table 15.18. 
Table 15.18. Requirements needed to protect the DAME pilot. 
Requirement Type Number of Requirements 
Access - Operation (access deny) 60 
Access - Service (deployment constraints) 8 
Classification (identify data ownership) I 
Service constraint - Primitive (ConstrainFlow) 16 
Service constraint - Pattern 23 
Message Requirements 4 
The number of requirements that are needed to protect against high risks is small, as 
noted in section 15.5.13 above. The total number of access deny requirements reported 
above are lower than in the original baseline, because deployment constraints have been 
added that make some of these unnecessary 
A valuation of these requirements indicates that just under half the access controls in the 
original baseline (28) are not needed at the medium risk level. However, there is no obvious 
simplification of the protection scheme that results if these are relaxed; these requirements 
mostly relate to access from particular roles to operations within the various user interfaces, 
and 10 are associated with administration interfaces in the portal whose behaviour is not 
specified" and is therefore not connected to asset threats. This valuation is therefore a 
reminder of the need for consistent specification, rather than identifying any significant 
instances of over-constraint. 
This valuation did not provide any surprises, but is a useful check on the rationale for 
the proposed security requirements, and it allows confirmation that the proposed protection 
strategies at the high and medium risk levels are necessary as well as sufficient. The only 
security requirements that were identified as potentially over-constrained were those in the 
default baseline; no issues were indicated with requirements formulated to protect particular 
risks. 
The SeDAn process (see chapter 12) includes a review of each module as it is 
completed; this process was followed in the case study, but not reported for reasons of 
space. As a result, the requirements supporting each module were known to be necessary as 
well as sufficient as the analysis progressed. In these circumstances the final review is 
expected to detect only overlaps between modules, or redundant parts of the protection 
37 SeDAn infers data flow from the signatures of operations and data items, as well as from stereotypes. In this case 
not all the management functionality is specified, and neither is a system management role, so there is a limit to 
the extent that these functions can be investigated. 
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baseline, so it is not a surprise that evaluation at this stage failed to find superfluous 
requirements. 
The protection strategy summarised in table 15.18 is also a significant numerical result 
for SeDAn: the number of security requirements are not dominated by deferred 
requirements on services. A possible concern about fully representing the security 
requirements in a system is that this will result in a large number of side-constraints 
associated with services. Of a total of 112 security requirements in this baseline, only 39 are 
constraints on services, the rest (73) would be familiar to a security analyst working 
conventionally. In terms of total numbers, most of these are in the least privilege baseline, 
and would be present in a system that implemented even the most basic security policy. In 
the case study, therefore, SeDAn has added quality to the expression of security 
requirements, but not at the expense of a large increase in their number. 
15.6. Findings 
This section reproduces the findings of this case study, verbatim, from the 
management report to the stakeholders. 
This is not a particularly high-risk system (4 high risk attacks, 6 medium and 16 low); 
the few high-risk attacks are associated with legitimate users, because of their potential 
impact, and external attackers, because of their frequency. However, it would be unusual for 
a business to simply accept high or medium risks, and there are critical problems that need 
to be addressed in the existing design at this level: 
1. The provenance architecture does not record the provenance of persistent reference 
data (e. g. Engine Performance Data), nor does it record user actions that are carried 
out at interfaces other than the portal (there are several). (153.2.2and 15.4.1) 
2. All High risks attacks from users can be defended by security requirements at the 
system boundary, but this requires all user interfaces to have the same degree of 
protection against non-DAME users. It is not clear that the authentication and 
authorisation provided by the portal is extended to the other user interfaces in the 
system. (15.5.13) 
3. The deployment of the Engine Simulation system should be to either Rolls-Royce 
plc or Data Systems and Solutions LLC; there is no established need to deploy this 
subsystem to a grid, and to do so will introduce medium level risks. (15532) 
4. The design of the user authentication system is vulnerable to attacks at the medium 
risk level: operations may seek to attack provenance records by faking users or roles. 
A more effective design would make individual organisations responsible for the 
authentication of their own users. (15.533) 
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In the low risk category, a business is more likely to accept risks in return for the 
benefits of the system, but there are two issues that merit concern: 
S. The workflow system has a centralised design, and records an exchange that may 
later be the subject of contractual debate. Normal business practice for such 
documentation is well established - both parties need separate, equally valid, 
verifiable evidence of the execution of a contract. Centralised records will always be 
vulnerable to an attack by the organisation that holds the record, unless a trusted third 
party is employed. We caution that the vulnerability introduced by this design is 
sufficient to prevent the evolution of the business role taken by this system. (15.5.4.3) 
6. Deployment of the current design to the grid requires the acceptance of a low 
security risk, because of the possibility of attacks on the confidentiality of Engine 
Metadata, which is used extensively throughout the system. There are a range of other 
identifiers and references used in the system, and it is probable that rationalisation of 
these references would reduce this risk, but not eliminate it. (15.5.4.5) 
Extra functionality is also needed to manage the security risks in this system. In 
particular, Goal V (Availability) needs to be supported by user audit, backup, recovery and 
intrusion detection. Although these features may not be needed in an initial high-level 
design, they should be noted as potential requirements. (15.4.1) 
On a positive note, analysis of external attacks demonstrated that a straightforward 
protection strategy was able to reduce the overall distribution of data in the system, 
resulting in three main functional groups: the engine simulation, the workflow, and the 
analysis/search system. The degree of risk from external attacks to the last of these is lower, 
and this is also the part of the system that would most benefit from distributed processing. 
The system is therefore inherently well suited to grid applications, provided the 
stakeholders are prepared to accept low-level business risks in return for the benefits of 
distributed processing. (15.5.5) 
There are two common sources for the design problems identified in this study. The 
first is that designers are accustomed to considering access management from system users, 
but are perhaps less aware of accesses that might result from different deployment 
strategies. This is indicated by the prevalence of organisational attacks among the risks that 
expose design flaws. The centralised authentication and workflow issues noted above are 
examples of this type of oversight. 
The second problem, exemplified by security inconsistencies between the various user 
interfaces, is probably the result of iterating the initial design without an associated security 
analysis. This highlights the need for security analysis to be integrated in the design 
process, not carried out as a separate activity. 
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15.7. Summary of SeDAn Experience 
The focus of SeDAn is the design and analysis of protection strategies; however, before 
analysis can begin it is necessary to establish a complete system model. SeDAn provides a 
process for analysis (see chapter 12) but not to populate the system model (see chapter 8), 
since how this is achieved depends on the overall risk, governance, or design process that 
the security analysis is supporting. In the case study the system model was partly populated 
from existing documentation (the functional design, organisations and user roles), and the 
remaining elements (asset concerns, security goals and attackers) were elicited from 
stakeholders. The SeDAn analysis process was used with only minor variations. (15.2) 
The most important observation is that the use of SeDAn was very successful: it 
accommodated the description of a complex system, its models promoted the elicitation of 
the system security environment, and the design analysis resulted in important observations 
that were not previously self-evident. This section will not repeat these observations (see 
the management summary in the previous section), but summarise the main benefits and 
issues encountered in the use of SeDAn. 
Although the benefits described here accrue from the overall use of SeDAn, it is 
important to observe that a major enabling factor is that the framework can be adequately 
tooled. It would be difficult or impossible to perform the analysis described in this study 
without tool support, especially considering the size and complexity of the system. 
15.7.1. Benefits 
Populating and reviewing the SeDAn system model highlighted problems with 
existing functional requirements. 
Security goals give rise to functional as well as protection requirements, so it is not a 
surprise if new security goals identify missing system functions. This form of requirements 
development is evident in the need for accountability functions, identified in section 15.4. 
However, the development and subsequent audit of security goals also identified 
inconsistencies between these goals and existing requirements documentation. The asset- 
based model developed in SeDAn provided a much more specific definition of the 
previously defined provenance requirement; this resulted in the identification of extra assets 
whose provenance was critical, and user interfaces that bypass the proposed provenance 
design. (153.2.2 and 15.4) 
There is value in quantifying the level of risk, even for self-evident security problems. 
Two security issues were self-evident before the case study began. The first was 
inconsistent user authentication between different user interfaces (some appeared to have no 
authentication design features), and the second was that some assets of concern (e. g. Engine 
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Metadata) were used extensively throughout the system. The analysis determined that the 
first is a high-risk issue, and the second is low risk. The second was so extensive that the 
risk level could not have been confirmed without tool-based analysis; the customer may 
choose to accept this risk, whereas without an accurate quantification of the risk level a re- 
design would have been recommended. (15.5.13 and 15.5.4.6) 
The most significant design issues were related to organisations as both potential 
attackers and asset owners; these were discovered as a result of SeDAn's ability to 
model the relationships between organisations and assets. 
Two design issues at the medium-risk level are related to organisations. It is possible 
that these could be discovered at a later stage in a conventional design process, when 
concrete bindings were made to organisations, but without the SeDAn model of 
organisations and deployments it would not have been possible to systematically identify 
these early in the system development. 
The first issue is concerned with algorithm confidentiality, which can be protected using 
SeDAn deployment constraints. 
The second issue is the possibility that organizations may attempt to modify the 
provenance record by manipulating user authentication or authorization data (in other words 
by faking user roles). This is an unexpected and significant design issue that was not 
anticipated prior to design analysis, by either the security analyst, or by the team 
responsible for designing the role-based access infrastructure. (15.5.3.4) 
Requirement patterns are effective in managing the scalability of service constraints. 
One feature of SeDAn is that it forces the documentation of security constraints on 
services, as well as system-level constraints, such as access control (e. g. see 15.5.4.2, 
above). These deferred requirements (see chapter 9) are information-flow constraints, and 
requirement patterns (see chapter 10) are provided to ensure that these types of constraint 
and both scalable and meaningful to system practitioners. The numerical evidence of this 
study is that this tactic is successful. The number of security requirements is dominated by 
access controls, not service constraints, which make up 35% of the total. (15.5.6) 
External risk profiles are useful during the design analysis, as well as providing 
implementation guidance. 
External risk profiles link system design analysis to the wider implementation context; 
implementation studies are needed to show their true value, but this case study demonstrates 
that they can be used to influence the design of a protection strategy. It is evident from the 
analysis that this system has three major zones with different environmental risks, and a 
suitable protection strategy reduces the risk of deploying one of these to a grid. (15.5.5) 
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15.7.2. Issues 
Tabular forms of the security environment are as important as the UML 
representation; however, they use extensive informal commentaries that are difficult 
to accommodate in UML, so the two forms are not completely interchangeable. 
Two different formats were used for the security environment: tabular (the asset register 
and attack register) and UML. The UML form is well suited to analysis, but is not 
accessible to business stakeholders; the tabular form was used for this purpose. Conversion 
between the two forms was manual; it is straightforward to generate tabular reports from 
UML, but there is a deeper outstanding question on bow to integrate the explanatory text 
that surrounds these tables with the UML environment. (153.4) 
Most of the modelling aspects of SeDAn were intuitive to system stakeholders; 
however, the services model has the potential to inhibit stakeholder input. 
Section 9.3.2. argued that concerns are better expressed in terms of data (e. g. availability 
of results) rather than services (e. g. availability of service), since the former are a better 
expression of the requirement. The final case-study model did not need to diverge from this 
position, but during requirements elicitation stakeholders did discuss services, and the 
discussion usefully identified new security-critical assets (Algorithms). SeDAn practitioners 
need to be aware of this problem, but there is no evidence from the study that the 
underlying model is incorrect. (153.4) 
Some risks are not static: the frequency of attach or impact, varies with time. 
Only one requirement could not be accommodated within SeDAn: goal impacts that 
varied with the business cycle. The treatment of temporally varying risk is an open question 
for SeDAn, and probably for risk management generally. (153.4) 
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15.8. Summary 
This chapter describes the application of SeDAn to an industrial, distributed, service- 
oriented system, the pilot Distributed Aircraft Maintenance Environment (DAME). The 
risk-analysis process was successful in identifying design issues, and expressing their 
potential impact in business terms. Specific DAME conclusions are summarised in section 
15.6. 
As noted in the introduction, these issues do not imply criticism of the project or any of 
its partners, all of whom welcomed and helped with this study. Security problems are to be 
expected in the development of large distributed systems. The number of design issues 
discovered validates the usefulness of SeDAn, and particularly its effectiveness early in the 
development cycle. 
The experience of using SeDAn is summarized in section 15.7; particular benefits that 
were derived from the use of SeDAn in this study included: 
" identifying problems with existing functional requirements. 
" quantifying the risk level of known security problems; 
" identifying unexpected security issues, particularly relating to organisations as both 
potential attackers and asset owners; 
" fully specifying service constraints, without a large increase in the number of security 
requirements used, and 
" confirming that part of the system can be grid-deployed, and the level of risk associated 
with that deployment. 
The study also identified some open issues, of which the most significant are: 
" the need to support a tabular form of the security environment, and the problem of 
managing large amounts of informal text in the equivalent UML model; and 
" risks that vary with the business cycle. 
This case study demonstrates the ability of SeDAn to deliver new security insights in the 
design and protection of a complex system, early in its development lifecycle. The number 
of design issues related to organisational attacks demonstrates the importance of the SeDAn 
deployment model in enabling the analysis of collaborative distributed systems. 
The security goals managed in this study were varied, the most important of which was 
provenance of assets, and of business decisions. The ability of SeDAn to use the same 
analysis methods and models to reason about security goals other than `confidentiality or 
`integrity' is therefore confirmed. 
This chapter concludes the description of how SeDAn has been tooled and used. The 
next chapter reviews SeDAn in the light of the requirements identified in chapter 1. 
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Chapter 16. Evaluation 
The thesis proposition is given in section 1.2: 
A security analysis framework can be developed in which security concerns, risks and 
mitigating mechanisms, are superimposed on the high-level design of a service-based 
system. Such a framework will allow a system analyst to reason about the effect of 
changes to security or functionality, provide risk-related metrics to guide 
implementers, and will be capable of being applied to a practical industrial example. 
The purpose of this chapter is to show that the thesis supports this proposition. The 
detailed justification and evaluation of the SeDAn framework is distributed throughout the 
main body of the thesis; this chapter references and summarises that material, and shows 
how it contributes to the thesis proposition. 
The proposition is wide-ranging; such a framework requires models for all the 
components that influence risk analysis (the functional design, organisations, users, 
attackers, security goals, etc), analysis methods and tooling. It is also necessary to ensure 
that the analysis process is scalable and systematic, and can accommodate important 
features of modem networked systems. 
At the highest level, the thesis is a demonstration that `a framework can be developed'; 
no such framework existed prior to this research, and the primary objective is to show that 
such a framework is possible. The overall argument for the proposition is that the SeDAn 
framework exists and is effective: the framework is documented in this thesis, and its use is 
demonstrated by a substantial case study, and many worked examples. However, it is also 
necessary to show that the framework meets the specific goals contained in the proposition; 
the framework must: 
" [model] security concerns, risks and mitigating mechanisms, ... superimposed on the 
high-level design of a service-based system; 
" allow a system analyst to reason about the effect of changes to security or functionality 
[and] provide risk-related metrics to guide implementers; and 
" be capable of being applied to a practical industrial example. 
This chapter is divided into three sections that describe how the thesis supports each 
these goals, in turn. 
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Because the proposition is, in essence, an existence demonstration, the following 
arguments can be used to justify that each goal, or supporting requirement, has been met 
" by construction: for example, that requirements established in the literature are included 
in the framework (16.1.2); 
" by instance: for example, that the framework has been applied to a real industrial 
problem (163.3); or 
" by evaluation: for example, of bow the generic SeDAn risk model relates to existing 
risk management frameworks (16.1.1). 
16.1. The Framework: models, concerns, risks and 
requirements 
The thesis proposition requires: 
A security analysis framework ... in which security concerns, risks and mitigating 
mechanisms, are superimposed on the high-level design of a service-based system. 
In other words, the framework must accommodate all the elements that contribute to 
risk analysis. Section 1.2 sub-divides this goal into three requirements; the framework must 
" support risk analysis within the context of existing IT governance and organisational 
risk methods; 
" provide a common framework in which functional design, the system security 
environment, and security requirements, are related, and 
" express and analyse the security requirements and design configurations of emerging 
networked systems. 
The following sections describe how the thesis addresses each of these requirements. 
16.1.1. Supporting existing IT governance and risk methods 
Chapter 6 introduces a generic model of risk management, and this is used to define the 
SeDAn security environment, which sets the context for analysis. 
The relationship between this model and established IT governance and risk 
management methods is evaluated in section 6.1.5. The purpose of that evaluation is to 
show that the generic model is related to established processes and standards, so that the 
analysis can be used in a wide range of management frameworks. 
The results show that this is the case. The SeDAn generic risk model is almost identical 
to the risk model used by some standards (e. g. NIST [134]), and has a close mapping to 
others (e. g. OCTAVE [136]); SeDAn can therefore be employed to support established risk 
management processes. 
In summary, the evaluation in section 6.1.5 demonstrates that this requirement is met. 
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16.1.2. The design, security environment, and security requirements 
The system model used in SeDAn has two main components, the functional design and 
the security environment. It is necessary to show that requirements for these components 
are appropriate, and that they are represented in the SeDAn metamodel: 
" chapter 5 develops requirements for the functional model, based on existing literature; 
" chapter 6 justifies the generic model of risk management (the evaluation was discussed 
in the previous section, 16.1.1); and 
9 section 8.2 describes how the SeDAn metamodel incorporates the requirements 
developed in chapters 5 and 6. 
This chain of reasoning links the SeDAn metamodel to established security viewpoints 
and requirements; in brief, this requirement is met by construction: section 8.2 explains 
how the SeDAn metamodel relates to the requirements established in chapters 5 and 6, and 
these chapters provide the link to requirements in the literature. 
The metamodel in chapter 8, however, contains only a placeholder for security 
requirements, and these need further discussion. 
As noted in chapter 5, there is no straightforward way to show that a set of requirements 
is complete, or sufficient for all applications. This thesis is a proof of concept: it shows that 
a framework can be developed; to support this hypothesis, it is necessary to show that a 
wide range of security requirements are supported, rather than support all possible 
requirements. The strategy within SeDAn is therefore to identify the types of requirement 
that are possible within the framework, and give examples of each. This strategy inevitably 
leaves open questions relating to other types of requirement that may be useful in practice, 
and some of these are described in the next chapter. 
Two main types of requirement are identified: those that constrain the system model and 
those that constrain service behaviour. Most of the former are familiar to security analysts, 
for example access controls; these are identified in chapter 5 from the security literature. 
Some requirement types in this category are less familiar, for example deployment 
constraints, since they arise from the flexible organisational modelling possible in SeDAn. 
Requirements that constrain service behaviour are necessary to provide a complete security 
specification (see section 11.4). The form of these requirements is novel, since they 
constrain the underlying SeDAn information model. These are the deferred requirements, 
which are described in chapter 9. 
Section 10.1 provides the argument that links the foundation material in chapters 5 and 
6 to specific framework security requirements. A taxonomy is presented, which identifies 
the important types of requirement. Individual requirements defined in chapter 10 are cross- 
referenced to the taxonomy, and show that the framework supports at least one instance of 
each type of requirement in the taxonomy. 
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16.1.3. The requirements of emerging networked systems 
Security requirements for emerging networked systems are established in chapter 2, by 
reference to the literature, and examples of this type of system are used throughout the 
thesis (e. g sections 4.5 and 5.2). 
The effectiveness of the SeDAn framework in accommodating the requirements of these 
systems is evaluated in section 93. This evaluation considers possible limitations of the 
SeDAn information model, what can be expressed using the main form of systematic 
security objective (the asset concern), and the extent that this supports the identified 
requirements. 
The evaluation identifies some potential issues: 
" the need to develop functionality that results from security goals, before completing the 
specification of asset concerns or conducting an analysis; and 
" limitations in how the SeDAn models accommodate temporal constraints, and unwanted 
outcomes to system services. 
The first of these is likely to apply to any analysis framework; section 93 argues that 
the second does not limit the use of the framework in practice. This requirement is therefore 
demonstrated by evaluation in section 93. 
16.2. Reasoning about security, and risk-metrics 
The thesis proposition requires the framework to: 
allow a system analyst to reason about the effect of changes to security or 
functionality [and] provide risk-related metrics to guide implementers 
The analysis process is defined in chapter 12, and is evaluated in section 12.4. The 
purpose of that evaluation is to determine the extent to which the analytic process is 
systematic. The criterion used in that evaluation is the extent that an analyst needs to 
incorporate extra features in the model, over and above the standard functional design and 
security environment, just to ensure analytic correctness. 
The evaluation identifies some issues that are common to most forms of security 
modelling (e. g. the need to introduce `user' and 'other user' of the same role, if the 
distinction between individuals is important) but the most significant issue is the problem of 
attack modelling for message security. The underlying problem is that message security 
requirements add functionality as well as constraints; for example, encryption facilitates a 
data path to a remote service, as well as preventing access by intermediate services. 
Attackers may send spoof messages (e. g. false claims), and unless such attacks are 
explicitly modelled they may not be detected. Section 12.43 shows that the problem can be 
avoided by systematically constructing attack models. 
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Risk Metrics 
The SeDAn information model maintains traceability between threat paths that are 
determined by analysis, and the risk of each path. In addition, further novel types of risk 
metric can be calculated, and these provide quality measures for a complete system 
protection strategy. They include: 
" component risk profiles; 
" the risk-value of individual requirements; 
" liveness measures; and 
" the degree to which components are trusted. 
Risk profiles are also particularly important to implementers, since they decompose 
systematic risks to individual components, avoiding the need to re-evaluate the whole 
system after each component design iteration. These features are described in chapter 12. 
Summary 
Risk analysis methods and metrics are described in chapter 12; this requirement is 
demonstrated by evaluation in section 12.4, at the end of that chapter. 
16.3. Practical Applications 
The thesis proposition requires the framework to: 
be capable of being applied to a practical industrial example. 
Section 1.2 subdivides this goal into three framework requirements, SeDAn must: 
" integrate with standard engineering design methods and tools; 
" be supportable with scalable tools; and 
" be applicable to realistic systems. 
The following sections describe how the thesis addresses each of these requirements. 
16.3.1. Standard engineering design methods and tools 
There are two aspects of importance: the design process and design tooling. The first 
requires a demonstration that security analysis is useful and effective early in the design 
lifecycle. Chapter 4 shows that it is possible, and productive, to carry out security analysis 
on a system design, by giving patterns of problems that can be identified, and rectified. 
System design in industry is widely based on UML, so the question of design methods 
and tooling is answered if SeDAn models can be expressed in UML, and if the translation 
of SeDAn models to standard UML engineering models is achievable. The first is 
demonstrated in chapter 8, which gives UML profiles for the SeDAn system model. The 
second is described in section 14.2.2. From the perspective of this thesis it is sufficient to 
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show that it is possible to exchange models between standard engineering tools and SeDAn 
tooling; the technical details are omitted, but have been published separately [7]. 
In summary, this requirement is met by giving instances of solutions in chapters 4 and 
14. 
16.3.2. Tool support and scalability 
Tool support is demonstrated by the development of a complete proof-of-concept tool, 
which is capable of supporting the analysis of realistic systems; the tool is described in 
chapter 14. An evaluation of its performance and scalability is given in section 143. 
This evaluation was carried out to determine if the proof-of-concept tool was suitable 
for use on industrial-scale systems. This was confirmed, the performance results suggest 
that the existing tool can support system designs of approximately 1000 UML classes, 
which would be about ten times larger than the case study, and that there are good prospects 
to redevelop the tool with larger systems in mind. The significance of this result is less the 
performance of the current tool, than an indication that the framework is potentially able to 
accommodate very large systems. 
In summary, this requirement is met by giving an instance of a suitable practical tool, 
which is described in chapter 14, and demonstrated in the case study in chapter 15; an 
evaluation of its performance and scalability is presented in section 143. 
16.3.3. Applicability to real systems 
The practical use of the SeDAn framework is demonstrated in the case study in chapter 
15. This is a genuine industrial application, with modem networked features (multiple 
organisations, collaboration, grid) and complex and pre-determined security requirements. 
The use of SeDAn in the case study is evaluated in section 15.7. The purpose of that 
evaluation is to identify benefits resulting from the use of the framework, and highlight 
potential problems. 
Particular benefits included: 
" identifying gaps in existing functional requirements; 
" quantifying the risk level of known security problems; 
" identifying unexpected security issues, particularly relating to organisations that are 
both asset owners and potential attackers; 
" fully specifying service constraints, without a large increase in the number of security 
requirements used; and 
" confirming that part of the system can be grid-deployed, and the level of risk associated 
with that deployment. 
There were no significant problems identified with the use of the framework, although 
some open questions were identified, and are discussed in chapter 17. 
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This case study demonstrates that SeDAn is able to deliver new security insights into the 
design and protection of complex systems, early in their development lifecycle. Novel 
features in SeDAn that accommodate the requirements of modem networked systems 
facilitated the most significant insights (see section 15.6). These features include flexible 
modelling of the relationships between organisations and their assets, and the ability to 
reason about complex security goals, such as provenance. This confirms that it is possible 
to construct a framework, which can be used to effectively analyse complex networked 
systems typical of those described in chapter 2. 
In summary, this requirement is met by giving an instance of practical industrial use in 
chapter 15, together with an evaluation of that case study in section 15.7. 
16.4. Summary 
The thesis achieves its aim: to demonstrate that it is possible to construct a security 
analysis framework, with the comprehensive and systematic properties described in the 
thesis proposition. Detailed justification and evaluation of the framework is contained 
within the main text, this chapter references and summarises that material, and shows how it 
supports the thesis proposition. 
This chapter has described how the thesis proposition is supported; the final chapter 
describes a further contribution of the thesis: novel features that were developed to support 
the SeDAn framework, and which may have wider significance to requirements 
management, risk analysis and security design. It also highlights important open questions 
that arise from this work, and concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 17. Conclusions 
This thesis began with two questions, which established risk-management processes are 
unable to address; they are: 
" What is the value (or level of responsibility) of any particular security feature, or system 
component, in terms of risk? and 
" Is it possible to replace one security requirement with another, which may be more 
convenient in system terms? 
Existing risk analysis methods lose the connection between risk and security 
requirements during the security design process, and this failure has a more fundamental 
origin than merely failing to maintain traceability. In essence, existing methods rely on 
checklists, built partially from system topologies and partly from received wisdom, and do 
not have at their core a consistent system model which allows reasoning about a system in 
the context of its security environment. 
This thesis has shown that it is possible to develop an analysis framework that is able to 
systematically answer these questions. SeDAn maintains a single model that relates a 
system's functional design to its security environment (organisations, security goals, asset 
concerns, attackers etc); this allows the evaluation of a design from a security perspective, 
including evaluating the choice and position of security requirements. Given this 
framework, it is also possible to analyze a system in new and useful ways, including the 
derivation of component risk profiles; these relate the system-level analysis to 
implementation defects, and hence the social and physical context of deployed sub-systems 
or components. 
Risk profiles are just one of several innovations that are necessary to support a 
comprehensive security design analysis framework. Although the main purpose of the thesis 
is to show that such a framework is possible (see chapter 16), the novel features in SeDAn 
have separate intrinsic value, since they resolve difficult problems in security risk analysis, 
and may therefore find application in other situations. 
The evaluation in chapter 16 summarised how the thesis supports the research 
proposition; this chapter completes the description of the contribution of the thesis by 
summarising important novel features that were developed to support the SeDAn 
framework, and highlighting some of the open questions resulting from this work. 
Because this thesis is a feasibility demonstration, there are inevitably many open 
questions. They range from the type of security infrastructure that can be supported, and the 
possibility of more expressive, or detailed, security requirements, to questions of how better 
to support the analysis process. These questions are valuable, because they highlight areas 
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where the existing framework can be extended, as well as indicating fruitful areas for future 
research. 
In detail, this chapter is organised as follows: 
" section 17.1 describes novel features of SeDAn that are important in facilitating risk- 
based security analysis; 
" section 17.2 describes open questions that arise from this work; and 
" section 17.3 summarises the chapter. 
Supplementary material is referenced within the following sections, together with 
relevant publications. 
17.1. Novel Features in SeDAn 
The following sections describe seven innovative features that were necessary to 
achieve a systematic framework for security design, they are: 
9 the deployment model: how organisations are represented and deferred service 
deployment is accommodated; 
9 the information model, which models the security-relevant aspects of a system; 
" deferred requirements, that specify service behaviour, 
" requirement patterns, which allow the specification of security requirements that are 
meaningful in design terms; 
" implementation risk profiles, which relate the system level risk analysis to 
implementation defects and the wider system context; 
" protection strategy quality metrics, which extend the underlying analysis to provide 
metrics about complete protection strategies; and 
" tooling. 
17.1.1. Service Deployment and Asset Ownership 
Conventional models of a system's security environment support only a hierarchical 
relationship between services or assets, and organisations; in other words specific services 
and assets are owned by specific organisations (e. g. [286]). There are two problems with 
this approach: 
" modem networked systems defer the deployment of services, in some cases to run time. 
It is therefore necessary to reason about possible deployments during the design 
process. 
" in collaborative systems, `administration' of an asset does not necessarily mean that the 
administrator is the sole organisation with a security interest in the asset. For example, 
several collaborating organisations may have security goals relating to the same asset, 
which may be located at a trusted third party. 
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SeDAn addresses this problem by modelling the relationships from organisations to 
services and assets as flexible associations, rather than fixed bindings. This allows the 
framework to represent abstract services, as in web-service architectures, as well as the 
more dynamic types of service deployment that are used in computing Grids. One 
consequence of this flexibility is that it introduces the need for a new type of security 
requirement, constrained deployment, whereas models without this flexibility have no need 
to express constraints of this type. A deployment constraint is a form of access control that 
specifies where services may, or may not, be located. 
Similar flexible relationships are used to model the ownership of security goals and 
associated asset concerns: organisations may own security goals, or be potential attackers of 
security goals, regardless of the location of any related assets. This flexibility is needed to 
express the range of security objectives found in collaborative systems, such as the business 
workflow described in the case study (see chapter 15). 
In summary, flexible modelling of the relationships between organisations, services, and 
security goals, is a direct response to the functionality supported by emerging collaborative 
networked systems. This flexibility expands the system behaviour that can be described, so 
it also introduces the need for additional security requirements, of which constrained 
deployment is one example. 
Deployment is introduced in chapter 7; the system modelling aspects are described in 
chapter 8, security requirements in chapter 10, and the analysis consequences of these 
models, including organisations as potential attackers, are described in chapter 12. 
This overall approach to modelling distributed systems is published in Adapting 
Security Risk Analysis to Service-Based Systems [4]. 
17.1.2. The Information Model 
In order to relate the many risk-associated elements of a system (the functional design, 
and various elements of the security environment), it is necessary for the framework to have 
a single core model, which is expressive enough to represent important security features, 
and also facilitates efficient analysis. 
This is the function of the SeDAn information model, and the design of this model 
determines: 
" what system features can be represented; 
" what security requirements can be represented; and 
" the efficiency and scalability of the analysis process. 
The essence of the information model is that it models precisely what is known about a 
system design: a system design specifies sub-systems, or services, and the messages that 
flow between them. It defines the interfaces to these services, but not their behaviour. The 
information model therefore captures the specific information flow between services, while 
providing a generic model for service behaviour. This allows the representation of 
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conventional security constraints, such as access controls, since they constrain the message 
flow and topology of the system, as well as allowing information-based security 
requirements that constrain the behaviour of individual services. 
The information model is formulated as a graph, which facilitates efficient model 
checking. 
Another feature of the information model is that information flow is typed. The typing 
distinguishes between traffic flow (i. e. events with no related data, such as void operation 
returns) and information flow via data items. This is important for two reasons: 
" it allows path exploitability to be qualified, to some extent, at the system level. Threat 
paths with traffic flow steps may not be exploitable for certain types of security goal, 
such as commercial integrity; and 
" it allows the observability of assets to external attackers to be modelled For example, 
wiretaps make messages observable. This allows SeDAn to analyse end-to-end 
communication security requirements (message policies), such as integrity sealing and 
encryption. 
The information model is described in detail in chapter 9. This work has not yet been 
published in its entirety; however, the use of graph-based information-flow models for 
privacy [5], and the information-flow approach to security requirements [6] have both been 
published. 
17.1.3. Deferred Requirements 
The information model includes a generic model of service behaviour, this allows a 
complete set of security requirements to be established, because it is possible to constrain 
all parts of the system. However, service requirements that are specified in just information 
terms are unlikely to be directly meaningful to an implementer, for a number of reasons: 
" it is necessary to distinguish between security goals that are more subtle than 
confidentiality (e. g. provenance in the case study); and 
" security requirements are likely to be better implemented, and more succinct, if they are 
conveyed to an implementer in design terms, rather than information terms. 
These problems arise because system models do not specify service behaviour (as 
opposed to service interfaces), but it is necessary to specify security requirements that 
constrain services. However, asset concerns include an informal description of the required 
security objective; SeDAn exploits this information by binding service requirements to their 
informal context, the related asset concern, as well as their formal constraint in information 
terms. 
For example, a service may support a simple integrity requirement, perhaps to ensure 
that certain data values are maintained within acceptable limits. This security requirement 
consists of two equally important parts: 
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" the information constraint, which specifies that the service has a responsibility to defend 
a particular information path; and 
" the informal semantics that specify the implementation requirement. These are 
documented by the related asset concern; in this case that the service must constrain 
data values within the given range. 
This type of requirement is known as a deferred requirement, because it can be properly 
interpreted only in terms of a detailed functional design, or implementation. 
A technical problem with the analysis of deferred requirements is that because their 
semantics are not formally complete, they are not comparable: an information flow 
constraint traceable to one asset concern does not, necessarily, protect a different concern. 
For this reason the SeDAn information model is not a single information graph, but a set of 
graphs, one for each asset concern. 
This formal separation of asset concerns allows SeDAn to analyse a wide range of 
different security properties (see section 9.3). For example, availability can be analysed, 
because a concern can be related to (the availability of) a particular result, and information 
paths from potential attackers to that result can be determined. Requirements placed on 
services in these paths are traceable to the availability objective. Information flow analysis 
determines possible locations for security requirements, while the informal asset concern 
(availability) specifies the property required of the implementation. 
In summary, deferred requirements allow the meaningful specification of service 
constraints and facilitate the analysis of a wide range of different security requirements. 
Deferred requirements, and the use of SeDAn for a range of different security goals, are 
both discussed in chapter 9. This approach to specifying security requirements is published 
in Specifying Information-Flow Controls [6]. . 
17.1.4. Requirement Patterns 
The second issue in the previous section, the need to communicate requirements in 
design terms, is partly answered by deferred requirements, since they allow a wide range of 
security objectives to be analysed. However, the primitive information constraints that are 
directly supported by the information model are generally too detailed, and may become too 
numerous, to be useful to an implementer. This problem is resolved in SeDAn by specifying 
security requirements as patterns of information constraint, rather than individual 
constraints. 
For example, stateless is a common design pattern, in which a designer ensures that 
instances of operations are independent, in the sense that the input to one operation instance 
is unable to directly influence the result of another. This pattern is familiar and important to 
an implementer, so SeDAn includes a stateless security requirement, which compiles to the 
set of primitive constraints needed to express this implementation property. 
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In summary, security requirements are patterns of primitive information constraints. 
SeDAn security requirements are defined in chapter 10, and worked examples of their use 
are given in chapter 11. The primitive information flow constraints are specified formally in 
appendix B. The use of requirements patterns has been published in Specffng Information- 
Flow Controls [6]. 
17.1.5. Decomposing Systematic Risk Into Component Risk Profiles 
A system design is a relatively high-level specification for a system, and the security 
requirements specified in such a design are also, therefore, at a high level. SeDAn is able to 
quantify the risk associated with each requirement (see 17.1.6, below), but a major practical 
issue is the need to defend the system from attacks via implementation features or defects 
that do not appear in the system design. For example, an implementation feature is a 
physical server, which contains critical assets, and must therefore be protected against theft. 
A defect (or vulnerability) may be a faulty software implementation, which provides an 
unexpected access path to the system via a buffer-overflow attack. 
Although these features do not appear in the system design, the SeDAn analysis process 
is able to relate the risk environment (asset concerns, attackers etc) to components in the 
system model, and these eventually map to the implementation. The services in a system 
design are (usually) implemented in software and hosted on physical computers; some of 
the associations in the system design may be implemented as communications links; and 
user roles map to real users, or organisational roles. SeDAn introduces the concept of a risk 
profile, which specifies the risks that would result from the subversion of these components. 
Risk profiles are derived by modelling implementation defects as external, or non=standard 
(i. e. not described in the system design), accesses to system components. The threat paths 
that result from such non-standard accesses provide the risk profile for the component, and 
this indicates the degree of protection, or assurance, required in the implementation of each 
component 
Risk profiles are important, since without them it is necessary for an implementer to 
analyse the complete system to determine the need for the protection of implementation 
features, such as physical servers. The generation of risk profiles decomposes the 
systematic risk environment into local risk environments, which can be used as metrics for 
individual system components. Because these profiles can be provided for any part of the 
system model, including users, they also link the system-level security analysis to the wider 
organisational and process context of the system. 
Non-standard, or external, attacks are introduced in chapter 7, the analysis method is 
described in detail in chapter 12, and implementation issues are discussed in chapter 13. 
A description of the external attack model is has been published in Adapting Security 
Risk Analysis to Service-Based Systems [4]. 
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17.1.6. Protection Strategy Quality Metrics 
The problems that introduced this thesis included the need to value a security 
requirement, or to understand the contribution of a requirement to mitigating system level 
risks. This is part of the more general problem of evaluating the quality of a protection 
strategy which is complete, in the sense that there are no unprotected threat paths. Important 
questions include: 
" if the set of security requirements are necessary, as well as sufficient; 
" the value of each security requirement, in terms of risk; 
" if any security requirements compromise functional liveness; and 
" if the system is vulnerable from potentially subverted components. 
Metrics of this sort are novel in risk analysis, but they are all derived from relatively 
straightforward extensions of the underlying SeDAn analysis. 
The review of requirements to determine if any are potentially unnecessary, and the 
valuation of requirements, are both supported in the same way: requirements are removed 
from the system in turn, and the system analysed for threat paths in the usual way. Any risks 
that emerge are mitigated by the requirement under test. 
Liveness is assessed by seeking information paths between legitimate users (rather than 
attackers) and their assets; this detects security requirements that may prevent normal 
system operation. 
Some systems have embedded components that are very likely to be subverted; for 
example, systems that communicate via the Internet. The risk profiles described in the 
previous section characterise the extent that a subverted component is able to attack the 
system; they are therefore suitable metrics for this aspect of a protection strategy, as well as 
providing a risk framework for components. 
In summary, there are still important questions to be answered when all the threats in a 
system have been mitigated. The underlying SeDAn analysis model is able to answer these 
questions by providing a range of quality metrics for a complete protection strategy. 
Protection strategy review is introduced in chapter 7, and the analysis methods are 
detailed in chapter 12. The published case study uses this type of analysis [8], including the 
use of risk profiles to determine the vulnerability of the system to services that are deployed 
to the Grid. 
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17.1.7. Tooling: The Security Analyst Workbench 
The Security Analyst Workbench (SAW) allows SeDAn to be applied to realistic 
industrial problems, and it also demonstrates that the framework is systematic, and that the 
underlying modelling is inherently efficient (see chapter 14). Most of the innovation is in 
the design of the SeDAn framework, rather than the supporting tool; however, there is one 
novel aspect which is specific to the SAW, and that is the ability to exchange models with 
arbitrary proprietary development environments. 
This is facilitated by a novel transformation language, which is interpreted bi- 
directionally by a template processor. This allows the same infrastructure to import a 
system design from the XML (XMI [292]) representation of a UML model, and also merge 
security requirements specified within SAW back into the engineering design. 
The supporting tool is briefly described in chapter 14, the details of the bi-directional 
model processing have been published in XRound. - Bidirectional Transformations and 
Unifications via a Reversible Template Language [7]. 
17.1.8. Summary 
In order to develop a systematic framework for risk-based security analysis it is 
necessary to solve some important modelling problems, and this has resulted in the novel 
features described above. The information model, deployment model and tooling are direct 
responses to the need for single model of a system and its context, the requirements of 
emerging networked systems, and integration with standard engineering environments, 
respectively. 
The other innovations - deferred requirements, requirement patterns, risk profiles and 
quality metrics - are not direct solutions to framework requirements, but result from 
pursuing research into how the analysis framework can be exploited to provide more 
insights into a security design. The result is a set of novel concepts and metrics that are of 
wider significance to requirements management, risk analysis, and secure system design. 
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97.2. Open Questions 
This thesis inevitably raises many open questions. The function of this section is to 
describe some of the more significant issues, both to highlight possible extensions to the 
existing framework, and also to indicate potentially fruitful areas for future research. The 
questions are grouped into three main topics: 
" advanced security technology: the analysis of more complex emerging security 
environments; 
9 enhancements to the requirements language: extending the current security requirements 
to represent other requirements features; and 
" further automated support to design analysis, including model preparation and module 
management 
17.2.1. Advanced Security Technology 
Four topics for further study are suggested by the review of emerging systems, worked 
examples, and the case study. These are: 
" security configurations or technologies that extend, or distort, security domains; 
" the security of electronic products; 
" dynamic security environments; and 
" advanced security infrastructure. 
Security Domains 
Most security modelling enforces a hierarchical relationship between organisational 
domains, and services, assets and users. SeDAn models these relationships more flexibly, 
allowing the representation and analysis of a wider range of deployment scenarios, 
including Grid applications. (See section 17.1.1, above. ) 
There are emerging security technologies which do more than flexibly deploy services, 
but also guarantee, to some extent, the behaviour of software that is physically located in a 
remote organisation's system. The most comprehensive of these is Trusted Computing, an 
established concept [297], which is now being incorporated in hardware to provide a 
guaranteed execution environment. Other arrangements also provide trusted clients in 
otherwise hostile domains, such as end-to-end encryption to a user's smart card, or VPN 
tunnels from dedicated client systems. There are also more extreme computing models, 
such as pervasive computing [1], or smart sensors [224], with inconsistencies between 
physical and administrative ownership, or where the concept of security administration is 
not meaningful once the device has been deployed. 
The SeDAn security environment metamodel is probably flexible enough to 
accommodate some of these issues, but the range of distinctive scenarios in this space is 
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still unknown, as is the effectiveness of the SeDAn deferred-deployment model in these 
circumstances. 
Electronic Products 
Chapter 2 concluded that the most significant security objectives in emerging systems 
are associated with assets that cross administration boundaries. Workflow records are an 
important class of these assets, and have been used in most of the examples, and the case 
study, in this thesis. 
Other types of cross-administration assets include electronic products, and licences; the 
security objectives for these assets tend to focus on restricting their use, in a very similar 
way to privacy requirements [5], or mandatory security (see section 23.1). The mechanisms 
proposed to protect such assets include extended security domains (see above), but there is a 
further question of how policies such as `must be copied only twice' relate to security goals, 
functional requirements and asset concerns. 
By refining security goals into either functional requirements or asset concerns, SeDAn 
provides the essential basis for security analysis, but more study is required to determine if 
the security objectives for electronic products and licenses can be framed as SeDAn security 
goals (e. g. are they meaningful as objects of traceability, and as attack objectives) or if not, 
how they relate to such goals. 
Dynamic Risk Environments 
An open question identified in the case study is how to manage a risk that varies with 
the business cycle; for example, the impact of the concern may be greater during contract 
negotiation, or product development. (See Non-Static Risks in section 153.2.2. ) A range of 
pragmatic approaches to this problem are described, but they essentially involve 
partitioning the system in time, or space, so that the partitions can be regarded as having a 
static security environment. 
This is an instance of a more general problem of non-stationary risks. In extreme cases 
risks are highly dynamic; for example, there is a military need to form dynamic tactical 
coalitions [261], which is in tension with conservative security practices. The need for 
dynamic assessment of risk is also apparent in most mobile systems, and is a feature in 
pervasive security. 
Since SeDAn is concerned with risk during the design process, it does not immediately 
apply to the dynamic assessment of risk in a deployed system. However, we conjecture that 
the system modelling in SeDAn, and the innovations necessary to accommodate 
collaborative distributed systems, also provide a modelling basis that could also be used for 
dynamic risk management. 
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Advanced Security Infrastructure 
SeDAn assumes the simplest possible model of a security infrastructure (see section 
13.2.2): that the system will maintain consistent use of references to services, user roles and 
organisations. This might, for example, be supported by a basic public key system, but most 
practical security infrastructure provides more complex functionality; for example, the 
identity federation system described in section 5.2.3, or trust-management systems that 
provide distributed access control [149]. 
The security analyst is faced with a choice: 
" to model the security infrastructure as part of the system design, which has the effect of 
incorporating elements in the design that are not easily interpreted in business terms; or 
" to introduce the infrastructure later in the system-lifecycle, which may introduce new 
interfaces at the system level, requiring the security analysis to be revisited. 
Identity infrastructure, such as that in section 5.2.3 can be modelled in SeDAn"; the 
question is how and when to introduce such models into the development lifecycle. SeDAn 
may therefore be useful later in the lifecycle, as well as during the system design, but how 
design artefacts should be managed to achieve this is an open question: the problem of 
managing design refinement in UML models is not one which has a general solution, even 
without security requirements. 
A related question is how the security requirements introduced by SeDAn can be 
migrated into the implementation. Some of the SeDAn security requirements are capable of 
direct translation into automated policy files (e. g. WS-Policy) and access-control languages, 
which are directly interpreted by security infrastructure. Although these languages are not 
yet universally supported, the potential to automate the process from the security analysis to 
the implementation would be an important assurance mechanism. Perhaps it would be 
equally profitable to move in the other direction: superimpose access policy statements 
generated by conventional policy tools on a system design, and then use SeDAn to analyse 
the resulting operational configuration. 
17.2.2. Enhancements to the Requirements Language 
Chapter 10 gave a taxonomy of security requirements; SeDAn supports each type of 
requirement, but does not elaborate the requirements language further than necessary for 
this purpose. This strategy has been effective, since it allows the feasibility of the 
framework to be demonstrated, proves sufficient for the representative examples given in 
this thesis, and also supports a realistic case study. 
However, there is a gap between the minimal requirements defined in SeDAn, and the 
extremely rich requirements that can be encoded in some policy languages (e. g. XACML 
38 A SeDAn model exists of this system. It is not presented in this thesis because it is not essential to the thesis 
proposition. 
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[270]). It is certainly possible to make a case for simplicity (see, for example, the critique 
of message-based security in section 5.2.2), but it is equally true that additional features in 
SeDAn may allow the better specification of some security scenarios. The open question is 
where this balance should lie. 
Possible enhancements to the current requirements language, and the SeDAn 
metamodel, include: 
" role hierarchies, including the inheritance of access permissions; 
" message-level access controls that are conditional on both user and data origin (at 
present either one or the other is supported); and 
" message-level access controls based on the value of a claim, rather than its signature. A 
completely general version of this may not be desirable (see section 5.2.2) but more 
restricted versions may be useful; for example, claims that specify application context 
may allow the partitioning of a system into applications. 
17.2.3. Further Automated Support to Design Analysis 
This section identifies potentially fruitful work in the relationship between security 
analysis and the system design process. There are two main topics: 
" the automation of security modelling; and 
" modular analysis support. 
Most of the open questions identified in this section are straightforward in principle, but 
may be more complex in practice, because of the need to extend existing models, and 
interact with propriety UML design models and tools. 
Automation of Security Modelling 
Two systematic tasks will be often be needed to prepare a system model for analysis: 
" setting a default protection strategy; and 
" modelling potential message-level attacks. 
Section 12 describes the need for a default protection strategy. If a system does not have 
an existing protection strategy, one is generated; this is illustrated in the case study (see 
section 15.5.2). A default strategy ensures that only the access permissions needed for the 
operation of the system are allowed. If system requirements have been established using 
interaction diagrams, then in principle it is possible to infer a default protection strategy 
from the design. 
The modelling of message level attacks is described in section 12.43, and requires 
additions to the system model to account for possible `spoof claim' attacks on message 
level security. This process is systematic (see section 12.433); the essential problem is 
how it should be automated. As far as possible this is a technical problem that should be 
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hidden from the analyst, but implemented with sufficient transparency to allow the analyst 
to understand any threat paths that are reported. 
Model managen7ent 
The SeDAn analysis process (see section 12.1) divides the protection of a system into 
discrete modules. In the case study (see section 15.2.2) these were a combination of concern 
and risk level, but their definition is system-specific; for example, they may also be 
characterised by different groups of assets. 
Modules may be analysed and protected separately, or in combination, and modules 
may also be excluded from the analysis because they cannot be adequately protected, or 
because a management decision has been made to mitigate the associated risks outside the 
system. In these circumstances it may be valuable to continue security analysis, temporarily 
omitting one or more protection modules, rather than re-work the functional design or 
security environment (see section 12.1). This suggests the need for module management, 
which would: 
" automate analysis management to include or exclude certain modules; and 
" maintain an analysis record that shows the circumstances in which a particular 
protection strategy was valid. 
Neither of these is completely straightforward, and both require a better-developed 
understanding of how to modularise a protection strategy. Modules are likely to include 
arbitrary combinations of assets and concerns, so it is necessary to ensure that the set of 
modules partitions the protection requirement in a way that is intuitively meaningful to the 
analyst. Omitting modules implies the need to record which security requirements were 
used in the analysis of which module. 
The existing framework does not include a separate artefact that records and manages 
the analysis process (the Security Analyst Workbench maintains analysis logs, but these are 
not used to manage analysis). The primary output of the analysis is the protection strategy, 
which is recorded in security requirements in the UML system design. More comprehensive 
modular analysis management may therefore require additional framework artefacts to 
manage and record the analysis process. 
17.3. Summary 
This thesis has shown that it is possible to develop a systematic framework for 
reasoning about security requirements, and their relationship to security risks. SeDAn 
maintains the relationship between security requirements and the risks they defend. This 
allows the risk-based value, or responsibility, of any security requirement or system 
component to be determined, allowing an analyst to reason about the type and placement of 
security requirements, and the quality of an overall protection strategy. 
420 Summary 
The SeDAn framework incorporates a number of innovative features, which are 
themselves significant contributions to the fields of risk management and security design. 
These include: 
"a flexible deployment model, which includes flexible associations between 
organisations, assets and security goals, rather than fixed hierarchical bindings. These 
types of association also give rise to new types of security requirement; 
" an information model, which models security-relevant aspects of the whole system, 
binding the functional model to the risk context of the system; 
" deferred requirements, which allow service behaviour to be specified; 
" requirement patterns, which allow the definition of types of security requirement that 
are meaningful in design terms; 
" implementation risk profiles, which relate system level risks to implementation defects 
and the wider system context. This mechanism provides a new dimension to component 
requirements, since it informs the implementer of the risk-context of a component, 
without the need to re-evaluate the whole system; and 
" protection strategy quality metrics, which include the valuation of security 
requirements, and the evaluation of liveness and trust. 
The information model, deployment model, and tooling, are direct responses to the need 
for a single model of a system and its context, the requirements of emerging networked 
systems, and integration with standard engineering environments, respectively. The other 
innovations, however, are not direct solutions to framework requirements, but demonstrate 
that further insights into security design can be developed given a suitable framework. The 
resulting concepts and metrics are of potential significance to requirements management, 
risk analysis and secure system design, and indicate the potential for further work in this 
area. 
Since the purpose of this thesis is to show that a security design analysis framework is 
feasible, it leaves many open questions for further work. These include how best to 
incorporate advanced security infrastructure, such as trusted computing base technology, 
how to support a more dynamic approach to risk management in operational systems, the 
range of security requirements needed, and analysis features that better support the modular 
process described in section 12.1. 
The critical test of SeDAn is that it can be used to improve the security of real, complex 
systems. This is demonstrated by the case study in chapter 15, followed in chapter 16 by a 
full evaluation of how well the framework meets its objectives. This chapter has highlighted 
other contributions of the framework: that SeDAn includes innovative approaches to 
security analysis that are themselves of wider significance, and that it has the potential for 
further development. 
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Appendix A. Diagram Conventions and UML Profiles 
Two types of diagram are used extensively in this thesis: 
" UML diagrams that are used to model systems, and present the SeDAn metamodel in 
chapter 8; and 
" information flow diagrams, that are used to explain how information flows in a system, 
and how this is constrained by security requirements. 
Chapter 8 specifies how to write SeDAn models in UML [288], using a feature within 
UML 2.0 that allows the introduction of application-specific language extensions: the 
profile mechanism. A profile defines a collection of stereotyped diagram features and tags 
to support a particular application. 
The UML usage in this thesis does not deviate from standard, but a relatively small 
subset of the language is used, partly because of the focus on abstract system design and 
hence class diagrams, and partly to avoid ambiguity. This appendix briefly describes the 
main elements of a class diagram and their use, and then introduces UML profiles and 
describes how they are documented. 
Information flow diagrams are introduced in chapter 4 to clarify the effects of system 
design decisions. They are used throughout the thesis, but particularly in chapter 9, to 
explain the effect of security requirements on information flow. This appendix also defines 
the main elements of an information flow diagram. 
The appendix is organised as follows: 
" section A. 1 describes the main components of a class diagram, and UML useage 
conventions within this thesis; 
" section A. 2 describes how profiles are used to define application-specific language 
extensions; and 
" section A. 3 describes the main components of an information-flow diagram. 
Other types of diagram are explained where they occur in the thesis. 
424 Class Diagrams and Conventions 
Al. . Class Diagrams and Conventions 
Most of the UML diagrams in this thesis are class diagrams, and use a small subset of 
the UML language. This corresponds to normal practice in system modelling and 
requirements capture, which tends to focus on class diagrams to indicate system structure, 
and interaction diagrams to capture user scenarios. 
The main features of a UML class diagram are shown in figure A. I. 
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Figure A. 1. UML Class Diagram 
The primary component is the class, which denotes a named set of objects or instances, 
which are disjoint from those denoted by any other named class, unless a language feature 
such as generalisation specifies otherwise. Classes may optionally encapsulate other 
language elements, including attributes, operations and tags. 
Classes are subsets of the UML metaclass Class, and it is possible to introduce an 
intermediate level of classification between the metaclass Class, and classes used in a 
design, by the use of stereotypes. A class stereotype denotes a subset of the metaclass Class; 
in turn, classes labelled with a particular «stereotypeName» are disjoint subsets of that 
stereotype. In UML this process is known as extending a metaclass with a stereotype. 
Although only a class stereotype is shown in figure 1, stereotypes can be similarly used to 
extend other UML metaclasses; for example, Association is extended by stereotype in 
chapter 8. 
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The semantics of a class are usually suggested by its name, and either described 
explicitly, or by reference to the profile in which the stereotype is introduced. 
Attributes are properties of an instance of a class. Although instances can be represented 
in UML (as Objects in an object diagram, not described here), it is generally not possible to 
specify attribute values for individual objects3'. Tags, on the other hand, are properties of a 
class, not an instance, and are given a value in the class definition. They are often used to 
constrain how a class should be implemented. 
The other important feature of a class diagram is how classes are related to each other. 
UML provides a range of possible relations, two of which are described here. The most 
common and flexible relation is an association, which specifies that instances of two classes 
are related in some way. The semantics of an association is described by a label, which 
should be read as a verb, with the subject of the verb being the diagrammatically adjacent 
class. For example, the association between Presentation and Order in figure A. 1 should be 
read as: 
"Presentation Displays Order" 
UML conventions also allow nouns to be placed on association ends (i. e. near the 
classes they describe) but that option is never used here; if class names are meaningful it is 
often redundant, and they can be confused with association verbs. 
Associations are constrained at both ends by multiplicity specifications, which 
determine upper and lower bounds for the instances of each class involved in the 
association. For example, in figure A. 1: none, or one instance of classA may be related to 
one or many instances of classB. By convention, if a multiplicity is not specified it denotes 
a single instance at that end. 
The second relation shown in figure A. 1 is generalisation. In UML a generalisation can 
be interpreted in one of two ways, depending upon circumstances. In abstract designs or 
specifications it usually represents a sub-type; this specifies that one class is a subset of 
another (for example, in figure A. 1, classY is a subset of classX). The principle of 
substitutability (classYcould always be substituted for classes is therefore an important test 
for the appropriateness of a generalisation in an abstract design. Since the metamodels and 
designs in this thesis are abstract, generalisations used here denote subsets by convention. If 
several sub-classes are specified in this way, they are disjoint. 
The alternative interpretation of generalisation is similar to programming-language 
inheritance, where attributes, tags, and operations from the main class are propagated into 
the sub-class, which is able to over-ride them if required. This interpretation allows the 
specification of object-oriented software, and is used in implementation specifications. 
39 It is only possible to specify initial values for objects in standard UML. Various IJML extensions (e. g. action 
semantics) allow other values to be specified. 
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Two common auxiliary features are packages and notes. A package is a container for 
UML components (e. g. classes and class diagrams), used to organise UML into logical 
elements; a note is additional informal information about an element in a diagram. 
Packages are used to divide class diagrams into logical sub-specifications, but often it is 
necessary to refer to classes in one package that have been defined in another. This is shown 
in two ways: 
" The two packages are linked with a dotted arrow, that denotes dependancy, sometimes 
with the additional «import» stereotype. In Figure A.! PackageA depends on 
PackageB, or in other words, PackageA makes use of some of the components defined 
in PackageB. 
" Classes can be prefixed to show the package in which they are declared. For example in 
Figure A. 1, classX is declared in `OtherPackage'. 
A. 2. Profiles 
Stereotypes and tags were described in the previous section, but their relationship is 
important. In versions of UML prior to 2.0, tags could be placed at will on almost any 
feature; this usage is now deprecated in favour of associating tags with particular 
stereotypes as part of a profile. A profile is a lightweight UML extension mechanism, which 
defines how a particular application will be represented in UML. A profile specifies the 
stereotypes to be used and the UML metaclasses which these stereotypes extend; for each 
stereotype it defines: 
the Semantics of the Stereotype: a natural language description that explains how the 
stereotypes should be interpreted; 
" properties: tags that may be used in classes of this stereotype, their multiplicity and 
type; and 
" constraints: constraints specified in natural language, OCL, or other formatted text. 
They constrain the structure of the UML; for example, they can be used to specify valid 
associations between classes of different stereotypes. 
Profiles provide a consistent way of customising UML for a particular application, and 
allow tools that support UML 2.0 to be consistently configured to support the application. 
They are used in chapter 8 to define how SeDaN models should be represented. 
Profiles are defined using a specialised UML Profile Diagram which introduces one or 
more stereotypes and specifies the metaclasses they extend. An example of such a diagram 
is shown in figure A. 2. 
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«metaclass» 
interface 
Represents: 
<<stereotype>> #ABSTRACT SERVICE 
service 
Figure A. 2. UML Profile Diagram 
The profile defined in figure A. 2 introduces a single new stereotype <<service», 
which extends the UML metaclass «interface». The solid arrow signifies the extends 
relationship between model elements. «interface» is not a UML base class, but is a pre- 
defined stereotype within the UML language. A profile uses a profile diagram to introduce a 
set of stereotypes, and informally defines the semantics, tags and constraints for each 
stereotype. 
The profile diagrams and documentation in this thesis also provide an informal link to 
the component in the metaclass to which they relate, the term Represents (not a UML 
construct) is used as a note or comment to indicate this linkage. In figure A. 2, the service 
stereotype is a way of representing an element that represents an 'ABSTRACT SERVICE in the 
metamodel. 
Although a profile includes semantics for each stereotype, it is often not possible to 
explain piecemeal how the components of a profile interrelate. The semantics of a complete 
UML application are usually described first in a separate metamodel, and this is the 
approach taken in chapter 8. The relationship between a metamodel and system model, via 
a profile, is explained in section 8.1. 
A. 3. Information Flow diagrams 
Information flow diagrams illustrate information flow paths in a system. The diagram 
components are shown in figure A. 3. 
These diagrams may vary in the amount of system detail shown, but they usually 
identify the services in the system and any significant data, both of which are shown as 
simple stereotypes. 
Solid arrows between services show service invocation and may include details of the 
messages sent. Invocation may be directed either toward a service, or to a particular 
operation in a service. 
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flows between its inputs 
and outputs, unless 
otherwise specified 
A possible information 
----------------- 
x 
-------------------flow 
that is prohibited, 
e. g. by a security 
requirement 
Figure A. 3. Information Flow Diagram Conventions 
Dashed arrows indicate the flow of information, regardless of how that flow takes place; 
for example, they may indicate either a service invocation, or a response, or that a data item 
is part of the state of a service. Dashed arrows may be used between any objects in the 
diagram, for example between operations within a service, to indicate information flow. In 
some cases it is necessary to indicate traffic flows, which are information flows signalled 
via events rather than data, these are shown with a dotted arrow. 
In a service based architecture all data items would be accessed via a service and this 
encapsulation is shown by the outline service around a data item; data managing services 
are shown explicitly only when they play a significant part in the description. Services and 
data within an outline service boundary are local to each other, but any other objects may be 
remote. Organization (security domain) boundaries are shown if they are significant. 
Services usually support information flow between many data items, so by convention, a 
service is understood to support all possible information flows, unless otherwise specified. 
One way in which the information flow within a service can be qualified is by showing 
flows that are explicitly prohibited. 
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Appendix B. Core Models and Security Constraints 
This appendix presents the core formal models which are the basis on which the 
remainder of SeDAn is built. These are: 
" the system model, including security requirements that directly constrain the functional 
design; and 
" the information model, and the primitive security constraints which are used to specify 
security requirements. 
Security requirements in SeDAn are divided into two root categories (see section 10.1): 
those that are expressed directly in terms of the functional design, such as access control, 
and deferred requirements which are modelled in information terms. 
The system model is specified in section B. 1, and section B. 2 shows how this model is 
directly constrained by certain security requirements. This model is the formal counterpart 
of the system metamodel introduced in chapter 8. 
The information model provides a genetic model of service behaviour, and a common 
framework that expresses the information flow consequences of the main risk-management 
artefacts (the functional design together with its security environment) to provide the basis 
for security analysis. The information model is described informally in chapter 9, and its 
formal core is presented in section B. 3. The deferred requirements defined in chapter 10 are 
formally specified using four primitive information constraints; these primitive constraints 
are defined in section B. 4. 
This chapter does not provide a full formal account of SeDAn; however, it: 
" presents the core models in such a way that the underlying theory is exposed; and 
" specifies the primitive information constraints, which are not described informally in 
the main text. 
The final section, B. 5, briefly describes how the formal model of a complete system is 
constructed using the core models specified in this appendix. 
The formal models are presented in Z [298], and were prepared and type-checked using 
the Formaliser tool. The style of presentation is unusual in two respects. First, it does not 
use the state/operation convention common to most Z functional models, rather an 
axiomatic style both well suited to describing an information graph, and able to be 
informally compared with its Jess [293] counterpart (see chapter 14). 
Second, the models are first described, and then later constrained. The presentation of 
models that are later constrained by security requirements is determined by the nature of the 
application. Security requirements constrain an underlying behavioural model of the 
system, so in order to show the effect of security requirements on a system it is necessary to 
separate the modelling of behaviour and constraints. The system is modelled as a set of 
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information graphs; the process of setting security requirements progressively constrains 
these graphs. In other words, a constrained system is a sub-set of all the possible systems 
specified by the functional model. (Similarly, for the analysis to remain valid, a compliant 
implementation must be a sub-set of the resulting design. ) These sub-set relations are made 
explicit in the formalism of the system model and of the security requirements. (For 
example, see Ulnvoke in section B. 1. ) 
B. 1. The System Model 
The system model is described in chapter 8, and is usually divided into two parts, the 
functional design and the security environment. Since the purpose of this appendix is to 
clarify the core models, this section excludes those parts of the environmental model whose 
purpose is to manage risk analysis; the detailed use of these components is described in 
chapter 12. 
The sets and relations introduced in this section are described informally in section 
8.2.2, which relates the metamodel components used here with the system designer's UML. 
The components introduced in this section either correspond to named components in the 
metamodel, or to relations between metamodel components. Relations may be un-named in 
section 8, but can be readily identified by their type. 
Six base types are needed, three from the functional model and three from the security 
environment: 
[Asset, AbstractService, Operation) 
(Organisation, UserRole, AssetConcern] 
These sets are disjoint, and have the meanings described in table B. 1. 
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Table B. 1. Primary Types 
Type Description of elements of the set of the given type 
Asset A particular asset, such as an instance of a data type. 
AbstractService A type of service interface, and the location for service-based 
security requirements. 
Operation An operation or method that is offered by a particular type of 
service. 
Organisation An organisation, security administration, or other meaningful 
domain of system deployment. 
UserRole A group of users with a common business function, or degree of 
system privilege. 
AssetConcern A concrete stakeholder concern for one or more assets in the 
system. 
Assets are not usually represented directly in the system model, although they can be 
constrained in various ways; the UML class diagram instead describes Assetlpes, which 
are sets of assets: 
AssetType :P (P Asset) 
d t, of : AssetType .t* of -* tn of -0 
Different instances ofAssetType are disjoint. 
A subset of the AbstractServices are known as clients; these are services where users 
may directly invoke some or all of the associated operations. 
I Client :P AbstractService 
The Manages relation identifies certain AsselTypes with particular AbstractServices. It 
is used to designate assets that are part of a service's state, for example persistent data. 
I Manages : AbstractService f-+ AssetType 
Every operation is associated with a particular abstract service. In practice this is 
achieved by using fully qualified operation names: 
I HostedBy : Operation -º AbstractService 
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Data bound to an operation has a direction: it is associated with a forward (invoke) or 
return path. From the point of view of information flow these are two different channels; 
from the perspective of the metamodel, some assets are bound to each direction. The Param 
relation specifies the set of AssetTypes bound to each direction: 
Direction :. = INVOKE I RETURN 
Param : Operation -º (Direction (% AssetType) 
Slnvoke identifies the operations that may be invoked by any particular service: 
Slnvoke : AbstractService +--º Operation 
These basic definitions are supplemented by relations to elements of the environmental 
model. The first is Employs, which relates an Organisation to a UserRole. Note that this is 
not necessarily a function; organisations may have several roles, also one role may be 
shared by several organisations. 
I Employs : Organisation +--º UserRole 
AbstractServices may be deployed to one or more organisations: 
I Deploy : AbstractService t-9 Organisation 
Instances of some AssetTypes (i. e. some Assets) in the system model may be owned by a 
particular user role: 
Owner : Asset -i-i UserRole 
UserRoles may also invoke operations. 
Ulnvoke : UserRole H Operation 
Ulnvoke Q ((HostedBy > Client) I Deploy 1 Employs)- 
For a user to invoke an operation, they must be employed by organisations to which the 
clients hosting the operations may be deployed. 
As noted in the introduction, the functional model is first defined, and then constrained 
by security requirements. The subset definition used here, and in subsequent definitions, 
should be read as'the maximum functionality is'. For example, see section B. 2.2, below, for 
how access controls further constrain this function. 
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AssetConcerns have a number of properties, but the only one that is significant in 
information flow terms is the direction of flow of a threat to an asset. This is captured by the 
ConcernDirection relation. Other properties specify how the risk analysis is conducted for 
that asset, and are not therefore needed to define information flow. 
FlowDirection :: = TOWARD I FROM 
I ConcernDirection : AssetConcern -º FlowDirection 
B. 2. Security Requirements that Constrain the System Model 
Security requirements are divided into those that constrain the system model, and those 
that constrain the behaviour of services. This section defines the former, which modify 
permitted deployments, or limit what operations can be invoked. There are three, given in 
table B. 2; their informal definitions are given in chapter 10. 
Table B. 2. Security Requirements that directly constrain the system model 
Requirement Description 
NoDeploy Specifies that a particular service should not be deployed to a 
particular organisation. 
PermitAccess Specifies that a particular access invoke is permitted. Note that 
this is defined as a permission rather than denial, unlike most other 
requirements, since this is the normal way that system access 
permissions are specified. In the formal model, this requirement 
has two alternate definitions, with different types: 
PermitServiceAccess; and PermitUserAccess. 
RefuseToAccess Specifies that a particular service will not access a remote 
operation, even if the access permission in that operation may 
allow the access. 
These are the primary access constraints supported by SeDAn (see section 10.1.2); there 
are two other security requirements that constrain the system model (classification of assets 
and of services); these are not described in this section, since they also impose information- 
flow side-constraints on service behaviour. 
The following specifications introduce each of these requirements, and show how they 
constrain the model given in the previous section. 
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B. 2.1. NoDeploy 
The deployment requirement specifies that an abstract service may not be deployed to a 
particular organisation: 
NoDeploy : AbstractService i--' Organisation 
Deploy n NoDeploy =0 
The effect of the security requirement is to exclude terms in the Deploy relation. 
B. 2.2. PermitAccess 
The PermitAccess requirement restricts accesses from either users or services: 
PermitServiceAccess : AbstractService 4-4 Operation 
PermitUserAccess : UserRole +-º Operation 
Slnvoke 9 PermitServiceAccess 
Ulnvoke Q PermitUserAccess 
Ulnvoke and Slnvoke are limited to the explicit permissions given in the security 
requirement; note that Ulnvoke is already constrained by deployment. 
B. 2.3. RefuseToAccess 
RefuseToAccess specifies that a service will not access a remote operation, even if the 
service hosting the operation would permit such an access. The RefuseToAccess policy is 
associated only with accesses from services to operations; it is distinct from an access 
permission, because the responsibility for enforcement lies with the invoking service, rather 
than the service that hosts the operation. 
RefuseToAccess : AbstractService F-+ Operation 
Slnvoke n RefuseToAccess -0 
This constraint specifies that no member of RefuseToAccess is in the Slnvoke relation. 
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B. 3. The Information Flow Graph 
Information flow in the system is modelled as a directed, but not acyclic, graph. The 
vertices of the graph are carriers of information, such as persistent or transitory data items 
and the invocation of operations. Graph edges model the information-flow behaviour of 
services. The information graph is described informally in section 9.2. 
B. 3.1. Graph Vertices and their Properties 
There is a single base type in the graph, which represents a vertex: 
(V] 
A vertex has a number of properties, which are expressed as functions. The basic 
properties specify the type of the vertex and the services to which the vertex is attached. In 
SeDAn a vertex represents an atomic information carrier in the system model, which may 
be shared between two services (which may be the same service), or between a service and 
a user. 
VType :: = REAL I INTEGRITY I CONFIDENTIALITY I VOID 
VIRTUAL 
TypeOf :V -º VType 
VfromService :V -i-i AbstractService 
VtoService :V -4--I AbstractService 
The Vertex type (YType) describes properties of the vertex that are used in risk analysis. 
Essentially it specifies the visibility of the node to external attackers and distinguishes the 
type of information carried (i. e. a data or traffic flow). This is described in section 9.2.4, 
and a brief summary is given in table B. 3. 
Table B. 3. Vertex Types 
Type Information Flow to Vertex Information Flow from Vertex 
REAL data data 
INTEGRITY data traffic 
CONFIDENTIALITY traffic data 
VOID traffic traffic 
VIRTUAL data data 
The relation between vertices and services is partial because users are also represented 
as vertices; although information may flow to and from a user, the SeDAn model does not 
search for threats that flow through users (see chapter 12). 
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The other properties of a vertex are bundled into `ID'; this does not strictly identify a 
vertex, but it is known as ID because it encapsulates the information that a user or analyst 
may use to refer to a particular system component in a security requirement. An ID may 
have three properties, its name (BaseName), UserRole and Direction. The UserRole and 
Direction may not always be specified; for example, a security requirement may be 
specified that contains an ID that references several vertices. The ID matching function is 
specified in section B. 4.1. 
[BaseName, ID) 
VtoID :V -º ID 
NameOf : ID -º BaseName 
RoleOf : ID -44 UserRole 
DirOf : ID -44 Direction 
The type signified by the base name depends on the vertex; it may either be the name of 
an Operation, a UserRole or an AssetType. 
NameOfUser : BaseName -+-º UserRole 
NameOfAsset BaseName -+º AssetType 
NameOfOperation : BaseName -+-i Operation 
(dom NameOfUser, dom NameOfAsset, dom NameOfOperation) 
partition BaseName 
The BaseName is identified with exactly one of Operation, UserRole or AssetType. 
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B. 3.2. The Generic Information Flow Graph 
Information flow in the graph is simply a relation between vertices: 
Flow :V 4--º V 
However, some types of security requirement are specific to particular asset concerns 
(see traceability model in section 6.3.3); so there is potentially a set of graphs, one for each 
possible concern. In practice, many of these will be identical. 
I ConcernFlow : AssetConcern -º P Flow 
The key SeDAn modelling assumption is that information flow in a system can be 
partitioned into the information flow of its various services (see chapter 9). Essentially, the 
system is divided into services, and information between services is transmitted via specific 
carriers that can be identified in the system model (messages that invoke operations etc); the 
behaviour of a service moves information between these carriers. The carriers are modelled 
as graph vertices, and the primary restriction on edges is that they only occur between 
vertices that are within the scope of a particular service. 
Since vertices are (by definition) information flow carriers between specific services, 
their scope is set by the VtoService and VfromService relations. It is therefore 
straightforward to define the information flow that takes place within a service: 
ServiceFlow : AbstractService 4-º ConcernFlow 
V service : AbstractService " 
U (ran (ran ({service} a ServiceFlow))) 
C; { from, to :VI 
(from, service) e VfromService A (to, service) e VtoService } 
The information flow possible within a service, are all the paths from vertices defined as 
inputs to the service, by VFromService, to those defined as outputs to that service, by 
VtoService. 
The information flow model of the system is therefore a function from asset concerns to 
information flow graphs. 
InformationFlow :P ConcernFlow 
InformationFlow 9 ran ServiceFlow 
The only possible information flow in the system is that which is possible within a 
service. 
Security requirements that constrain behaviour forbid certain edges in this graph. In 
general they are specified in the form: 
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{specification} n InformationFlow -0 
The specification identifies the vertices between which information flow constraints are 
applied. 
The information model distinguishes between different instances of operations, or assets 
with different owners, by enumerating the vertices required to express these distinctions. 
This enumeration is partly hidden from the system designer, who is more likely to specify 
security requirements in terms of groups or patterns of vertices. To provide a more 
meaningful match between these two viewpoints, primitive information constraints are first 
defined, which are used to specify the user-level security requirements described in chapter 
10. These primitive constraints are described in the next section. 
BA, Primitive Information-Flow Constraints 
This section introduces the primitive security constraints that are used to specify 
security requirements. 
B. 4.1. General Definitions 
Table B. 4 summarises the relations defined in this section; these define various types of 
equality or matching that are used in the definition of security requirements. 
Table B. 4. Definitions 
Name and Type Description 
IDMatch : ID H ID Matches IDs for equality. 
Self :V f--º V Matches vertex (call, return) pairs. 
UniqueType :F (operation x Direction Specifies parameters with unique 
x AssetType) data types. 
IDMatch specified how IDs are usually compared for equality: 
IDMatch : ID i--' ID 
IDMatch 
{ a, b : ID 
NameOf a= NameOf b 
n (a e dom RoleOf Abe dom RoleOf = RoleOf a= RoleOf b) 
n (a e dom DirOf Abe dom DirOf A DirOf a= DirOf b 
vaf dom DirOf Abj dom DirOf) } 
For IDs to match, they must have the same name; if both have a role, the roles must be 
identical; either both must have a matching direction, or neither may have a direction. 
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Self identifies vertex pairs that arise from the call/return of a single instance of an operation. 
Self :V 4-º V 
Self 
{ vi, vr :Vý 
3 idi, idr : ID I idi - VtoID vi n idr - VtoID yr 
DirOf idi = INVOKE A DirOf idr = RETURN 
n VtoService vi = VfromService yr 
n VtoService vi = HostedBy (NameOfOperation (NameOf idi)) 
n NameOf idi = NameOf idr 
n (idi e dom RoleOf n idr e dom RoleOf mº 
RoleOf idi = RoleOf idr) } 
This selects in/return vertex pairs that are otherwise identical, and where the name of the 
first vertex is an operation name in the target service for that vertex. 
UniqueType identifies operation parameters that are unique - i. e. where there is only a 
single asset bound to the vertex. Parameters can be bound to each direction separately. 
UniqueType :P (Operation x Direction x AssetType) 
UniqueType 
{ op : operation; dir : Direction; asset : AssetType 
(dir, asset) E Param op 
A (d a: AssetType I (dir, a) E Param op . asset - a) } 
This specifies that a parameter is a unique type for this service, operation and direction, 
if there is no other parameter with a different AssetType. 
B. 4.2. Primitive Information Constraints 
Section B3.2 introduced the information flow graph in generic terms; a security 
requirement prohibits certain edges in the graph. This section presents four primitive 
constraints; these provide the language that is used to formally specify the security 
requirements described in chapter 10. The constraints defined in this section are 
summarised in table B. 5. 
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Table B. 5. Primitive Constraints 
Name and Type Description 
restrictFlow : Constrains information flow between 
F(AbstractService 
x AssetConcern x ID x ID) 
different IDs, the constraint is specific to an 
asset concern. 
restrictSelfFlow : Constrains information flow between 
P (AbstractService 
x AssetConcern x ID) call/return pairs of the same operation 
instance; these are not constrained by 
restrictFlow. 
roleSeparation : Maintains role separated channels between 
P (AbstractService x ID x ID). 
two objects. 
orgSeparation : Separates the elements of a service by 
IP AbstractService 
organisation, where possible. 
restrictFlow is the most basic form of constraint, it uses the IDmatch relation described 
in section B. 4.1, which requires equality of name, but matches direction and role as follows: 
" if both IDs are bound to a role, then they have to match; 
" if one of the IDs is not bound to a role, this is effectively interpreted as `all roles' and 
will match anything; and 
" either both IDs are bound to matching directions, or neither have a direction. 
Many requirements do not need to specify direction - names alone are sufficient, so this 
last feature allows restrictFlow to be used either with or without direction matching. 
restrictFlow does not constrain information flow between call and return instances of 
the same operation. A separate constraint is provided that constrains only self-operations; 
this allows higher-level security requirements to include, or exclude, self-flow as required. 
restrictFlow :F (AbstractService x AssetConcern x ID x ID) 
{ concern : AssetConcern; flow :P Flow; vl, v2 : V; 
service : AbstractService; idl, id2 : ID 
(vl, v2) e flow A (service, concern, idl, id2) e restrictFlow 
n VtoService vl = service 
n VfromService v2 = service 
n (VtoID vl, idl) e IDMatch 
n (VtoID v2, id2) e IDMatch 
n (vl, v2) f Self . concern i-4 flow } 
n InformationFlow =0 
restrictFlow matches a service context by matching all input and output nodes of that 
service; the AssetConcern is whatever set is specified by restrictFlow, and IDs are matched 
as described above. The exclusion of self-operations is provided by the Self relation, defined 
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in section B. 4. I, which matches vertices that are identical in all but direction, and where the 
name matches an operation. 
restrictSe jFlow is almost identical to restrictFlow, except that only self flow is 
matched. 
restrictSelfFlow :P (AbstractService x AssetConcern x ID) 
Vs: AbstractService; c: AssetConcern; i: ID 1 
(s, c, i) E restrictSelfFlow 
iJ dom RoleOf u dom DirOf 
{ concern : AssetConcern; flow :P Flow; vl, v2 : V; 
service : AbstractService; idl, id2 : ID 
(vi, v2) e flow A (service, concern, idl) e restrictSelfFlow 
n VtoService vl - service 
n VfromService v2 = service 
n (VtoID vl, idl) e IDMatch 
n (VtoID v2, idl) e IDMatch 
n (vl, v2) e Self . concern i-º flow } 
n InformationFlow -0 
The pre-condition on this relation specifies that only names can be bound to the ID: 
UserRole and Direction are never set for this constraint to be valid. 
roleSeparation specifies that no information should flow between instances of vertices 
with different roles, but which otherwise match a pair of IDs. For example, this would 
constrain information flowing between an operation and manages data to flow only in role- 
specific channels. The signature for role separation is a service and pair of IDs; no concern 
is specified, since this form of constraint is likely to be structural. 
roleSeparation :P (AbstractService x ID x ID) 
Vs: AbstractService; idi, id2 : ID I (s, idl, id2) e roleSeparation 
{idl, id2} n dom RoleOf =0 
{ concern : AssetConcern; flow :F Flow; vl, v2 : V; 
service : AbstractService; idl, id2 : ID 
(vl, v2) e flow A (service, idl, id2) E roleSeparation 
n VtoService vl a service 
n VfromService v2 - service 
n (VtoID vl, idl) e IDMatch 
n (VtoID v2, id2) e IDMatch 
n VtoID vi E dom RoleOf 
n VtoID v2 e dom RoleOf 
n RoleOf (VtoID vl) # RoleOf (VtoID v2) . concern H flow } 
n InformationFlow -0 
The precondition requires that the IDs in the constraint do not specify roles; the 
specification forbids information flow between different vertices that match the provided 
IDs, but have different roles. 
442 Conclusion - Assembling the SeDAn Model 
orgSeparation specifies separation between vertices in a given service on the basis of 
organisation. The primary use of this constraint is to model a service that is physically 
deployed to several different administrations, with the implication that there is no direct 
information flow between the different deployments. 
orgSeparation :P AbstractService 
{ concern : AssetConcern; flow :P Flow; vl, v2 : V; 
service : AbstractService 
(vl, v2) e flow A service e orgSeparation 
n VtoService vl - service 
n VfromService v2 = service 
n VtoID vl e dom RoleOf 
n VtoID v2 e dom RoleOf 
n dom (Employs > {RoleOf (VtoID vl), RoleOf (VtoID v2)}) 
n Organisation =0. concern ý-4 flow } 
n InformationFlow =0 
The matching of the constraint to services is straightforward, as in the previous 
examples; however, matching to Organisations is indirect via roles. Two vertices are 
assumed to be in different administrations if they do not have roles that are employed by a 
common organisation. No constraints are set to, or from, vertices that are not bound to roles. 
None of these primitive constraints are directly available as security requirements, 
although the ConstrainFlow requirement (see section 10.2.3.1) is very similar to 
restrictFlow, hence the discussion in chapter 10 and elsewhere about the primitive nature of 
the former. Strictly, the higher level types of requirement (Stateless, etc) are defined in 
terms of these primitives, not in terms of ConstrainFlow. The difference between 
ConstrainFlow and restrictFlow, is that the former may constrain information flow between 
the input and output of the same instance of an operation, assuming that if a user specifies 
this intentionally, it will have a meaningful interpretation in system terms. A ConstrainFlow 
requirement may therefore give rise to both restrictFlow and restrictSe jFlow constraints. 
B. 5. Conclusion - Assembling the SeDAn Model 
This appendix has given a formal definition of the core SeDAn models, this section will 
briefly describe how these are used. The complete information model is assembled in two 
parts: the functional behaviour and related security constraints. The behaviour is modelled 
by mapping elements of the system model to vertices; each operation, asset and user defines 
one or more vertices, and these are specified as both the domain and range of the Flow type 
(see section B. 3.2). 
Security requirements placed by users are defined in terms of the types of the primitive 
constraints defined in the previous section, then assembled: 
SecurityRequirementl u SecurityRequirement2 ... 
a PrimitiveConstraint 
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This results in a complete information graph, the behaviour of which is obtained from 
the given system model, and is constrained by the user's security requirements. 
The detailed process of constructing the model is slightly more complex, since it must 
take account of security requirements that modify the behaviour of the system as well as 
applying constraints. These include classification and message requirements; the 
behavioural implications of the latter are complex, and are discussed in section 12.4.3. From 
the perspective of modelling, these issues result in the structure given in figure B. 1. 
The figure shows the relationship between the components of the complete information 
flow model in SeDAn, and how the core components defined in this appendix are used. The 
rectangular components show parts of the model, with cross-references to the specifications 
in this appendix. The rounded boxes are security requirements specified by the user, and 
these show which of the requirements defined in chapter 10 contribute to each part of the 
model. Arrowed lines show dependencies between model components. 
Primitive Constraints Information Flow Model 
- restrictFlow 
- InformationFlow [C. 3] 
- mtrictSel(Row 
- noleSeparation 
- orgSeparation C. 4 
Information 
Model 
Message Level Constraints 
Messaging 
Layer 
lMessage 
Requirements 
- AssertConfidentiality I- ClaimAuthentication 
- RequireConfidentiality 
- RequireAuthentication 
Model Vertices 
.......... v...................................... I ....... 
Primary Model Constraints 
Primary Vertices 
Service Constraints Primary 
- EnforceSeparation 
C-DeploySeparation 
ssification Requirements 
- ConstrainFlow ataSeparation 
(Communication) 
- Stateless 
Layer 
- TypeRestrictedFlow 
System 
Access Constraints Model 
- NoDep/oy SystemModel 
- Perinmccess 
- RefuseToAccess [C. 2 
[C. 1, C. 2) 
UML Model 
Figure B. 1. The SeDAn Model Structure 
444 Conclusion - Assembling the SeDAn Model 
As outlined above, information carriers in the system model specify vertices, and hence 
the scope of the information graph. This is constrained by security requirements, some of 
which also give rise to vertices. The model is built in four layers: the system model and the 
overall information model, which are both defined in this appendix, and two mapping layers 
that populate the information model from the system model and security requirements 
provided by the user. 
The primary layer corresponds to point-to-point behaviour, and the message layer adds 
end-to-end behaviour. Two layers are necessary, because the message layer modifies certain 
point-to-point behaviour (e. g. data encryption modifies vertex types in the primary layer). 
The formal models of these mapping layers are not included here because of their size, and 
because they add little to the information flow interpretations of each security requirement, 
which are presented in chapter 10. 
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Appendix C. UML Security Requirements Syntax 
This appendix supplements the information in chapters 8 and 10 by providing the syntax 
of the SeDAn security requirements, as they are recorded in UML tags. The profile in 
section 8.3.2 lists the tags, but does not provide further information. The meaning of the 
syntax given here is explained in section 10.2. 
Conventions 
The following specification uses standard BNF notation (e. g. see [299]), with the 
following additions: 
" square brackets [... ] are used to indicate optional parameters. 
" colon ": " is used to separate tagname-value pairs 
C. 1. BNF Specification of Tag Syntax for Security Requirements 
<UML_Security_Requirement> :: = <NoDeploy> I <PermitAccess> I 
<RefuseToAccess> I <DataSeparation> I <DeploySeparation> 
<EnforceSeparation> I <ConstrainFlow> ( <Stateless> ý 
<TypeRestrictedFlow> I <AssertConfidentiality> I 
<ClaimAuthentication> I <RequireConfidentiality> 
<RequireAuthentication> 
<NoDeploy> NoDeploy : <organisation> 
<PermitAccess> PermitAccess : <invoking_client> <s> <gen_operation> 
<RefuseToAccess> RefuseToAccess : <service> <s> <operation> 
<DataSeparation> DataSeparation : <assetType> 
<DeploySeparation> DeploySeparation : TRUE 
<EnforceSeparation> EnforceSeparation : <from to_name> 
[<s> <from to_location>] 
<ConstrainFlow> ConstrainFlow : <assetConcern> <s> <from_to_name> 
[<s> <from to_role> <s> <from to_location>] 
<Stateless> Stateless : <gen_operation> 
<TypeRestrictedFlow> TypeRestrictedFlow : <assetConcern> <s> <op_or asset> 
<AssertConfidentiality>:: = AssertConfidentiality : <link spec> <s> <signature> 
<ClaimAuthentication> :: = ClaimAuthentication : <Iink spec> <s> <service> 
<RequireConfidentiality> :: = RequireConfidentiality : <gen_link_spec> <s> required 
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<RequireAuthentication> :: = RequireAuthentication : <gen link spec> <s> 
<authenticator> 
<gen_Iink spec> 
<link spec> 
<link destination> 
<from to name> 
<from to location> 
<from to role> 
<op or asset> 
<invoking_client> 
<authenticator> 
<gen_userRole> 
<gen_service> 
<gen operation> 
<direction> <s> <gen_service> <s> <link_destination> 
<direction> <s> <service> <s> <Iink destination> 
<service> <s> <operation> <s> <assetType> 
<op_or asset> <sp> <op_or asset> 
<location> <s> <location> 
<userRole> <sp> <userRole> 
<operation> I <assetType> 
<gen_userRole> I <gen_service> 
,; _ <service> 
I <userRole> 
:: _ <userRole> ALL_USERS 
<service> I ALL_CLIENTS'0 
:: _ <operation> I ALL_OPERATIONS 
<userRole> a UML class name stereotyped with <<userRole» 
<client> :: = a UML class name stereotyped with <<client>> 
<service> a UML class name stereotyped with <<service>> or with 
<<client>> 
<operation> :: = an operation, embedded in a <<client>> or <<service>> 
<organisation> :: = a UML class name stereotyped with «organisation» 
<assetConcem> a UML class name stereotyped with «assetConcem» 
<assetType> a UML class name with no SeDAn-specific stereotype 
<location> :: = local I remote 
<signature> .: = service I role_at_service 
<s> :: = a system-specific character separator, usually `, ' 
40 This is used in access controls, where the client, or invoker, of a service may be any type of «service>>. 
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Appendix D. Case Study Reference Information 
This appendix lists the SeDAn requirements needed to support protection strategies 
described in the case study (see chapter 15). The purpose of this supplementary information 
is to show in detail how SeDAn security requirements support protection strategies. 
The DAME system is described in section 15.1, but the requirements below necessarily 
reference services and assets that are not detailed in that section for reasons of space. To 
make the material more accessible, therefore, section D. 1 provides a cross reference 
between the DAME subsystems described in section 15.1 and the public services in each 
subsystem. The contents of subsequent sections are listed in table D. 1, below. 
Table D. 1. Index of Supplementary Case-Study Information 
Section Reference Risk Description 
D. 2 15.5.2 Protection Baseline 
D. 3 15.5.3.1 Medium 1 User Attacks against the provenance record, or 
supporting assets. 
D. 4 15.5.3.2 Medium 2 Organisational attacks against engine confidentiality. 
D. 5 15.5.4.2 Low 2 User attacks against the confidentiality of operational 
performance. 
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I. Service Names and Packages 
The main subsystems in DAME are described in section 15.1. Table D. 2 summarises the 
public services that are available in each subsystem; services stereotyped <<client>> are 
directly accessible by users. 
Table D. 2. Public services in DAME subsystems 
DataAnalysis 
AURA-G Indexes data, and matches data patterns 
Extractor-G Extracts data sub-streams for indexing 
FragmentExtractor-G Builds pattern match search queries 
PatternMatchController-G Manages distributed pattern matching 
SignalDataExplorer «client» Interactive tool for building search queries 
XTO-G Data feature extraction 
EngineData 
EngineDataBase-G Metadata and file location service 
EngineFileStore-G Raw data file repository 
Groundlnterface 
QUICK-GSS Interface to the ground support system 
Portal 
MyProxy User credential repository 
Portal <<client>> User interface, includes login/access control 
RoleDatabase Maps distinguished (user) names to roles 
ServiceRecords 
CBRAnalyser-G Ranks diagnoses with reference to SDM data 
DatabaseMiner-G Searches for patterns of diagnoses 
SDM-G Interface to maintenance service history data 
SimulationTools 
EngineGUl <<client>> Manages simulation & result visualisation 
EnginePerformanceVisualiser Contrasts simulated and actual performance 
«client>> 
EnginePerformanceDatabase-G Repository of simulation results 
EngineSimulation-G Simulations of expected system performance 
Workflow 
CBRWorkflowAdvisor-G Proposes suitable diagnostic workflows 
Chart-G Feature (XTO-G output) viewer 
WorkflowManager Orchestrates services for users 
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D. 2. Protection Baseline 
The protection baseline is described in section 15.5.2; it includes the security 
requirements needed to protect high risks, and the least-privilege access protection strategy. 
The latter allows only those accesses that are necessary for the system to function. 
In the following report, access permissions are shown in deny form; these are exceptions 
to navigable associations between services in the UML functional model. There are 71 
access prohibitions in the following list, leaving a total of 100 access permissions remaining 
in the system. 
Requirements at EngineDataBase-G 
Deny Access: 
(EngineFileStore-G »> EngineDataBase-G. arrivalNotification) 
(EngineSimulation-G »> EngineDataBase-G. arrivalNotification) 
(EngineSimulation-G »> EngineDataBase-G. storeNotification) 
(Extractor-G »> EngineDataBase-G. arrivalNotification) 
(Extractor-G »> EngineDataBase-G. storeNotification) 
(QUICK-GSS »> EngineDataBase-G. retrieveEDR) 
(QUICK-GSS »> EngineDataBase-G. ret(eveEngineMetaData) 
(QUICK-GSS »> EngineDataBase-G. storeNotification) 
(SignalDataExplorer »> EngineDataBase-G. ar(valNotification) 
(SignalDataExplorer »> EngineDataBase-G. storeNotification) 
(WorkflowManager »> EngineDataBase-G. arrivalNotification) 
(WorkflowManager »> EngineDataBase-G. storeNotification) 
(XTO-G »> EngineDataBase-G. arrivalNotification) 
(XTO-G »> EngineDataBase-G. storeNotification) 
Requirements at EngineFileStore-G 
Deny Access: 
(EngineSimulation-G »> EngineFileStore-G. ar(valNotification) 
(Extractor-G »> EngineFileStore-G. arrivalNotification) 
(SignalDataExplorer »> EngineFileStore-G. arrivalNotification) 
(XTO-G »> EngineFileStore-G. arrivalNotification) 
Requirements at EngineGUI 
Deny Access: 
(Analyst »> EngineGUi. selectSimulationModeAndParameters) 
(Engineer »> EngineGUl. selectSimulationModeAndParameters) 
(Expert »> EngineGUl. selectSimulationModeAndParameters) 
(NonDameUser »> EngineGUl. defaultUserOperation) 
(NonDameUser »> EngineGUl. selectSimulationModeAndParameters) 
(Portal »> EngineGUi. defaultUserOperation) 
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Requirements at EnginePerformanceDatabase-G 
Deny Access (EnginePerformanceVisualiser 
»> EnginePerformanceDatabase-G. storePerformanceData) 
Requirements at EnginePerformanceVisualiser 
Deny Access (NonDameUser »> EnginePerformanceVisualiser. selectDataToView) 
Requirements at MyProxy 
ConstrainFlow for IV User Role Authenticity (MyProxy. getUser »> MyProxy. getUser) 
TypeRestrictedFlow for IV User Role Authenticity, assetType=User 
Requirements at Portal 
Deny Access: 
(Analyst »> Portal. administerService) 
(Analyst »> Portal. administerUser) 
(Analyst »> Portal. administerWorkflow) 
(Analyst »> Portal. displayData) 
(Engineer »> Portal. administerService) 
(Engineer »> Portal. administerUser) 
(Engineer »> Portal. administerWorkflow) 
(Engineer »> Portal. displayData) 
(Expert »> Portal. administerService) 
(Expert »> Portal. administerUser) 
(Expert »> Portal. administerWorkflow) 
(Expert »> Portal. displayData) 
(NonDameUser »> Portal. OtherOperation) 
(NonDameUser »> Portal. administerService) 
(NonDameUser »> Portal. administerUser) 
(NonDameUser »> Portal. administerWorlcflow) 
(NonDameUser »> Portal. displayData) 
(NonDameUser »> Portal. mineDatabase) 
(NonDameUser »> Portal. runChart) 
(NonDameUser »> Portal. runZmodViewer) 
(WorkflowManager »> Portal. OtherOperation) 
(WorkflowManager »> Portal. administerService) 
(WorkflowManager »> Portal. administerUser) 
(WorkflowManager »> Portal. administerWorkflow) 
(WorkflowManager »> Portal. mineDatabase) 
(WorkflowManager »> Portal. runChart) 
(WorkflowManager »> Portal. runZmodViewer) 
TypeRestrictedFlow for IV User Role Authenticity: 
assetType=AccessPermittedPage 
assetType=RoleDatabase. getRole 
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Requirements at SignalDataExplorer 
Deny Access: 
(Analyst »> SignalDataExplorer. invokeFromPortal) 
(Engineer »> SignalDataExplorer. invokeFromPortal) 
(Expert »> SignalDataExplorer. invokeFromPortal) 
(NonDameUser »> SignalDataExplorer. invokeFromPortal) 
(NonDameUser »> SignalDataExplorer. selectAndSearch) 
(NonDameUser »> SignalDataExplorer. selectTimeSeries) 
(Portal »> SignalDataExplorer. selectAndSearch) 
(Portal »> SignalDataExplorer. selectTimeSeries) 
Requirements at WorkflowManager 
Deny Access: 
(Portal »> WorkflowManager. arrivalNotification) 
(QUICK-GSS »> WorkflowManager. administerService) 
(QUICK-GSS »> WorkflowManager. administerWorkflow) 
(QUICK-GSS »> WorkflowManager. rankResults) 
(QUICK-GSS »> WorkflowManager. requestWorkflowAdvice) 
(QUICK-GSS »> WorkflowManager. runChart) 
(QUICK-GSS »> WorkflowManager. runEngineModel) 
(QUICK-GSS »> WorkflowManager. runMiiner) 
(QUICK-GSS »> WorkflowManager. runWorkflow) 
(QUICK-GSS »> WorkflowManager. runXto) 
D. 3. Medium Risk 1: User Attacks against the provenance 
record, or supporting assets 
This section presents the SeDAn requirements needed to support the protection strategy 
described in section 15.5.3.1. 
" the Groundlnterface subsystem must guarantee the integrity of incoming data 
Requirements at QUICK-GSS 
Stateless operation: 
QUICK-GSS. getMetaData 
QUICK-GSS. getPerformance 
QUICK-GSS. getZmod 
ConstrainFlow for IV Decision Basis: 
(QUICK-GSS. getMetaData »> EngineDataBase-G. arrivalNotification) 
(QUICK-GSS. getPerformance »> EngineDataBase-G. arrivalNotification) 
(QUICK-GSS. getZmod »> EngineDataBase-G. arrivalNotification) 
(QUICK-GSS. getPerformance »> QUICK-GSS. getPerformance) 
(QUICK-GSS. getZmod »> QUICK-GSS. getZmod) 
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These requirements ensure that the results supplied by Groundlnterface are not 
influenced by other parts of the system. It is necessary to use primitive constraints 
(ConstrainFlow), either because the constraint deals with the use of a remote operation 
(e. g. arrivalNot jcation) or because it constrains the relationship between the call and 
return of the same operation (e. g. getZmod). This latter use of ConstrainFlow is 
described in section 15.5.1.1. 
" the EngineData subsystem must load reference data from only the Groundlnterface 
Requirements at EngineDataBase-G 
ConstrainFlow for IV Decision Basis 
(EngineDataBase-G. storeNotification »> EngineMetaData) 
TypeRestrictedFlow for IV Decision_Basis, assetType=EngineMetaData 
Requirements at EngineFileStore-G 
TypeRestrictedFlow for IV Decision Basis: 
assetType=EngineDataRecordZmod 
assetType=EngineDataRecordPerformance 
Requirements at EnginePerformanceDatabase-G 
TypeRestrictedFlow for IV Decision_Basis, assetType=EngineMetaData 
ConstrainFlow for IV Decision_Basis 
(EnginePerformanceDatabase-G. getPerformanceData »> EngineMetaData) 
The TypeRestrictedFlow requirements identify the specific local assets that need 
integrity protection. The ConstrainFlow requirements specify that EngineMetaData 
used as a primary key in a database query is not used to update the stored database of 
metadata; in other words, that a database query does not update the database index. This 
is necessary because although EngineMetaData is protected by a TypeRestrictedFlow 
requirement, this does not constrain information flow between matching types. 
" the Workflow subsystem must protect the record of collaboration and analysis actions 
from subsequent modification. 
Requirements at WorkflowManager 
TypeRestrictedFlow for N Decision_Basis: 
assetType=Annotations 
assetType=WorkflowRecord 
These are internal to the Workflow subsystem, so straightforward local protection 
obligations using TypeRestrictedFlow are sufficient to specify that the Workflow service 
must protect these assets. 
Case Study Reference Information 453 
D. 4. Medium Risk 2: Organisational attacks against engine 
confidentiality 
This section presents the SeDAn requirements needed to support the protection strategy 
described in section 15.5.3.2. 
" assert that the selection of input items from the EngineData filestore does not pose a 
threat to this goal 
Requirements at EngineSimulation-G 
ConstrainFlow for I_Engine Proprietary_H: 
(Engine Simulation Algorithms »> EngineDataBase-G. retrieveEDR) 
(Engine Simulation Algorithms »> EngineDataBase-G. ret(eveEngineMetaData) 
(Engine Simulation Algorithms »> EngineFileStore-G. getPerformance) 
(Engine_Simulation Algorithms »> EngineFileStore-G. retrieveZmodData. allroles) 
TypeRestrictedFlow for I Engine_Proprietary_H: 
assetType=EnginePerformanceDatabase-G. getSimData 
assetType=EnginePerformanceDatabase-G. getPerformanceData 
Requirements at EngineGUI 
ConstrainFlow for I Engine Proprietary_H: 
(EnginePerformanceVisualiser. selectDataToV ew 
»> EngineSimulation-G. runEngineSimulation) 
The ConstrainFlow requirements specify that there is no information flow relating to 
this concern (I Engine Proprietary_Ii) from the algorithm to the selection of data from 
the EngineData subsystem. This reflects a decision that the pattern of database access 
does not reveal significant information about the simulation algorithms (see section 
15.5.3.2). 
The EnginePerformanceDatabase is within the SimulationTools subsystem so the 
TypeRestrictedFlow requirements protect simulation results. The requirement at the 
EngineGUl constrains the information that may be obtained from simulation algorithm 
results; if this were not present, then the EngineSimulation-G service would (illogically) 
need to constrain information flow from the EngineGUl to the EngineData subsystem. 
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" constrain the deployment of services in the SimulationTools sub-system to prevent their 
deployment to fleet Operators. 
Requirements at EngineGUI 
NoDeploy to Operator 
NoDeploy to Operator 
_n 
Requirements at EnginePerformanceDatabase-G 
NoDeploy to Operator 
NoDeploy to Operator n 
Requirements at EnginePerformanceVisualiser 
NoDeploy to Operator 
NoDeploy to Operator n 
Requirements at EngineSimulation-G 
NoDeploy to Operator 
NoDeploy to Operator 
_n 
These directly implement the specified strategy. Note that some of these deployment 
constraints also imply access controls between users and operations, and some of these 
are already present in the baseline (i. e. the access is prevented by both requirements). 
This reduces the number of access denials reported by the Security Analyst Workbench, 
accounting for a reduction in the number of baseline requirements reported. 
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D. 5. Low Risk 2: User attacks against the confidentiality of 
operational performance 
This section presents the SeDAn requirements needed to support the protection strategy 
described in section 15.5.4.2. 
" results produced for display by the DataAnalysis subsystem GUI (SignalDataExplorer) 
may be provided only to the users for whom they were generated. 
Requirements at SignalDataExplorer 
TypeRestrictedFlow for II M Operational Performance, 
assetType=S ignalDataExplorerResult 
DataSeparation assetType: SignalDataExplorerResult 
EnforceSeparation (SignalDataExplorerResult »> SignalDataExplorer. selectAndSearch) 
These requirements specify the need to protect the SignalDataExplorerResult, requiring 
the implementation to maintain its confidentiality. Its legitimate use is then constrained 
by specifying that each result can be identified with a role, and results are only supplied 
to the correct user. 
" assert that case based reasoning does not propagate sufficient information about its 
input data to be exploitable for this concern. 
Requirements at CBRAnalyser-G 
TypeRestrictedFlow for II_M Operational Performance, 
assetType=SDM-G. getEventAircraft 
Requirements at WorkflowManager 
TypeRestrictedFlow for II M_Operational Performance, assetType=WorkflowRecord 
Requirements at CBRWorkflowAdvisor-G 
ConstrainFlow for II M Operational Performance: 
(CBRWorkflowAdvisor-G. requestWorkflowAdvice 
»> CBRWorkflowAdvisor-G. requestWorkflowAdvice) 
(CBRWorkflowAdvisor-G. requestWorkflowAdvice »> WorkflowModel) 
The type restriction on Work. 7owRecord effectively specifies that this must be used by 
only the case-based reasoning services. There are two case-based reasoning services 
(CBR.. ), one in the Workflow subsystem, and one in the ServiceRecord subsystem. Both 
these services produce relatively simple recommendations from complex input data and 
working models; as noted in the main text, these outputs do not convey enough 
456 Low Risk 2: User attacks against the confidentiality of operational performance 
information to represent exploitable paths for this concern, so the security requirements 
in both the CBR services record this assertion. 
" results derived from maintenance records are supplied only to authorised users. 
Requirements at SDM-G 
Claim Authenticity of SDMRecord on 
(CBRAnalyser-G »> SDM-G. getEventAircraft. retum) from role_at_service 
Requirements at DataBaseMiner-G 
Claim Authenticity of DataBaseMinerResult on 
(WorkflowManager »> DataBaseMiner-G. getResultretum) from role at service 
ConstrainFlow for II M Operational Performance 
(SDM-G. getEventAircraft. all roles »> SDM-G. getEventAircraft. all roles) 
Require Authenticity of SDMRecord on 
(DataBaseMiner-G »> SDM-G. getEventAircraft. retum) from SDM-G 
EnforceSeparation (SDM-G. getEventAircraft »> DataBaseMiner-G. getResult) 
Requirements at WorkflowManager 
TypeRestrictedFlow for II M Operational Performance, 
assetType=DataBaseMiner-G. getResult 
Requirements at Portal 
Require Authenticity of DataBaseMinerResult on 
(Portal »> WorkflowManager. runMiner. retum) from DataBaseMiner-G 
EnforceSeparation (DataBaseMiner-G. getResult »> Portal. mineDatabase) 
TypeRestrictedFlow for ll M Operational Performance, 
assetType=DataBaseMiner-G. getResult 
The chain of requirements needed to implement this protection strategy is described in the 
main text (see section 15.5.4.2). The requirements are presented above in the order of flow 
of data through the services. The SDM-G service authenticates its data to a role, which will 
be the basis of the access decision. Each service in the chain has a side-constraint that 
protects the confidentiality of the data, or in other words prevents it being delivered to the 
wrong place. (ConstrainFlow in DataBaseMiner-G, and TypeRestrictedFlow in Workflow 
and Portal). The DataBaseMiner-G service uses the SDMRecords to create 
DataBaseMinerResult, so this service must maintain the continuity of the role 
authentication: it requires an authenticated input, creates a new authentication claim on 
output, and ensures that the two correspond. The WorkflowManager is an intermediate 
service that does not need to re-authenticate the result; the Portal uses the claim asserted by 
DataBaseMiner-G to establish the data user, and enforce separation between the incoming 
data and the user of its mineDatabaseO operation. 
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Glossary 
This glossary defines terms that are important in security design analysis. Some of these 
definitions are straightforward, but terms such as asset, threat and risk have a common 
usage as well as specialised meanings in other disciplines. As far as possible the definitions 
given here, and used throughout the thesis, are consistent with the normal English usage of 
the term as well as with standard security literature. 
Terms set in italic (e. g. `Concern') are definitions specific to SeDAn; other terms are in 
common use. 
AEF/ADF: See Policy Enforcement Point. 
Asset: In information security terms, assets are "information or resources to be 
protected. "[ 16] 
The English usage of asset usually implies ownership; however, the security 
significance of an asset may not always be determined by ownership. For example a 
contract between two companies may be equally significant to both, and other stakeholders, 
such as industry regulators or certifiers, may impose security concerns on assets. 
Since asset is a general term for property, the phrase asset of concern is used where 
necessary to distinguish assets to which security concerns apply, or that are associated with 
a particular threat. 
Attack (or Threat Action): A discrete event that has the potential to realise a threat against 
an asset. 
Attacks are usually specific intentioned malicious acts, for example "A discrete 
malicious action of debilitating intent inflicted by one entity upon another" [280]. They may 
also include inappropriate but inadvertent or careless user behaviour, and some risk 
management methods expand this definition further to encompass natural disasters such as 
fire, flood, or earthquake. 
Types of attack are usually named by the action of the attacker (e. g. impersonation, 
message replay, timing attack, eavesdropping) rather than any vulnerability that the attack 
exploits. 
Attacker (or Threat Agent): The source of an attack. 
An attacker is usually a person or organisation that originates an intentioned or 
inadvertent attack. The term Threat Agent is more general; it includes events such as fire, 
lightning and flood, and is also used to describe an intermediary that facilitates an attack, 
including people or software mechanisms. For example, a legitimate system user who is 
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tricked into performing an attack by social engineering is, from the point of view of the 
system, a threat agent. 
An attacker or threat agent is therefore something or someone that "exploits a 
vulnerability in a system, operation, or facilit/' [300]. 
Claim: An arbitrary statement, authenticated by some authority, which will later be 
referenced by an access policy. 
The most common type of claim is a security token that identifies the source (machine 
or user) of an access request; claims of this sort are usually signed cryptographically to 
demonstrate that they are authentic. Claims may also include more arbitrary statements 
`sufficient budget remaining', `company buyer' (see role), `authorised parts distributor' and 
usually either reference an authority that will verify their authenticity, or be signed by such 
an authority. 
Concern: A concern is a specific unwanted outcome for an asset. 
A concern is a concrete security objective; it identifies the nature of the unwanted 
outcome (e. g. confidentiality, inconsistency, availability) and the impact of that outcome. 
Concerns are more specific than security goals, which are usually stated in more general 
business terms, but should be traceable to such goals to demonstrate how they relate to the 
business context. This usage is intended to be close to the normal English sense of the word 
("a worry, a matter of importance" [301]); the security literature does not have a consistent 
term for a specific unwanted outcome, it is often regarded as simply one aspect of a threat. 
Constraint: A specification that prohibits certain functional behaviour. See goal and 
requirement. 
Control: A protection mechanism, which implements a security requirement. 
The terms safeguard and countermeasure are also used to denote protection 
mechanisms, with similar meaning. (See discussion of Goal. ) Controls are usually technical 
mechanisms, but the word is also used to describe procedural or organisational features, for 
example, user security education. 
Data: A concrete representation of information, in any form (e. g. a database, computer file, 
card file, paper document). 
Deferred Requirement: A requirement which can only be fully interpreted in terms of a 
detailed functional design or implementation, rather than a system design. 
It is important to be able to specify security requirements that constrain the behaviour of 
services, but a system design specifies the interfaces to services, not their detailed 
functionality. SeDAn resolves this problem by supporting deferred requirements, which are 
specified in terms of a generic information-flow model of a service together with a 
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reference to the associated asset concern, which includes an informal specification of the 
required security property. 
Design: A process that results in decisions about the structure or implementation of a 
system. 
The process of decomposing system goals into operationalized requirements is one of 
design, since choices are made about how the system will implement the goals, perhaps by 
showing a high-level functional decomposition, or a detailed business process. The term 
`system design' describes this first step in problem decomposition. Security design is 
similarly concerned with deciding the type and placement of security requirements in a 
system, again there is an element of choice, which restricts future implementation options. 
Design is also used as a noun, meaning the result of a design process. 
Goal, and Requirement: A goal is a business-focussed objective that can be used to judge 
the completeness and pertinence of system requirements. 
The meanings of goal and requirement depend upon the perspective of the writer. We 
take a requirement to signify an `operationalized requirement', that is an specific statement 
about a system that can be readily implemented and tested, and a goal to be a higher level 
business-focussed objective. 
Operationalized security requirements are also known as control requirements, or 
protection requirements. Most security requirements specify constraints on the behaviour of 
system functions or services. Functional goals refine into functional requirements, but 
security goals require a mixture of functional requirements (e. g. audit analysis capability) 
and control requirements (e. g. integrity of audit records). 
Impact: The cost, in business terms, of a security incident. 
Impact may be the actual cost after a specific incident, or the expected cost of a 
particular security violation. Cost may be measured in a number of ways; some risk 
methods are able to use financial metrics, most methods use coarse linguistic scales that can 
be broadly interpreted financial terms. If there is an impact on more than one stakeholder, 
then the impacts for each stakeholder may either be regarded as separate issues, or 
combined in an application-specific way to give a single metric. 
Information Carrier: A feature which is an identifiable agent of information flow in a 
system. Examples are messages that flow between services, and data that are part of a 
service's state. 
Policy: Policy has such a wide range of meaning (e. g. access policy, management policy, 
certificate policy... ) that the best practice is not to use it without qualification [280]. Two 
types of policy are frequently encountered in risk management: management policy, and 
access policy. 
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A management policy is a high level policy for a system or business activity; it may 
state security goals for a system, or parts of a business, as well as describing how security 
will be approached and managed in the wider business context. 
An access policy, or access control policy, is a set of rules that determine what subjects 
(people or software) are allowed access to what system functions. 
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy Decision Point (PDP) 
In ISO terms [269], a PEP is known as an Access control Enforcement Facility (AEF), 
and a PDP as an Access control Decision Facility (ADF). 
The standard model for access control is derived from the ISO model, and divides 
access control functions into two parts: access policy enforcement and access policy 
decision. The enforcement function intercepts all attempts to use a function, and has the 
ability to deny access to the function. The decision to grant or deny access is made in the 
policy decision component. 
Protection Module: A subset of the security aspects of a system (e. g. a subset of threats and 
assets), which it is convenient to regard as a sub-problem for security design and analysis. 
Protection Strategy: The set of security requirements, and other measures, used to protect 
a system, or part of a system. 
A protection strategy is normally concerned with a particular set of risks to a system, 
which may either be protected by specifying security requirements within the system, or 
mitigated by external measures, such as insurance or constrained use. 
Requirement: See definition under Goal. 
Risk: A measure of the overall exposure of a system to a particular threat. 
Risk is usually quantified in two dimensions: the impact of the asset concern and the 
likelihood of a successful attack. The later may reflect a range of factors including the 
frequency of attack, the availability of vulnerabilities and the ability of the attacker to 
exploit them. 
A single measure of risk strictly applies to a particular threat, but risk measures are often 
combined; for example, several threats could be grouped to indicate the overall risk to a 
particular asset. 
Risk Level: A risk level is a single metric that expresses the overall risk of a particular 
threat. 
The risk elements of impact and frequency are often combined into a single metric in 
way that is justifiable in business terms; this allows the risks to a system to be ranked by 
sensitivity. In the same way that impacts can be expressed as continuous variables, or as a 
coarse linguistic scale, so can risk levels. 
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Risk Profile: A risk profile applies to a specific system component (e. g. service, service 
association, user) and specifies the risks to which the system would be exposed if that 
component were subverted. 
A risk profile is produced by an external attack analysis, where an external attack is an 
attack via a mechanism which is outside the scope of the current system design. This 
analysis decomposes the systematic risk environment of the system into risk profiles that 
characterise each element of the system from the risk perspective. This provides a 
mechanism for understanding how much dependence is placed on individual components, 
and relates a system to its full implementation context, including its physical, and social 
environments. 
Role: An attribute that indicates the job function that a user is performing in relation to the 
system. 
Roles have two common functions: to model the business practices of an organisation 
(e. g. `doctor', `company buyer') and to model coarse divisions of system privilege (e. g. 
`system admin', `user'). The use of role-based policies to map security requirements to 
business practices has been studied extensively (see chapter 2). 
Security Design: see Design. 
Security Environment (or Threat Environment): The security context of a system, 
including its security goals, the organisations and roles that will use the system, together 
with potential attackers and attacks. 
Stakeholder: A person or organisation with a vested interest in the behaviour of the system. 
Not all stakeholders are directly connected to the implementation, use, or operation of a 
system; for example, indirect customers, company shareholders, and industry regulators 
may all influence the design of a system and its security. 
Threat: A potential event or sequence of circumstances that may impact an asset. 
Threat has a range of definitions in English, including simply "the possibility of trouble 
or danger" [301]. In security its meaning is equally broad, a threat may be the possibility 
that a known or unknown vulnerability may be exploited, for example "the potential that an 
existing vulnerability can be exploited to compromise the security of systems or networks" 
[280] or a potential attack: "an action or event that might prejudice security" [51 ]. The 
later is often used in the context of attack motives or types (e. g. computer fraud) rather than 
mechanisms. 
In this thesis, threat is used as a general term to signify a complete potential attack, 
which may include a specific attach the threat path through the system the target asset and 
the asset concern which specifies the (unwanted) outcome. 
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Threat Path: A path through the system that an attacker may use to realise a threat against 
an asset. 
Threat Paths may involve the use of services or system functions (intended and 
unintended), and intermediate assets (also called indirect assets). Indirect paths are common 
in real attacks, for example an attacker may obtain root access to a system, install a root-kit 
to allow repeated access, and then use this new system function to attack an asset. 
Vulnerability: A feature of a system that allows an attack to realize a threat. 
Vulnerabilities may be in the form of legitimate system functions that can be exploited 
by an attacker, or undesired functional behaviour that may not be known to the system 
designer. Although the term can be a meaningful name for any exploitable system state, it is 
usually used to describe an exploitable implementation defect, for example software that is 
inadvertently vulnerable to a buffer-overflow attack. 
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